Reserved On: - 12.03.2026 vs State Of J&K

Sr. No. 02 HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH AT JAMMU Case No.: CRMC No. 67/2013 c/w CRMC No. 15/2013

Reserved on: - 12.03.2026 Pronounced on:- 01.04.2026 Uploaded on:- 01.04.2026 Whether the operative part or full judgment is pronounced Full

Kali Dass and Anr. .... Petitioner(s)

Through: - Mr. O P Thakur, Sr. Advocate with Mr. R K S Thakur, Advocate. Ms. Anandita Thakur, Advocate (in CRMC No. 67/2013). Mr. Aseem Kumar Sawhney, Sr. Adv. (Th. Virtual Mode). Ms. Tehseena Bukhari, Advocate. Mr. Sarfaraz Ahmed, Advocate. Mr. Piyush Behal, Advocate. Mr. Dheeraj Singh, Advocate. Mr. Harsh Singh, Advocate in (CRMC No. 15/2013) V/s

State of J&K. .... Respondent(s)

Through: - Mr. P D Singh, Dy. AG.

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PARIHAR, JUDGE JUDGMENT

1. These two petitions arise out of a common order dated 15.12.2012

passed by Principal Sessions Judge, Jammu, hereinafter referred to

as "the trial Court", in a case arising out of FIR No. 31/2006

registered at Police Station, Peer Mitha, Jammu, for commission of

offences under Sections 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act and

Sections 419, 420, 467, 468 and 471 RPC. By virtue of the

impugned order, the petitioners came to be discharged for offences

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under Sections 467 and 471 RPC, but were directed to be charged

for offences under Sections 419, 420, 468, 120-B RPC and Sections

3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act. Aggrieved thereof, the

petitioners have questioned the legality, propriety and correctness

of the order of charge.

2. The principal grounds urged in challenge are that the order

impugned is contrary to facts and law; that the petitioners have

been falsely implicated; that they have been roped in subsequently

only on the basis of statements of co-accused; that there was no

legal material before the trial Court to frame charges against them;

and that the petitioners have been made accused in relation to what

is essentially the same transaction already forming subject matter of

another FIR registered by another police station, which, according

to them, was not legally permissible.

3. The case of the petitioners, in brief, is that the prosecution has

failed to place on record any material to show that allotment order

No. 1384-87/AD/CAPD/J-100-05 dated 16.05.2006 was prepared

by any of them. It is contended that the said allotment order

pertains to FIR No. 91/2006 of Police Station, Satwari, and not to

the present FIR No. 31/2006 of Police Station, Peer Mitha. It is

further submitted that in the list of allotment orders annexed with

the charge-sheet in the present case, the aforesaid allotment order

dated 16.05.2006 is not specifically reflected as the foundational

forged document prepared by the petitioners. According to the

petitioners, the prosecution has failed to identify with certainty the

particular false document attributed to each of them.

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4. It is also contended that petitioner Kali Dass, at the relevant time,

was serving as Senior Assistant in the CAPD Department;

petitioner Swaran Singh was working as Chowkidar; and petitioner

Bal Krishan Sharma was functioning as Assistant Director in the

said Department. According to learned counsel for the petitioners,

mere employment in the CAPD Department cannot be made a basis

for fastening criminal liability, unless there is cogent material

showing participation in preparation, issuance or use of forged

allotment orders. The argument is that no such material has been

collected during investigation.

5. The factual matrix, as emerging from the record, is that Police

Station, Satwari had registered FIR No. 91/2006 under Sections 3/7

of the Essential Commodities Act and Sections 419, 420, 467, 468

and 471 RPC, when it was found that one Gurmeet Singh, licence-

holder of a kerosene oil sale outlet, was indulging in black-

marketing of kerosene oil meant for public distribution. A raid

conducted at his premises resulted in recovery of 600 litres of

kerosene oil in three barrels, which, according to the police, was in

excess of the allotted quota of 300 litres.

6. During investigation of the said case, it surfaced that the kerosene

oil had been decanted at the outlet of the said Gurmeet Singh on

14.06.2006 by Tanker No. JK06G-9394 driven by Kesar Singh. The

tanker belonged to M/S Devi Dass Gopal Krishan Warehouse,

Jammu, a stockist of kerosene oil of Indian Oil Corporation. Upon

arrest of Gurmeet Singh and scrutiny of the record, the police found

that the kerosene oil had allegedly been released vide allotment

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order No. 1384-87/AD/CAPD/J-100-05 dated 16.05.2006, which

came to be suspected as fake.

7. It further appears that the senior police officer supervising the

jurisdiction of Police Station, Satwari informed the Senior

Superintendent of Police, Jammu, that kerosene oil was being sold

in black market by various sale depots in Jammu city on the

strength of fake allotment orders. Consequently, Police Station,

Peer Mitha registered FIR No. 31/2006 for offences under Sections

3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act and Sections 419, 420, 467,

468 and 471 RPC, in relation to the larger racket concerning

preparation and circulation of fake allotment orders.

8. During investigation of FIR No. 31/2006, it was alleged that

employees of M/S Devi Dass Gopal Krishan disclosed that fake

allotment orders had been got prepared with the active connivance

of officials of the CAPD Department. It is also the case of the

prosecution that fake allotment orders were being used by stockists

to obtain release of kerosene oil, which was then sold in black

market, thereby defeating the object of public distribution under the

statutory control regime.

9. The record further reveals that the co-accused Swarn Singh is stated

to have disclosed during investigation that co-accused Rattan Lal

and Keshav Sawhney had faked a large number of allotment orders

with the connivance of the then Assistant Director, namely Bal

Krishan Sharma. Likewise, petitioner Kali Dass is shown to have

stated under Section 161 Cr.P.C. that the co-accused, namely,

Keshav Sawhney and Rattan Lal, who were associated with the

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Kerosene Oil Dealers' Association, used to produce photocopies of

various orders and that the then Assistant Director had asked him to

sign printed allotment orders, which he signed under directions of

the superior officer. He is also shown to have stated that later he

found that such orders were photocopies, tampered with and

illegally used for fake allotment of kerosene oil.

10. It has also come in the investigation that typing work of such

allotment orders was allegedly being undertaken in the office of

M.K. Enterprises, Chowk Chaubtra, Mubarak Mandi, owned by one

M.K. Koul. Statement of PW-Sanjay Sharma indicates that Keshav

Sawhney and Rattan Lal used to come regularly for typing

allotment orders of kerosene oil for the last several months and he

used to charge Rs.10/- per page, though according to him, he had

no knowledge that the same were forged documents.

11. The prosecution has also relied upon the statement of PW-Omesh

Sharma, an employee of M/S Devi Dass Gopal Krishan, who stated

that allotment order bearing No. 1384-87/AD/CAPD/J-100-05

dated 16.05.2006 had been produced by co-accused Keshav

Sawhney. He further stated that when he and another employee

suspected the genuineness of the order, the photocopy thereof was

shown to Kali Dass and Swaran Singh, employees of the CAPD

Department, who informed them that the order was genuine,

whereafter kerosene oil was issued on that basis.

12. Upon completion of investigation, the petitioners along with other

accused came to be challaned before the Court of Special Railway

Magistrate, Jammu, for commission of offences under Sections 3/7 CRMC No. 67/2013 c/w CRMC No. 15/2013 Page 5 of 14 2026:JKLHC-JMU:873

of the Essential Commodities Act and Sections 419, 420, 467, 468,

471 and 120-B RPC. The petitioners had remained on bail during

investigation. The learned Magistrate committed the case to the

Court of Sessions, that trial Court, after consideration of the

material on record, discharged the petitioners for offences under

Sections 467 and 471 RPC, but framed charges against them for

offences under Sections 419, 420, 468, 120-B RPC and Sections

3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act. It is this order, which is

under challenge in the present petitions.

13. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that not an iota of

evidence has been collected during investigation to show that any

forged allotment order was actually prepared by the petitioners. It is

contended that the trial Court failed to notice that the allotment

order dated 16.05.2006 is the subject matter of FIR No. 91/2006 of

Police Station, Satwari, and that the present charge-sheet in FIR

No. 31/2006 does not clearly spell out as to which particular forged

order was authored or fabricated by the petitioners.

14. It is next contended that petitioner Bal Krishan Sharma has been

implicated solely on the basis of statements of co-accused recorded

by the police under Section 161 Cr.P.C., which are neither

substantive evidence nor legally admissible against a co-accused for

the purpose of framing charge. It is urged that statements of co-

accused, unless amounting to legally admissible confessions within

the framework of the Evidence Act, cannot be used to implicate

another accused. It is submitted that the trial Court failed to

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appreciate this settled principle and proceeded on conjectures and

assumptions.

15. Learned counsel further submitted that PW-Omesh Sharma and

Chamail Singh, both employees of the stockist firm, in fact stated

that when the questioned allotment order was brought from the

office of M/S Devi Dass Gopal Krishan, they became suspicious

and approached the CAPD Department for verification, where they

were told by petitioners Kali Dass and Swaran Singh that the order

was genuine. According to the petitioners, even if this statement is

taken at face value, it may at best amount to an act of verification or

misrepresentation, but by no stretch establishes preparation of

forged allotment orders or conspiracy to fabricate them.

16. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent-State

submitted that the trial Court has rightly passed the impugned

order. According to the respondent, the material collected during

investigation discloses a prima facie case showing active

connivance of the petitioners with stockists and dealers in

preparation, verification and use of fake allotment orders. It is

submitted that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court is not

required to meticulously appreciate the evidence as if finally

determining guilt, but only to see whether strong suspicion or grave

suspicion arises from the material collected.

17. It is also submitted by the respondent that the learned trial Court

has already sifted the material and found that there was no

sufficient ground for framing charge under Sections 467 and 471

RPC, which is why the petitioners were discharged for those

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offences. According to the learned State counsel, the impugned

order demonstrates due application of mind, inasmuch as the

learned trial Court separated the offences not made out from those

for which prima facie case did exist.

18. In rebuttal, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the

CAPD Department had, by order dated 04.01.2006, directed all

stockists of kerosene oil not to act upon photocopies of allotment

orders. Therefore, according to the petitioners, even if a forged

photocopy was used in the market, the petitioners cannot be blamed

unless there is direct evidence of their participation in the

fabrication or intentional use thereof.

19. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length, perused the

impugned order, the charge-sheet, the statements collected during

investigation and the material produced on record.

20. The scope of interference by this Court, while exercising revisional

jurisdiction against an order framing charge, is well circumscribed.

It is trite that at the stage of charge, the Court is not required to

meticulously evaluate the evidence as if conducting a full-fledged

trial. The test is whether the material placed on record, if taken at

its face value, discloses the existence of a prima facie case or at

least raises a grave suspicion against the accused. The Court is not

to weigh the sufficiency of evidence for conviction but only to

examine whether there exists a strong suspicion which, if

unrebutted, would warrant the accused being put on trial. This

principle stands authoritatively settled in "State of Bihar v. Ramesh

Singh, AIR (1977) 4 SCC 39", wherein it was held that even strong

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suspicion founded on material before the Court is sufficient for

framing charge.

21. It is equally settled that while exercising powers of discharge or

framing of charge, the Court must sift the material to the limited

extent necessary to determine whether the allegations are

groundless. Where the material gives rise to grave suspicion, the

Court would be justified in framing the charge; conversely, where

two views are possible and the material gives rise only to mere

suspicion, the accused would be entitled to discharge. However, the

threshold at this stage is intentionally low, so as not to stifle

legitimate prosecution at its inception. The principles governing

this stage have been succinctly laid down in "Union of India

vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal, AIR 1979 SC 366", wherein the

Supreme Court delineated the contours of judicial scrutiny at the

stage of charge.

22. In the present case, the argument of the petitioners that there is "not

an iota of evidence" against them is, upon a careful scrutiny of the

record, found to be an overstatement. The material collected during

investigation cannot be said to be wholly bereft of incriminating

circumstances. The seizure of as many as twenty-five allotment

orders, coupled with the forensic indication that at least one such

allotment order was fake, prima facie suggests that the case is not

confined to a singular aberration but points towards a systematic

modus operandi involving preparation and use of forged allotment

orders. At this stage, such material is sufficient to raise a

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presumption, within the meaning of law governing framing of

charge.

23. The statement of PW-Omesh Sharma assumes significance at this

stage. According to the prosecution, when suspicion arose

regarding the genuineness of the allotment order dated 16.05.2006,

the same was shown to petitioners Kali Dass and Swaran Singh,

who, being officials of the CAPD Department, represented the

same to be genuine, whereafter kerosene oil was released. If this

material is taken at face value, it prima facie indicates that the said

petitioners were not passive spectators but played a role in

facilitating the use of a forged document. Whether such conduct

ultimately constitutes culpability is a matter for trial; however, at

this stage, the Court cannot undertake a meticulous evaluation of

credibility. As reiterated in "Amit Kapoor Vs. Ramesh Chander,

(2012) 9 SCC 460", the Court must refrain from examining the

sufficiency or reliability of evidence and should only see whether

the allegations disclose an offence.

24. Further, the statements indicating that forged allotment orders were

being repeatedly typed outside the department by private

individuals, and that such orders were similar in nature and used

over a period of time, lend support to the prosecution version that

the activity was organized and not isolated. The allegation of a

broader conspiracy involving private persons and departmental

officials, therefore, cannot be said to be inherently implausible at

this stage. It is settled that conspiracy is seldom proved by direct

evidence and may be inferred from surrounding circumstances, as

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recognized in "State (NCT of Delhi) Vs. Navjot Sandhu",

AIR 2005 SC 3820".

25. The principal thrust of the petitioners' challenge relates to the

implication of petitioner Bal Krishan Sharma on the basis of

statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. It is correct that

such statements are not substantive evidence. A statement made to

a police officer, if in the nature of a confession, is rendered

inadmissible by virtue of Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act,

except to the limited extent permissible in law. The evidentiary

limitations of such statements have been consistently emphasized,

including in "Kashmira Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh,

AIR 1952 SC 159" where it was held that confession of a

co-accused is not substantive evidence and can only lend assurance

to other independent evidence.

26. This Court is in respectful agreement with the proposition that a

co-accused cannot be implicated solely on the basis of a police

statement of another accused, particularly, when such statement is

sought to be treated as substantive evidence. However, the question

that arises is whether, in the present case, the prosecution rests

exclusively on such statements.

27. A careful reading of the charge-sheet reveals that the prosecution

has not rested its case solely on statements under Section 161

Cr.P.C. There exists additional material pointing towards (i)

existence of multiple forged allotment orders, (ii) their circulation

and use, (iii) verification by departmental officials, and (iv)

interaction between private accused and departmental authorities.

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At the stage of charge, such material is sufficient to raise grave

suspicion requiring adjudication at trial. The Supreme Court in

"Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368", has reiterated that

where the material discloses grave suspicion, the Court should not

discharge the accused merely because the evidence may not

ultimately result in conviction.

28. It must be borne in mind that admissibility and probative value of

evidence are matters for trial. At the stage of framing charge, the

Court cannot exclude material merely because it may ultimately be

found inadmissible, unless such inadmissibility is apparent on the

face of the record. This position has been reaffirmed in "Niranjan

Singh Karam Singh Punjabi vs. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya,

AIR 1990 SC 1962".

29. The argument that FIR No. 31/2006 is barred as a second FIR in

view of the law laid down in "T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala,

(2001) 6 SCC 181", does not impress this Court. The prohibition

against multiple FIRs applies only where the subsequent FIR relates

to the same incident or occurrence forming the subject matter of the

earlier FIR. The decisive test is the "test of sameness".

30. In the case at hand, FIR No. 91/2006 pertains to a specific incident

of black-marketing based on a particular allotment order, whereas

FIR No. 31/2006 pertains to a larger conspiracy involving

preparation and circulation of multiple forged allotment orders. The

two FIRs, though connected, operate in distinct spheres of

criminality. The distinction between "same transaction" and

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"distinct conspiracy" has been clarified by the Supreme Court in

"Babubhai vs. State of Gujarat, 2010 AIR SCW 5126".

31. Therefore, the second FIR cannot be said to be legally

impermissible. Rather, it falls within the permissible category

where subsequent investigation reveals a wider conspiracy,

justifying independent registration within territorial jurisdiction.

32. The submission of the petitioners regarding the departmental

circular dated 04.01.2006 may be relevant for trial but does not

demolish the prosecution case at the threshold. The defence sought

to be projected cannot be examined in depth at this stage, as held in

"State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, AIR 2005 SC 359",

wherein it was held that defence material cannot ordinarily be

considered at the stage of framing charge.

33. The contention that there is no direct evidence of preparation of

forged allotment orders is equally untenable at this stage. Offences

involving conspiracy and cheating are often proved through

circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence is not a sine qua non for

framing charge.

34. The learned trial Court has, in the considered opinion of this Court,

exercised due judicial discretion by discharging the petitioners for

certain offences while proceeding against them for others. This

reflects proper application of mind and does not call for

interference.

35. Viewed thus, this Court is satisfied that the material on record,

taken at its face value, discloses a prima facie case and raises grave

suspicion against the petitioners. The petitioners have failed to

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demonstrate that the allegations are so inherently improbable or

unsupported by material as to justify discharge at this stage.

Petitions are, thus, dismissed. Interim direction, if any, shall stand

vacated enabling the trial court to proceed with the trial in

accordance with law.

(SANJAY PARIHAR) JUDGE JAMMU 01.04.2026 Ram Krishan Whether the order is speaking? Yes Whether the order is reportable? Yes

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