S. Mohan (Dr.) vs Puducherry Technological University

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 54-55 OF 2025 (Arising out of SLP (C.) No. 4593-4594 of 2024)

DR. S. MOHAN ….APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE SECRETARY TO THE CHANCELLOR, PUDUCHERRY TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY, PUDUCHERRY & ORS ETC. ….RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

Mehta, J.

1. Heard.

2. The appellant, Dr. S. Mohan1, has approached

this Court by way of the instant appeals with special

leave, under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by RASHI GUPTA Date: 2026.01.30 17:01:52 IST Reason: 1 Hereinafter, referred to as “appellant”.

1 19502, for assailing the common judgment and order

dated 19th December, 2023, passed by the High Court

of Judicature at Madras3 in Writ Petition Nos. 28147

of 2022 and 4174 of 2023, whereby the High Court

allowed the two separate writ petitions filed by the

Petitioners therein, i.e., respondent No. 2 in Civil

Appeal No. 54 of 2025 and respondent No. 1 in Civil

Appeal No. 55 of 2025, and set aside the appointment

of the appellant as the Vice-Chancellor of the

Puducherry Technological University4. However, the

High Court, in order to avoid a vacuum, permitted the

appellant to continue in office until a duly selected

incumbent assumes charge in accordance with law

or until 30th June, 2024, whichever was earlier. The

said common judgment and order dated 19th

2 Hereinafter, referred to as “Constitution”. 3 Hereinafter, referred to as “High Court”. 4 Hereinafter, referred to as “the University”.

2 December, 2023, is the subject matter of challenge in

these appeals by special leave.

3. While entertaining the special leave petitions,

this Court vide order dated 26th February, 2024

issued notice and stayed the operation of the

impugned judgment and order dated 19th December,

2023 and as a consequence, the appellant continues

to hold the post of the Vice-Chancellor. His tenure of

five years ends in December, 2026.

BRIEF FACTS

4. Succinctly stated, the facts relevant and

essential for disposal of these appeals are noted

hereinbelow.

5. The Legislative Assembly of the Union Territory

of Puducherry, in exercise of its legislative powers

under Article 246 read with Seventh Schedule of the

Constitution, enacted the Puducherry Technological

3 University Act, 20195, which received the assent of

the Hon’ble President on 31st March, 2020, thereby

establishing the Puducherry Technological University

under Section 3 of the PTU Act.

6. According to Section 14 of the PTU Act, the Vice-

Chancellor shall be a whole-time officer of the

University and shall be a person of academic

eminence, competence, integrity, moral standing,

and institutional commitment, to be appointed in

accordance with the qualifications and norms

prescribed in the Statutes. The appointment shall be

made from a panel of three names recommended by

the Search-cum-Selection Committee constituted

under Section 14(5), and such panel shall not include

the name of any member of the said Committee. The

identification of candidates for inclusion in the panel

shall be carried out by the Search-cum-Selection

5 Hereinafter, referred to as “PTU Act”.

4 Committee through a public notification, or by

nomination, or through a talent-search process, or by

a combination thereof. The members of the Search-

cum-Selection Committee shall be persons of

eminence in the fields of Engineering, Technology,

Management, and Advanced Sciences, and shall not,

in any manner, be connected with the University.

7. Section 14(5) of the PTU Act lays down the

composition of the Search-cum-Selection Committee

referred to above, and the same is reproduced

hereinbelow for ready reference:

“(5) For the purpose of sub-section (2), the Search Committee shall consist of following members to recommend the names for the appointment as Vice-Chancellor, namely:-

(a) A nominee of the Chancellor, who shall be a person of eminence in the field of Engineering/Technology, not below the rank of Vice-Chancellor/Professor …Convener

(b) A nominee of the Government …Member

(c) A nominee of Board of the Governors …Member For the appointment of First Vice-

Chancellor, Secretary to Government (Higher and Technical Education),

5 Government of Puducherry shall be the member in place of the nominee of Board of the Governors.”

8. In accordance with the above statutory

mandate, a Search-cum-Selection Committee was

duly constituted under Section 14(5) of the PTU Act

by the Hon’ble Lieutenant Governor of Puducherry for

the purpose of selection of the Vice-Chancellor of the

University, vide G.O.M. No. 3 dated 20th January,

2021. The Committee comprised of Prof. V. Ramgopal

Rao, Director, Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi,

as the Convenor, while Dr. V. Jagadeesh Kumar,

Professor, Department of Electrical Engineering,

Indian Institute of Technology, Madras, and the

Secretary to Government (Higher & Technical

Education), Government of Puducherry, were

nominated as Members.

9. Pursuant to its constitution, the aforesaid

Search-cum-Selection Committee issued a public

6 advertisement on 22nd February, 2021, inviting

applications and nominations from distinguished

academicians in the field of Engineering and

Technology possessing the highest level of

competence, integrity, moral stature and

institutional commitment for appointment to the post

of Vice-Chancellor of the University.

10. In response to the said advertisement, several

applications and nominations were received from

eminent academicians. After conducting a

comprehensive and objective assessment, the

Search-cum-Selection Committee finalized a panel of

eligible candidates and submitted its

recommendations to the Hon’ble Lieutenant

Governor for consideration.

11. Acting upon the recommendations of the duly

constituted Search-cum-Selection Committee, the

Hon’ble Lieutenant Governor of the Puducherry

7 appointed the appellant, Dr. S. Mohan, as the first

Vice-Chancellor of the University vide order dated

17th December, 2021. The appointment was made for

a tenure of five years from the date on which Dr.

Mohan entered upon office, or until he attained the

age of 70 years, whichever is earlier, in strict

conformity with the mandate of the PTU Act and the

statutory framework governing such appointments.

12. Aggrieved with the appointment of the appellant

as the Vice-Chancellor of the University, respondent

No. 2–Palaniappa instituted Writ Petition No. 28147

of 2022 before the High Court seeking to challenge

the appellant’s appointment as the Vice-Chancellor.

In parallel, respondent No. 1–Mourouga Pragash filed

Writ Petition No. 4174 of 2023, laying a broader

challenge to the statutory framework itself, assailing

Section 14(5) and its proviso as unconstitutional,

void, and non-est. Both the writ petitions, though

8 distinct in form, effectively sought to challenge the

duly concluded selection process and the

appointment made pursuant thereto of the appellant

as the Vice-Chancellor of the University.

13. It was contended before the High Court that the

constitution of the Search-cum-Selection Committee

for the appointment of the 1st Vice-Chancellor of the

University was not in conformity with Regulation 7.3

of the UGC Regulations on Minimum Qualifications

for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic

Staff in Universities and Colleges and Measures for

the Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education,

20186, as it did not include a nominee of the

Chairman, UGC. It was further urged that the

inclusion of the Secretary (Higher & Technical

Education), Government of Puducherry, in the

Search-cum-Selection Committee contravened the

6 Hereinafter, referred to as “UGC Regulations, 2018”.

9 same Regulation, since he was connected with the

University in the capacity of Pro-Chancellor and had

earlier served as a member of the Governing Body of

the erstwhile Puducherry Engineering College,

thereby giving rise to a conflict of interest. The said

Regulation 7.3 is reproduced herein below for ready

reference:-

“7.3. VICE CHANCELLOR:

i. A person possessing the highest level of competence, integrity, morals and institutional commitment is to be appointed as Vice-Chancellor. The person to be appointed as a Vice-Chancellor should be a distinguished academician, with a minimum of ten years' of experience as Professor in a University or ten years' of experience in a reputed research and I or academic administrative organisation with proof of having demonstrated academic leadership.

ii. The selection for the post of Vice-Chancellor should be through proper identification by a Panel of 3-5 persons by a Search-cum- Selection-Committee, through a public notification or nomination or a talent search process or a combination thereof. The members of such Search-cum- Selection Committee shall be persons' of eminence in the sphere of higher education and shall not be connected in any manner with the University concerned or its colleges. While preparing the panel, the

10 Search cum-Selection Committee shall give proper weightage to the academic excellence, exposure to the higher education system in the country and abroad, and adequate experience in academic and administrative governance, to be given in writing along with the panel to be submitted to the Visitor/Chancellor. One member of the Search cum- Selection Committee shall be nominated by the Chairman, University Grants Commission, for selection of Vice Chancellors of State, Private and Deemed to be Universities. iii. The Visitor/Chancellor shall appoint the Vice Chancellor out of the Panel of names recommended by the Search-cum-Selection Committee.

iv. The term of office of the Vice-Chancellor shall form part of the service period of the incumbent making him/her eligible for all service related benefits.”

14. The High Court, while considering the

contentions regarding the constitution of the Search-

cum-Selection Committee, traversed into the broader

issue of the vires of Section 14(5) of the PTU Act. It

examined the question of Presidential assent under

Article 254(2) of the Constitution and observed that

as provided under Article 254(2), where a State

legislation is inconsistent with a Central legislation in

a matter enumerated in the Concurrent List, it can

11 only prevail if it has been reserved for consideration

of the Hon’ble President and has received such

assent. Reliance was placed upon the decision of the

Constitution Bench of this Court in Kaiser-I-Hind

Pvt. Ltd. & Another v. National Textile

Corporation (Maharashtra North) Ltd. & Others7,

which held that such assent requires conscious

consideration of the repugnancy and express

approval by the Hon’ble President. Viewed from this

perspective, the High Court found that the

Government of Puducherry had not produced any

material to demonstrate that the Hon’ble President’s

assent had been obtained for Section 14(5) of the PTU

Act, particularly with context to its inconsistency

with Regulation 7.3 of the UGC Regulations, 2018,

which mandates inclusion of a nominee of the

Chairman, University Grants Commission in the

7 (2002) 8 SCC 182.

12 Search-cum-Selection Committee for appointment of

the Vice-Chancellor.

15. Relying on the pronouncements in Dr. Preeti

Srivastava v. State of M.P.8, Praneeth K. v. UGC9,

and Gambhirdhan K. Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat10,

the High Court concluded that any action or decision

by a University inconsistent with the binding

provisions of the UGC Regulations is legally

untenable and invalid to the extent of such

inconsistency.

16. After applying the ratio of above judicial

pronouncements, the High Court struck down

Section 14(5) of the PTU Act as being ultra vires the

UGC Regulations, 2018 and consequently invalidated

the appointment of the appellant as Vice-Chancellor

of the University. Nonetheless, to ensure continuity

8 (1999) 7 SCC 120.

9 (2021) 14 SCC 241.

10 (2022) 5 SCC 179.

13 of administration and prevent a leadership vacuum,

the High Court allowed the appellant to remain in

office until a duly appointed successor assumed

charge in accordance with law, or until 30th June,

2024, whichever occurs earlier.

17. The said judgment and order dated 19th

December, 2023 passed by the High Court is the

subject matter of challenge in these appeals by

special leave.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS

18. Shri Nidhesh Gupta, learned senior counsel

appearing for the appellant, vehemently and fervently

contended that the impugned judgment is contrary to

the settled principles of statutory interpretation and

inconsistent with the factual situation obtaining from

record.

19. To buttress the above contentions, learned

senior counsel for the appellant, submitted that

14 reliance placed by the High Court upon Kaiser-i-

Hind (supra) is fundamentally flawed. It was argued

that where the Hon’ble President accords general

assent, such assent operates for all purposes, and

validates the State legislation in its entirety. It is only

where the Hon’ble President grants specific or limited

assent, expressly confined to a particular provision or

subject matter, that the operation of the assent

becomes correspondingly restricted.

20. It was submitted that in the present case, it is

nobody’s case that the assent obtained for the State

legislation was a limited or qualified assent. The

assent of the Hon’ble President to the PTU Act is a

general assent, and therefore attracts the principles

laid down by the Constitution Bench in Rajiv Sarin

& Another v. State of Uttarakhand & Others11,

which squarely governs the issue.

11 (2011) 8 SCC 708.

15

21. It was further submitted that the respondents’

argument, that any deviation from the UGC

Regulations, 2018 would make the statute ultra vires

ipso facto is misplaced, inasmuch as the UGC

Regulations, 2018, even if traceable to Entry 66 of

List I, cannot extend beyond the prescription of

standards in higher education. Learned senior

counsel submitted that the Constitution Bench

decisions in R. Chitralekha v. State of Mysore12,

Modern Dental College v. State of M.P.13 and T.N.

Medical Officers’ Association v. Union of India14,

have consistently held that Entry 66 of List I is

confined to prescribing standards in higher

education and does not extend to administrative or

governance matters of universities, which fall under

Entry 25 of List III in the Seventh Schedule to the

12 (1964) 6 SCR 368.

13 (2016) 7 SCC 353.

14 (2021) 6 SCC 568.

16 Constitution. The said rulings clearly establish that

the composition of a Search-cum-Selection

Committee to select a Vice-Chancellor is not a

standard under Entry 66 of List I.

22. It was further submitted that the reliance

placed by the High Court upon Gambhirdhan

(supra), is unfounded as the said judgment deals with

entirely different set of facts. The Vice-Chancellor

appointed in the said case did not satisfy the

mandatory eligibility criteria under the UGC

Regulations, 2010, and the Search-cum-Selection

Committee itself had diluted the University Grants

Commission15 mandated qualifications. Further, the

University in that case was receiving substantial

Central financial assistance; had adopted the UGC

Scheme; and the Search-cum-Selection Committee

was not constituted as per the relevant UGC

15 Hereinafter, referred to as “UGC”.

17 Regulations. Most significantly, Gambhirdhan

(supra) was decided not on the basis of Entry 66 of

List I, but squarely on principles of repugnancy

under Article 254 of the Constitution, in a situation

where no Presidential assent existed at all. In

contrast, the present case involves an enactment

protected by Presidential assent under Article 254(2)

of the Constitution, coupled with the admitted

position that the University has neither adopted the

UGC Regulations, 2018 nor receives UGC grants.

23. It was submitted that in the present case, there

is no dispute regarding the appellant’s qualifications

and credentials. There is no allegation regarding

integrity of the appellant or regarding the

performance of duties as a Vice-Chancellor pursuant

to the selection in the year 2021. It was thus

submitted that even if this Court were to affirm the

judgment of the High Court, this is a fit case wherein

18 the appellant should be allowed to complete his

tenure as the Vice-Chancellor which is coming to an

end in December, 2026.

24. On these grounds, learned counsel for the

appellant, implored the Court to set aside the

impugned judgment and allow the appeals.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS

25. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents

opposed the submissions of the appellant and argued

that the legislative field in respect of coordination and

determination of standards in higher education is

exclusively occupied by the Parliament under Entry

66 of List I. Since Parliament has exercised this power

through the enactment of the University Grants

Commission Act, 195616, the Legislature of the Union

Territory stood denuded of competence to legislate on

any matter covered by Entry 66 of List I. It was

16 Hereinafter, referred to as “UGC Act”.

19 submitted that, in such a situation, the PTU Act is

ultra vires, not only on the ground of repugnancy

under Article 254, but also because the Legislature of

Union Territory lacked the legislative competence to

enact it in the first place.

26. It was further submitted that Entry 66 of List I

cannot be construed in the narrow and restrictive

manner as argued by the appellant. Reliance was

placed on Gujarat University, Ahmedabad v.

Krishna Ranganath Mudholkar17, wherein a six-

Judge Bench of this Court held beyond the pale of

doubt that the power under Entry 66 of List I extends

not merely to evaluating standards but also to

preventing and removing disparities in such

standards. The Court emphasised that the power of

coordination necessarily includes the power to take

all steps required to ensure uniformity and prevent

17 1962 SCC OnLine SC 146.

20 any impediment to national educational standards.

The Constitution Bench described this power as

absolute and unconditional, warranting full effect

according to its plain terms.

27. It was further submitted that this Court in

University of Delhi v. Raj Singh18, has provided

that norms for the appointment of Lecturers in a

University fall within the ambit of Entry 66 of List I of

the Constitution. The said rationale applies a fortiori

to the appointment of a Vice-Chancellor, as the

standards and norms prescribed by the UGC for such

appointment directly determine the standards of

education in a university, an institution of higher

education or research.

28. Lastly, it was argued that even assuming,

arguendo, that the power to frame regulations

regarding the appointment of a Vice-Chancellor is

18 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 516.

21 traceable to Entry 25 of List III, the PTU Act remains

invalid. The Presidential assent to the PTU Act was

granted without reference to the purpose for which it

was sought, unlike the general assent under Article

254 considered in Gram Panchayat, Jamalpur v.

Malwinder Singh19, as relied upon in Rajiv Sarin

(supra), which is effective for all purposes. In the

present case, the assent was not under Article 254 at

all, and therefore, the reasoning in Rajiv Sarin

(supra) does not assist the appellant.

29. Learned counsel appearing for the UGC

submitted that the UGC Regulations are mandatory

in nature and have statutory force. It was contended

that the said Regulations cannot be diluted,

disregarded or overlooked at any stage of the process

of appointment, and that all Universities, whether

19 (1985) 3 SCC 661.

22 Central or State, are bound to act in strict conformity

with the same.

30. In light of the submissions made hereinabove,

learned counsel for the respondents supported the

impugned judgment and urged that the appeals be

dismissed as devoid of merit.

ANALYSIS

31. We have heard and considered the submissions

advanced by learned counsel for the parties and have

gone through the impugned judgment and the

statutory provisions and the other material placed on

record.

32. The case of the writ petitioners before the High

Court was that, although the procedure prescribed

under the PTU Act for constituting the Search-cum-

Selection Committee for appointment of the Vice-

Chancellor of the University may have been followed

but the same was not in accordance with the UGC

23 Regulations, 2018. The relevant extracts from the

discussion made by the High Court for declaring

Section 14(5) of the PTU Act ultra vires on the ground

of being inconsistent with Regulation 7.3 of the UGC

Regulations, 2018 and thereby quashing and setting

aside the appointment of the appellant are as below:-

“10. Though elaborate submissions have been made by both sides on repugnancy in terms of Article 254 of the Constitution arising out of inconsistency of Section 14(5) of the PT Act with Regulation 7.3 of the UGC Regulations, 2018, in view of the legal position having been settled by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Dr.Preeti Srivastava -vs- State of M.P. [(1999) 7 SCC 120], it would not be necessary to delve into it, except to notice the relevant passage from that ruling, which reads as follows:-

“35. The legislative competence of Parliament and the legislatures of the States to make laws under Article 246 is regulated by the VIIth Schedule to the Constitution. In the VIIth Schedule as originally in force, Entry 11 of List II gave to the State an exclusive power to legislate on “education including universities, subject to the provisions of Entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I and Entry 25 of List III”.

Entry 11 of List II was deleted and Entry 25 of List III was amended with effect from 3-1-1976 as a result of the Constitution 42nd Amendment

24 Act of 1976. The present Entry 25 in the Concurrent List is as follows:

“25. Education, including technical education, medical education and universities, subject to the provisions of Entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I; vocational and technical training of labour.” Entry 25 is subject, inter alia, to Entry 66 of List I. Entry 66 of List I is as follows:

“66. Coordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions.”

Both the Union as well as the States have the power to legislate on education including medical education, subject, inter alia, to Entry 66 of List I which deals with laying down standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions as also coordination of such standards. A State has, therefore, the right to control education including medical education so long as the field is not occupied by any Union legislation. Secondly, the State cannot, while controlling education in the State, impinge on standards in institutions for higher education. Because this is exclusively within the purview of the Union Government. Therefore, while prescribing the criteria for admission to the institutions for higher education including higher medical education, the State cannot adversely affect the standards laid down by the Union of India under Entry 66 of List I. Secondly, while considering the cases on the subject it is also necessary to remember that from 1977, education, including, inter alia, medical and university education, is now in the Concurrent

25 List so that the Union can legislate on admission criteria also. If it does so, the State will not be able to legislate in this field, except as provided in Article 254.

It would be beneficial here to extract Article 254 of the Constitution, which reads as follows:-

“254. Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and laws made by the Legislatures of States.— (1) If any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2), the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State, or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void.

(2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State:

26 Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State.

The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Kaiser-I-Hind (P) Ltd. -vs- National Textile Corporation [(2002) 8 SCC 182] has authoritatively explicated the law in that regard as follows:-

“65. ....

2. (a) Article 254(2) contemplates “reservation for consideration of the President” and also “assent”.

Reservation for consideration is not an empty formality. Pointed attention of the President is required to be drawn to the repugnancy between the earlier law made by Parliament and the contemplated State legislation and the reasons for having such law despite the enactment by Parliament.

(b) The word “assent” used in clause (2) of Article 254 would in context mean express agreement of mind to what is proposed by the State.

(c) In case where it is not indicated that “assent” is qua a particular law made by Parliament, then it is open to the Court to call for the proposals made by the State for the consideration of the President before obtaining assent.”

Viewed from this perspective, the Government of Puducherry has not placed any material before the Court to show that the assent of the President has been obtained for the PTU Act with specific reference to the inconsistency of Section 14(5) of the PTU Act with Regulation 7.3 of the

27 UGC Regulations, 2018 that requires a nominee of the Chairman of the UGC to constitute the 'Search Committee' for the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor of PT University.

[Emphasis supplied]

33. A plain reading of the aforesaid extract shows

that the High Court held that both the Union as well

as the States possess the power to legislate on subject

of education, however, the State’s competence to

regulate on matters relating to education, including

medical and university education, is restricted to the

fields not occupied by the Union legislation.

Furthermore, the State cannot, while exercising

control over education within its jurisdiction, impinge

upon the standards prescribed for institutions of

higher education, which remain exclusively within

the competence of the Union.

34. The High Court further held that, while

prescribing the criterion for admission to the

institutions of higher education, the State cannot

28 adversely affect the standards laid down by the

Union, in exercise of its legislative power under Entry

66 in List I. Furthermore, since the year 1977,

medical and university education have been included

in the Concurrent List and hence, the Union can

legislate on admission criterion also. In such a

scenario, the State is precluded from enacting

legislation in this field except in accordance with

Article 254, which governs repugnancy between

Union and State laws.

35. Moreover, while referring to Article 254, the

High Court observed that the Government of

Puducherry did not place any material before the

Court to show that assent of the Hon’ble President

had been obtained for the PTU Act with specific

reference to the inconsistency between Section 14(5)

of the PTU Act and Regulation 7.3 of the UGC

Regulations, 2018, which unequivocally requires that

29 one of the members of the Search-cum-Selection

Committee for appointment of Vice-Chancellor must

be a nominee of the Chairman, UGC.

36. Before proceeding to examine the merits of the

controversy raised in the present appeals, it is

necessary and appropriate to advert to the

constitutional scheme governing the distribution of

legislative powers under Article 246 of the

Constitution, since the determination of the source,

extent, and limits of legislative competence

constitutes the essential backdrop against which the

validity of the appointment of the appellant as the

Vice-Chancellor must be assessed.

37. The scheme of legislative distribution under the

Constitution is delineated in Article 246 read with the

Seventh Schedule. Parliament is vested with the

power to legislate on matters enumerated in List I of

the Seventh Schedule, whereas the State Legislatures

30 are competent to enact laws on subjects falling within

List II. In respect of matters placed in List III,

legislative competence is shared by both Parliament

and the State Legislatures, subject to the

constitutional mechanism governing overlap and

inconsistency. The controversy involved in the

present appeals, according to the appellant, relates

to a subject traceable to Entry 25 of List III, which

therefore assumes relevance for its proper

determination and is reproduced hereinbelow for

ready reference:-

“25. Education, including technical education, medical education and universities, subject to the provisions of entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I; vocational and technical training of labour” [Emphasis Supplied]

38. A plain reading of Entry 25 of List III indicates

that while the State Legislature is competent to enact

laws on the subject of education, such legislative

power is expressly circumscribed by Entries 63 to 66

31 of List I, and in particular, Entry 66 thereof, which

confers exclusive authority upon the Parliament to

legislate with respect to the coordination and

determination of standards in institutions for higher

education. The said Entry reads as below: -

“66. Co-ordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions.”

39. As noted above20, this Court in Dr. Preeti

Srivastava (Supra) held that both the Union and the

States have legislative competence over education,

including medical education, subject to Entry 66 of

List I, which exclusively vests Parliament with the

power to determine standards in higher education.

While the State may regulate education so long as the

field is unoccupied, it cannot, in doing so, impinge

20 Supra paragraph No. 28.

32 upon or dilute the standards prescribed by the Union

under Entry 66 of List I.

40. The UGC Regulations, 2018 trace their source

to Entry 66 of List I, inasmuch as the said

Regulations have been framed by the UGC in exercise

of the powers conferred under Section 26(1)(e) and

26(1)(g) read with Section 14 of the UGC Act, which

itself has been enacted by the Parliament in exercise

of its exclusive legislative competence under Entry 66

of List I of the Constitution.

41. On that anvil, the PTU Act was required to

operate in strict conformity with Regulation 7.3 of the

UGC Regulations, 2018, which lays down a

mandatory framework for appointment of a Vice-

Chancellor and, inter alia, stipulates that the Search-

cum-Selection Committee must necessarily include

one nominee of the Chairman, UGC. The inclusion of

a UGC nominee being an integral component of the

33 standards prescribed for appointments in higher

education, any deviation therefrom strikes at the root

of the scheme envisaged under the Regulations. In

the present case, it is undisputed that the Search-

cum-Selection Committee was constituted without

the inclusion of the nominee of the Chairman, UGC,

in clear disregard of Regulation 7.3 of the UGC

Regulations, 2018. Consequently, Section 14(5) of

the PTU Act, to the extent it prescribes a composition

of the Search-cum-Selection Committee contrary to

the mandate of the UGC Regulations, 2018, has to be

declared ultra vires the UGC Regulations, 2018,

which have been framed under a Central enactment

traceable to Entry 66 of List I, which occupies the

field and therefore, possess overriding effect.

42. Moreover, Regulation 7.3(ii) of the UGC

Regulations, 2018 mandates that members of the

Search-cum-Selection Committee shall not be

34 connected in any manner with the concerned

University or its affiliated colleges. However, proviso

to Section 14(5) of the PTU Act includes the Secretary

to the Government (Higher & Technical Education) as

a member of the Search-cum-Selection Committee for

appointment of the 1st Vice-Chancellor. The Secretary

to the Government (Higher & Technical Education) in

the capacity of Pro-Chancellor and as a former

member of the Governing Body of the erstwhile

Puducherry Engineering College, stands directly

connected with the University, thereby giving rise to

a clear conflict of interest and placing the said

provision in direct contravention of the UGC

Regulations, 2018.

43. The aforesaid deviations from the mandatory

requirements of the UGC Regulations, 2018 not only

vitiate the constitution of the Search-cum-Selection

Committee but also strike at the statutory framework

35 governing appointments to the office of Vice-

Chancellor, thereby rendering such appointments

legally vulnerable.

44. As also noted by the High Court, this Court in

Gambhirdan (supra), while setting aside the

appointment of the Vice-Chancellor of Sardar Patel

University, held that the UGC Regulations, being

subordinate legislation framed under the UGC Act

and laid before Parliament as statutorily mandated,

form an integral part of the Central enactment and

that any appointment made in derogation thereof

amounts to a violation of statutory provisions and is

consequently unsustainable in law, warranting

judicial interference. This Court held as follows in

Gambhirdan (Supra):-

“49. Therefore, when the appointment of Respondent 4 is found to be contrary to the UGC Regulations, 2018 and the UGC Regulations are having the statutory force, we are of the opinion that this is a fit case to issue a writ of quo warranto and to quash and set aside the

36 appointment of Respondent 4 as the Vice-

Chancellor of the SP University.

50. It cannot be disputed that the UGC Regulations are enacted by the UGC in exercise of powers under Sections 26(1)(e) and 26(1)(g) of the UGC Act, 1956. Even as per the UGC Act every rule and regulation made under the said Act, shall be laid before each House of Parliament. Therefore, being a subordinate legislation, UGC Regulations becomes part of the Act. In case of any conflict between the State legislation and the Central legislation, Central legislation shall prevail by applying the rule/principle of repugnancy as enunciated in Article 254 of the Constitution as the subject “education” is in the Concurrent List (List III) of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.

Therefore, any appointment as a Vice-Chancellor contrary to the provisions of the UGC Regulations can be said to be in violation of the statutory provisions, warranting a writ of quo warranto.”

45. The legislative provisions under consideration

trace their source to different entries in the Seventh

Schedule, with the UGC Act and the UGC

Regulations, 2018 framed thereunder being referable

to Entry 66 of List I, while the PTU Act is traceable to

Entry 25 of List III. The two enactments, therefore, do

not operate within the same legislative field, but are

37 founded on distinct heads of legislative competence

allocated under the Constitution of India.

46. In that view of the matter, the factual matrix

does not give rise to any occasion to examine the

issue of repugnancy under Article 254 of the

Constitution of India, since the doctrine of

repugnancy and the concomitant requirement of

Presidential assent are attracted only where both the

Central and State legislations operate within the

Concurrent List. Undeniably, in the present case, the

Central legislation occupies a field exclusively

reserved for the Parliament under List I, and

consequently the question of testing or determining

repugnancy, or of curing the same by recourse to

Article 254(2), does not arise at all.

47. This Court in Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd.

v. State of Bihar21, categorically ruled that the

21 (1983) 4 SCC 45.

38 doctrine of repugnancy and provision of Article 254

of the Constitution are attracted only when both

legislations operate within the Concurrent List. The

Court observed as follows:

“69. We fail to comprehend the basis for the submission put forward on behalf of the appellants that there is repugnancy between sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Act which is relatable to Entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule and para 21 of the Control Order issued by the Central Government under sub- section (1) of Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act relatable to Entry 33 of List III and therefore sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Act which is a law made by the State legislature is void under Article 254(1). The question of repugnancy under Article 254(1) between a law made by Parliament and a law made by the State legislature arises only in case both the legislations occupy the same field with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, and there is direct conflict between the two laws. It is only when both these requirements are fulfilled that the State law will, to the extent of repugnancy, become void. Article 254(1) has no application to cases of repugnancy due to overlapping found between List II on the one hand and Lists I and III on the other. If such overlapping exists in any particular case, the State law will be ultra vires because of the non obstante clause in Article 246(1) read with the opening words “subject to” in Article 246(3). In such a case, the State law will fail not because of repugnance to the Union law but due to want of legislative competence. It is no doubt true

39 that the expression “a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact” in Article 254(1) is susceptible of a construction that repugnance between a State law and a law made by Parliament may take place outside the concurrent sphere because Parliament is competent to enact law with respect to subjects included in List III as well as “List I”. But if Article 254(1) is read as a whole, it will be seen that it is expressly made subject to clause (2) which makes reference to repugnancy in the field of Concurrent List — in other words, if clause (2) is to be the guide in the determination of scope of clause (1), the repugnancy between Union and State law must be taken to refer only to the Concurrent field. Article 254(1) speaks of a State law being repugnant to (a) a law made by Parliament or (b) an existing law. There was a controversy at one time as to whether the succeeding words “with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List” govern both (a) and (b) or (b) alone. It is now settled that the words “with respect to” qualify both the clauses in Article 254(1) viz, a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact as well as any provision of an existing law. The underlying principle is that the question of repugnancy arises only when both the legislatures are competent to legislate in the same field i.e. with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List. Hence, Article 254(1) cannot apply unless both the Union and the State laws relate to a subject specified in the Concurrent List, and they occupy the same field.” (Empasis Supplied)

48. Thus, in view of the constitutional scheme and

the analysis undertaken hereinabove, no occasion

40 arises for this Court to embark upon an examination

of any perceived or alleged conflict of views in the

decisions in Kaiser-i-Hind (supra) and Rajiv Sarin

(supra) concerning the requirement of Presidential

assent under Article 254 of the Constitution, the said

provision being inapplicable to the present

controversy.

49. Upon an exhaustive examination of the material

placed on record and a careful consideration of the

submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the

parties, we are of the considered view that the

findings recorded and the conclusions arrived at by

the High Court in the impugned judgment do not

suffer from any legal infirmity, perversity, or

jurisdictional error warranting interference by this

Court.

50. Having affirmed the impugned judgment insofar

as it holds the constitution of the Search-cum-

41 Selection Committee to be illegal, we are now called

upon to decide as to whether the grave consequences

of removal from the post of the Vice-Chancellor

should befall the appellant before us. We may note

that there is not even a whisper of an allegation by

the writ petitioners before the High Court impugning

the qualifications, integrity or administrative acumen

of the appellant, who has been continuing to

administer the affairs of the University without any

complaint from December, 2021. The High Court

itself, whilst ruling against the appellant, granted

him a lease of life till 30th June, 2024. This Court,

while entertaining the appeals, stayed the operation

of the impugned judgment, thereby protecting the

appellant from the damning consequences of removal

from the office, which could have proved unduly

harsh and stigmatic to the career of an academician.

42

51. Therefore, having regard to the peculiar facts

and circumstances of the case, particularly the facts

that (i) the appellant was found meritorious and was

duly selected by the Search-cum-Selection

Committee with due regard to his qualifications and

credentials; (ii) that he has continuously and without

any demur, discharged the functions of the Vice-

Chancellor of the University for the past four years;

(iii) that his tenure is due to expire in December,

2026, this Court is of the considered view that an

immediate cessation of his tenure may result in grave

stigma to the appellant and so also avoidable

disruption in the academic and administrative

functioning of the University.

52. In the absence of any material on record to show

that the appellant was, in any manner, disqualified

to hold the office of Vice-Chancellor and bearing in

mind that the process of selection of a new Vice-

43 Chancellor by adhering to Clause 7.3 of the UGC

Regulations, 2018 is likely to consume some time,

we, in order to do complete justice, exercise our

powers under Article 142 of the Constitution,

and direct that the appellant shall continue to

hold the post of Vice-Chancellor till the end of his

normal tenure or till a new Vice-Chancellor is

selected in accordance with law, whichever is

earlier. We further provide that the appellant

shall be entitled to participate in the selection

process, if any, undertaken for fresh selection to

the post of Vice-Chancellor of the University,

without being prejudiced by the impugned

judgment.

53. At the cost of repetition, it is clarified that the

Legislature of the Union Territory of Puducherry

remains fully empowered and at liberty to take such

appropriate and necessary steps, including

44 amendment or modification of the existing statutory

framework, as may be required to bring the

provisions of the PTU Act in conformity with the UGC

Regulations, 2018, in accordance with law.

54. The appeals are accordingly disposed of in the

above terms.

55. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand

disposed of.

….……………………J. (VIKRAM NATH)

….……………………J. (SANDEEP MEHTA)

NEW DELHI;

JANUARY 30, 2026.

45