Regional Mangaer, Centaral Bank Of ... vs Madhulika Guru Prasad Dahir And Ors

Petition No.2558 of 2003. By the impugned judgment, the 1 writ petition filed by the first respondent, hereinafter referred

to as `the employee', challenging the order of termination of

her services has been allowed with a direction to reinstate her

with continuity in service but without back-wages.

3.The employee was appointed to the post of Clerk in the

appellant-Bank with effect from 18th March, 1981, against a

post reserved for "Scheduled Tribes", as she had claimed to be

belonging to "Thakur Scheduled Tribe", on the basis of a caste

certificate issued on 4th December, 1979. In March, 1991, she

was promoted as Junior Officer. It appears that pursuant to

the instructions issued by the Government of India, Ministry

of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs on 23rd March,

1990, directing all the public sector banks/financial

institutions to get the caste certificates of the existing

employees, belonging to various scheduled tribes, verified, the

caste certificate filed by the employee was referred to the

Committee for Scrutiny and Verification of Tribe Claims,

Nagpur (for short the Scrutiny Committee), respondent No.2

herein.

2

4.The Scrutiny Committee granted an opportunity of hearing

to the employee on 11th October, 1999; made its own inquiries

and found that the employee was not originally belonging to

"Thakur Scheduled Tribe" but had obtained the Scheduled

Tribe certificate from the issuing authority to take advantage

of various concessions given to the tribal communities. The

Scrutiny Committee discovered that the employee had studied

in Jeevan Shikshan Vidyalaya, Nagpur and by blotting out the

original caste "Rajput Dahayat" as mentioned in the school

leaving certificate, noted down the caste as "Thakur", and

thus, took admission in college on the basis of caste certificate

"Thakur", which caste also got mentioned in the college

leaving certificate of the employee. In the absence of any

documentary evidence adduced by the employee to prove her

claim, the Scrutiny Committee relied on the affinity test and

found that the employee did not show any affinity towards

"Thakur Scheduled Tribe". Accordingly, vide its order dated

2nd May, 2000, the Scrutiny Committee cancelled the caste

certificate dated 4th December, 1979, issued to the employee.

3

5.The aforesaid order of the Scrutiny Committee was

challenged by the employee by way of a writ petition. The

High Court allowed the writ petition on the ground that there

was non application of mind on the part of the Scrutiny

Committee; set aside its order dated 2nd May, 2000 and

remanded the matter to the Scrutiny Committee for

reconsideration of the caste claim of the employee.

6.Pursuant thereto, the Scrutiny Committee, reconsidered the

caste claim of the employee. Concurring with its earlier

findings, vide order dated 29th May, 2003, the Committee

again rejected the claim of the employee and cancelled the

caste certificate dated 4th December, 1979. Consequently, by

order dated 28th June, 2003, the services of the employee were

terminated by the appellant on the ground that her tribe claim

had been invalidated. Aggrieved, the employee preferred a

writ petition challenging both the said orders.

7.It is pertinent, however, to note that at the hearing of the

writ petition before the High Court, the employee did not

challenge the correctness of the order of the Scrutiny

Committee, dated 29th May, 2003 and the same attained 4 finality, which manifestly shows that the employee accepted

the finding of the Scrutiny Committee that she did not belong

to "Thakur Scheduled Tribe", as recorded on the caste

certificate filed for obtaining employment. The order of

termination of service was challenged only on the ground of

inordinately delay of more than 10 years in making a reference

to the Scrutiny Committee for verification of the caste

certificate. Accepting the said plea of the employee, while

upholding the order of the Scrutiny Committee dated 29th

May, 2003, invalidating the caste certificate, the High Court

has quashed the order of termination dated 28th June, 2003.

The High Court has observed that since the services of the

employee have been terminated after a period of twenty two

years on the basis that she does not belong to the Scheduled

Tribe and the employee having herself given up the claim of

belonging to the Scheduled Tribe, the interest of justice

demands that the employee be continued in service.

Aggrieved thereby, the appellant has come up before us in this

appeal.

5

8.Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant

submitted that having found that the findings of the Scrutiny

Committee were correct, the High Court should not have

quashed the order of termination of service, as admittedly the

employee had obtained appointment by fraudulent means by

producing a false caste certificate. It was asserted that

neither the delay in reference to the Scrutiny Committee nor

the time taken by the Committee in scrutinizing the certificate

can be used as a ground to validate a fraudulent action. It

was also urged that having entered the service by deceitful

means, rendering of long period of services does not entitle the

appellant to any relief in equity. In support of the proposition,

reliance was placed on the decisions of this Court in Addl.

General Manager--Human Resource, Bharat Heavy

Electricals Ltd. Vs. Suresh Ramkrishna Burde1 and Bank

of India & Anr. Vs. Avinash D. Mandivikar & Ors.2.

9.Per contra, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the

employee, while supporting the decision of the High Court,

submitted that in the absence of any finding by the Scrutiny

1 (2007) 5 SCC 336 2 (2005) 7 SCC 690 6 Committee that the caste certificate had been obtained

fraudulently, the High Court was justified in directing her

reinstatement. Learned counsel contended that it has not

been evolved as a general principle that in every case where

the caste claim is rejected, the equitable jurisdiction of the

Court is ousted. In support of the submission that the

parameters for consideration of claim for employment are

different in a case of fraud as compared to a mere rejection of

such a claim, learned counsel referred us to the decisions of

this Court in Suresh Ramkrishna Burde (supra), Manjula

Sircar & Ors. Vs. Harendra Bahadur Singh & Ors.3 and

Punjab National Bank & Anr. Vs. Vilas, S/O Govindrao

Bokade & Anr.4.

10.The sequence and the narration of facts above leaves little

doubt in our mind that the caste certificate, on the basis

whereof the employee got employment, was false to her

knowledge. Based on that the Scrutiny Committee, on

reconsideration after remand by the High Court, vide order

dated 29th May, 2003, again invalidated employee's caste

3 AIR 2007 SC 3211 4 2007 (8) SCALE 108 7 certificate, resulting in termination of the services by order

dated 28th June, 2003 (supra). As noted above, the said order

of the Scrutiny Committee having not been challenged, has

attained finality and remains in operation. It is, thus, not a

case of mere rejection of a claim and the cited authorities are

inapplicable.

11.In the above background, the questions for our

consideration would be: (i) whether delay in making reference

to the Scrutiny Committee for verification of the caste

certificate as also the delay on the part of the Scrutiny

Committee in such verification per se vitiates the order of

termination of services of an employee, even when the

certificate is ultimately found to be false and (ii) whether

because of the employee having rendered services to the

employer for over twenty years, would it be equitable to cancel

her appointment, when admittedly in the first instance the

employee was not eligible for such appointment?

12.Both the issues are no longer res integra. The implications

of misuse of the benefits conferred by the Constitution on a

particular section or sections of the citizenry were highlighted 8 by this Court in Kumari Madhuri Patil & Anr. Vs. Addl.

Commissioner, Tribal Development & Ors.5. It was said

that the admission wrongly gained or appointment wrongly

obtained on the basis of false social status certificate

necessarily has the effect of depriving the genuine Scheduled

Castes or Scheduled Tribes or OBC candidates as enjoined in

the Constitution of the benefits conferred on them by the

Constitution. The genuine candidates are also denied

admission to educational institutions or appointments to office

or posts under a State for want of social status certificate.

Therefore, with a view to streamline the procedure for the

issuance of social status certificates, their scrutiny and their

approval, the Court issued as many as fifteen directions. One

of the directions so issued, was that as soon as the finding is

recorded by the Scrutiny Committee, holding that the

certificate obtained was false, on its cancellation and

confiscation simultaneously, it should be communicated to

the educational institution concerned, or the appointing

authority with a request to cancel the admission or the

appointment. Thereupon, the admission or the appointment 5 (1994) 6 SCC 241 9 shall be cancelled without any further notice to the candidate

and the candidate shall be debarred from further study or

continue in office in a post.

13.Similarly, the plea regarding rendering of services for a long

period has been considered and rejected in a series of

decisions of this Court and we deem it unnecessary to launch

on exhaustive dissertation on principles in this context. It

would suffice to state that except in a few decisions, where the

admission/appointment was not cancelled because of peculiar

factual matrix obtaining therein, the consensus of judicial

opinion is that equity, sympathy or generosity has no place

where the original appointment rests on a false caste

certificate. A person who enters the service by producing a

false caste certificate and obtains appointment for the post

meant for a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe or OBC, as

the case may be, deprives a genuine candidate falling in either

of the said categories, of appointment to that post, does not

deserve any sympathy or indulgence of this Court. He who

comes to the Court with a claim based on falsity and

deception cannot plead equity nor the Court would be justified

1 0 to exercise equity jurisdiction in his favour. An act of

deliberate deception with a design to secure something, which

is otherwise not due, tantamounts to fraud. Fraud is a

conduct either by letter or words, which induces the other

person or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a

response to the conduct of the former either by words or letter.

[See: R. Vishwanatha Pillai Vs. State of Kerala & Ors.68

Bank of India (supra), Addl. General Manager (supra),

Derry Vs. Peek7, Ram Preeti Yadav Vs. U.P. Board of High

School and Intermediate Education & Ors.8 and Bhaurao

Dagdu Paralkar Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors.9]

14.In Ram Chandra Singh Vs. Savitri Devi & Ors.10, this

Court had observed that fraud is anathema to all equitable

principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be

perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable

doctrine.

6

(2004) 2 SCC 105 7 (1889) 14 AC 337 8 (2003) 8 SCC 311 9 (2005) 7 SCC 605 10 (2003) 8 SCC 319 1 1

15.Recently, in State of Maharashtra & Ors. Vs. Ravi

Prakash Babulalsing Parmar & Anr.11, dealing with a

similar situation, this Court has observed thus:

"The makers of the Constitution laid emphasis on equality amongst citizens. The Constitution of India provides for protective discrimination and reservation so as to enable the disadvantaged group to come on the same platform as that of the forward community. If and when a person takes an undue advantage of the said beneficent provision of the Constitution by obtaining the benefits of reservation and other benefits provided under the Presidential Order although he is not entitled thereto, he not only plays a fraud on the society but in effect and substance plays a fraud on the Constitution. When, therefore, a certificate is granted to a person who is not otherwise entitled thereto, it is entirely incorrect to contend that the State shall be helpless spectator in the matter."

16.Having considered the matter in the light of the afore-

stated legal position, in our judgment, the decision of the High

Court is untenable. As noted supra, the employee having

accepted the finding of the Scrutiny Committee, holding that

the caste certificate furnished by the employee was false, the

very foundation of her appointment vanished and her

11 (2007) 1 SCC 80 1 2 appointment was rendered illegal. Her conduct renders her

unfit to be continued in service and must necessarily entail

termination of her service. Under these circumstances, there

is absolutely no justification for her claim in respect of the

post merely on the ground that she had worked on the post for

over twenty years. The post was meant for a reserved

candidate but she usurped the same by misrepresentation

and deception. In our opinion, the fact that caste certificate

was referred to the Scrutiny Committee for verification after

ten years of her joining the service and a long time was taken

by the Scrutiny Committee to verify the same is of no

consequence inasmuch as delay on both the counts does not

validate the caste certificate and the consequent illegal

appointment.

17.We are also unable to persuade ourselves to agree with

learned counsel for the employee that in the absence of any

finding of fraud having been played by the employee, the order

of the High Court is equitable and should not be interfered

with. As noted above, the selection of the employee was

1 3 conceived in deceit and, therefore, could not be saved by

equitable considerations.

18.In view of the aforegoing discussion, the impugned

judgment and order quashing the order of termination of

service of the employee and directing her reinstatement

cannot be sustained. The order of termination based on the

report of the Scrutiny Committee does not suffer from any

infirmity and the High Court should not have interfered with

the same.

19.Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and order

of the High Court dated 6th April, 2005 is set aside but with no

order as to costs.

.................................................J. (C.K. THAKKER)

.................................................J. (D.K. JAIN) NEW DELHI;

JULY 25, 2008.

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