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Reserved On: 6.11.2025 vs Of

Himachal Pradesh High Court28 November 2025

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

1. The High Court should adopt a hands-off approach when exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash proceedings under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, and should interfere only in cases of gross illegality or gross abuse of process. 2. Section 2(q) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, read down to strike out the words "adult male," permits complaints to be filed against any person, including females, who is in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person. 3. A court exercising territorial jurisdiction under Section 27 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act has authority over a matter where the aggrieved person permanently or temporarily resides, and such jurisdiction is established by the averments in the petition itself showing the aggrieved person resides within the court's local limits. 4. At the stage of considering a petition to quash proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the court must treat the allegations in the complaint as correct and cannot inquire into their truthfulness or validity. 5. A complaint under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act cannot be quashed merely for want of specific details, as the allegations may be elaborated during trial by leading evidence; the complaint needs only contain sufficient allegations to inquire into the matter. 6. Proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act are predominantly civil in nature, and therefore the standards applicable to criminal proceedings under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code do not apply. 7. Where a matter is pending before a trial court, the trial court should be permitted to appreciate the materials and make its own determination rather than having the proceedings quashed at an interlocutory stage.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

2025:HHC:40525
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. MMO No. 1060 of 2025

. Reserved on: 6.11.2025

Date of Decision: 28.11.2025.

Prateek Singh and others ...Petitioners Versus

of State of H.P. and another ...Respondents

Coram rt Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?1 No.

For the Petitioners : Mr Ganesh Barowalia, Advocate. For the Respondents : None.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The petitioners have filed the present petition for

quashing of the proceedings in the petition filed under the

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (DV Act)

pending before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate,

Dehra, District Kangra, HP. It has been asserted that petitioner

No.1 is the husband of respondent No.2/aggrieved person. He is

residing in Mumbai. Petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 are the sisters of

petitioner No.1. Respondent No.2 filed a petition under Section 12 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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of the DV Act before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kangra,

at Dharamshala, levelling false allegations to harass the

.

petitioners. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kangra,

allowed the objection raised by the petitioners regarding the lack

of jurisdiction and transferred the case to the Court of the learned

Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dehra. Petitioners Nos. 2 and

of 3 are the sisters of petitioner No.1 and were unnecessarily dragged

into the present proceedings. The marriage between petitioner rt No.1 and respondent No.2 was solemnised on 7.12.2022 at HPTDC

Hotel Jawalaji as per Hindu rites and customs. The parties resided

at Kolkata for a brief time and thereafter resided in Mumbai. The

petitioners organised a welcome reception for respondent No.2 on

11.12.2022, but respondent No.2 refused to interact with the

guests or to take family photographs. Petitioner No.1 arranged a

honeymoon trip to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, but

respondent No.2 refused to communicate with petitioner No.1 or

consummate the marriage. The petitioner no. 1 and respondent

no. 2 went to Mumbai on 31.1.2023. She left the matrimonial home

on 7.2.2023. Efforts were made to bring her back, but these were

unsuccessful. Respondent No.2 filed a petition under the DV Act.

Respondent No.2 never shared any household, conferring the

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jurisdiction upon the Courts at Dehra. The allegations made in the

complaint are false, and they do not show any incident of physical

.

or mental violence after 2017. The parties resided at Kolkata and

Mumbai, and no act had taken place in Dehra. False allegations

were made against the petitioners. The learned Magistrate erred

in issuing the notice. Hence, the petition.

of

2. Mr Ganesh Barowalia, learned counsel for the

petitioners, submitted that the petition filed by respondent No.2 rt is not maintainable for want of territorial jurisdiction. The

allegations are false and were made to harass the petitioners. The

petitioners never resided in Kolkata; therefore, he prayed that the

present petition be allowed and the proceedings pending before

the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dehra, District

Kangra, HP, be quashed. He relied upon the judgment of Vijay

Verma v. State NCT of Delhi and another, AIR 2011 NOC 177 and

Sanjay D. Jain and others Vs. State of Maharashtra and others 2025

INSC 1168 in support of his submission.

3. I have given considerable thought to the submissions

made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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4. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1158,

.

that the High Court should have a hands-off approach under the

DV Act and should interfere only when there is gross illegality or

abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed:

"35. When it comes to the exercise of power under Section

of 482 of the CrPC in relation to an application under Section 12(1), the High Court has to keep in mind the fact that the DV Act, 2005, is a welfare legislation specially enacted to rt give justice to those women who suffer from domestic violence and to prevent acts of domestic violence. Therefore, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482

of the CrPC for quashing proceedings under Section 12(1), the High Court should be very slow and circumspect. Interference can be made only when the case is clearly of

gross illegality or gross abuse of the process of law. Generally, the High Court must adopt a hands-off approach while dealing with proceedings under Section 482 for

quashing an application under Section 12(1). Unless the High Courts show restraint in the exercise of jurisdiction

under Section 482 of the CrPC while dealing with a prayer for quashing the proceedings under the DV Act, 2005, the very object of enacting the DV Act, 2005, will be defeated."

5. Section 2(q) of the DV Act defines the respondent as

any adult male person who is or has been in a domestic

relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom the

aggrieved person has sought any relief under the Act. It was

submitted that since the term respondent means only an adult

male person, therefore, the petition could not have been filed

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against petitioners No.2 and 3, who are females and not covered

under the provisions of Section 2(q). This submission cannot be

.

accepted. The Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the

constitutionality of Section 2(q) in Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum

Narottamdas Harsora, (2016) 10 SCC 165 : (2017) 1 SCC (Cri) 1 :

(2017) 1 SCC (Civ) 468: 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1118 and held that

of Section 2(q) has to be read down and the words adult male person

are to be struck out because they are contrary to the object of rt protecting women who have suffered from the Domestic Violence

Act of any kind. It was observed at page 197:

"39. A conspectus of these judgments also leads to the re-

sult that the microscopic difference between male and fe- male, adult and non-adult, regard being had to the object sought to be achieved by the 2005 Act, is neither real nor

substantial nor does it have any rational relation to the ob- ject of the legislation. In fact, as per the principle settled in

Subramanian Swamy v. CBI, (2014) 8 SCC 682: (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 42: (2014) 3 SCC (L&S) 36 judgment, the words "adult

male person" are contrary to the object of affording pro-

tection to women who have suffered from domestic vio- lence "of any kind". We, therefore, strike down the words "adult male" before the word "person" in Section 2(q), as these words discriminate between persons similarly situ- ated, and far from being in tune with, are contrary to the object sought to be achieved by the 2005 Act."

6. Therefore, the submission that a complaint under the

Domestic Violence Act is not maintainable against a female

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cannot be accepted, and the complaint cannot be held to be bad

against the petitioners.

.

7. It was submitted that the Court at Dehra had no

territorial jurisdiction because respondent No.2 never shared any

household within the jurisdiction of the Courts at Dehra. This

submission cannot be accepted. Section 27 of the DV Act confers

of jurisdiction on the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class within

the local limits of which the aggrieved person permanently or rt temporarily resides or carries on a business or is employed. The

petitioners have specifically mentioned in the memo of parties

that respondent No. 2 is residing in the house of her parents at

House No.306, Paragpur, Tehsil Dehra, District Kangra, HP.

Respondent No.2 also asserted in the complaint filed under

Section 12 of the DV Act (Annexure P1) in para-14 that she was

working from home as a Software Engineer. Therefore, as per the

averments of the present petition and the petition filed by

respondent No.2, she is residing within the jurisdiction of the

Courts at Dehra. Hence, the Courts at Dehra would have

jurisdiction. The judgment of the Delhi High Court in Vijay Verma

(supra) does not deal with the question of jurisdiction under

Section 27 of the DV Act and will not help the petitioners.

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8. It was submitted that no specific allegations were

made against the petitioners. Reliance was placed on the

.

judgment of Sanjay D. Jain (supra). This submission will not help

the petitioners because the judgment in Sanjay D. Jain (supra)

deals with the commission of an offence punishable under

Section 498-A of IPC, which is criminal in nature, whereas the

of proceedings under the DV Act are civil in nature. This position

was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shaurabh Kumar rt Tripathi (supra) wherein it was observed:

"28.1 Thus, there is no doubt that, notwithstanding the penal provisions in the form of Sections 31 and 33 of Chapter V, the proceedings before the Magistrate under the

DV Act, 2005, are predominantly of a civil nature."

9. In the present case, the petition filed by the

respondent no. 2 contains sufficient allegations to inquire into

the matter, and the allegations are to be elaborated during the

trial by leading the evidence. Therefore, it is impermissible to

quash the petition on the ground that sufficient details were not

given by the respondent no. 2.

10. It was submitted that the allegations against the

petitioners are false. The petitioners have cooperated with the

respondent no. 2, and she left her matrimonial home without any

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reason. This submission will not help the petitioners. The Court

exercising inherent jurisdiction does not go into the validity or

.

otherwise of the allegations and has to treat them as correct. This

position was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Punit

Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, wherein it

was observed: -

of "29. It is settled law that the power of quashing a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with rt circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly

held that, save in exceptional cases where non-

interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the

stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely according to its whims or caprice."

11. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P.,

2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent

jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or

otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: -

"13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the

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cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a

.

case against the accused. We are of the considered view that

the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra).

14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060:

of "14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for rt quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the

position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59:

(2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the

charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC

p. 63, para 16) "16. Thus, the general conspectus of the

various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge sheet, documents, etc. or not.

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12. Once the contents of the petition filed by the

respondent no. 2 are taken to be correct, they show the economic,

.

physical, verbal and emotional abuse and prima facie satisfy the

requirement of domestic violence. Therefore, it is impermissible

to quash the proceedings.

13. It is undisputed that the matter is pending before the

of learned Trial Court. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC rt 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial

Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed:

"At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the

absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged

offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We

say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected, forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not."

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14. A similar principle will apply to the complaint, and the

complaint cannot be quashed on this consideration as well.

.

15. No other point was urged.

16. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and the

same is dismissed.

of

17. The observation made herein before shall remain

confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, rt whatsoever, on the merits of the case.

(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 28th November 2025

(Chander)

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