Ravish Singh Rana vs State Of Uttarakhand

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2438 OF 2025 (@ SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (CRL.) NO. 2776 OF 2025)

RAVISH SINGH RANA .… APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ANR. … RESPONDENT(S)

O R D E R

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal impugns judgment and order of the

High Court of Uttarakhand1, dated 11.12.2024, by

which Criminal Misc. Application No. 922 of 2024

filed by the appellant for quashing FIR No. 482 of

2023 and proceedings arising therefrom, including

the cognizance order dated 13.02.2024, has been

dismissed.

3. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to the

instant appeal are as follows:

(i) The second respondent lodged a First Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by RAJNI MUKHI Date: 2025.05.06 Information Report2 at Police Station3 18:02:32 IST Reason:

1 High Court 2 FIR 33 PS

Page 1 of 12 Khatima, District Udham Singh Nagar on

23.11.2023 against the appellant, inter-alia,

alleging that on 06.02.2021, the informant

got introduced to the appellant through

Facebook; after introduction, they began a

live-in relationship; during this period the

appellant rented a room at Khatima and

established physical relationship many times

with a promise to marry the informant;

physical relationship continued though at

times informant was abused and beaten; later,

when the informant insisted on marriage, the

appellant refused to marry and instead

threatened the informant; and forcibly

established physical relationship on

18.11.2023.

(ii) The aforesaid FIR was registered under

Sections 376, 323, 504 and 506 of the Indian

Penal Code, 18604

(iii) To quash the aforesaid FIR and the

consequential proceedings, the appellant

filed Criminal Misc. Application No.922 of

2024 before the High Court by invoking its

powers under Section 528 of the Bharatiya

Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 20235 (equivalent to 44 IPC 55 BNSS

Page 2 of 12 section 482 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 19736).

(iv) In the aforesaid application, the

appellant, inter alia, stated that admittedly

both parties were adults; they lived together

under one roof for over two years; during

this period, they had physical relationship

voluntarily; and, later, they codified an

agreement/settlement on 19.11.2023. Thus, the

allegations are nothing but mala fide,

concocted with a view to blackmail the

appellant and his family. Moreover, those

allegations have no support from any injury/

medical report. And, in any case, an offence

punishable under Section 376 IPC is not made

out.

(v) The High Court by the impugned order

dismissed the petition on the ground that the

allegations made in the FIR disclose

commission of a cognizable offence and,

therefore, the same cannot be quashed.

(vi) Aggrieved by the order of the High

Court, the appellant is in appeal before us.

4. We have heard learned counsel for the

appellant and Ms. Vanshaja Shukla for the

66 CrPC Page 3 of 12 respondents.

Submissions on behalf of appellant

5. The contention of the learned counsel for the

appellant is that admittedly the parties have

executed a settlement deed on 19.11.2023, which

reads as under:

“The agreement has been made today 19.11.2023 between the first party (name and address of the second respondent) and the second party (name and address of the appellant). On the advice of the respected persons with the condition that both are living together since 12th August so we must conduct Mangbhari and live like husband and wife in the room and we would hand over our papers today to the Advocate to register their marriage and they would get the registration done going to the Court. If the second party violates the agreement, the legal action can be taken against us.

We both the parties know each other since February, 2021. We love each other.”

6. Based on the aforesaid settlement, the learned

counsel for the appellant contended that the allegation

that appellant forcibly established physical

relationship with the informant on 18.11.2023 is

palpably false. Had it been so, the settlement

agreement, which was entered on 19.11.2023, would not

have stated that parties love each other. This

settlement clearly establishes that till 19.11.2023

there was no untoward incident, and the parties were in

love with each other.

7. It is urged on behalf of the appellant that the

Page 4 of 12 High Court overlooked this settlement agreement, as a

result grave injustice has been caused to the

appellant.

Submissions on behalf of respondents

8. Per contra, Ms. Vanshaja Shukla, who appeared for

the respondents, submitted that the agreement clearly

stated that if marriage is not formalized then legal

action will be taken. In these circumstances, since

admittedly the marriage has not been registered and

formalized, legal action has rightly been taken against

the appellant. Besides that, the FIR alleges that

physical relationship was established under a promise

of marriage and as marriage has not taken place, it was

proved that there was a false promise of marriage,

therefore consent for physical relationship stood

vitiated. Hence, even an offence of rape is made out.

In this light, Ms. Vanshaja Shukla cited a decision of

this Court in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of

Maharastra and Another7.

9. We have considered the rival submissions and have

perused the materials on record.

Discussion/ Analysis

10. An overview of the facts makes it clear that

relationship between the appellant and the second

respondent (the informant) had been there since 2021.

77 (2019) 9 SCC 608

Page 5 of 12 This relationship was not merely of knowing each other

but of living together as a couple under one roof in a

rented accommodation. The FIR does not allege that

physical relationship was established only because

there was a promise of marriage. Besides, physical

relationship continued for over two years without a

complaint in between. In such circumstances, a

presumption would arise of there being a valid consent

for initiating and maintaining the physical

relationship that spanned over two years.

11. In Pramod Suryabhan Pawar (supra), this Court held

that where the promise to marry is false and the

intention of the maker, at the time of making the

promise, itself was not to abide by it, but to deceive

the woman to convince her to engage in sexual

relations, there is a “misconception of fact” that

vitiates the woman’s “consent”. However, a mere breach

of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise.

Therefore, to establish a false promise, it would have

to be demonstrated that the maker of the promise had no

intention of upholding his word at the time of making

the promise.

12. In Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana8, this Court

observed:

“21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or 88 (2013) 7 SCC 675

Page 6 of 12 through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise and not fulfilling a promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage, a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after fully understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutor agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches to a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives.”

13. In Sonu @ Subash Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh &

another9 this Court quashed the FIR and the proceedings

arising therefrom upon noticing that (1) relationship

between appellant and the second respondent was of

consensual nature; (2) parties were in relationship for

a period of one-and-a-half years; and (3) subsequently,

appellant had expressed disinclination to marry the

second respondent which led to registration of FIR. 99 (2021) 18 SCC 517 Page 7 of 12

14. In the instant case also, we find that the

relationship between the appellant and the second

respondent (the informant) was spread over two years.

Further, they not only admit of having physical

relations with each other but also of living together

in a rented accommodation as a live-in couple. In our

view, if two able-minded adults reside together as a

live-in couple for more than a couple of years and

cohabit with each other, a presumption would arise that

they voluntarily chose that kind of a relationship

fully aware of its consequences. Therefore, the

allegation that such relationship was entered because

there was a promise of marriage is in the circumstances

unworthy of acceptance, particularly, when there is no

allegation that such physical relationship would not

have been established had there been no promise to

marry.

15. Moreover, in a long drawn live-in relationship,

occasions may arise where parties in that relationship

express their desire or wish to formalize the same by a

seal of marriage, but that expression of desire, or

wish, by itself would not be indicative of relationship

being a consequence of that expression of desire or

wish. A decade or two earlier, live-in relationships

might not have been common. But now more and more women

are financially independent and have the capacity to

Page 8 of 12 take conscious decision of charting their life on their

own terms. This financial freedom, inter alia, has led

to proliferation of such live-in relationships.

Therefore, when a matter of this nature comes to a

court, it must not adopt a pedantic approach rather the

Court may, based on the length of such relationship and

conduct of the parties, presume implied consent of the

parties to be in such a relationship regardless of

their desire or a wish to convert it into a marital

bond.

16. In that view of the matter, in our considered

view, the long-drawn relationship of the appellant and

the second respondent including the circumstance of

their living together and cohabiting with each other,

that too, in a separate rented accommodation, would

give rise to a presumption that their relationship was

based on a valid consent.

17. The settlement agreement, dated 19.11.2023, which

is not disputed by the second respondent, points out

that the parties had been in love. In such

circumstances, we are of the view that on ground of

refusal to marry, the appellant cannot be subjected to

prosecution for the offence of rape. The other

allegations of assault and abuse have not been

supported by any material particulars. Even the alleged

sexual assault on 18.11.2023 is negated by the recital

Page 9 of 12 in the settlement agreement that parties love each

other.

18. For all the reasons above, in our view, the

impugned first information report and the consequential

proceedings in pursuance thereof are nothing but abuse

of the process of the court and the same deserves to be

quashed. The appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment

and order of the High Court is set aside. The impugned

first information report and the consequential

proceedings are hereby quashed.

19. The pending applications, if any, stand disposed

of.

............................J [ SANJAY KAROL ]

............................J [ MANOJ MISRA ]

NEW DELHI;

APRIL 28, 2025.

Page 10 of 12 ITEM NO.24 COURT NO.16 SECTION II-B

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 2776/2025

[Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 11-12-2024 in CRMA No. 922/2024 passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital]

RAVISH SINGH RANA Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & ANR. Respondent(s)

(IA No. 47067/2025 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT, IA No. 47066/2025 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T. AND IA No. 47065/2025 - PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS/FACTS/ANNEXURES)

Date : 28-04-2025 This matter was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KAROL HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ MISRA

For Petitioner(s) :Mr. Gautam Barnwal, Adv.

Mr. Ajeet Kumar Yadav, Adv.

Mr. Nishant Gill, Adv.

Mr. Saksham Kumar, Adv.

Mr. Aakash, Adv.

Mr. Mukesh Kumar, AOR

For Respondent(s) :Ms. Vanshaja Shukla, AOR Mr. Ajay Bahuguna, Adv.

Mr. Siddhant Yadav, Adv.

Mr. Garvesh Kabra,AOR Ms. Pallavi Kumari, Adv.

UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R

1. Leave granted.

2. The appeal is allowed in terms of signed reportable

order.

Page 11 of 12 3. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

(RAJNI MUKHI) (PREETI SAXENA) ASTT. REGISTRAR-cum-PS COURT MASTER (NSH)

(Signed order is placed on the file)

Page 12 of 12