Ravi vs The State Of Punjab

2025 INSC 170 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025 (Arising out of SLP (Crl) No.7712 OF 2022)

RAVI …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF PUNJAB …RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

PANKAJ MITHAL, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The appellant-accused Ravi has been convicted by both

the courts below for the murder of his first wife Jamni by

strangulation. Therefore, the present appeal.

3. The appellant was living in the village Madh, Amritsar by

constructing a jhuggi in an open space, where he was Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by SNEHA DAS Date: 2025.02.10 working as a labourer. He used to live with his deceased 17:17:05 IST Reason:

wife Jamni, his second wife Soma and his two sons born

1 from the first wedlock. They all had been living together as

such for over 10-12 years.

4. The incident is of 22.08.2014. According to the case of the

prosecution, Chaina Ram (PW-1), the brother of the

deceased lodged a Zero FIR at Police Station Rajgarh,

District Churu, Rajasthan on 22.08.2014 stating that his

sister Jamni with her husband i.e., appellant, was living at

Rayya Mandi, Tehsil Baba Bakala, District Amritsar,

Punjab. On the night of 22.08.2014 at about 11:00 pm,

she was murdered by her husband in connivance with his

second wife Soma. The husband of the deceased i.e., the

appellant, brought the dead body from his village Rayya

Mandi to village Gujjuwas in a truck. In the FIR, he also

stated that his sister Rajo was residing in the neighbouring

jhuggi of the appellant and she, herself, had seen the

appellant committing the murder of the deceased by

strangulating her with a rope and that he threatened her

from disclosing anything about it to anyone.

5. The aforesaid FIR was transferred to the Police Station,

Khilchian, Amritsar, Punjab and the dead body of the

deceased was also taken there, where the memo of

2 panchnama was executed and the post-mortem was

conducted.

6. The panchnama on record reveals that it was conducted at

village Rayya Mandi, Police Station Rayya, Tehsil Baba

Bakala, District Amritsar, Punjab, i.e., the place where the

appellant was living in a jhuggi. The said panchnama,

apart from other things, records the marks of injury on the

body of the deceased and reports that there were marks of

ligature around the neck and the mouth was open with

tongue protruding outward.

7. The post-mortem report states that in the opinion of the

doctor, the deceased died of asphyxia caused by hanging

and that there were ligature marks on the neck.

8. The prosecution, to prove the appellant guilty of the

aforesaid offence, examined seven witnesses which

included the brother of the deceased Chaina Ram (PW-1),

her sister Rajo (PW-2), her cousin Deep Chand (PW-3), the

doctor who conducted the post-mortem Dr. Mohan Lal

Meena (PW-5), retired DSP Bagla Ram (PW-6), Inspector

Rachhpal Singh (PW-4) and Inspector Amolak Singh

(PW-7).

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9. The entire case of the prosecution is based on

circumstantial evidence. Though, the sister of the

deceased, i.e., Rajo (PW-2) is said to be an eye witness, she

had not seen the commission of the crime. She was simply

a resident of the neighbouring jhuggi and as such, may

have had the first-hand information.

10. It is an admitted position that after the death of the

deceased, the appellant, i.e., her husband carried her dead

body on a truck to the native place of the brother of the

deceased Chaina Ram (PW-1) and the sister of the

deceased Rajo (PW-2) had accompanied him. Chaina Ram

(PW-1), the brother of the deceased who had lodged the

complaint in his testimony, accepted that her sister was

married to the appellant and they were residing in Rayya

Mandi. However, he was not aware of what actually

happened on 22.08.2014 and stated that her sister died

due to her illness. He categorically stated that the

appellant was not responsible for her death. The said

witness, as such, was declared hostile.

11. It may be pertinent to mention here that the aforesaid

witness admitted his signatures on the Zero FIR (Exh.

4 PW4/1) but went on to state that he had signed a blank

paper and did not know what was written there.

12. A pursual of the Zero FIR reveals that it is a computerized

FIR and is not in the handwriting of the aforesaid witness.

It only bears his signatures at the relevant place on both

the pages of the Zero FIR.

13. The sister of the deceased Rajo (PW-2) was also declared

hostile as she stated that there was no dispute between

her sister and her husband i.e. the appellant and that she

died due to illness and breathing problems. Similarly, the

cousin of the deceased Deep Chand (PW-3) was also

declared hostile as he expressed ignorance as to what had

actually happened on 22.08.2014.

14. In view of the aforesaid three witnesses turning hostile, the

prosecution was left with the formal witnesses, namely, Dr.

Mohan Lal Meena (PW-5) who conducted the post-mortem,

the police officer/retired DSP Bagla Ram (PW-6) who

registered the Zero FIR at Churu, Rajasthan, the

SHO/retired Inspector Racchpal Singh (PW-4) who

registered the formal FIR (Exh.PW4/2) and Inspector

Amolak Singh (PW-7) who carried out the investigation.

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15. Dr. Mohan Lal Meena (PW-5), in his testimony, stated that

he had conducted the post-mortem. The deceased had died

due to asphyxia caused by hanging which is established

by the ligature marks appearing on her neck. The death

may have occurred two to five days prior to the post-

mortem. In cross-examination, this witness accepted that,

though the cause of death is asphyxia, it can be caused by

chronic tuberculosis also and that the appearance of

ligature marks on the neck might be due to the long

journey of the dead body from one place to another. The

above testimony of PW-5, thus, in no certain terms,

establishes that the deceased died of asphyxia due to

hanging or strangulation inasmuch as he had also opined

that the death may be due to chronic tuberculosis. He had

also explained the possibility of the ligature marks on the

neck to be on account of the long journey and not solely

due to hanging or strangulation.

16. The Inspector Amolak Singh (PW-7), who carried out the

investigation, simply states that he had conducted the

investigation and had arrested the appellant. On

appellant’s disclosure, he discovered the rope which was

6 used in the commission of the crime. However, in cross-

examination, he admitted that similar ropes were easily

available in the market.

17. Now, if we discard the evidence of the witnesses who

turned hostile, the crucial evidence with which we are left

with is that of the doctor conducting the post-mortem (PW-

5) and that of the inspector conducting the investigation

(PW-7). The evidence of the aforesaid two, if read together,

would only reveal that they have conducted the post-

mortem and the investigation respectively. The doctor

opined the cause of death to be asphyxia due to hanging

with ligature marks on the neck but in the cross-

examination admitted that the ligature marks could be on

account of the long journey of the dead body and that the

cause of death of the deceased can also be due to chronic

tuberculosis. Therefore, his evidence does not conclusively

establish the cause of the death. Even the evidence of the

Inspector (PW-7) does not establish beyond the shadow of

doubt that the rope which was recovered by him was the

same rope with which the crime may have been committed

7 as similar ropes were easily available in the market.

Nothing much turns upon his evidence as well.

18. In a leading case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State

of Maharashtra1 this Court laid down the five golden

principles, the panchsheels of circumstantial evidence,

namely, (i) The circumstances from which the conclusion

of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established; (ii) The

facts so established should be consistent with the

hypothesis of guilt and the accused, that is to say, they

should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except

that the accused is guilty; (iii) The circumstances should

be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (iv) They should

exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be

proved; and (v) There must be a chain of evidence so

complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the

conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused

and must show that in all human probability the act must

have been done by the accused.

19. If we apply the above principles, the circumstances of this

case, in no way, conclusively establish the guilt of the

1 (1984) 4 SCC 116

8 appellant rather it gives sufficient room to form a different

opinion. On the basis of the above circumstantial

evidence, the innocence of the appellant cannot be

completely ruled out.

20. Learned counsel for the State has placed reliance upon Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra2,

wherein it has been held that in view of Section 106 of the

Evidence Act, there is a corresponding burden on the

inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation about

the manner of the commission of the crime. Therefore,

Learned counsel for the State argued that in view of

Section 106 of the Evidence Act, it was for the appellant

to have explained the circumstances under which the

deceased died as the crime had occurred within the four

corners of a house i.e. jhuggi and he alone had knowledge

as to what had happened inside at the time of the crime.

21. The above argument may appear to be of some substance

but if we look into the law deeply, we would find that the

initial burden is upon the prosecution to first prima facie

establish the guilt of the accused and then only the

2 (2006) 10 SCC 681

9 burden shifts upon the accused to explain the

circumstances as contemplated by Section 106 of the

Evidence Act.

22. A three judge Bench of this Court in Anees v. The State

Govt. of NCT3 has elaborately considered the principles of

law governing the applicability of Section 106 of the

Evidence Act and has held that the court should apply

Section 106 of the Evidence Act in criminal cases with care

and caution. The ordinary rule which applies to criminal

trials and places the onus on the prosecution to prove the

guilt of the accused, does not, in any way, stand modified

by the provisions contained under Section 106 of the

Evidence Act. The said provision cannot be invoked to

make up the inability of the prosecution to produce the

evidence of circumstances pointing to the guilt of the

accused. The said provision cannot be used to support a

conviction unless the prosecution has discharged the

onus by proving all elements necessary to establish the

offence. In other words, the prosecution does not stand

absolved from its initial liability to prove the offence and it

3 (2024) SCC OnLine SC 757

10 is only when such an onus is discharged and a prima facie

case of guilt is made out that the provisions of Section 106

of the Evidence Act may come into play.

23. It has further been emphasized in the above case that

Section 106 of the Evidence Act would apply to cases

where the prosecution could be said to have succeeded in

proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be

drawn regarding the guilt of the accused and not

otherwise.

24. This apart, the courts below have completely lost sight of

the statement of the appellant recorded under Section 313

of Code of Criminal Procedure4. The appellant in his

statement under Section 313 CrPC, on being asked if he

had anything further to say, categorically stated that the

deceased had died a natural death as she was suffering

from chronic tuberculosis for which she was under

treatment at Beas hospital. Once the appellant had

disclosed about the aforesaid illness of the deceased and

her treatment in a particular hospital, it was for the

prosecution to have sought re-examination of the doctor

4 In short ‘CrPC’

11 conducting the post-mortem so as to ascertain as to

whether the deceased was actually suffering from chronic

tuberculosis, though he may have opined that the death

may be due to asphyxia caused due to tuberculosis. The

prosecution failed to do so or to produce any other

independent evidence in this regard to dislodge the version

of the appellant.

25. In view of the totality of the facts and circumstances of this

case, we are of the opinion that the prosecution has

completely failed to produce evidence to prove the guilt of

the appellant beyond the shadow of doubt on the basis of

the circumstantial evidence. Rather the evidence on

record gives ample leverage for two conflicting opinions,

and in such circumstances, the benefit of doubt has to be

given in favour of the appellant.

26. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and order dated

23.01.2019 passed by the High Court of Punjab and

Haryana at Chandigarh is liable to be and hereby set aside

and the appeal deserves to be allowed.

27. The appellant is not on bail as per the reports on record.

He is in jail and as per the custody certificate, he has been

12 in jail for six years and two months as on 05.01.2021,

meaning thereby that he is in jail for over ten years as of

today. Accordingly, he is directed to be released from

custody immediately.

28. Before parting, we record our appreciation to the valuable

assistance rendered by the legal aid counsel Ms. Sonia

Mathur, Senior Advocate, who had appeared for the

appellant and ably assisted by learned counsel, Ms.

Surbhi Bhardwaj.

29. The appeal is allowed accordingly.

.............……………………………….. J.

(PANKAJ MITHAL)

.............……………………………….. J.

(AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH)

NEW DELHI;

FEBRUARY 10, 2025

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