Ravinder Kumar And Anr vs State Of Punjab

Supreme Court31 August 2001K.T.Thomas · S.N.Variava

SCC(2001) 7 SCC 690
Neutral2001 INSC 414
AIRAIR 2001 SC 3570
SCR[2001] Supp (2) SCR 463

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

RAVINDER KUMAR AND ANR VS STATE OF PUNJAB (31 August, 2001) Delay in lodging a First Information Report is not itself a vitiating factor or ground to doubt the prosecution case, provided the reasons for such delay are not referable to any effort to concoct a version; the court must examine the causes for delay, and where those causes are genuine and attributable to circumstances such as grief, shock, or lack of immediacy in informing authorities, the delay carries no legal consequence to the prosecution case. The testimony of an ordinary person such as a rickshaw-puller, delivered after considerable lapse of time, regarding the identity of those who engaged him to carry a particular load and the load itself, is not to be rejected on the bare ground that such memory over time is inherently improbable; where the carrying of a load is immediately followed by sensational news that the load contained evidence of a serious crime, the striking and unusual nature of the event creates a lasting imprint on memory that is likely to be recalled with vivid detail, distinguishing such events from routine occurrences. Where the prosecution succeeds in showing the possibility of some motive or ire between accused and victim, the inability to prove the precise manner or full dimension of the mental disposition that impelled the accused to commit the offence does not constitute a fatal weakness of the prosecution case, and failure to establish motive in complete detail does not vitiate a conviction resting on other sufficiently proved circumstances. ---

S. NAGALINGAM VS SIVAGAMI (31 August, 2001) For the offence of bigamy under Section 494 IPC, the second marriage must be proved to be a valid marriage according to the personal law of the parties, notwithstanding that it would be void under Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act by reason of being performed while the first marriage subsisted. Where the parties to a second marriage are Hindus residing in Tamil Nadu and the marriage is solemnized with the ceremonies specified in Section 7-A of the Hindu Marriage Act—namely declaration by each party that the other is taken as spouse, garlanding of each other, placing a ring, or tying of thali—the marriage is valid and binding under Section 7-A(2), and the requirement that "Saptapadi" be performed as an essential ceremony does not apply, as Section 7-A(2) expressly provides that such marriages shall be good and valid notwithstanding anything contained in Section 7 or in any text, rule, or interpretation of Hindu law or custom.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

CASE NO.:Appeal (crl.) 881 of 2001Special Leave Petition (crl.) 1118 of 2001

PETITIONER:RAVINDER KUMAR AND ANR.

Vs.

RESPONDENT:STATE OF PUNJAB

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 31/08/2001

BENCH:K.T.Thomas, S.N.Variava

JUDGMENT:

THOMAS, J.

Leave granted.

A railway burial was contrived for eliminating thecorpse of a business broker of Ludhiana. The coffin madefor that purpose was camouflaged as parcel container to bedespatched to a distant destination. But the parcelnarrowly missed from being consigned to the railway bogieas some employees at the Parcel Service Center smelledfoul. The suspicion led to the disinterring of a strangledbody which was later identified to be that of the aforesaidbusiness broker. Eventually it led to the detection of anorchestrated murder committed by the appellants. The trialcourt convicted the appellants for murder of the businessbroker besides the offences of abducting him and destroyingthe evidence. They were sentenced to imprisonment for lifeon the main count and to lesser terms of imprisonment onthe other two counts. A Division Bench of the High Court ofPunjab and Haryana confirmed the conviction and sentence asper the judgment which is now being challenged.

Amar Kumar Gupta (deceased) and his wife Veena wereliving with their two little daughters (Sonia and Dimple)in their house at Ludhiana. He was making his livelihoodthrough the brokerage earned by him in the businesstransactions with the manufacturers of hosiery goods. Itappears that the two appellants were manufacturers ofhosiery articles at Ludhiana and the manufacturing concernwas called "M/s. Kapoor Knitting, Harbans Pura", and theyhad engaged the deceased as a broker for the sale of goodsmanufactured in their concern. The amount which theappellant owed to the deceased ranged around one lakh ofrupees by way of brokerage.

Now the prosecution story can be narratedcompendiously. On 2.2.1994 the appellant visited the houseof the deceased at about 11 A.M. and they had aconversation, presumably about the brokerage claimed by thedeceased or due to him. Appellants asked the deceased to gowith them so that the accounts could be settledconveniently. Reciprocating the offer the deceased wentwith them. He rode on a scooter along with Mohan Lal Jain(PW-8) who was a close relative. As they reached the placeof the appellants deceased relieved PW-8 who was in a hurryto go away for his own work.

The vivid details of what all happened thereafter arenot known except that at some time during the day the twoappellants murdered the deceased by strangulating him witha ligature. They packed the dead body in a woodencontainer. It was wrapped in a gunny bag, on the top ofwhich they scribbled the words "To self-Arun Goel; G-1 NewDelhi". They engaged a rickshaw-puller to transport thecontainer to the parcel service center adjoining theRailway Station at Ludhiana. PW-5 Daya Ram (rickshaw-puller) collected the load from the premises of M/s. KapoorKnitting and transported it in his rickshaw to theaforesaid parcel service center. The box was unloaded fromthe vehicle to the parcel building by the rickshaw-pullerwith the help of the two appellants and another person.

Then the two appellants approached PW-11 who was oneof the partners of a parcel service firm and wanted to dothe needful for booking the goods for being despatched toNew Delhi. It was 4.30 P.M. but they learnt that the nextgoods train available from that station would be only onthe succeeding day. However, PW-11 agreed that the goodswould be despatched on the next day itself. But when theParcel Supervisor weighed the load and found it to be 152Kgs. he felt something fishy about it. But by that timeboth the appellants had left the scene. So the containerwas kept outside the Parcel Office. Perhaps the staff atthe parcel section felt that the load was somethingsuspicious and hence they wanted to see what was inside thecontainer.

On 4.2.1994 the Chief Parcel Supervisor intimated thepolice about the suspicious container lying at theiroffice. After the police reached, the container was openedand all of them became stunned seeing a dead body with aligature tied around its neck and the legs tied up with astring stuffed inside the box. The body was found wrappedwith a black glazed paper and the box was wrapped with agunny bag on which the destination of the parcel wasscribbled as mentioned above. The inquest was held byPW-17 Boota Ram who was the Station House Officer, GeneralRailway Police Station (GRPS), Ludhiana.

The police suspecting the appellants detailed a guardat the house of the accused as both were absent from thescene. On 11.2.1994, the first appellant Ravinder Kumarreturned to the house but when he noticed the presence ofthe police in the vicinity of his house he realised that hewas within the penumbra of police suspicion. He then ranaway from the place. On the way he gulped some poison butbefore he could die he was admitted in the CMC Hospital,Ludhiana. On 25.2.1994 he was arrested by the police whenhe was discharged by the hospital authorities.

Appellant Surinder Kumar was arrested in connectionwith some other case on 2.5.1994 by the Jind Police. WhenPW-17 Boota Ram came to know of his arrest he proceeded tothat station and took over the custody of appellantSurinder Kumar after formally arresting him in connectionwith this case.

The case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence.The trial court and the High Court concurrently found thatthe circumstances proved by the prosecution were quitesufficient to establish that the deceased was murdered bythe two appellants and that they tried to dislodge thecorpse in such a manner as to escape from anybody'ssuspicion.

We have no doubt that the deceased Amar Kumar Guptawas murdered on 2.2.1994 by ligature strangulation and hisbody was packed up in a wooden container which wascamouflaged as a parcel consignment. Nor has that aspectbeen disputed by the appellants. The sole question whichthe appellants seriously disputed was that they were thekillers of the deceased. To substantiate that appellantswere the real murderers in this case prosecution haspresented the following circumstances:

(1) Appellants had dealings with the deceased and agood sum was to be paid to the deceased by way ofbrokerage.

(2) On 2.2.1994 appellants went to the house of thedeceased and persuaded him to go with them up totheir house at Mohalla Taj Ganj situated inHarbans Pura.

(3) On the same evening appellants engaged PW-5 DayaRam (rickshaw-puller) to transport a load wrappedin a gunny bag from the factory of the appellantsat Harbans Pura to the parcel office of theLudhiana Railway Station.

(4) Appellants booked the parcel to be despatched toNew Delhi on the same evening. When the parcelemployees asked certain queries regarding theheavy weight of the load appellants advancedfalse excuses.

(5) The container was opened and the dead body wasdisintered. Since then the appellants remainedabsent from the locality itself for 14 dayshenceforth.

(6) The appellant Ravinder Kumar immediately onsmelling that police suspected him attempted tocommit suicide.

(7) On the information supplied by the said appellantthe scooter of the deceased was retrieved fromthe premises of the Railway Station, Ludhiana.(8) The clothes of the deceased were recovered byPW-17 Investigating Officer on the basis of theinformation elicited from appellant RavinderKumar.

Both the courts found that the prosecution hasestablished the above circumstances with convincing andreliable evidence. But learned counsel for the appellantscontended that there are some basic infirmities which didnot weigh with the two courts and those infirmities aresufficient to disrupt the chain of circumstances. He firstcontended that the FIR was inordinately delayed and thatitself is a vitiating factor. His next contention was thatthe two courts did not consider how a rickshaw-puller wouldremember, after many days, that a particular load wastransported at the instance of the appellants. Lastly, hecontended that the appellants had no motive to murder thedeceased, and even the suggestion made by the prosecutionfor that purpose remained unsubstantiated. On thesegrounds he pleaded for interference with the conviction andsentence passed on the appellants.

The attack on prosecution cases on the ground of delayin lodging FIR has almost bogged down as a stereotypedredundancy in criminal cases. It is a recurring feature inmost of the criminal cases that there would be some delayin furnishing the first information to the police. It hasto be remembered that law has not fixed any time forlodging the FIR. Hence a delayed FIR is not illegal. Ofcourse a prompt and immediate lodging of the FIR is theideal as that would give the prosecution a twin advantage.First is that it affords commencement of the investigationwithout any time lapse. Second is that it expels theopportunity for any possible concoction of a false version.Barring these two plus points for a promptly lodged FIR thedemerits of the delayed FIR cannot operate as fatal to anyprosecution case. It cannot be overlooked that even apromptly lodged FIR is not an unreserved guarantee for thegenuineness of the version incorporated therein.

When there is criticism on the ground that FIR in acase was delayed the court has to look at the reason whythere was such a delay. There can be a variety of genuinecauses for FIR lodgment to get delayed. Rural people mightbe ignorant of the need for informing the police of a crimewithout any lapse of time. This kind of unconversantnessis not too uncommon among urban people also. They mightnot immediately think of going to the police station.Another possibility is due to lack of adequate transportfacilities for the informers to reach the police station.The third, which is a quite common bearing, is that thekith and kin of the deceased might take some appreciabletime to regain a certain level of tranquillity of mind orsedativeness of temper for moving to the police station forthe purpose of furnishing the requisite information. Yetanother cause is, the persons who are supposed to give suchinformation themselves could be so physically impaired thatthe police had to reach them on getting some nebulousinformation about the incident.

We are not providing an exhausting catalogue ofinstances which could cause delay in lodging the FIR. Oureffort is to try to point out that the stale demand made inthe criminal courts to treat the FIR vitiated merely on theground of delay in its lodgment cannot be approved as alegal corollary. In any case, where there is delay inmaking the FIR the court is to look at the causes for itand if such causes are not attributable to any effort toconcoct a version no consequence shall be attached to themere delay in lodging the FIR. [Vide Zahoor vs. State of UP(1991 Suppl.(1) SCC 372; Tara Singh vs. State of Punjab(1991 Suppl.(1) SCC 536); Jamna vs. State of UP (1994 (1)SCC 185). In Tara Singh (Supra) the Court made thefollowing observations:

"It is well settled that the delay in giving theFIR by itself cannot be a ground to doubt theprosecution case. Knowing the Indian conditionsas they are we cannot expect these villagers torush to the police station immediately after theoccurrence. Human nature as it is, the kith andkin who have witnessed the occurrence cannot beexpected to act mechanically with all thepromptitude in giving the report to the police.At times being grief-stricken because of thecalamity it may not immediately occur to themthat they should give a report. After all it isbut natural in these circumstances for them totake some time to go to the police station forgiving the report."

In the present case, no doubt, there is apparently along delay of two days to give information to the policebut the bereaved widow was not absolutely certain that shelost her husband once and for all until her brother-in-lawconfirmed to her, after identifying the dead body, that thesame was that of her husband. The initial tension andsuspense, undergone by her would have billowed up into amassive wave of grief. It is only understandable how muchtime a woman, placed in such a situation, would take toreach some level of placidity for communicating to thestrangers of what she knew about the last journey of herhusband. We therefore find no merit in the contentionbased on the delay of lodging the FIR.

The second contention relates to the evidence of PW-5Daya Ram (rickshaw-puller). He remembered the twoappellants who engaged him to carry the load in hisrickshaw up to the railway station. He also identified thewooden box in which the load was packed, with the help ofthe scribblings made on it. The contention is that it isnot possible for any person, much less a rickshaw-pullerlike PW5, to remember who exactly employed him to carry aparticular load on a particular day, after the lapse ofseveral days thereafter. This contention is raisedoverlooking the psychological phenomenon that human memoryis very often a conditioned characteristic. Anything whichhas any special or peculiar lineament can create an impacton the human mind lasting for long. While it is true thatroutine events in a man's day to day life may not remain inhis mind for being remembered later, any odd or bizarrehappenings involving him or in front of him have thetendency to stick in his mind indelibly. If there is anycause for him to recollect such events again they getrefreshed again. That is why he is able to narrate suchevents with all details when asked to do so. This appliesto all witnesses in criminal cases involving seriousoffences. Normally no porter or rickshaw-puller couldspeak from memory as to whom or whose load he carried manydays ago. But if the carrying of a load on a particularday was soon followed by the flash of sensational news inthe locality - that the load contained the corpse of amurdered person, the instinctive reaction of the carrier isto become inquisitive to know whether it was in respect ofthe load which he himself carried. If that inquisitivenesshad turned positive it is extremely probable that all thevivid details relating to that event would stick in hismemory. For him such event would not have been a usualoccurrence but extraordinarily odd and queer. Hence it isnot likely to fade out of the canvass of his mind. It willbe unrealistic to jettison the testimony of such a witnesson the mere ground that he could not have remembered afterthe lapse of long period the identity of the persons whoengaged him and also of the load which he carried. We,therefore, repel such contention.

The third contention is that the motive alleged by theprosecution was not established and hence the area remainsgray as to what would have impelled them to liquidate thebroker. No doubt it is the allegation of the prosecutionthat appellants owed a sum of Rs. one lakh to the deceasedand it might not have been possible for the prosecution toprove that aspect to the hilt. Nonetheless some materialswere produced for showing that there were transactionsbetween the appellants and the deceased and that they hadsome account to be settled. Only thus far could beestablished but not further. It is generally an impossibletask for the prosecution to prove what precisely would haveimpelled the murderers to kill a particular person. Allthat prosecution in many cases could point to is thepossible mental element which could have been the cause forthe murder. In this connection we deem it useful to referto the observations of this Court in State of HimachalPradesh vs. Jeet Singh {1999 (4) SCC 370}:

"No doubt it is a sound principle toremember that every criminal act was donewith a motive but its corollary is not thatno criminal offence would have beencommitted if the prosecution has failed toprove the precise motive of the accused tocommit it. When the prosecution succeededin showing the possibility of some ire forthe accused towards the victim, theinability to further put on record themanner in which such ire would have swelledup in the mind of the offender to such adegree as to impel him to commit theoffence cannot be construed as a fatalweakness of the prosecution. It is almostan impossibility for the prosecution tounravel the full dimension of the mentaldisposition of an offender towards theperson whom he offended."

An earlier decision of this Court in Nathuni Yadav vs.State of Bihar {1998 (9) SCC 238}, which dealt with thesame aspect, has been referred to therein and a passagetherefrom has been extracted. We are, therefore, notpersuaded to change the tide on account of the inability ofthe prosecution to prove the motive aspect to the hilt.

In the result we dismiss this appeal.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 882 OF 2001(Arising from S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 904 of 2001)

S. Nagalingam .. Appellant

Vs.

Sivagami .. Respondent

J U D G M E N T

K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, J.

Leave granted.

This appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Madras in Criminal Appeal No. 486 of 1999 reversing the order of acquittal passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, Madras. The learned Single Judge found the appellant guilty of the offence under Section 494 IPC.

The appellant, S. Nagalingam married respondent-complainant Sivagami on 6.9.1970. Three children were born from that wedlock. The respondent alleged that the appellant started ill-treating her and on many occasions she was physically tortured. As a result of ill-treatment and severe torture inflicted by the appellant as well as his mother, she left her marital home and started staying with her parents. Whille so, the respondent came to know that the appellant had entered into a marriage with another woman on 18.6.1984, by name Kasturi, and that the marriage was performed in a Marriage Hall at Thiruthani. The respondent then filed a criminal complaint before the Metropolitan Magistrate against the appellant and six others. All the accused were acquitted by the trial court. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent filed criminal appeal No. 67 of 1992 before the High Court of Madras. The learned Single Judge, by his judgment dated 1.11.1996 upheld the acquittal of accused 2-7, but as regards the acquittal of the appellant, the matter was remitted to the trial court permitting the complainant to adduce evidence regarding the manner in which the marriage was solemnized. Upon remand, the Priest [PW-3], who is alleged to have performed the marriage of the appellant with the second accused, Kasturi, on 18.6.1984, was further examined and the appellant was allowed further cross-examination. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate by his judgment dated 4.3.1999 acquitted the accused. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the respondent preferred a criminal appeal before the High Court of Madras. By the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge held that the appellant had committed the offence punishable under Section 494 IPC. This is challenged before us.

We heard Mr. R. Sundravardan, learned senior counsel for the appellant. The respondent Sivagami appeared in person and she filed some documents in court. Though she was offered the assistance of a counsel, she declined to avail herself of that opportunity.

The short question that arises for our consideration is whether the second marriage entered into by appellant with the second accused, Kasturi, on 18.6.1984 was a valid marriage under Hindu Law so as to constitute an offence under Section 494 IPC.

The essential ingredients of the offence under Section 494 IPC are (I) the accused must have contracted the first marriage; (ii) whilst the first marriage was subsisting, the accused must have contracted a second marriage; and (iii) both the marriages must be valid in the sense that necessary ceremonies governing the parties must have been performed.

Admittedly, the marriage of the appellant with the respondent, entered into by them on 6.9.1970, was subsisting at the time of the alleged second marriage. The Metropolitan Magistrate held that an important ceremony, namely, "Saptapadi" had not been performed and therefore, the second marriage was not a valid marriage and no offence was committed by the appellant . The learned Single Judge reversing this decision in appeal held that the parties are governed by Section 7-A of the Hindu Marriage Act as the parties are Hindus residing within the State of Tamil Nadu. It was held that there was a valid second marriage and the appellant was guilty of the offence of bigamy.

In the complaint filed by the respondent, it was alleged that the appellant had contracted the second marriage and this marriage was solemnised in accordance with the Hindu rites on 18.6.1984 at RCC Mandapam, Tiruttani Devasthanam. To support this contention, PWs 2 & 3 were examined. PW-3 gave detailed evidence regarding the manner in which the marriage on 18.6.1984 was performed.

Learned counsel for the appellant contended that as per the evidence of PW-3, it is clear that "Saptapadi", an important ritual which forms part of the marriage ceremony, was not performed and therefore, there was no valid marriage in accordance with Hindu rites.

It is undoubtedly true that the second marriage should be proved to be a valid marriage according to the personal law of the parties, though such second marriage is void under Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act having been performed when the earlier marriage is subsisting. The validity of the second marriage is to be proved by the prosecution by satisfactory evidence.

In Kanwal Ram & Ors. vs. H.P. Administration AIR 1966 SC 614 this Court held that in a bigamy case, the second marriage is to be proved and the essential ceremony required for a valid marriage should have been performed. It was held that mere admission on the part of the accused may not be sufficient.

The question as to whether "Saptapadi" is an essential ritual to be performed, came up for consideration of this Court in some cases. One of the earliest decisions of this Court is 1971 (1) SCC 864 [Smt. Priya Bala Ghosh vs. Suresh Chandra Ghosh] wherein it was held that the second marriage should be a valid one according to the law applicable to the parties. In that case, there was no evidence regarding the performance of the essential ceremonies, namely, "Datta Homa" and "Saptapadi". In paragraph 25 of the judgment, it was held that the learned Sessions Judge and the High Court have categorically found that "Homo" and "Saptapadi" are the essential rites for a marriage according to the law governing the parties and there is no evidence that these two essential ceremonies have been performed when the respondent is stated to have married Sandhya Rani. It is pertinent to note that in paragraph 9 of the judgment it is stated that both sides agreed that according to the law prevalent amongst the parties, "Homo" and "Saptapadi" were essential rites to be performed to constitute a valid marriage. Before this Court also, the parties on either side agreed that according to the law prevalent among them, "Homo" and "Saptapadi" were essential rites to be performed for solemnization of the marriage and there was no specific evidence regarding the performance of these two essential ceremonies.

1979 (3) SCC 80 [Lingari Obulamma vs. L. Venkata Reddy & Ors.] was a case where the High Court held that two essential ceremonies of a valid marriage, namely "datta homa" and "sapathapathi" [taking seven steps around the sacred fire] were not performed and, therefore, the marriage was void in the eye of law. This finding was upheld by this Court. The appellant therein contended that among the "Reddy" community in Andhra Pradesh, there was no such custom of performing "datta homa" and "saptapadi", but the High Court held that under the Hindu Law these two ceremonies were essential to constitute a valid marriage and rejected the plea of the appellant on the ground that there was no evidence to prove that any of these two ceremonies had been performed. The finding of the High Court was upheld by this Court that there was no evidence to prove a second valid marriage.

In 1991 Supp. (2) SCC 616 [Santi Deb Berma vs. Kanchan Prava Devi] also, the appellant was acquitted by this Court as there was no proof of a valid marriage as the ceremonial "Saptapadi" was not performed. This Court noticed in this case also that the High Court proceeded on the footing that according to the parties, performance of "Saptapadi" is one of the essential ceremonies to constitute a valid marriage.

Another decision on this point is 1994 (5) SCC 545 [Laxmi Devi vs. Satya Narayan & Ors.] wherein, this Court, relying on an earlier decision in [1971] 1 SCC 864 (supra), held that there was no proof that "Saptapadi" was performed and therefore, there was no valid second marriage and that no offence of bigamy was committed.

In the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court, it has been held that if the parties to the second marriage perform traditional Hindu form of marriage, "Saptapadi" and "Datta Homa" are essential ceremonies and without there being these two ceremonies, there would not be a valid marriage.

In the instant case, the parties to the second marriage, namely the appellant, Nagalingam, and his alleged second wife, Kasturi, are residents of the State of Tamil Nadu and their marriage was performed at Thiruthani Temple within the State of Tamil Nadu. In the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, there is a State Amendment by the State of Tamil Nadu, which has been inserted as Section 7-A. The relevant portion thereof is as follows :

"7-A. Special provision regarding suyamariyathai and seerthiruththa marriages. --- (1) This section shall apply to any marriage between any two Hindus, whether called suyamariyathai marriage or seerthiruththa marriage or by any other name, solemnized in the presence of relatives, friends or other persons --

(a) by each party to the marriage declaring in any language understood by the parties that each takes the other to be his wife or, as the case may be, her husband; or

(b) by each party to the marriage garlanding the other or putting a ring upon any finger of the other; or

(2) (a) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 7, but subject to the other provisions of this Act, all marriages to which this section applies solemnized after the commencement of the Hindu Marriage (Madras Amendment) Act, 1967, shall be good and valid in law.

(b) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 7 or in any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of the Hindu Marriage (Madras Amendment) Act, 1967, or in any other law in force immediately before such commencement in any judgment, decree or order of any court, but subject to sub-section (3), all marriages to which this section applies solemnized at any time before such commencement, shall be deemed to have been with effect on and from the date of the solemnization of each such marriage, respectively, good and valid in law.

(3) .............................................

(a).........................................

(i) .....................................

(ii) ....................................

(b) ........................................

Section 7-A applies to any marriage between two Hindus solemnized in the presence of relatives, friends or other persons. The main thrust of this provision is that the presence of a priest is not necessary for the performance of a valid marriage. Parties can enter into a marriage in the presence of relatives or friends or other persons and each party to the marriage should declare in the language understood by the parties that each takes other to be his wife or, as the case may be, her husband, and the marriage would be completed by a simple ceremony requiring the parties to the marriage to garland each other or put a ring upon any finger of the other or tie a thali. Any of these ceremonies, namely garlanding each other or putting a ring upon any finger of the other or tying a thali would be sufficient to complete a valid marriage. Sub-section 2(a) of Section 7-A specifically says that notwithstanding anything contained in Section 7, all marriages to which this provision applies and solemnized after the commencement of the Hindu Marriage (Madras Amendment) Act, 1967 shall be good and valid in law. Sub-section 2(b) further says that notwithstanding anything contained in Section 7 or in any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of the Hindu Marriage (Madras Amendment) Act 1967, or in any other law in force immediately before such commencement or in any judgment, decree or order of any court, all marriages to which this section applies solemnized at any time before such commencement, shall be deemed to have been valid. The only inhibition provided is that this marriage shall be subject to Sub-Section (3) of Section 7-A. We need not elaborately consider the scope of Section 7-A(3) as that is not relevant for our purpose.

The evidence in this case as given by PW-3 clearly shows that there was a valid marriage in accordance with the provisions of Section 7-A of the Hindu Marriage Act. PW-3 deposed that the bridegroom brought the "Thirumangalam" and tied it around the neck of the bride and thereafter the bride and the bridegroom exchanged garlands three times and the father of the bride stated that he was giving his daughter to "Kanniyathan" on behalf of and in the witness of "Agnidevi" and the father of the bridegroom received and accepted the "Kanniyathan". PW-3 also deposed that he performed the marriage in accordance with the customs applicable to the parties.

Under such circumstances, the provisions of Section 7-A, namely, the State Amendment inserted in the Statute are applicable and there was a valid marriage between the appellant and Kasturi. Moreover, neither complainant nor the appellant had any case that for a valid marriage among the members of the community to which they belong, this ceremony of "Saptapadi" was an essential one to make it a valid marriage. Section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act says that a Hindu marriage may be solemnized in accordance with the customary rites and ceremonies of either party thereto and where such rites and ceremonies include the Saptapadi, i.e. the taking of seven steps by the bridegroom and the bride jointly before the sacred fire, the marriage becomes complete and binding when the seventh step is taken.

"Saptapadi" was held to be an essential ceremony for a valid marriage only in cases where it was admitted by the parties that as per the form of marriage applicable to them that was an essential ceremony. The appellant in the instant case, however, had no such case that "Saptapadi" was an essential ceremony for a valid marriage as per the personal law applicable whereas the provisions contained in Section 7-A are applicable to the parties. In any view of the matter, there was a valid marriage on 18.6.1984 between the appellant and the second accused, Kasturi. Therefore, it was proved that the appellant had committed the offence of bigamy as it was done during the subsistence of his earlier marriage held on 6.9.1970.

The learned Single Judge was right in holding that the appellant committed the offence of bigamy and the matter was correctly remanded to the trial court for awarding appropriate sentence. We see no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed accordingly.

......................................J ( D.P. Mohapatra )

......................................J ( K.G. Balakrishnan ) New Delhi, August 31,2001

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