Ratilal Jhaverbhai Parmar vs State Of Gujarat

2024 INSC 801 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11000 OF 2024

RATILAL JHAVERBHAI PARMAR AND ORS. … APPELLANTS

VERSUS

STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS. …RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

1. In recent times, on more occasions than one, this Court has suo

motu initiated proceedings having noticed attitudinal and

thought patterns of learned Judges of various high courts across

the country which tended to lower the image of the judiciary in

general and the high courts in particular. While some of the Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by Jatinder Kaur Date: 2024.10.21 proceedings are still pending, one such proceeding has been 17:19:59 IST Reason:

1 disposed of recently emphasising the need for learned Judges

to exercise restraint while expressing one’s views in open court.

2. Yet again, a fortnight back, this Court set aside a judgment of a

high court on the ground that such judgment had been signed

by the learned Judge after demitting office.

3. These are distressing trends indeed.

4. As if there is no end to it, the present case unfolds facts which

are equally disturbing and meets with our disapproval.

5. However, before we refer to the factual matrix giving rise to this

civil appeal, noticing a decision of fairly recent origin of this

Court in Balaji Baliram Mupade vs State of Maharashtra1 is

considered imperative. Relevant excerpts from such decision

read as follows:

“1. … Judicial discipline requires promptness in delivery of judgments—an aspect repeatedly emphasised by this Court. The problem is compounded where the result is known but not the reasons. This deprives any aggrieved party of the opportunity to seek further judicial redressal in the next tier of judicial scrutiny. ***** 10. We must note with regret that the counsel extended through various judicial pronouncements including the one referred to aforesaid appear to have been ignored, more importantly where oral orders are pronounced. In case of such orders, it is expected that they are either dictated in the court or at least must follow immediately thereafter, to facilitate any aggrieved party to seek redressal from the higher court. The delay in delivery of judgments has been observed to be a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution

1 (2021) 12 SCC 603

2 of India in Anil Rai case [(2001) 7 SCC 318] and as stated aforesaid, the problem gets aggravated when the operative portion is made available early and the reasons follow much later.

11. It cannot be countenanced that between the date of the operative portion of the order and the reasons disclosed, there is a hiatus period of nine months! This is much more than what has been observed to be the maximum time period for even pronouncement of reserved judgment as per Anil Rai case.

12. The appellant undoubtedly being the aggrieved party and prejudiced by the impugned order is unable to avail of the legal remedy of approaching this Court where reasons can be scrutinised. It really amounts to defeating the rights of the appellant to challenge the impugned order on merits and even the succeeding party is unable to obtain the fruits of success of the litigation.

13. We are constrained to pen down a more detailed order and refer to the earlier view on account of the fact that recently a number of such orders have come to our notice and we thought it is time to send a reminder to the High Courts.”

6. We are surprised, not a little, that the strong reminders issued

by this Court from time to time have had little effect on the high

courts in the country and that decisions, binding under Article

141 of the Constitution, are being persistently ignored. It has

been stressed time and again over the years and we feel pained

to observe, once more, that neglect/omission/refusal to abide

by binding precedents augurs ill for the health of the system.

Not only does it tantamount to disservice to the institution of

the judiciary but also affects the administration of justice. For a

3 learned Judge to deviate from the laid down standards would be

to betray the trust reposed in him by the nation. We sincerely

hope that learned Judges of the high courts while being careful

and cautious will remain committed to the service of the

litigants, for whom only they exist, as well as the oath of office

that they have taken so that, in future, we are not presented

with another case of similar nature to deal with.

7. In this case, which is a civil appeal arising from a judgment and

order bearing the date 1st March, 2023, we find the High Court

of Gujarat at Ahmedabad2 to have egregiously breached the law.

8. The bare facts necessary for decision, without any reference to

the facts and law involved in the case before the High Court,

culled out from the pleadings before us are these.

9. R/Special Civil Application No. 10912 of 20153, being a petition

under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, was filed by the

appellant before the High Court challenging an order dated 16th

June, 2015 passed by the Deputy Collector, Kamrej Prant,

District Surat. The Deputy Collector, by such order, had

confirmed the order dated 23rd February, 2015 of the Mamlatdar,

Kamrej. The petition came up for consideration on 1st March,

2 High Court, hereafter 3 petition, hereafter

4 2023 before a learned Judge, having been listed in the cause-

list as Item No.17. According to the appellant, he was

represented before the learned Judge by his counsel. Hearing

having concluded on 1st March, 2023, “he was under the belief

that the detailed order is reserved in the proceeding. However,

even an order recording the reserving of orders has not been

passed or made available on the official website of the Hon’ble

High Court till date”. Since the detailed order was not

pronounced, the appellant’s counsel did not also apply for the

certified copy. In the process, more than a year passed by. On

30th April, 2024, the appellant’s counsel received from the IT

Cell of the High Court soft copy of a reasoned order dated 1 st

March, 2023 containing the reasons for dismissal of the petition.

10. The impugned order is part of the records. At the beginning of

the said order, “ORAL ORDER” is printed in bold font, i.e., it is

supposed to be an order which has been dictated in open court.

However, the appellant has alleged something rather serious :

that the learned Judge had passed the reasoned order more

than a year after 1st March, 2023 and ante-dated the same to

project that the reasoned order was passed on 1st March, 2023.

5

11. Such allegation prompted us to seek, by an order dated 12th

August, 2024, a report4 from the Registrar General of the High

Court as to whether the allegation of the appellant that the

reasoned order bearing the date 1st March, 2023 was

communicated to him for the first time on 30 th April, 2024 is

correct or not. A report has since been filed by the Registrar

General and on perusal thereof, we have found the allegation of

the appellant to be substantially correct. It is revealed that the

learned Judge dictated the reasoned order on 12th April, 2024

to His Lordship’s personal secretary, whereafter such order was

uploaded on the website of the High Court on 30 th April, 2024

as well as communicated to the appellant’s counsel by the IT

Cell.

12. Having regard to the nature of controversy raised by the

appellant, we also had the occasion to witness (on the virtual

platform) the recorded version of the proceedings dated 1 st

March, 2023 before the learned Judge of the High Court. After

briefly hearing counsel for the appellant and his adversary, the

learned Judge was heard to say, “I will dismiss” and a few

seconds thereafter, pronounced the outcome of the petition as

“dismissed”. Counsel representing the appellant before the High

4 the report, hereafter

6 Court being present could hear what the learned Judge said

while his adversary acknowledged that he was “grateful”.

Immediately thereafter, the next item on the board was called.

This is precisely what happened on 1st March, 2023, while

dealing with the petition.

13. There can be no two opinions that if not the appellant, but his

counsel certainly did have knowledge of dismissal of the petition

by the learned Judge; also, we have no doubt that the appellant

feigned complete ignorance and deliberately did not plead that

his counsel was well and truly aware of the outcome of the

petition moments after hearing stood concluded before the

learned Judge.

14. At the same time, from the proceedings of the court of the

learned Judge available on the virtual platform, it is patently

clear that His Lordship did not even express that the ‘reasons

would follow’ for the dismissal of the petition. Not having so

expressed, His Lordship practically rendered the court functus

officio. We say so because it is not too clear as to whether any

order of dismissal was signed by His Lordship on 1 st March,

2023, or at any point of time immediately thereafter, although

we have noted from the report that the Disposal Log Report of

1st March, 2023 of His Lordship’s court duly recorded that the

7 petition stood disposed of. In Vinod Kumar Singh v. Benaras

Hindu University5, this Court held that when a judgment is

pronounced in open court, parties act on the basis that it is the

operative judgment and that signing is a mere formality;

however, in exceptional circumstances, an order pronounced in

open court can be amended or even altered before the same

has been authenticated by the Judge by signing the order but

such a course ought to be adopted judicially, sparingly and for

adequate reasons and upon putting the parties to notice. Such

is not the case here. We are inclined to the view that the learned

Judge not having expressed that reasons for the dismissal would

follow, His Lordship ceased to retain jurisdiction over the

petition and foreclosed assignment of reasons for the dismissal.

15. Assuming that His Lordship were to express that reasons for the

dismissal would follow, still there could be no valid reason to

write a detailed reasoned order after lapse of a year having

expressed “dismissed” and upload such order on the website.

No doubt, as per the good practice prevailing in the High Court,

the order was communicated to the appellant’s counsel by the

IT Cell but that is little consolation in a case of the present

nature.

5 1987 SCC

8

16. Having said thus, and bearing in mind the onerous

responsibilities that learned Judges of the high courts across the

country have to shoulder on a daily basis, we are persuaded to

think that the duty and responsibility of assigning reasons for

dismissal of the petition completely escaped the mind of the

learned Judge. Perhaps, there is hardly any individual including

any Judge who can truly claim to have committed no mistake in

his life. It is a feature of human fallibility that people are prone

to commit mistakes. It is how lessons that individuals learn from

mistakes which facilitate in putting the past behind for moving

forward.

17. Nonetheless, we regret to observe that the learned Judge

having realised in April, 2024 of having omitted to assign

reasons for dismissal of the petition although His Lordship had

pronounced “dismissed” in open court proceedings on 1 st March,

2023, could have avoided committing an act of indiscretion, by

breaching all norms of ethics, in proceeding to assign reasons

more than a year later. In accordance with the highest standards

of fairness, propriety and discipline, the need of the hour

required the learned Judge to bring the matter back on board

once again, recall the verbal order of dismissal and place it

9 before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of the High Court for

assigning it to some other Bench for fresh consideration.

18. It cannot be gainsaid that in today’s world, particularly when

more and more people are showing interest in court proceedings

and there is wide coverage thereof on social media platforms,

the presiding officers of courts are equally at the centre of

attention as the controversy that is involved and the manner of

its resolution. The society expects every Judge of a high court,

so to say, to be a model of rectitude, an epitome of

unimpeachable integrity and unwavering principles, a champion

of moral excellence, and an embodiment of professionalism,

who can consistently deliver work of high-quality guaranteeing

justice. Although, on the whole, the weight of work on learned

Judges of the high courts across the country is immense and the

Judges have also been performing commendably despite various

odds, instances such as the one under consideration, which we

view as nothing more than an aberration, bring disrepute to the

judicial system of the country and show the entire judiciary in

poor light. This, in our opinion, could have well been avoided

with a little bit of care and caution, and deference to the

decisions on the point by this Court.

10

19. The situation presents us with an opportunity where we feel it

expedient to share our thoughts only for the purpose of future

guidance to overcome adversity. Having regard to the demands

of changing times, one of the significant aspects of judging that

has been at the forefront of discussion in many a

conference/conclave or legal circle is the need for prompt

‘pronouncement of judgments’. Order XX of the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908 ordains that a judgment can be pronounced, in

an open court, either at once or as soon thereafter as may be

practicable on a future day. Guided by the principles enshrined

in Order XX, number of learned Judges scrupulously follow the

same. Learned Judges do come across cases requiring short

orders which, in their assessment, may not consume more than

15/20 minutes. These orders are generally dictated in open

court immediately after a hearing is over. On the other hand, if

in any given case the judgment could justifiably be reserved

after hearing of extensive arguments, it would not be proper to

criticize a learned Judge if he dictates the judgment in open

court notwithstanding the length of time to be taken therefor.

As per the ordainment of Order XX, the learned Judge would be

perfectly justified in doing so. In such cases, it could roughly

take any time between 20 minutes to a couple of/few hours or

11 even more spilling over to the next day (in rare cases) to

accomplish the task. This approach could result in the board (if

it is heavy) getting choked and the remaining cases on the board

having slim chances of being considered. As the saying goes,

necessity is the mother of invention. The necessity to strike a

balance, in turn, has led to an innovative approach (many a

times followed even by this Court) which, though not strictly in

tune with Order XX, has transitioned into a regular practice by

passage of time. This contemplates a rough assessment made

by a learned Judge of the time to be taken for dictating a

judgment after hearing in a matter is concluded and if, in such

assessment, it is likely to take more than 20/25 minutes, the

learned Judge proceeds to pronounce the operative part

together with the outcome while expressing “reasons to/would

follow” and then concludes the exercise of pronouncing the final

judgment by providing the reasons as soon as possible

thereafter. Having regard to the exploding docket of a majority

of the high courts, learned Judges consider it wise and prudent

to make optimum use of judicial time by not dictating lengthy

judgments in court. This practice, no doubt, seeks to serve a

salutary purpose. People unversed with the functioning of the

judicial system are perhaps unaware as to how development of

12 this practice has contributed to saving of precious judicial time,

which the learned Judges invariably devote and utilize for

hearing more cases that are on board in the anxiety to consider

and decide as many cases as are possible during the scheduled

working orders. Burdened though with immense pressure of

work and brushing aside fatigue, which is quite likely to develop,

the learned Judges after retiring for the day dictate the

judgment in their court chambers or in their residential offices

either on the same day or within a few days thereafter. The

hearing having concluded not too long back, the arguments

remain fresh in the mind of the learned Judges and it becomes

all the more easy to dictate the judgment. While this approach

without a doubt has its own benefits, recent happenings leave

us to lament that reasons for the conclusion reached are being

placed in the public domain much too late, as in the case of

Balaji Baliram Mupade (supra) as well as this case. In an

attempt to save time to attend to as many cases as possible,

certain learned Judges unwittingly are contributing to justice

being delayed in given cases which, concomitantly, have been

giving rise to criticism of unpleasant flavours. Critics of such

practice (to pronounce the operative part with the outcome and

to provide the reasons later in detailed final judgments) could

13 and do legitimately argue in favour of reserving judgments as

required by the procedural laws if the particular case so

demands but as Judges, we know, reserving too many

judgments has its own pitfalls. Once the files pile up, it becomes

increasingly difficult to remember the minute details of the case

and the arguments advanced by the parties in support of their

respective cases which leads to a shift to rely on the written

notes of arguments. However, if only written notes were

enough, there would be no need of oral hearing in court.

Additionally, drawing from our experience on the bench, we can

safely say that inclination of learned Judges to reserve

judgments is invariably the course adopted where cases

involving complex and intricate points of law do call upon

learned Judges to craft well-researched and well-reasoned

judgments. That apart, there are cases arising from recent

enactments involving questions of law not having arisen hitherto

and consequently such questions have never been answered.

Such categories of cases demand the high courts to lay down

the law in clear terms for comprehension of all concerned.

Obviously, this process is time consuming and the time limit for

delivering judgments by the high courts as laid down in Anil Rai

14 vs State of Bihar6, at times, is breached. We have full trust

and confidence in the learned Judges of the high courts since

they are well-equipped to tackle any kind of pressure situation.

However, while it would be prudent to leave it to the learned

Judges to pick any one of the three options [(i) dictation of the

judgment in open court, (ii) reserving the judgment and

pronouncing it on a future day, or (iii) pronouncing the operative

part and the outcome, i.e., “dismissed” or “allowed” or

“disposed of”, while simultaneously expressing that reasons

would follow in a detailed final judgment supporting such

outcome], it would be in the interest of justice if any learned

Judge, who prefers the third option (supra), makes the reasons

available in the public domain, preferably within 2 (two) days

thereof but, in any case, not beyond 5 (five) days to eliminate

any kind of suspicion in the mind of the party losing the legal

battle. If the pressure of work is such that in the assessment of

the learned Judge the reasons in support of the final judgment

cannot be made available, without fail, in 5 (five) days, it would

be a better option to reserve the judgment. Also, if the ultimate

order would have the effect of changing the status of the parties

or the subject matter of the lis, it would always be advisable to

6 (2001) 7 SCC 318

15 stick to the course envisaged in Order XX. Since, the fraternity

of learned Judges of all the courts are interested to preserve the

dignity of the respective judicial institutions with which they are

associated, all learned Judges must be mindful of the impact of

their actions on the society at large. Dealing with lakhs of

litigation is no mean task, but at the same time we must realize

that instances do emerge leaving absolutely no margin for error.

It is our duty as Judges to stand tall and rise to the challenge.

20. While concluding, we are reminded of the universal truth “to err

is human, to forgive is divine” emphasizing the human tendency

of committing mistakes and the importance of forgiving a

human error.

21. Conscious that we are of learned Judges of the high courts

working overtime to render justice to the litigants by conducting

judicial proceedings, at times, by sitting in excess of normal

working hours, discharging administrative duties in addition to

judicial work, etc, and in the process overlooking health issues

and sacrificing all pleasures of social life, we need to look at the

issue wearing glasses of grace and compassion. As has been

held by this Court in Tirupati Balaji Developers (P) Ltd. vs

State of Bihar7, in the unified hierarchical judicial structure

7 (2004) 5 SCC 1

16 that we have under the Constitution, vertically the Supreme

Court is placed over the high courts; but if the Supreme Court

and the high courts were thought of as brothers, we as Judges

of the apex court in the country remain as the elder brother only

to the extent of exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Promoting

empathy and understanding by encouraging forgiveness, which

is a divine quality transcending human limitation, should be

preferred to anything else in the given circumstances,

particularly when the learned Judge has not been put on notice

and is unable to place His Lordship’s version. This approach is

considered to be a better option rather than remarking

adversely or giving unsolicited advice.

22. We, thus, allow the controversy to rest here.

23. It is now time for us to give our decision. Notwithstanding that

the appellant has not been entirely clean in his approach but

having regard to the famous words of Lord Hewart, the Lord

Chief Justice of England in R. vs Sussex JJ., ex p McCarthy 8

that “justice must not only be done, but must also be seen to

be done”, meaning thereby that the outcome of proceedings

should be visibly just, the impugned order bearing the date 1st

March, 2023 has to be set aside which we do hereby order. This

8 (1924) 1 KB 256

17 would result in revival of the petition of the appellant and it shall

stand restored on the file of the High Court. The Hon’ble the

Chief Justice of the High Court is requested to place the petition

before the learned Judge currently having the assignment to

hear the same.

24. Needless to observe, the petition shall be considered and

decided by the High Court uninfluenced by any observation

made in the order bearing the date 1st March, 2023.

25. The appeal stands allowed on the aforesaid terms.

26. We make it clear that we have not examined the rival claims on

merits.

………………………………………, J.

(DIPANKAR DATTA)

………………………………………, J.

(PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)

NEW DELHI

21st October, 2024

18 19