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Rishab Chand Bhandari(D)By Lrs. & Anr vs National Engineering Industry Ltd

Supreme Court17 September 2009Asok Kumar Ganguly · Markandey Katju

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

1. Under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950, the definition of 'landlord' must be interpreted purposively, not literally. While the expanded definition in Section 3(iii) includes agents and persons authorized to collect rent, this does not eliminate the natural landlord, who is ordinarily the owner of the premises; the owner remains capable of exercising rights of landlord even if an agent is collecting rent. 2. A person claiming to act as agent of the landlord and seeking to file a suit for eviction must produce documentary evidence of written authorization from the owner to do so; absent such written authorization or proof of agency (such as a power of attorney), the agent cannot maintain a suit for eviction on behalf of the owner, notwithstanding that it may have actually let out the premises and collected rent. 3. Where a literal interpretation of a statutory provision would lead to absurd consequences, such interpretation must be avoided in favour of a purposive construction that respects the reasonable operation of the statute.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

1

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1320 OF 2005

Rishab Chand Bhandari (D) by .... Appellants Lrs. & Anr.

Versus

National Engineering Industry .... Respondent Ltd.

O R D E R

1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. This appeal has been filed against the judgment and

order dated 17.01.2005 of the Division Bench of the High

Court of Judicature at Rajasthan Bench at Jaipur whereby the

learned Division Bench has set aside the order of the

learned Single Judge dated 23.08.2001 and restored that of

the Trial Court, i.e., the Addl. District Judge No. 5,

Jaipur City, Jaipur dated 31.07.1993.

3. The respondent-plaintiff filed a suit for eviction

against the appellants-defendants and for deposit of arrears

of rent. The said suit was decreed by the Trial Court. In

appeal the said decree was set aside by the learned Single

Judge of the High Court, which order has been set aside by

the learned Division Bench by the impugned order. Hence, 2

this appeal by special leave.

4. The facts in brief are that the suit premises

admittedly belonged to Sitaram Bhandar Trust (hereinafter

for short 'the Trust') and the Trust is the owner of the

suit premises. The respondent, claiming that it was

authorized by the Trust to do so, alleged that it had let

out the premises in dispute to appellant No.2 (defendant No.

1 in the suit) and was collecting rent from it. However,

thereafter, the defendant No. 1 started paying rent to one

Ram Das Modani who claimed to be an employee of the Trust.

The respondent then filed a suit for eviction and arrears of

rent against the appellants alleging that the appellants had

committed default in payment of rent.

5. Under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent &

Eviction) Act, 1950, under Section 3(iii) the word

'landlord' has been defined as under:-

"landlord" means any person who for the time

being is receiving or is entitled to receive the

rent of any premises, whether on his own account

or as an agent, trustee, guardian or receiver or

any other person or who would so receive or be

entitled to receive the rent if the premises were

let to a tenant; it includes a tenant in relation 3

to a sub-tenant".

6. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that

there were no arrears of rent as rent was being paid to Ram

Das Modani, who was collecting rent on behalf of the Trust.

Hence, he submitted that there was no default in payment of

rent.

7. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent

submitted that the respondent company was the landlord and

hence rent should have been paid to it and thus there was

default in payment of rent. He further submitted that it

was the respondent who had let out the premises and

accordingly in terms of the Act it was entitled to receive

rent.

8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. We

are required to interpret the word 'landlord' as provided

under the Act.

9. In our opinion a purposive, and not literal

interpretation has to be given to the definition of

'landlord' in the Act.

10. The natural landlord of a premises is ordinarily

the owner. However, an expanded definition has been given

in various rent statutes of many States for the reason that

sometimes the owner may not himself be in a position to 4

collect the rent and may hence appoint an agent or authorize

any person to collect rent on his behalf because he may be

abroad or is unable to do so for any other reason. This

does not mean that the natural meaning of the word

'landlord', who is the owner of the premises, would

disappear and that the owner goes out of the picture

altogether. This is the view taken by the Delhi High Court

in the case of Shri Madan Lal Vs. Shri Hazara Singh 1977 (2)

RLR, 641. We approve of the view taken in the said

decision. If we interpret the definition of 'landlord' in

the Act literally it will result in strange consequences.

It will mean that even if the owner, who is the natural

landlord, does not want to evict a tenant, his agent may do

so. Surely this is an absurd situation. It is well settled

that if a literal interpretation leads to absurd

consequences, it should be avoided, and a purposive

interpretation be given.

11. In the present case the respondent has not been able

to show that it was authorized in writing to act on behalf

of the Trust either by a power of attorney or any other

written document. Unless there is some documentary proof

that the Trust had authorized its agent to file a suit for

eviction on its behalf, it cannot be said that the 5

respondent had any right to file such a suit, even though it

had actually let out the premises to the appellant and

collected rent. The respondent is admittedly not the owner

of the premises, and only claims to be the agent of the

Trust.

12. On the facts and circumstances of the case, we are

of the opinion that this aspect of the matter needs to be

gone into by the Trial Court. Accordingly, we allow this

appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the

Division Bench and that of the learned Single Judge and

remand the matter to the Trial Court. Before the Trial

Court, the respondent will have liberty to produce any

documentary evidence to show that the Trust had authorized

it in writing to receive rent and file suit for eviction on

behalf of the Trust. The respondent-plaintiff shall also

implead the Trust as proforma-defendant before the Trial

Court.

13. The Trial Court shall decide the suit uninfluenced

by any observations made by us in our order or the

observations made by the Division Bench and learned Single

Judge of the High Court or the earlier decree of the Trial

Court. All contentions are left open to the parties to be

urged before the Trial Court.

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14. Appeal allowed. No order as to the costs.

.....................J. (MARKANDEY KATJU)

.....................J. (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY) NEW DELHI;

SEPTMBER 17, 2009

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