Ranvir Singh vs State Of Haryana & Anr

C RI M I N A L AP P E L L A T E JU RIS DI C TI O N

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NOS.670-671 OF 2008

Ranvir Singh ... Petitioner

Vs.

State of Haryana & Anr. ... Respondents

J U D G M E N T

ALTAMAS KABIR, J.

1. These Special Leave Petitions arise out of the

judgment and order passed by the Punjab & Haryana High

Court on 31st May, 2007, dismissing two criminal

revision cases, viz., Crl. Misc. No.6703-M of 2000 and

Crl. Misc. No.598-M of 2005 filed by the petitioner

herein, who is appearing in-person. Crl. Misc.

No.6703-M of 2000 was filed by the petitioner herein

to quash a complaint filed by Smt. Ved Wati,

Respondent No.2 herein, on 1st July, 1999, under 2 Section 420/34 I.P.C. on allegations of payment having

been received by the petitioner to perform certain

favours for the complainant's son-in-law by making use

of his official position. Process was issued by the

Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rohtak, Haryana, on the

said complaint on 19th August, 1999. The said matter is

still pending before the learned Magistrate.

2. The Crl. Misc. No.598-M of 2005 was filed by the

petitioner for quashing another complaint filed by the

said Smt. Ved Wati on 29th September, 2003, under

Sections 7, 8, 9, 11 and 13 of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988, wherein the learned Additional

Sessions Judge, Rohtak, issued process on 8th January,

2004. Both the Criminal Revision Petitions were taken

up for hearing and disposal together by the High Court

on 31st May, 2007, and were dismissed by a common

judgment and order, which has been assailed in these

Special Leave Petitions.

3. The petitioner, who appeared in-person, submitted

that the High Court had erred in rejecting the

revisional applications filed by him since in the

first complaint filed on 1st July, 1999, the

complainant had stated that sanction was being sought 3

for prosecuting the petitioner, but such sanction had

never been obtained.

4. The petitioner also submitted that thereafter the

complainant applied for sanction to prosecute the

petitioner under the provisions of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988, on four different occasions, but

such sanction was not granted while the petitioner

remained in service. The petitioner ultimately

retired from service on 31st January, 2002.

Immediately thereafter, on 8th April, 2002, the

complainant filed the complaint mentioned hereinabove

under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption

Act, 1988, on 8th April, 2002, which was entertained by

the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak, and

process was issued on 16th April, 2003. The

petitioner further submitted that the complaint filed

on 8th April, 2002, on which process had been issued on

16th April, 2003, came to be dismissed on 24th July,

2003, for non-filing of process fee. The petitioner

submitted that an application filed by the complainant

on 18th September, 2003, for recall of the order dated

24th July, 2003, was dismissed by the learned

Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak. Thereafter, yet

another complaint was filed by Smt. Ved Wati on 29th 4

September, 2003, on the same grounds under the

provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988,

on which process was issued on 8th January, 2004. The

petitioner submitted that having taken cognizance on

the complaint filed by Smt. Ved Wati and the same

having been dismissed for non-filing of process fee,

the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak, was no

longer competent to take cognizance and issue process

on a separate complaint on the same cause of action.

According to the petitioner, the complaint filed on

29th September, 2003, was nothing but an abuse of the

process of the Court having regard to the fact that

the earlier complaint on which cognizance had been

taken was dismissed on account of non-filing of

process fee.

5. In support of his aforesaid submission, the

petitioner firstly referred to the decision of this

Court in Pramatha Nath Talukdar vs. Saroj Ranjan

Sarkar [AIR 1962 SC 876], wherein the majority view of

the Three-Judge Bench was that an order of dismissal

on a complaint under Section 203 Cr.P.C. does not

constitute bar to the entertainment of a second

complaint on the same facts, but it would be 5

entertained only in exceptional circumstances such as

(i) where the previous order was passed on an

incomplete record; or (ii) on a misunderstanding of

the nature of the complaint; or (iii) it was

manifestly absurd, unjust or fallacious or false where

new facts which could not with a reasonable diligence

have been brought on record in a previous proceeding,

have been adduced. It was observed further that it

could not be said in the interest of justice that

after a decision had been given against the

complainant upon a full consideration of his case, he

or any other person should be given another

opportunity to have his complaint inquired into.

6. The petitioner also referred to the decision of

this Court in Poonam Chand Jain vs. Fazru [2005 SCC

(Cri) 190], wherein a similar view was expressed

relying on, among other cases, the decision in

Pramatha Nath Talukdar's case (supra).

7. The petitioner then contended that the complaint

under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption

Act, 1988, is a special Statute and would have an

overriding effect over the general provisions

contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure. 6

According to the petitioner, the maxim generalia

specialibus non derogent would have application and

that since a special provision had been made with

regard to matters relating to prevention of corruption

and for other matters connected therewith, the same

would stand excluded from the general provisions and

accordingly the provisions of Section 19 of the Act

would have an overriding effect over the general

provisions contained in Section 190 or 319 Cr.P.C. In

support of his said submission, the petitioner relied

on the decision of this Court in Dilawar Singh vs.

Parvinder Singh [2005 (12) SCC 709].

8. The petitioner lastly submitted that in any event,

the complainant after serving notice under Section 80

of the Civil Procedure Code had issued a notice on 12th

June, 1999, indicating that if sanction was not given,

the complainant would be compelled to file a suit for

damages against the Government. The petitioner

submitted that it was obviously an attempt to

pressurize the Government into granting sanction for

prosecution of the petitioner under the provisions of

the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The

petitioner submitted that both the complaints filed on

1st July, 1999 and 29th September, 2003, without the 7

sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988, were not maintainable,

particularly when the earlier complaint on the same

cause of action had been dismissed.

9. The petitioner also urged that since under Section

362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the learned

Additional Sessions Judge was not competent to recall

and/or review his earlier order, he was not competent

to entertain the second complaint on the same set of

facts and between the same parties. In support of his

submissions, the petitioner relied on the decision of

this Court in Sankatha Singh vs. State of U.P. [1962

Supp. (2) SCR 817], which dealt with the provisions of

Sections 369 and 424 of the 1898 Code which is pari

materia with the provisions of Section 362 of the

present Code. The petitioner submitted that this

Court had specifically observed that inherent powers

of the Court could not be exercised to do something

which the Code specifically prohibited the Court from

doing.

10. Appearing for the complainant, Smt. Ved Wati, Mr.

S.S. Sangwan, learned Advocate, submitted that while a

Magistrate could not exercise any inherent 8

jurisdiction to restore a case after the discharge or

acquittal of an accused, a second complaint could be

entertained if the same could be tried within the

limitations imposed by this Court in Pramatha Nath

Talukdar's case (supra). Relying on the decision of

this Court in Maj. Gen. A.S. Gauraya & Anr. vs. S.N.

Thakur & Anr. [AIR 1986 SC 1440], Mr. Sangwan

submitted that it had been held in the said decision

that filing of a second complaint is not the same

thing as reviving a dismissed complaint after

recalling the earlier order of dismissal. Mr.

Sangwan, therefore, urged that there was no legal bar

to a second complaint being entertained by the

Magistrate if it could be brought within the

parameters of the exceptions culled out in Pramatha

Nath Talukdar's case (supra).

11. On behalf of the State, it was submitted by Mr.

Gautam Awasthi, learned Advocate, that apart from the

various decisions mentioned hereinabove regarding the

competence of the learned Magistrate to entertain the

second complaint, right from the decision in Pramatha

Nath Talukdar's case (supra), any doubt as to whether

a second complaint could be entertained by the

Magistrate if an earlier complaint was dismissed not 9

on merits but on account of default on the part of the

complainant, had been dispelled by the decision of

this Court in Jatinder Singh vs. Ranjit Kaur [2001 (2)

SCC 570], wherein while considering the earlier

decisions, including the decision in Pramatha Nath

Talukdar's case (supra), this Court spelt out the

distinction between Sections 202 and 203 Cr.P.C. in

arriving at a finding that dismissal of a complaint on

grounds of default was no bar for a fresh complaint

being filed on the same set of facts. This Court held

that under Section 202 of the Code a Magistrate

conducts an inquiry before issuing process, for the

purposes of determining whether there was sufficient

ground for proceeding, whereas Section 203 of the Code

empowered him to dismiss a complaint after holding

such inquiry, if he was of the view that there was no

sufficient ground of proceeding. In such an event,

the Magistrate was required to record reasons as to

why there was no sufficient ground for proceeding

though an elaborate order was not required to be

given. But, there is no provision in the Code which

debars a complainant from preferring a second

complaint on the same allegations if the first

complaint did not result in the conviction or 10

acquittal or even discharge. This Court observed

further that if the dismissal of the complaint was not

on merit but on default of the complainant to be

present, there could be no bar in the complainant

moving the Magistrate again with the second complaint

on the same facts. However, this Court made a

distinction in respect of a dismissal under Section

203 of the Code on merits on the basis of an inquiry

conducted under Section 202 thereof. Relying on the

observations made in Pramatha Nath Talukdar's case

(supra), it was held that in such a case the second

complaint on the same facts cannot be made unless very

exceptional circumstances existed.

12. Mr. Awasthi submitted that since a prima facie

case had been made out for issuance of process in the

first complaint in which process was issued on 19th

August, 1999, the High Court had rightly rejected the

petitioner's prayer for quashing the same. Even with

regard to the subsequent complaint in which process

was issued by the learned Additional Sessions Judge,

Rohtak, on 8th January, 2004, there was no bar to the

filing of a second complaint when the earlier

complaint had not resulted in either conviction,

acquittal or discharge.

11

13. The main question which emerges for decision in

these special leave petitions is whether a second

complaint on the same cause of action and between the

same parties would lie, when an earlier application

had been dismissed. In the instant case, the question

is narrowed down further as to whether such a second

complaint would be maintainable when the earlier one

had not been dismissed on merits, but for the failure

of the complainant to put in process fees for

effecting service.

14. The answer has been provided firstly in Pramatha

Nath Talukdar's case (supra), wherein this Court had

held that even if a complaint was dismissed under

Section 203 Cr.P.C., a second complaint would still lie

under exceptional circumstances, indicated herein-

before. The said view has been consistently upheld in

subsequent decisions of this Court. Of course, the

question of making a prayer for recalling the order of

dismissal would not be maintainable before the learned

Magistrate in view of Section 362 Cr.P.C., but such is

not the case in these special leave petitions. In

these cases, neither have the complaints been dismissed

on merit nor have they been dismissed at the stage of 12 Section 203 Cr.P.C. On the other hand, only on being

satisfied of a prima facie case, the learned Magistrate

had issued process on the complaint. The said

situation is smainly covered by the decision of this

Court in Jatinder Singh's case (supra), wherein the

decision in Pramatha Nath Talukdar's case (supra) was

also taken into consideration and it was categorically

observed that in the absence of any provision in the

Code barring a second complaint being filed on the same

allegation, there would be no bar to a second complaint

being filed on the same facts if the first complaint

did not result in the conviction or acquittal or even

discharge of the accused, and if the dismissal was not

on merit but on account of a default on the part of the

complainant.

15. As far as the first complaint under Section

420/34 I.P.C. is concerned, the petitioner has not

seriously questioned the order of the High Court

rejecting the petitioner's prayer for quashing the

same. The petitioner confined his case mainly to the

complaint wherein the learned Sessions Judge took

cognizance and issued process under the provisions of

the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, despite an 13

earlier complaint on the same ground and on the same

set of facts having been dismissed earlier for non-

filing of process fees.

16. We are unable to appreciate the submissions made on

behalf of the petitioner, since the law with regard to

the filing of a second complaint is now crystalised.

It is well-settled that such a complaint is

maintainable in different circumstances as enumerated

in Pramatha Nath Talukdar's case and Jatinder Singh's

case (supra). We, therefore, have no hesitation in

dismissing both the Special Leave Petitions, since we

are of the view that both the complaints are

maintainable and the impugned judgment of the High

Court does not warrant any interference.

17. The Special Leave Petitions are, accordingly,

dismissed.

.................J.

(ALTAMAS KABIR)

..................J. (CYRIAC JOSEPH)

New Delhi Dated: 01.09.2009.