Reserved On: 17.09.2025 vs State Of H.P. & Others

Suresh Sharotri & others ...Petitioners

of Versus

State of H.P. & others rt ...Respondents

Coram

Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? No

For the Petitioners : Mr Anuj Nag, Advocate.

For the respondents No. 1 : Mr Prashant Sen, Deputy to 3/State Advocate General.

For the respondent No.4 : Ms Tanu Sharma, Advocate.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The petitioners have filed the present petition for

quashing of the Case No. 02/2023 titled Shilpi Sharma versus

Sandeep and others pending before the learned Judicial

Magistrate First Class, Court No. IV, Hamirpur, District

Hamirpur, H.P. (learned Trial Court). (Parties shall hereinafter

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be referred to in the same manner as they are arrayed before the

learned Trial Court for convenience.)

.

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present

petition are that a Domestic Incident Report was filed before the

learned Trial Court claiming various reliefs under the Protection

of Women from Domestic Violence Act (DV Act). It was asserted

of that the informant was being taunted on trivial matters. When it

was found that the informant was sick, she was asked to conceal rt the illness. She was not permitted to serve at Hamirpur and was

not allowed to go out of her matrimonial home. Obstructions

were being created in meeting the informant's relatives. Her

name was not recorded in the Ration Card. She was asked to

carry out the work after she had undergone an operation, even

though her health did not allow her to carry out the work. The

informant's husband listened to his parents, and the

informant's parents-in-law interfered with her life. She was

left in Hamirpur on 30.10.2007. She was not allowed to sit in the

courtyard. Her stridhan, articles and health record were with the

respondents, and she required the health record for further

treatment. The informant had to carry out the private job, and

no maintenance was provided to her. Her mobile number was

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also blocked by her husband. Hence, it was prayed that the

action be taken against the respondents and various reliefs be

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provided to her.

3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to issue

summons to the respondents.

4. Being aggrieved by the petition filed before the

of learned Trial Court, the respondents have filed the present

petition for quashing the complaint and the proceedings rt pending before the learned Trial Court. It was asserted that

petitioners No. 1 and 2 are parents of Sandeep Sharotri, the

informant's husband and petitioner No. 3 is the sister of

Sandeep Sharotri. The marriage between the informant and her

husband was solemnised on 19.11.2015. It was agreed between

the parties that there would be no exchange of dowry. Sandeep

Sharotri, his parents and the informant left for Gurugram,

where he was serving. Petitioners No.1 and 2 returned after 15

days and settled the informant and her husband in their new

home. The informant and her husband resided happily in

Gurugram. The petitioner No.3 visited Gurugram in March 2016

for her studies at AIIMS. She informed Sandeep Sharotri that the

informant was suffering from a severe backache and should be

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taken to the hospital. Various tests were conducted, and it was

found that the informant had a tumour. The informant told her

.

husband and his relatives not to disclose this fact to her parents.

The informant was taken to PGI, Chandigarh, where she

underwent an operation. The informant was taken to the

hospital for follow-up treatment. The informant started

of behaving strangely after her surgery. She withdrew herself from

the household chores, social obligations and marital duties. She rt started saying bad things about her husband and his family

members. She left the home suddenly after arguments with her

husband. Sandeep Sharotri suggested that he would drop her off

at her parents' home, and he dropped the informant off at her

parents' home. Efforts were made to take her to a matrimonial

home, but the informant stated that she was serving in a school

and would leave for Gurugram only if she got a job. The

informant had herself withdrawn from the society of her

husband. A divorce petition is pending before the learned

District Judge, Kangra. The present proceedings were initiated

as a counterblast to the proceedings for divorce. The informant

has not been residing in her matrimonial home since 2017, and

the complaint under the Domestic Violence Act is barred by

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limitation. The complaint can only be filed against the male

members, and the complaint filed against petitioners No.2 and

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3, who are females, is not maintainable. Hence, it was prayed

that the present petition be allowed and the proceedings

pending before the learned Trial Court be quashed.

5. The petition is opposed by filing a reply by

of respondent No.3, making a preliminary submission regarding

the lack of maintainability. It was asserted that the petitioners rt interfered with the family life of the informant. Hence, they

were included as respondents in the proceedings before the

learned Trial Court. The informant tried to contact her husband

through mobile, WhatsApp and his relatives, but she was

unsuccessful. She was abandoned by the respondents (present

petitioners). The case of domestic violence was made out;

therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

6. The informant also filed a separate reply taking a

preliminary objection regarding the lack of maintainability. She

asserted that the petitioners had abandoned her. She tried to

contact the petitioners but was unable to do so. She was forced

to work, which she was unable to do because of her illness. She

was left in her parental home. She had to take a job to survive.

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The petitioners and the informant's husband snapped all

contact with the informant, and she was unable to reach them.

.

She had no option but to file a complaint under the DV Act. The

domestic violence is continuing, and the petition is not barred

by limitation. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be

dismissed.

of

7. I have heard Mr Anuj Nag, learned counsel for the

petitioners and Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate rt General for respondents No.1 to 3/State and Ms Tanu Sharma,

learned counsel for respondent No.4/informant.

8. Mr Anuj Nag, learned counsel for the petitioner,

submitted that the petition against the female members is not

maintainable under the DV Act. No specific allegations were

made against the petitioners, and a complaint containing

general and vague allegations against the petitioners is not

maintainable. The informant left her matrimonial home in the

year 2017, and she filed a complaint under the Domestic

Violence Act before the learned Trial Court in the year 2021.

Hence, the petition was barred by limitation. The continuation

of the proceedings before the learned Trial Court amounts to an

abuse of the process of the Court; therefore, he prayed that the

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present petition be allowed and the proceedings pending before

the learned Trial Court be quashed. He relied upon the judgment

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of Geddam Jhansi and another vs. State of Telangana and others

2025 SCC Online SC 263 in support of his submission.

9. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General

for respondents No.1 to 3/State, submitted that the informant

of made a complaint to the police regarding the domestic violence.

The complaint was referred to the Protection Officer, who rt investigated it and submitted a Domestic Incident Report before

the learned Trial Court. The learned Trial Court is seized of the

matter, and this Court should not interfere with the proceedings

pending before the learned Trial Court. Therefore, he prayed

that the present petition be dismissed.

10. Ms. Tanu Sharma, learned counsel for the

respondent No.3/informant, submitted that the Hon'ble

Supreme Court struck down the provision of Domestic Violence,

which excluded the female members in Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum

Narottamdas Harsora, (2016) 10 SCC 165, and the plea that the

complaint is not maintainable against the female members is

not sustainable. The domestic violence is continuing wrong and

no limitation applies to it. The allegations in the domestic

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incident reports are sufficient to show that the petitioners had

committed domestic violence against the informant. This Court

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should not exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction in the present

matter. Hence, she prayed that the present petition be

dismissed.

11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions

of made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

12. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in rt Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal, 2025 SCC OnLine SC

1158, that the High Court should have a hands-off approach

under the DV Act and should interfere only when there is gross

illegality or abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed:

"35. When it comes to the exercise of power under Section 482 of the CrPC in relation to an application under Section 12(1),

the High Court has to keep in mind the fact that the DV Act, 2005, is a welfare legislation specially enacted to give justice to those women who suffer from domestic violence and to

prevent acts of domestic violence. Therefore, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC for quashing proceedings under Section 12(1), the High Court should be very slow and circumspect. Interference can be made only when the case is clearly of gross illegality or gross abuse of the process of law. Generally, the High Court must adopt a hands-off approach while dealing with proceedings under Section 482 for quashing an application under Section 12(1). Unless the High Courts show restraint in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC while dealing with a prayer for quashing the proceedings under the DV Act, 2005, the very object of enacting the DV Act, 2005, will be defeated."

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13. Section 2(q) of the DV Act defines the respondent as

any adult male person who is or has been in a domestic

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relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom the

aggrieved person has sought any relief under the Act. It was

submitted that since the term respondent means only an adult

male person, therefore, the complaint could not have been filed

of against petitioners No.2 and 3, who are females and not covered

under the provisions of Section 2(q). This submission cannot be rt accepted. The Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the

constitutionality of Section 2(q) in Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum

Narottamdas Harsora, (2016) 10 SCC 165 : (2017) 1 SCC (Cri) 1 : (2017) 1

SCC (Civ) 468: 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1118 and held that Section 2(q)

has to be read down and the words adult male person are to be

struck out because they are contrary to the object of protecting

women who have suffered from the domestic violence of any

kind. It was observed at page 197:

"39. A conspectus of these judgments also leads to the result that the microscopic difference between male and female, adult and non-adult, regard being had to the ob- ject sought to be achieved by the 2005 Act, is neither real nor substantial nor does it have any rational relation to the object of the legislation. In fact, as per the principle settled in Subramanian Swamy [Subramanian Swamy v. CBI, (2014) 8 SCC 682: (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 42: (2014) 3 SCC (L&S) 36] judgment, the words "adult male person" are

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contrary to the object of affording protection to women who have suffered from domestic violence "of any kind".

We, therefore, strike down the words "adult male" before the word "person" in Section 2(q), as these words dis-

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criminate between persons similarly situated, and far

from being in tune with, are contrary to the object sought to be achieved by the 2005 Act."

14. Therefore, the submission that a complaint under

the Domestic Violence Act is not maintainable against a female

of cannot be accepted, and the complaint cannot be held to be bad

against the petitioners, Nos. 2 and 3.

15. rt It was submitted that the complaint is barred by

limitation because the informant had left her matrimonial

home in the year 2017. This submission will not help the

petitioners. The Domestic Incident Report shows that no

maintenance was being provided to her, and she was not

permitted to reside in a shared household. It was rightly

submitted on behalf of the informant that these were

continuing wrongs and there would be no period of limitation

for filing the complaint. It was laid down by the Punjab and

Haryana High Court in Geeta Kapoor v. State of Haryana, 2013 SCC

OnLine P&H 21779: ILR (2014) 2 P&H 293 that a petition under

the DV Act can be filed at any time during the subsistence of

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marriage and no period of limitation applies to it. It was

observed at page 297:

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"(6) The case law, Inderjit Singh Grewal's case (supra), is

not applicable to the case in hand. In the cited case, there was a decree of divorce between the parties. The relation-

ship came to an end between the parties in the cited case

law. The correct view is that in the case of a decree of di- vorce, the limitation to file proceedings is only a year. But in this case still the relationship of husband and wife is

of alive. The object of the D.V. Act is to provide effective pro- tection of the rights of women guaranteed under the Constitution who are victims of violence of any kind oc-

rt curring within the family. So, it is held that in the case of a subsisting relationship of husband and wife, there is no limitation. Meaning thereby that the complaint under the

D.V. Act can be filed at any time, as the physical and men- tal harassment within the family is a continuing offence."

16. It was laid down by the Allahabad High Court in

Trilochan Singh vs. Manpreet Kaur and Ors. (23.10.2021 - ALLHC):

MANU/UP/3561/2021 that the petition under Section 12 of the D V

Act does not disclose an offence and the period of limitation

provided under Section 468 of does not apply to it. It was

observed:

5. Section 468 Cr.P.C. speaks about taking of "cognizance of an offence" and the acts of domestic violence described in the D.V. Act are not offences under the D.V. Act, hence taking of the cognizance of offence is out of question, therefore, applicability of Section 468 Cr.P.C. for acting upon the applications moved under Section 12 of the D.V. Act does not seem just and legal. In other words, Section

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468 Cr.P.C. has no application as far as the applications under Section 12 of the D.V. Act are concerned.

17. It was further held that the proceedings are of a civil

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nature, but the Limitation Act does not apply to them. It was

observed:

90. Hence, at the cost of repetition, since the D.V. Act is a beneficial legislation providing remedies of a civil nature

of for ensuring effective protection to women against domestic violence. The legislature in its wisdom has provided no limitation for moving an application under its Section 12, so the rigour of provisions of the rt Limitation Act, 1963 shall not apply, and the application so moved cannot be turned down in limine on the ground

of limitation alone. The best approach would be to apply the criteria of within 'reasonable period', and what will be the 'reasonable period' will be decided on the basis of 'factual matrix' of each case, keeping in mind the

principle of 'equity, justice and good conscience'.

18. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan, (2022) 15 SCC 50: 2022 SCC

OnLine SC 446 that a petition under Section 12 of the DV Act does

not disclose any offence and no limitation applies to it. It was

observed at page 71:

"19. Let us now consider the applicability of these princi- ples to cases under the Act. The provisions of the Act con- template the filing of an application under Section 12 to initiate the proceedings before the Magistrate concerned. After hearing both sides and taking into account the ma- terial on record, the Magistrate may pass an appropriate order under Section 12 of the Act. It is only the breach of such an order which constitutes an offence, as is clear

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from Section 31 of the Act. Thus, if there be any offence committed in terms of the provisions of the Act, the limi- tation prescribed under Section 468 of the Code will apply from the date of commission of such offence. By the time

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an application is preferred under Section 12 of the Act,

there is no offence committed in terms of the provisions of the Act, and as such, there would never be a starting point for limitation from the date of application under

Section 12 of the Act. Such a starting point for limitation would arise only and only after there is a breach of an or- der passed under Section 12 of the Act."

of

19. This judgment was followed by the Jammu, Kashmir

and Ladakh High Court in Mudasir Ahmad Dar vs. Mashooka and rt Ors. (20.05.2024 - JKHC) : MANU/JK/0434/2024, and it was

observed:

"8. So far as the contention of the petitioner that the

petition under Section 12 of D.V.Act filed by respondent No.1 is barred by time is concerned, the same is also without any substance. This question has been dealt with

by the Supreme Court in the Kamatchi case (supra), and it has been held that it is not necessary that an application

under Section 12 of the Act ought to be filed within a period of one year when the alleged acts of domestic violence have taken place. The contention of the

petitioner is therefore without any substance.

20. This position was reiterated in Tilak Raj v. Darshana

Devi, 2025 SCC OnLine J&K 855, wherein it was observed:

"17. In such a situation of the matter, when the bar of limitation is not applicable to a complaint/application under Section 12 or under Section 23 of the DV Act, the plea raised with regard to limitation is not tenable in the case, as the provision under Section 468 CrPC regarding limitation can be made applicable to a complaint under

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penal provisions of Sections 31 and 33 of the DV Act, and not to any other application under the DV Act."

21. Hence, the plea that the complaint be quashed

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because it was filed beyond the period of limitation cannot be

accepted.

22. It was submitted that the allegations against the

of petitioners are false. The petitioners have cooperated with the

informant, and she has left the matrimonial home without any rt reason. This submission will not help the petitioners. The Court

exercising inherent jurisdiction does not go into the validity or

otherwise of the allegations and has to treat them as correct.

This position was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983,

wherein it was observed: -

"29. It is settled law that the power of quashing a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with

circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non- interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely according to its whims or caprice."

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23. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P.,

2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent

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jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or

otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: -

"13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made

of in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face rt value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the

present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under

Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra).

14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in

the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060:

"14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once

the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16)

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"16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the

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complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had

been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the

offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge sheet, documents, etc. or not.

of

24. Once the contents of the Domestic Violence Act are

taken to be correct, they show the economic, physical, verbal rt and emotional abuse and prima facie satisfy the requirement of

domestic violence. Therefore, it is impermissible to quash the

proceedings.

25. It was submitted that the allegations are vague.

Reliance was placed upon the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme

Court, Geddam Jhansi (supra). This submission will not help the

petitioners because the judgment in Geddam Jhansi (supra) dealt

with the commission of an offence punishable under Section

498A, which is criminal in nature, whereas the proceedings

under the DV Act are civil in nature. This position was laid down

by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi

(supra) wherein it was observed:

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"28.1 Thus, there is no doubt that, notwithstanding the penal provisions in the form of Sections 31 and 33 of Chapter V, the proceedings before the Magistrate under the DV Act, 2005, are predominantly of a civil nature."

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26. In the present case, the domestic incident report

contains sufficient allegations to inquire into the matter, and

the allegations are to be elaborated during the trial by leading

the evidence. Therefore, it is impermissible to quash the

of complaint on the ground that sufficient details were not given

by the informant.

rt

27. It is undisputed that the matter is pending before the

learned Trial Court. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine

SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned

Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was

observed:

"At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected, forming part of the charge sheet. If any such

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discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not."

28. Therefore, the complaint cannot be quashed on this

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consideration as well.

29. No other point was urged.

30. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and

of the same is dismissed.

31. The observation made herein before shall remain rt confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing,

whatsoever, on the merits of the case.

(Rakesh Kainthla)

th 6 November, 2025 Judge (Nikita)

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