Reserved On: 30.12.2024 vs State Of H.P. And Others

Cr. Appeal No. 177 of 2014 Reserved on: 30.12.2024 Date of Decision: 04.01.2025

Jai Devi ...Appellant.

Versus State of H.P. and others ...Respondents.

Coram Hon'ble Mr Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge. Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes.

For the Appellant : Mr. Ramesh Sharma, Advocate.

For the Respondents : Ms Sharmila Patial, Additional Advocate General, with Mr. Raj Negi, Deputy Advocate General for Respondent No.1.

Mr. Surya Chauhan, Advocate for respondents No.2 to 4.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The present appeal is directed against the judgment

dated 28.2.2014, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-I,

Una, H.P., (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondents no. 2

to 4 (accused before the learned Trial Court) were acquitted of

the commission of offences punishable under Sections 498-A

1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2

2025:HHC:599

and 306 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

(Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they

were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present

appeal are that the appellant/informant Jaidei (PW1) is the

mother of Sandesh Kumari (since deceased). Sandesh Kumari

was married to accused Ravinder Kumar five years before the

incident. Dowry was provided to Ravinder Kumar and his family

members as per the informant's capacity, and she had spent

about ₹5.00 lacs for solemnising the marriage. The accused kept

Sandesh Kumari properly for about three years after the

marriage. They started harassing her after three years. The

husband, mother-in-law and brother-in-law of the deceased

used to demand money from her. The informant would counsel

the deceased and provide her with something or the other.

₹40,000/- was provided to the accused on the occasion of

marriage of Ravinder's sister as per his demand; however, the

accused continued to harass the deceased. They compelled the

deceased to get her younger sister married to accused, Shashi

Pal; however, he was physically challenged, and the younger

sister of the deceased did not agree to this proposal. The 3 2025:HHC:599

deceased told the informant three days before the incident that

the accused were harassing her. The accused, Ravinder,

threatened to commit suicide and falsely implicate the deceased

and her family members in case the marriage between his

brother and sister of deceased was not solemnised. The

informant told the deceased that the matter would be discussed

after 1-2 days. Saroj told the informant on 22.6.2011 at about 2.00

AM that Sandesh had consumed poison. The informant, her

husband Joginder Lal, her brother-in-law and her sister-in-law

reached Una Hospital. The Medical Officer on duty referred

Sandesh Kumari to the Post Graduate Institute (PGI),

Chandigarh. The deceased revealed on the way that her husband

compelled her to get the marriage of her sister solemnised with

his brother; otherwise, he would commit suicide. She

disconnected the phone, but he called his mother. Accused Kamla

Devi and Shashi Pal harassed the deceased. They asked Sandesh

Kumari that if she wanted to die; she could die, but she should

not kill Kamla's son. Sandesh committed suicide due to the

harassment of her husband, mother-in-law and brother-in-law.

They were also not present during the last rites of the deceased. A

complaint (Ex.PW1/A) was made to the police. FIR (Ex.PW22/A) 4 2025:HHC:599

was registered. Dr. D.K. Sharma (PW11) conducted a medical

examination of Sandesh at the time of her admission to the

hospital. He issued the MLC (Ex.PW11/B). He also preserved the

gastric lavage of the deceased. Darshan Lal and Mohinder Singh

(PW8) visited the Police Station and disclosed that one suicide

note was recovered from the room of the deceased, which was

kept in the house. ASI Bhagat Ram (PW19) went to the house of

Gurmail Singh. A suicide note (Ex. P7) and an empty pouch of

Celphos were handed over to ASI Bhagat Ram, who seized them

vide memo (Ex.PW8/A). The pouch was wrapped in a piece of

cloth, and the parcel was sealed with three impressions of seal

'A'. Specimen impression of seal (Ex.PW19/A) was taken on a

separate piece of cloth. Sandesh died at PGI, Chandigarh. ASI

Bhagat Ram (PW19) went to PGI, Chandigarh and prepared an

inquest report (Ex.PW19/B). He obtained the postmortem report

(Ex.PW19/C). He handed over the dead body of the deceased to

her father-in-law in the presence of her father vide memo

(Ex.PW2/A). He also took photographs of the dead body (Ex. P12

to Ex. P14). ASI Bhagat Ram prepared the site plan (Ex.PW19/D)

and recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version.

Gurmail Singh handed over one slip pad (Ex. P11), which was 5 2025:HHC:599

seized vide memo (Ex.PW10/A). Jagroop Singh (PW3) handed

over six pieces of plyboard (Ex. P1 to Ex. P6) on which papers in

Gurmukhi script in the hands of the deceased were pasted. These

were seized vide memo (Ex.PW3/A). ASI Bhagat Ram obtained the

admitted signatures of the deceased from the records of

Government Senior Secondary School Khanpur Khun. The extract

of Page No. 138 of the register (Ex.PW6/B) was seized vide memo

(Ex.PW6/A). The signatures were sent to RFSL, Dharamshala, for

obtaining expert opinion. The result of the analysis (Ex.CC) was

issued in which it was shown that the disputed and admitted

handwritings were written by the same person. Vijay Sharma

(PW20) conducted further investigation. He searched the room of

the deceased and seized three ballpoint pens (Ex. P8 to Ex. P10)

from the drawer of bed and table. He seized four leaves of the

application addressed by Ravinder to his superior vide seizure

memo (Ex.PW9/A). The ballpoint pens and the papers were

wrapped in a piece of cloth, and the parcel was sealed with seal

'H'. Specimen seal 'H' (Ex.PW20/A) was taken on a separate

piece of cloth. He filed an application (Ex.PW11/D) to obtain the

opinion of the Medical Officer and the inpatient record. Dr. D.K.

Sharma (PW11) issued the impatient record (Ex.PW11/C). The call 6 2025:HHC:599

detail record and Customer Application Form of the mobile

phones were taken into possession. The reports of analysis

(Ex.CA and Ex.CB) were issued by RFSL in which it was

mentioned that the Phosphine Gas was detected in the viscera

and Gastric lavage. Aluminium phosphide was detected in the

packet of Celphos. Statements of remaining witnesses were

recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the

investigation, a challan was prepared and presented before

learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Una, who committed it to

learned Sessions Judge, Una, for trial. Learned Sessions Judge,

Una assigned the trial to learned Additional Sessions Judge, Una

(learned Trial Court).

3. Learned Additional Sessions Judge Una charged the

accused with the commission of offences punishable under

Sections 498-A and 306 read with Section 34 of IPC, to which

they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

4. The prosecution examined 22 witnesses to prove its

case. Jaidei is the informant and mother, Joginder Lal (PW2) is

the father, and Jagroop (PW3) is the brother of the deceased.

Dalip Chand (PW4) was running a shop, to whom the deceased

disclosed about the pressure being exerted upon her to marry her 7 2025:HHC:599

younger sister to accused Shashi Pal. Neelam (PW5) is the elder

sister of the deceased, to whom the deceased confided about the

pressure being exerted upon her. Baljeet Kaur (PW6) handed over

the extract of the register and detail marks card register to the

police. Sanjiv Kumar (PW7) carried the deceased on a motorcycle

towards the hospital. Mohinder Singh (PW8) is the witness to the

recovery. Dharamjeet (PW9) did not support the prosecution

case. Gurdas Ram (PW10) is a witness to recovery. Dr. D.K.

Sharma (PW11) conducted the medical examination of Sandesh

when she was brought to the hospital. He also prepared the

record regarding her treatment. ASI Rajinder Kumar (PW12) went

to the hospital after hearing about the admission of the deceased.

Raj Kumar (PW13) proved that there was a dispute between the

parties regarding the marriage of the younger sister of the

deceased with accused Shashi Pal. Arpna Gupta (PW14) proved

that the mobile phone did not belong to her. HHC Shiv Kumar

(PW15) proved the copy of the application received from the

accused. HC Ajaib Singh (PW16) was posted as MHC, with whom

the case property was deposited. SI Rupinder Kumar (PW17)

seized a copy of the marriage certificate, family register, and the

extract of the marriage register. ASI Pratap Singh (PW18) 8 2025:HHC:599

recorded the statement of Aparna Gupta (PW14). ASI Bhagat Ram

(PW19) and Vijay Sharma (PW20) conducted the investigation.

Sushil Kumari (PW21) went to verify the facts regarding the entry

in the daily diary and recorded the statement of the deceased.

R.R. Thakur (PW22) went to the hospital with Sushil Kumari.

5. The accused, in their statements recorded under

Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted their relationship with the

deceased. They admitted that the deceased had consumed

poison, and she was taken to Regional Hospital, Una, from where

she was referred to PGI, Chandigarh. Accused Kamla stated that

she was innocent. Witnesses deposed against her because they

were related to the deceased. The last rites of the deceased were

performed by the accused. Accused Ravinder stated that he was

on duty at the time of the incident. He had left the village after

availing annual holidays in the month of January. The witnesses

deposed against him because they were related to the deceased.

Accused Shashi stated that he was innocent and all the witnesses

were related to the deceased.

6. Learned Trial Court held that the deceased had made a

statement before Sushila Kumari (PW21) that she had consumed

poison voluntarily and no one was responsible for her suicide. 9

2025:HHC:599

This statement was endorsed by her father. Subsequently, a

complaint was made by the informant after three days. There

was no explanation for the delay. The delay made the prosecution

case suspect. The prosecution evidence was not sufficient to

show that the deceased was left with no other option but to

commit suicide. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the

accused.

7. Being aggrieved from the judgment passed by the

learned Trial Court, the informant filed the present appeal

asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the

accused. The deceased committed suicide within four years of her

marriage, which raised a presumption that the suicide was

committed due to cruelty and maltreatment. This presumption

was not considered by the learned Trial Court. The parents of the

deceased were in great shock and could not report the matter

earlier. When they realised that the suicide was due to the torture

and maltreatment, they made a complaint. This aspect was

ignored by the learned Trial Court. A demand of ₹50,000/- was

raised by the accused. It was duly proved on record that accused

Ravinder threatened the deceased to commit suicide if she would

not get her younger sister married to his younger brother. The 10 2025:HHC:599

deceased was compelled to commit suicide due to such a threat.

The documents were read from the wrong perspective. The

Medical Officer stated that the deceased was unconscious and not

responding to the commands. The statement was got signed by

the police without telling the deceased its nature. Such a

statement could not have been used for acquitting the accused.

The deceased complained to her parents, her relatives and other

persons about the pressure being exerted upon her; therefore, it

was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment

passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

8. We have heard Mr Ramesh Sharma, learned counsel

for the appellant/informant, Ms Sharmila Patial, learned

Additional Advocate General with Mr Raj Negi, learned Deputy

Advocate General for the respondent No.1-State and Mr Surya

Chauan, learned counsel for respondents No.2 to 4-accused.

9. Mr Ramesh Sharma, learned Counsel for the

appellant/informant, submitted that the learned Trial Court

erred in acquitting the accused. It was duly proved by the

statements of the parents and brother of the deceased that the

accused were harassing the accused. She had also told her sister

and the shopkeeper about the pressure being exerted upon her to 11 2025:HHC:599

marry her younger sister with accused Shashi Pal. The accused

had created such circumstances that the deceased was left with

no option but to commit suicide. Therefore, he prayed that the

present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the

learned Trial Court be set aside.

10. Ms Sharmila Patial, learned Additional Advocate

General for respondent No.1/State, supported the submissions of

Mr Ramesh Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant-

informant.

11. Mr Surya Chauhan, learned counsel for respondents

No.2 to 4-accused, supported the judgment passed by the

learned Trial Court. He submitted that the deceased had left the

suicide note, absolving any other person of any liability. She

made a statement before the Police that she had taken the poison

in a fit of anger. This statement was endorsed by her father. A

false complaint was made by the informant after three days of

the incident. The statements of the prosecution witnesses are

vague and do not contain the time and detail of the demands

being made by the accused. The learned Trial Court had taken a

reasonable view, which could have been taken based on the 12 2025:HHC:599

evidence led before the learned Trial Court. Therefore, he prayed

that the present appeal be dismissed.

12. We have given considerable thought to the

submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records

carefully.

13. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment

of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 3 SCC 544: 2024 SCC OnLine

SC 130 that while deciding an appeal against acquittal, the High

Court should see whether the evidence was properly appreciated

on record or not; second whether the finding of the Court is

illegal or affected by the error of law or fact and thirdly; whether

the view taken by the Trial Court was a possible view, which

could have been taken based on the material on record. The Court

will not lightly interfere with the judgment of acquittal. It was

observed:

"25. We may first discuss the position of law regarding the scope of intervention in a criminal appeal. For that is the foundation of this challenge. It is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused unless proven guilty. The presumption continues at all stages of the trial and finally culminates into a fact when the case ends in acquittal. The presumption of innocence gets concretised when the case ends in acquittal. It is so because once the 13 2025:HHC:599

trial court, on appreciation of the evidence on record, finds that the accused was not guilty, the presumption gets strengthened, and a higher threshold is expected to rebut the same in appeal.

26. No doubt, an order of acquittal is open to appeal, and there is no quarrel about that. It is also beyond doubt that in the exercise of appellate powers, there is no inhibition on the High Court to reappreciate or re-visit the evidence on record. However, the power of the High Court to reappreciate the evidence is a qualified power, especially when the order under challenge is of acquittal. The first and foremost question to be asked is whether the trial court thoroughly appreciated the evidence on record and gave due consideration to all material pieces of evidence. The second point for consideration is whether the finding of the trial court is illegal or affected by an error of law or fact. If not, the third consideration is whether the view taken by the trial court is a fairly possible view. A decision of acquittal is not meant to be reversed on a mere difference of opinion. What is required is an illegality or perversity.

27. It may be noted that the possibility of two views in a criminal case is not an extraordinary phenomenon. The "two-views theory" has been judicially recognised by the courts, and it comes into play when the appreciation of evidence results in two equally plausible views. However, the controversy is to be resolved in favour of the accused. For, the very existence of an equally plausible view in favour of the innocence of the accused is in itself a reasonable doubt in the case of the prosecution. Moreover, it reinforces the presumption of innocence. Therefore, when two views are possible, following the one in favour of the innocence of the accused is the safest course of action. Furthermore, it is also settled that if the view of the trial court, in a case of acquittal, is a plausible view, it is not open for the High Court to convict the accused by reappreciating the evidence. If such a course is permissible, it would make it practically impossible to settle the rights and liabilities in the eye of the law.

14 2025:HHC:599

28. In Selvaraj v. State of Karnataka [Selvaraj v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 10 SCC 230: (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 19]: (SCC pp. 236-37, para 13) "13. Considering the reasons given by the trial court and on an appraisal of the evidence, in our considered view, the view taken by the trial court was a possible one. Thus, the High Court should not have interfered with the judgment of acquittal. This Court in Jagan M. Seshadri v. State of T.N. [Jagan M. Seshadri v. State of T.N., (2002) 9 SCC 639: 2003 SCC (L&S) 1494] has laid down that as the appreciation of evidence made by the trial court while recording the acquittal is a reasonable view, it is not permissible to interfere in appeal. The duty of the High Court while reversing the acquittal has been dealt with by this Court, thus: (SCC p. 643, para 9) '9. ... We are constrained to observe that the High Court was dealing with an appeal against acquittal. It was required to deal with various grounds on which acquittal had been based and to dispel those grounds. It has not done so. Salutary principles while dealing with appeals against acquittal have been overlooked by the High Court. If the appreciation of evidence by the trial court did not suffer from any flaw, as indeed none has been pointed out in the impugned judgment, the order of acquittal could not have been set aside. The view taken by the learned trial court was a reasonable view, and even if by any stretch of the imagination, it could be said that another view was possible, that was not a ground sound enough to set aside an order of acquittal.'"

29. In Sanjeev v. State of H.P. [Sanjeev v. State of H.P., (2022) 6 SCC 294: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 522], the Hon'ble Supreme Court analysed the relevant decisions and summarised the approach of the appellate court while deciding an appeal from the order of acquittal. It observed thus: (SCC p. 297, para 7) "7. It is well settled that:

15

2025:HHC:599

7.1. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the reasons which had weighed with the trial court in acquitting the accused must be dealt with in case the appellate court is of the view that the acquittal rendered by the trial court deserves to be upturned (see Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka [Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436 :

(2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 586] and Anwar Ali v. State of H.P. [Anwar Ali v. State of H.P., (2020) 10 SCC 166 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 395] ).

7.2. With an order of acquittal by the trial court, the normal presumption of innocence in a criminal matter gets reinforced (see Atley v. State of U.P. [Atley v. State of U.P., 1955 SCC OnLine SC 51: AIR 1955 SC 807]).

7.3. If two views are possible from the evidence on record, the appellate court must be extremely slow in interfering with the appeal against acquittal (see Sambasivan v. State of Kerala [Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412: 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320])."

14. This position was reiterated in Ramesh v. State of

Karnataka, (2024) 9 SCC 169: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2581, wherein it

was observed at page 175:

"20. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the general principles culled out by this Court in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], regarding the power of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against a judgment of acquittal. The principles read thus: (SCC p. 432, para 42) "42. ... (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence 16 2025:HHC:599

before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law.

(3) Various expressions, such as "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc., are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court."

21. In Rajendra Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajendra Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1977) 2 SCC 205: 1977 SCC (Cri) 308], a three- judge Bench of this Court pointed out that it would be essential for the High Court, in an appeal against acquittal, to clearly indicate firm and weighty grounds from the record for discarding the reasons of the trial court in order to be able to reach a contrary conclusion of guilt of the accused. It was further observed that, in an appeal against acquittal, it would not be legally sufficient for the High Court to take a contrary view about the credibility of witnesses, and it is absolutely imperative that the High Court convincingly finds it well-nigh impossible for the trial court to reject their testimony. This was identified as 17 2025:HHC:599

the quintessence of the jurisprudential aspect of criminal justice."

15. The present appeal has to be decided as per the

parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

16. It is an admitted version that the accused had written

the suicide note (Ex. P7), which was seized by ASI Bhagat Ram. It

is in Punjabi and was got translated with the help of an official

Translator. Its free translation is as under: -

"I am responsible for my death. No one is responsible for it. I am committing suicide due to mental agitation."

17. When she was brought to the hospital, Sushil Kumari

(PW21) recorded her statement (Ex. DA), which is freely

translated as under: -

"Stated that I have been married for four years. One son, aged three years, was born to me. My husband is serving in the Army. He called me at about 10 PM. He switched off the phone suddenly. I became angry with him and consumed the poison. I had not quarrelled with any person."

18. This statement was signed by her. It was endorsed by

her father, Joginder Lal (PW2).

19. It was submitted that the deceased was critical when

she was brought to the hospital, and the police had obtained her 18 2025:HHC:599

signatures without explaining the nature of the statement being

recorded by them. This is not acceptable. Nothing was suggested

to Susheela Kumari (PW21) or Inspector R.R. Thakur (PW22) that

the statement was recorded by the police on their own, and no

such statement was made by Sandesh Kumari. Susheela Kumari

(PW21), on the other hand, stated in her cross-examination that

every word of the statement (Ex. DA) was stated by Sandesh

Kumari, and nothing was added to the statement.

20. Jagroop Singh (PW3) admitted in his cross-

examination that the deceased had made a statement to the

police about the consumption of poison in a fit of anger. He

admitted that Sandesh Kumari signed the statement, and her

father was also present. Joginder Lal (PW2) also admitted that

the lady Sub Inspector recorded the statement of the deceased in

the hospital, and he had signed the same. He admitted that his

statement (Ex. DB) was recorded in the hospital by Rajinder

Kumar. He volunteered to say that he was in a state of shock, and

police had obtained his signatures on 2-3 pages. He admitted

that he had not lodged any written complaint against any police

official regarding taking his signatures on (Ex. DA) and (Ex. DB)

without informing him of their contents. These statements prove 19 2025:HHC:599

that the deceased had made the statement (Ex. DA) voluntarily.

21. The statements (Ex. P7 and Ex. DA) were made by the

deceased regarding the circumstances related to her death and

are admissible under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. The

deceased had specifically stated that she had consumed poison

by herself and no one was responsible for it. Hence, the

statement made by the deceased did not establish the

prosecution case that the deceased was compelled to commit

suicide due to the circumstances created by the accused.

22. The police also recorded the statement of Joginder

Lal (Ex. DB) in which he specifically stated that Sandesh Kumari

had not complained about any person to him. His (Joginder's)

wife had made inquiries from Sandesh in his (Joiginder's)

presence; however, Sandesh Kumari said that she had mistakenly

consumed the poison. She had not complained about any person.

She made a statement regarding this fact to the police in his

presence. He did not have any suspicion regarding the death of

the deceased. Joginder Singh tried to explain that his signatures

were obtained on some documents without informing him,

which is not acceptable in view of his subsequent conduct of not

making any complaint to any person regarding the recording of 20 2025:HHC:599

wrong statement. Hence, the statement (Ex.DB) made by the

father of the accused cannot be discarded.

23. The statement (Ex. DB) also corroborates the contents

of the dying declaration that the deceased had consumed poison

by herself without being pressurised by any person. It was held in

Mallappa (supra) that when two versions appear on the record,

the version in favour of the accused should be preferred. If the

version of the deceased and the initial version of her father are

accepted, the prosecution case that the deceased was compelled

to commit suicide by the deceased has to be discarded.

24. It was stated in the complaint (Ex.PW1/A) that the

deceased told about the harassment to her parents on her way to

Chandigarh. This was not plausible. Dr. D.K. Sharma (PW11) had

attended to the deceased when she was brought to the hospital.

He stated in his cross-examination that he had told ASI Bhagat

Ram (PW19) that the deceased was not fit to make a statement.

Therefore, the deceased could not have made any statement

while going to PGI, Chandigarh, keeping in view her condition

and the prosecution's version that the parents of the deceased

came to know about the harassment on the way to PGI,

Chandigarh is not acceptable.

21

2025:HHC:599

25. Jaidei (PW1) stated that the relationship of her

daughter with Ravinder Kumar remained cordial for about three

years. Thereafter, the in-laws of Sandesh Kumari started

maltreating her on the pretext of money. She (Sandesh) used to

tell her that her husband and her in-laws were maltreating her.

They were not providing any money to the deceased for her

personal use, so she (the informant) started giving her money

frequently. The in-laws of Sandesh Kumari demanded ₹50,000/-

for the marriage of Ravinder's sister. ₹40,000/- were given to

them. The relationship between Sandesh Kumari and Ravinder

Kumar remained cordial for one and half years, and thereafter,

Ravinder started pressuring her to solemnise the marriage of her

younger sister with accused Shashi Pal; however, the informant

and her family members did not agree to this proposal, as the

younger sister of Sandesh had refused to marry accused Shashi

Pal. The accused started maltreating the deceased. Accused

Ravinder used to threaten the deceased Sandesh Kumari and

pressurise her to solemnise the marriage of his younger brother

with the younger sister of the deceased. He also used to tell the

deceased that he would commit suicide and implicate her family

members. The deceased disclosed all these facts to her. She asked 22 2025:HHC:599

the deceased to remain calm and told her (the deceased) that she

(the informant) would settle the matter within 2-3 days.

26. The statement of the informant is highly vague. She

did not mention any particulars of date and time and the name of

the person, who had made the demand. It was laid down by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in Neelu Chopra v. Bharti, (2009) 10 SCC

184: (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 286: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 1693 that the Court

has to see that particulars of the offences committed by every

accused and the role played by the accused in committing the

offence are given in the complaint made to the police. It was

observed: -

"9. To lodge a proper complaint, the mere mention of the sections and the language of those sections is not the be-all and end-all of the matter. What is required to be brought to the notice of the court is the particulars of the offence committed by each and every accused and the role played by each and every accused in committing that offence.

10. When we see the complaint, the complaint is sadly vague. It does not show as to which accused has committed what offence and what is the exact role played by these appellants in the commission of offence. There could be said something against Rajesh, as the allegations are made against him more precisely, but he is no more and has already expired. Under such circumstances, it would be an abuse of the process of law to allow the prosecution to continue against the aged parents of Rajesh, the present appellants herein, on the basis of a vague and general complaint which is silent about the precise acts of the appellants." (Emphasis supplied) 23 2025:HHC:599

27. Similarly, it was held in Abhishek v. State of M.P., 2023

SCC OnLine SC 1083: 2023 INSC 779 that the tendency of false

implication by way of general omnibus allegations, if left

unchecked, would result in the misuse of the process of law. It

was observed:

"13. Instances of a husband's family members filing a petition to quash criminal proceedings launched against them by his wife in the midst of matrimonial disputes are neither a rarity nor of recent origin. Precedents aplenty abound on this score. We may now take note of some decisions of particular relevance. Recently, in Kahkashan Kausar alias Sonam v. State of Bihar [(2022) 6 SCC 599], this Court had occasion to deal with a similar situation where the High Court had refused to quash a FIR registered for various offences, including Section 498A IPC. Noting that the foremost issue that required determination was whether allegations made against the in-laws were general omnibus allegations which would be liable to be quashed, this Court referred to earlier decisions wherein concern was expressed over the misuse of Section 498A IPC and the increased tendency to implicate relatives of the husband in matrimonial disputes. This Court observed that false implications by way of general omnibus allegations made in the course of matrimonial disputes, if left unchecked, would result in misuse of the process of law. On the facts of that case, it was found that no specific allegations were made against the in-laws by the wife, and it was held that allowing their prosecution in the absence of clear allegations against the in-laws would result in an abuse of the process of law. It was also noted that a criminal trial, leading to an eventual acquittal, would inflict severe scars upon the accused, and such an exercise ought to be discouraged.

14. In Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand [(2010) 7 SCC 667], this Court noted that the tendency to implicate the husband and all his immediate relations is also not 24 2025:HHC:599

uncommon in complaints filed under Section 498A IPC. It was observed that the Courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take pragmatic realities into consideration while dealing with matrimonial cases, such as allegations of harassment by the husband's close relations, who were living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant resided, would add an entirely different complexion and such allegations would have to be scrutinised with great care and circumspection.

15. Earlier, in Neelu Chopra v. Bharti [(2009) 10 SCC 184], this Court observed that the mere mention of statutory provisions and the language thereof for lodging a complaint is not the 'be all and end all' of the matter, as what is required to be brought to the notice of the Court is the particulars of the offence committed by each and every accused and the role played by each and every accused in the commission of that offence. These observations were made in the context of a matrimonial dispute involving Section 498A IPC." (Emphasis supplied)

28. It was held in Achin Gupta v. State of Haryana, 2024 SCC

OnLine SC 759:2024 INSC 369 that asking a person to face criminal

allegations without any specific instance of criminal misconduct

amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed:

"18. The plain reading of the FIR and the chargesheet papers indicate that the allegations levelled by the First Informant are quite vague, general and sweeping, specifying no instances of criminal conduct. It is also pertinent to note that in the FIR, no specific date or time of the alleged offence/offences has been disclosed. Even the police thought fit to drop the proceedings against the other members of the Appellant's family. Thus, we are of the view that the FIR lodged by Respondent No. 2 was nothing but a counterblast to the divorce petition & also the domestic violence case.

25 2025:HHC:599

25. If a person is made to face a criminal trial on some general and sweeping allegations without bringing on record any specific instances of criminal conduct, it is nothing but abuse of the process of the court. The court owes a duty to subject the allegations levelled in the complaint to thorough scrutiny to find out, prima facie, whether there is any grain of truth in the allegations or whether they are made only with the sole object of involving certain individuals in a criminal charge, more particularly when a prosecution arises from a matrimonial dispute." (Emphasis supplied)

29. It was further held that in matrimonial disputes, the

parents, including the close relatives, make a mountain out of a

molehill, and every matrimonial conduct amounting to nuisance

does not constitute cruelty. It was observed: -

"32. Many times, the parents, including the close relatives of the wife, make a mountain out of a mole. Instead of salvaging the situation and making all possible endeavours to save the marriage, their action, either due to ignorance or on account of sheer hatred towards the husband and his family members, brings about the complete destruction of marriage on trivial issues. The first thing that comes to mind of the wife, her parents and her relatives is the Police as if the Police is the panacea of all evil. No sooner the matter reaches up to the Police, then even if there are fair chances of reconciliation between the spouses, they would get destroyed. The foundation of a sound marriage is tolerance, adjustment and respecting one another. Tolerance of each other's fault, to a certain bearable extent, has to be inherent in every marriage. Petty quibbles and trifling differences are mundane matters and should not be exaggerated and blown out of proportion to destroy what is said to have been made in heaven. The Court must appreciate that all quarrels must be weighed from that point of view in determining what constitutes cruelty in each particular case, always keeping in view the physical and mental conditions of the parties, 26 2025:HHC:599

their character and social status. A very technical and hyper-sensitive approach would prove to be disastrous for the very institution of the marriage. In matrimonial disputes, the main sufferers are the children. The spouses fight with such venom in their hearts that they do not think even for a second that if the marriage would come to an end, then what will be the effect on their children? Divorce plays a very dubious role so far as the upbringing of the children is concerned. The only reason why we are saying so is that instead of handling the whole issue delicately, the initiation of criminal proceedings would bring about nothing but hatred for each other. There may be cases of genuine ill-treatment and harassment by the husband and his family members towards the wife. The degree of such ill-treatment or harassment may vary. However, the Police machinery should be resorted to as a measure of last resort and that too in a very genuine case of cruelty and harassment. The Police machinery cannot be utilised for the purpose of holding the husband at ransom so that he could be squeezed by the wife at the instigation of her parents, relatives or friends. In all cases where the wife complains of harassment or ill-treatment, Section 498A of the IPC cannot be applied mechanically. No FIR is complete without Sections 506(2) and 323 of the IPC. Every matrimonial conduct, which may cause annoyance to the other, may not amount to cruelty. Mere trivial irritations, and quarrels between spouses, which happen in day-to-day married life, may also not amount to cruelty"

30. Similarly, it was held in Mamidi Anil Kumar Reddy v.

State of A.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 127: 2024 (2) SCR 252 that the

phenomena of false implication by general omnibus allegation in

the case of matrimonial dispute are not unknown to the Court.

When the allegations are general and omnibus, the prosecution

should not be continued. It was observed: - 27

2025:HHC:599

"14. In the considered opinion of this Court, there is significant merit in the submissions of the Learned Counsel for the Appellants. A bare perusal of the complaint, statement of witnesses and the charge sheet shows that the allegations against the Appellants are wholly general and omnibus in nature; even if they are taken in their entirety, they do not prima facie make out a case against the Appellants. The material on record neither discloses any particulars of the offences alleged nor discloses the specific role/allegations assigned to any of the Appellants in the commission of the offences.

15. The phenomenon of false implication by way of general omnibus allegations in the course of matrimonial disputes is not unknown to this Court. In Kahkashan Kausar alias Sonam v. State of Bihar (2022) 6 SCC 599, this Court dealt with a similar case wherein the allegations made by the complainant-wife against her in-laws u/s. 498A and others were vague and general, lacking any specific role and particulars. The court proceeded to quash the FIR against the accused persons and noted that such a situation, if left unchecked, would result in the abuse of the process of law.

xxxx

17. Considering the dicta in Mahmood Ali (supra), we find that the High Court, in this case, has failed to exercise due care and has mechanically permitted the criminal proceedings to continue despite specifically finding that the allegations are general and omnibus in nature. The Appellants herein approached the High Court on inter alia grounds that the proceedings were re-initiated on vexatious grounds and even highlighted the commencement of divorce proceedings by Respondent No.

2. In these peculiar circumstances, the High Court had a duty to consider the allegations with great care and circumspection so as to protect against the danger of unjust prosecution."

31. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Kailashben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 SCC 28 2025:HHC:599

OnLine SC 2621 that general and vague allegations of cruelty

made against the husband and his relatives are not sufficient to

constitute cruelty. It was observed: -

"10.1 The tendency to make general, vague, and omnibus allegations is noticed by this Court in many decisions. In Usha Chakraborty v. State of W.B. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 90, this court observed that:

"16... the respondent alleged commission of offences under S tions 323, 384, 406, 423, 467, 468, 420 and 120B, IPC against the appellants. A bare perusal of the said allegation and the ingredients to attract them, as adverted to hereinbefore, would reveal that the allegations are vague and they did not carry the essential ingredients to constitute the alleged offences.... The ingredients to attract the alleged offence referred to hereinbefore and the nature of the allegations contained in the application filed by the respondent would undoubtedly make it clear that the respondent had failed to make specific allegations against the appellants herein in respect of the aforesaid offences. The factual position thus would reveal that the genesis as also the purpose of criminal proceedings are nothing but the aforesaid incident and further that the dispute involved is essentially of civil nature. The appellants and the respondents have given a cloak of a criminal offence in the issue..."

10.2 Similarly, dealing with allegations lacking in particulars and details, in Neelu Chopra v. Bharti (2009) 10 SCC 184, this court observed that:

"7. ...what strikes us is that there are no particulars given as to the date on which the ornaments were handed over, as to the exact number of ornaments or their description and as to the date when the ornaments were asked back and were refused. Even 29 2025:HHC:599

the weight of the ornaments is not mentioned in the complaint, and it is a general and vague complaint that the ornaments were sometimes given in the custody of the appellants and they were not returned. What strikes us more is that even in Para 10 of the complaint, where the complainant says that she asked for her clothes and ornaments, which were given to the accused, and they refused to give these back, the date is significantly absent."

xxxx

12. The complaint also refers to a small incident where the complainant's brother accompanied her to the matrimonial house when appellants no. 1 and 3 are alleged to have refused to take her back, but on persuasion by her brother, she was allowed to stay. There is also a vague allegation that, when the complainant gave birth to a second child, appellants 1 and 2 came and "quarrelled" with the complainant, her brother, and her parents and threatened them. This Court had occasion to examine the phenomenon of general and omnibus allegations in the cases of matrimonial disputes. In Mamidi Anil Kumar Reddy v. State of A.P. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 127, this Court observed that:

"14. ...A bare perusal of the complaint, statement of witnesses and the charge sheet show that the allegations against the Appellants are wholly general and omnibus in nature; even if they are taken in their entirety, they do not prima facie make out a case against the Appellants. The material on record neither discloses any particulars of the offences alleged nor discloses the specific role/allegations assigned to any of the Appellants in the commission of the offences.

15. The phenomenon of false implication by way of general omnibus allegations in the course of matrimonial disputes is not unknown to this Court. In Kahkashan Kausar alias Sonam v. State of Bihar, this Court dealt with a similar case wherein the allegations made by the complainant-wife 30 2025:HHC:599

against her in-laws u/s. 498A and others were vague and general, lacking any specific role and particulars. The court proceeded to quash the FIR against the accused persons and noted that such a situation if left unchecked, would result in the abuse of the process of law."

xxxx 13.1 In Kahkashan Kausar v. State of Bihar (2022) 6 SCC 599, this Court noticed the injustice that may be caused when parties are forced to go through tribulations of a trial based on general and omnibus allegations. The relevant portion of the observation is as under:

"11. ...in recent times, matrimonial litigation in the country has also increased significantly, and there is greater disaffection and friction surrounding the institution of marriage now more than ever. This has resulted in an increased tendency to employ provisions such as Section 498-A IPC as instruments to settle personal scores against the husband and his relatives.

18. ... upon a perusal of the contents of the FIR dated 1-4-2019, it is revealed that general allegations are levelled against the appellants. The complainant alleged that "all accused harassed her mentally and threatened her of terminating her pregnancy".

Furthermore, no specific and distinct allegations have been made against either of the appellants herein, i.e. none of the appellants have been attributed any specific role in furtherance of the general allegations made against them. This simply leads to a situation wherein one fails to ascertain the role played by each accused in furtherance of the offence. The allegations are, therefore, general and omnibus and can, at best, be said to have been made out on account of small skirmishes... However, as far as the appellants are concerned, the allegations made against them, being general and omnibus, do not warrant prosecution.

31

2025:HHC:599

21. ...it would be unjust if the appellants are forced to go through the tribulations of a trial, i.e. general and omnibus allegations cannot manifest in a situation where the relatives of the complainant's husband are forced to undergo trial. It has been highlighted by this Court in varied instances that a criminal trial leading to an eventual acquittal also inflicts severe scars upon the accused, and such an exercise must, therefore, be discouraged."

32. This position was reiterated in Dara Lakshmi

Narayana v. State of Telangana, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3682, wherein

it was observed:

18. A bare perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made by respondent No. 2 are vague and omnibus. Other than claiming that appellant No. 1 harassed her and that appellant Nos. 2 to 6 instigated him to do so, respondent No. 2 has not provided any specific details or described any particular instance of harassment. She has also not mentioned the time, date, place, or manner in which the alleged harassment occurred. Therefore, the FIR lacks concrete and precise allegations.

33. In the present case, the informant, her husband and

her son have made general and vague statements without any

particulars, and the statements are not sufficient to constitute

cruelty.

34. Dalip Chand (PW4) stated that the deceased disclosed

to him that her in-laws were pressurising her to settle the

marriage of her younger sister with accused Shashi Pal, and she

was depressed due to this fact. Neelam (PW5) stated that the 32 2025:HHC:599

deceased had talked about the pressure being exerted by her in-

laws to settle the marriage of her younger sister, Manjeet, with

accused, Shashi Pal. These statements only prove that the

marriage of accused, Shashi Pal and the younger sister of the

deceased was being settled. Joginder Lal (PW2), the informant Jai

Dei, and Jagroop Singh (PW3) admitted that Shashi Pal was

married, whereas Manjeet, the younger sister of the deceased,

was unmarried. This shows that accused Shashi had no difficulty

in getting married, and this fact would not have led the accused

to compel the deceased to commit suicide if she was unable to get

her sister engaged to accused Shashi Pal.

35. It was laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Naresh

Kumar versus the State of Haryana (2024) 3 SCC 573 that the

prosecution is required to prove that the accused had created

such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other

option but to commit suicide. The Court cannot conclude that a

woman was being harassed because she had committed suicide.

It was observed:

"17. This Court in Geo Varghese v. State of Rajasthan [Geo Varghese v. State of Rajasthan, (2021) 19 SCC 144], considering the provisions of Section 306IPC along with the definition of abetment under Section 107IPC observed as under: (SCC pp. 149-50, paras 14-16) 33 2025:HHC:599

"14. Section 306IPC makes abetment of suicide a criminal offence and prescribes punishment for the same. ...

15. The ordinary dictionary meaning of the word "instigate" is to bring about or initiate, incite someone to do something. This Court in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh [Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618: 2002 SCC (Cri) 1088], has defined the word "instigate" as under :

(SCC p. 629, para 20) '20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do "an act".'

16. The scope and ambit of Section 107 IPC and its co-relation with Section 306 IPC have been discussed repeatedly by this Court. In S.S. Chheena v.

Vijay Kumar Mahajan [S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan, (2010) 12 SCC 190 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 465], it was observed as under : (SCC p. 197, para 25) '25. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by the Supreme Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306IPC, there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option, and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide.'"

18. This Court in M. Arjunan v. State [M. Arjunan v. State, (2019) 3 SCC 315: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 219], while explaining the necessary ingredients of Section 306 IPC in detail, observed as under : (SCC p. 317, para 7) 34 2025:HHC:599

"7. The essential ingredients of the offence under Section 306IPC are (i) the abetment and (ii) the intention of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide. The act of the accused, however, insulting the deceased by using abusive language will not, by itself, constitute the abetment of suicide. There should be evidence capable of suggesting that the accused intended by such an act to instigate the deceased to commit suicide. Unless the ingredients of instigation/abetment to commit suicide are satisfied, the accused cannot be convicted under Section 306IPC."

19. This Court in Ude Singh v. State of Haryana [Ude Singh v. State of Haryana, (2019) 17 SCC 301: (2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 306], held that to convict an accused under Section 306IPC, the state of mind to commit a particular crime must be visible with regard to determining the culpability. It was observed as under: (SCC pp. 321-22, para 16) "16. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be proof of direct or indirect act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. It could hardly be disputed that the question of the cause of suicide, particularly in the context of an offence of abetment of suicide, remains a vexed one involving multifaceted and complex attributes of human behaviour and responses/reactions. In the case of an accusation of abetment of suicide, the court would be looking for cogent and convincing proof of the act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. In the case of suicide, a mere allegation of harassment of the deceased by another person would not suffice unless there be such action on the part of the accused which compels the person to commit suicide, and such an offending action ought to be proximate to the time of occurrence. Whether a person has abetted in the commission of suicide by another or not could only be gathered from the facts and circumstances of each case.

35

2025:HHC:599

16.1. For the purpose of finding out if a person has abetted the commission of suicide by another, the consideration would be if the accused is guilty of the act of instigation of the act of suicide. As explained and reiterated by this Court in the decisions above referred, instigation means to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do an act. If the persons who committed suicide had been hypersensitive and the action of the accused is otherwise not ordinarily expected to induce a similarly circumstanced person to commit suicide, it may not be safe to hold the accused guilty of abetment of suicide. But, on the other hand, if the accused, by his acts and by his continuous course of conduct, creates a situation which leads the deceased to perceive no other option except to commit suicide, the case may fall within the four corners of Section 306IPC. If the accused plays an active role in tarnishing the self-esteem and self- respect of the victim, which eventually draws the victim to commit suicide, the accused may be held guilty of abetment of suicide. The question of mens rea on the part of the accused in such cases would be examined with reference to the actual acts and deeds of the accused and if the acts and deeds are only of such nature where the accused intended nothing more than harassment or snap show of anger, a particular case may fall short of the offence of abetment of suicide. However, if the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words or deeds until the deceased reacted or was provoked, a particular case may be that of abetment of suicide. Such being the matter of delicate analysis of human behaviour, each case is required to be examined on its own facts while taking note of all the surrounding factors having bearing on the actions and psyche of the accused and the deceased."

20. This Court in Mariano Anto Bruno v. State [Mariano Anto Bruno v. State, (2023) 15 SCC 560: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1387], after referring to the above-referred decisions 36 2025:HHC:599

rendered in the context of culpability under Section 306IPC observed as under: (SCC para 45) "45. ... It is also to be borne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, a conviction in terms of Section 306IPC is not sustainable."

21. This Court in Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab [Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab, (2020) 10 SCC 200: (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 417], observed that whenever a person instigates or intentionally aids by any act or illegal omission, the doing of a thing, a person can be said to have abetted in doing that thing. To prove the offence of abetment, as specified under Section 107IPC, the state of mind to commit a particular crime must be visible to determine the culpability.

22. This Court in Kashibai v. State of Karnataka [Kashibai v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 15 SCC 751: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 575], observed that to bring the case within the purview of "abetment" under Section 107IPC, there has to be an evidence with regard to the instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid on the part of the accused and for the purpose proving the charge under Section 306IPC, also there has to be an evidence with regard to the positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid to drive a person to commit suicide.

23. Had there been any clinching evidence of incessant harassment on account of which the wife was left with no other option but to put an end to her life, it could have been said that the accused intended the consequences of his act, namely, suicide. A person intends a consequence when he (1) foresees that it will happen if the given series of acts or omissions continue and (2) desires it to happen. The most serious level of culpability, justifying the most serious levels of punishment, is achieved when both these 37 2025:HHC:599

components are actually present in the accused's mind (a "subjective" test).

24. For intention in English law, Section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1967, provides the frame in which the mens rea is assessed. It states:

"A court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an offence,

(a) shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his actions by reasons only of its being a natural and probable consequence of those actions but

(b) shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all the evidence, drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the circumstances."

Under Section 8(b), therefore, the jury is allowed wide latitude in applying a hybrid test to impute intent or foresight on the basis of all the evidence.

25. It is now well settled that in order to convict a person under Section 306IPC, there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. Mere harassment is not sufficient to hold an accused guilty of abetting the commission of suicide. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide. The ingredient of mens rea cannot be assumed to be ostensibly present but has to be visible and conspicuous.

36. It was submitted that the deceased had committed

suicide within seven years of her marriage, and presumption

under Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act applies to the

present case. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down

by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Naresh (supra) that the 38 2025:HHC:599

presumption under Section 113 A of the Indian Evidence Act will

only apply when there is proof of the cruelty. It was observed:-

"29. Section 113-A of the Evidence Act requires proof : (1) that her husband or relatives subjected her to cruelty and (2) that the married woman committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage.

30. Although it is not necessary for us to refer to Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, which raises a presumption as to dowry death yet, with a view to indicate the fine distinction between the two presumptions, we are referring to Section 113-B. In Section 113-A, the legislature has used the word "may", whereas in Section 113-B, the word used is "shall".

31. In this appeal, we are concerned with Section 113-A of the Evidence Act. The mere fact that the deceased committed suicide within a period of seven years of her marriage, the presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, would not automatically apply. The legislative mandate is that where a woman commits suicide within seven years of her marriage, and it is shown that her husband or any relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act may be raised, having regard to all other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband.

32. What is important to note is that the term "the court may presume having regard to all other circumstances of the case that such suicide had been abetted by her husband" would indicate that the presumption is discretionary, unlike the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, which is mandatory. Therefore, before the presumption under Section 113-A is raised, the prosecution must show evidence of cruelty or incessant harassment in that regard.

33. The court should be extremely careful in assessing evidence under Section 113-A for finding out if cruelty was 39 2025:HHC:599

meted out. If it transpires that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the court would not be satisfied for holding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide was guilty.

34. Section 113-A has been interpreted by this Court in Lakhjit Singh v. State of Punjab [Lakhjit Singh v. State of Punjab, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 173: 1994 SCC (Cri) 235], Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana [Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana, (1998) 3 SCC 309: 1998 SCC (Cri) 740] and Shanti v. State of Haryana [Shanti v. State of Haryana, (1991) 1 SCC 371: 1991 SCC (Cri) 191].

35. This Court has held that from the mere fact of suicide within seven years of marriage, one should not jump to the conclusion of abetment unless cruelty was proved. The court has the discretion to raise or not to raise the presumption because of the words "may presume". It must take into account all the circumstances of the case, which is an additional safeguard.

36. In the absence of any cogent evidence of harassment or cruelty, an accused cannot be held guilty of the offence under Section 306IPC by raising a presumption under Section 113-A."

37. Sanjiv Kumar (PW7) stated that on the intervening

night of 22nd and 23rd June 2011, Kamla Devi came to his home and

disclosed that Sandesh Kumar was serious and had to be shifted

to Una. He and Dharam Pal went towards the hospital with

Sandesh Kumari on a motorcycle. An Ambulance met them on the

way, and Sandesh Kumari was shifted to the Ambulance. She was 40 2025:HHC:599

taken in the Ambulance to Regional Hospital, Una. This shows

that Kamla Devi had approached her neighbour to take the

deceased to the hospital. The conduct of the accused is

inconsistent with their guilt. It was laid down by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Prithvi Raj, 1995 Supp (3)

SCC 410: 1995 SCC (Cri) 934 that where the accused took the

deceased to the hospital, it is quite consistent with their

innocence. It was observed at page 412:

"5. It is true, as contended by the learned counsel, that the manner of appreciation of the evidence in respect of the dying declaration is not altogether sound. But the High Court has rightly held that the immediate conduct of the accused and his parents in rushing the deceased to the hospital immediately by arranging a jeep is quite consistent with their being innocent. However, we find that the overall reasoning of the High Court in giving the benefit of the doubt to the accused cannot be said to be wholly unsound and does not stand judicial scrutiny..."

38. The complaint (Ex. PW-1/A) was made after three

days of the incident. Initially, no suspicion was expressed. It was

wrongly stated in the complaint that the deceased had told her

parents about the harassment on the way to PGI Chandigarh. It

was laid down in Mehraj Singh v. State of U.P. (1994) 5 SCC 188 that

the delay in lodging FIR leads to embellishments, concoction and

fabrication and, therefore, the Court should see the prosecution 41 2025:HHC:599

case with utmost care and caution in case of delay. It was

observed:

"FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence for the purpose of appreciating the evidence led at the trial. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the FIR is to obtain the earliest information regarding the circumstance in which the crime was committed, including the names of the actual culprits and the parts played by them, the weapons, if any, used, as also the names of the eyewitnesses, if any. Delay in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment, which is a creature of an afterthought. On account of the delay, the FIR not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, but danger also creeps in the introduction of a coloured version or exaggerated story. With a view to determine whether the FIR was lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, the courts generally look for certain external checks. One of the checks is the receipt of the copy of the FIR, called a special report in a murder case, by the local Magistrate. If this report is received by the Magistrate late, it can give rise to an inference that the FIR was not lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded unless, of course, the prosecution can offer a satisfactory explanation for the delay in dispatching or receipt of the copy of the FIR by the local Magistrate. The prosecution has led no evidence at all in this behalf. The second external check equally important is the sending of a copy of the FIR along with the dead body and its reference in the inquest report. Even though the inquest, prepared under Section 174 CrPC, is aimed at serving a statutory function, to lend credence to the prosecution case, the details of the FIR and the gist of statements recorded during inquest proceedings get reflected in the report. The absence of those details is indicative of the fact that the prosecution story was still in an embryo state and had not been given any shape and that the FIR came to be recorded later on after due deliberations and consultations and was then ante-timed to give it the colour of a 42 2025:HHC:599

promptly lodged FIR. In our opinion, on account of the infirmities as noticed above, the FIR has lost its value and authenticity, and it appears to us that the same has been ante-timed and had not been recorded till the inquest proceedings were over at the spot by PW 8."

39. This position was reiterated in P Rajagopal vs State of

Tamil Nadu 2019 (5) SCC 40, wherein it was observed: -

"12. Normally, the Court may reject the case of the prosecution in case of inordinate delay in lodging the first information report because of the possibility of a concoction of evidence by the prosecution. However, if the delay is satisfactorily explained, the Court will decide the matter on merits without giving much importance to such delay. The Court is duty-bound to determine whether the explanation afforded is plausible enough given the facts and circumstances of the case. The delay may be condoned if the complainant appears to be reliable and without any motive for implicating the accused falsely. [See Apren Joseph v. State of Kerala, (1973) 3 SCC 114; Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1]."

40. Thus, learned Trial Court was justified in doubting the

prosecution case due to the delay in reporting the matter to the

police.

41. No other point was urged.

42. In view of the above, the learned Trial Court had taken

a reasonable view, which could have been taken based on the

general/vague statements made by the prosecution witnesses,

the dying declaration made by the deceased and the statement of

Joginder Lal (PW2). No interference is required with the view of 43 2025:HHC:599

the learned Trial Court while deciding the appeal against the

acquittal. Accordingly, the present appeal fails, and the same is

dismissed.

43. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code

of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha

Sanhita, 2023), the respondents/accused are directed to furnish

bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/-each with one surety each in

the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court

within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with

stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed

against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the

respondents/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear

before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

44. A copy of this judgment along with the record of the

learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith. Pending applications,

if any, also stand disposed of.

(Tarlok Singh Chauhan) Judge

(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 4th January, 2025 (Chander)