Ravindra Tukaram Hiwale vs State Of Maharashtra
- SCC(2010) 13 SCC 253
- Neutral2010 INSC 463
- AIRAIR 2010 SC 3492
- SCR[2010] 9 SCR 454
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
Where the trial court has recorded a positive finding that misbehaviour on the part of the accused was not established over a period of time and that the incident was spontaneous and arose from a transient family quarrel, an appellate court cannot enhance the sentence on the basis of character evidence (such as letters written a year before the incident) that conflicts with the dying declaration of the deceased establishing the spontaneous nature of the incident. The appellate court's interference with the quantum of sentence imposed by the trial court should be rare and only in exceptional cases, and where the trial court has properly exercised its discretion within the statutory range of punishment available, such interference is not justified merely to enhance the sentence on the basis of inferences about the accused's general nature drawn from isolated evidence.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
O R D E R
Leave granted.
The appellant was married with the deceased Alka
after the death of his first wife. As per the prosecution
story at about 7.00 a.m. on 6th February, 1990 the deceased
suffered serious burn injuries in the kitchen of the house
and ultimately died of those injuries. It is the
prosecution case that at about 8.30 a.m. on the 9th February 1990 she made a dying declaration to PW.10 - a Police Head
Constable, in which she stated that she had a quarrel with
her husband over the house-hold chores and over the feeding
of the children and she had thereafter poured kerosene on
herself and then burnt herself.
The Trial Court on a consideration of the evidence
convicted the appellant for offences punishable under
Section 498-A and to a sentence of one year and under
Section 306 to a sentence of four years. The appellant
thereafter filed an appeal in the High Court of
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Bombay whereas the State of Maharashtra also filed an appeal pleading for a higher sentence. The appeal filed
by the appellant was dismissed. The appeal filed by the
State was allowed and the sentence awarded by the Trial
Court under Section 306 IPC was enhanced from four to six
years. It is in this situation that the matter is before
us.
The learned counsel for the appellant has made only
one argument before us. He has submitted that the High
Court had observed that the appellant appeared to be of a
quarrelsome and aggressive nature and as evidence of his
behaviour had placed reliance on two letters which required
that a heavy sentence should be imposed. We see, however,
that in the light of the dying declaration made by the
deceased that she had quarreled with her husband that
very morning (which is a common place happening amongst
young married couples), the High Court was not justified in holding that the appellant was liable to an enhancement in
the sentence on account of his quarrelsome nature. We must
also emphasize that the interference of the appellate court
on the quantum of sentence should be rare and only in
exceptional cases. Section 306 of the IPC provides for a
sentence which may extend to 10 years. It was therefore the
prerogative of the Trial Court to award a sentence up to
10 years. As already mentioned above the trial court had
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given a positive finding that there was no misbehaviour on the part of the appellant over a period of time and the
incident was a spontaneous one arising out of a family
quarrel in the morning. The finding of the High Court based
on two letters written about a year before the incident
would therefore have little value in the light of the dying
declaration of the deceased. We also notice that the
incident happened in February, 1990 and we are told by the
learned amicus curiae that the appellant has undergone
about four years of the sentence.
We accordingly allow the appeal, quash the sentence
awarded by the High Court and confirm the judgment of the
Trial Court. In the meantime, we also direct that the
appellant who is in custody, shall be released forthwith
if not required in connection with any other case. .................J. (HARJIT SINGH BEDI)
.................J. (C.K. PRASAD) New Delhi, August 2, 2010.
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