Ranveer Yadav vs State Of Bihar

2. The said Original Misc. (DB) No. 8 of 2008 was a

reference through a communication dated 22.4.2008 by the

1st Additional Sessions Judge, Khagaria about an incident

1 which happened in his Court on 13.2.2008. The High

Court treated the same a reference made under Section

15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter,

"the Act") made by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge,

Khagaria (hereinafter, "the Judge").

3. The reference by the Judge was made for the reason that

during the course of the Sessions Trial No.46/93 on

13.02.2008, five of the alleged contemnors were on one

side and the sixth contemnor, the appellant Ranveer

Yadav, on the other side, and all of them disrupted the

proceedings by aggressively exchanging heated words and

creating unpleasant scenes in Court. The decorum and

dignity of the Court was so much threatened that the

Judge was forced to rise.

4. Out of the six contemnors, Bharat Yadav, Bimal Yadav,

Ajay Yadav, Pandav Yadav and Madan Yadav are accused in

the Sessions Trial No. 46/93. The appellant Ranveer

Yadav, an witness in the case and was due to be cross-

examined on that day, i.e. 13.02.2008.

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5. The High Court on the basis of such reference issued

notice on 11.07.2008 to show cause why the alleged

contemnors should not be held guilty of Criminal

Contempt for their acts set out in the reference.

6. In the joint affidavits filed by the first five

contemnors, they tendered their apologies for creating

the disturbance and stated that the main person

responsible for the ruckus was the appellant Ranveer

Yadav. They stated the scene was created by him to delay

his cross-examination.

7. The show cause submitted by Madan Yadav, who is 76 years

old and is one of the accused in the Sessions Trial No.

46/93, is a crucial one. Madan Yadav stated that the

appellant is the prime accused in a case of murder of

Madan's son in 1998. In that case the appellant could be

produced before the Trial Court for the purpose of

framing charges only on the orders of the High Court.

Madan further stated that he had been falsely implicated

in the criminal case which was pending before the Court

on the basis of a police complaint containing false

3 allegations made by the brother of the appellant. The

main reason for Madan's implication is to pressurize him

to withdraw the earlier case relating to the murder of

his son and which is pending against the appellant.

8. The High Court after noting these facts observed that

the appellant, on many occasions came to the Trial Court

with followers who helped him in creating a nuisance in

Court. It also observed that several Additional Public

Prosecutors had withdrawn themselves from criminal cases

against the appellant in view of threats and

intimidation they received from the appellant. On the

date of incident, even the defence counsel was not

spared as is apparent from the letter written by the

defence counsel to the Presiding Officer.

9. The High Court found that appellant had also managed to

postpone and delay his cross-examination on various

occasions on the pretext of illness and non-appearance

on the fixed dates.

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10. It was also brought to the notice of the High Court

that a case under Section 302 IPC in which the appellant

was an accused had to be transferred to another district

in view of threats and intimidation given out by the

appellant.

11. In the show cause submitted by the appellant Ranveer

Yadav, he tried to justify his behaviour on 13.02.2008

by stating that on 12.12.2007, the Court had been

informed that there would be a compromise. But he got

miffed when the Additional Public Prosecutor made an

appearance before the Court and he thought that the

latter had appeared without the orders of the Public

Prosecutor. On such justification of the appellant,

High Court held that the appellant being a witness had

nothing to do with the appearance of the public

prosecutor and held that the appellant's misbehaviour

was not justified.

12. With regard to his failure to appear before the Court

on 1.3.2008, the appellant stated that he was not

provided the police protection which he had asked for.

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13. The High Court held that all the Contemnors were guilty

of having committed criminal contempt and it relied on

the letters of the two prosecution counsel as well as

the defence counsel and came to the conclusion that the

main person responsible for the disruption was the

appellant who acted in a motivated and high handed

manner to interfere in the due conduct of the

proceeding.

14. High Court further held that the main culprit for the

disruption in Court was the appellant. While accepting

the unqualified apology of the other five contemnors and

letting them off with admonition and severe warning, the

appellant was sentenced to a simple imprisonment for two

months with a fine of Rs.2,000/- and in default the

appellant was to undergo a further imprisonment of one

month.

15. This Court while issuing notice in this appeal passed

an order dated 28.8.2009 asking the other five

contemnors to show cause why the order of the High Court 6 accepting their unconditional apology and directing them

to be let off be not set aside. In the meantime, a

further stay on the arrest of the appellant was ordered

extending the order whereby the appellant was given

exemption from surrendering.

16. The five contemnors who were let off by the High Court

filed their joint counter affidavit on 28.01.2010. While

tendering their unqualified apology, they have given the

same explanation as given before the High Court that the

main person responsible for the disruptions was the

appellant. In Paras IV as well as V of the counter

affidavit, they have stated that the appellant behaved

in an audacious manner and abused the counsel for the

both sides and refused to be examined. They have also

made allegations that the appellant is a very well

connected person and has a political background with

criminal antecedents.

17. In this case learned counsel for the appellant sought to

argue that in a contempt proceeding, the High Court

cannot take a different stand by punishing the appellant

7 and letting the other appellants go unpunished even

after holding that they are guilty of contempt.

18.Learned counsel also argued that in the show-cause

notice which was given to the appellant, no different

role has been attributed to him so he cannot be treated

differently by the High Court in the matter of awarding

punishment.

19. This Court is unable to appreciate the above contention

of the learned counsel for the appellant. In the facts

of the case and on the materials on record, it is clear

that the case of the appellant stands on a different

footing. In fact the appellant took the main role in

causing disruption and there has no lack of opportunity

on his part in answering the charges against him. The

charges put against him must be read in a practical

sense and cannot be read in a pedantic manner. All the

constituents of the charges were stated in the show-

cause notice and the appellant has understood the

charges and has given the reply. Nowhere in the reply

the appellant has raised any difficulty in understanding

the charges. It does not appear that any contention was

8 raised by the appellant before the High Court about any

vagueness in the charges or about furnishing inadequate

particulars in the charges. This argument of the learned

counsel for the appellant only before this Court and

that too without a proper factual basis cannot be

entertained.

20. Criminal contempt has been defined under Section 2(c) of

the Act. The said definition is very wide. For a proper

appreciation of the questions involved in this case the

said definition is set out below:-

"2(c). "criminal contempt" means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible

representation, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which-

(i) scandalizes or tends to scandalize, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court; or

(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or

(iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner;"

21. From the facts of the case it is clear that in this case

the offending acts of the appellant are specifically 9 coming under Section 2(c)(ii). Due conduct of any

judicial proceeding is a matter of high public

importance as it is inextricably connected with rule of

law on which is based the constitutional mode of

governance in this country. That is why the framers of

the Act preceded the expression interfere with the words

"tends to" and it has been further emphasized by

addition of word `due' before "course of any judicial

proceedings".

22. We must remember that legislature does not waste words.

Therefore, every word used in Section 2(c)(ii) must be

given its proper and natural meaning. Thus read, Section

2(c)(ii) must be given a broad sweep so as to include

within it even any attempt to interfere with the due

course of a judicial proceeding. The word `due' is very

crucial in this context and must mean a natural and

proper course of judicial proceeding.

23. This Court, therefore, holds that Section 2(c)(ii) has

been enacted to protect apart from sanctity, the

regularity and purity of a judicial proceeding. This, we

10 repeat, is based on principles of high public policy.

That is why contempt power is said to be an inherent

attribute of a Superior Court of Record. This power has

not been given to the subordinate judiciary, but in an

appropriate case, subordinate judiciary can make a

reference to the High Court under Section 15 (2) of the

Act, as has been done in this case. Thus when High Court

exercises its power on a reference under Section 15(2)

of the Act, it is virtually exercising the same as a

guardian of the subordinate judiciary to protect its

proceedings against an outrage and affront. In

exercising such power, the High Court being a `Court of

Record' and the highest judicial authority in the State

is discharging its jurisdiction `in loco parentis' over

subordinate judiciary in that State. Therefore, there

is something in the nature of High Court's power under

Section 15(2) of the Act which couples it with a duty.

The duty is obviously to uphold the rule of law. Here

we may remember the views of Lord Chancellor Earl

Cairns, who gave the concept of power coupled with duty,

the most graceful articulation and which I quote:

"...But there may be something in the nature of the thing empowered to be done, something in the object for which it is to be done, something in the conditions under which it is

11 to be done, something in the title of the person or persons for whose benefit the power is to be exercised, which may couple the power with a duty, and make it the duty of the person in whom the power is reposed to exercise that power when called upon to do so..."

[Julius v. Lord Bishop of Oxford and another, 5 A.C. 214 (H.L.) at 222-223]

24. These words resonate with a strange poignancy even

today. But there is a rider. Contempt power has to be

exercised with utmost caution and in an appropriate case

and that is why High Court has been entrusted with it.

25. The offending acts of the appellant constitute contempt

in the face of Court. When contempt takes place in the

face of the Court, peoples' faith in the administration

of justice receives a severe jolt and precious judicial

time is wasted. Therefore, the offending acts of the

appellant certainly come within the ambit of

interference with the due course of judicial proceeding

and are a clear case of criminal contempt in the face of

the Court.

26. The High Court, in the impugned judgment, therefore was

correct in holding the appellant guilty and also in 12 punishing him with the sentence it has imposed. It

appears in the show cause notice, which was given by the

appellant, initially he did not offer any apology.

Rather the appellant tried to justify. The apology was

offered in a subsequent show cause reply. Therefore, it

is a belated apology.

27. It may be noted that under Explanation to Section 12(1)

of the Act, the Court may reject an apology if the Court

finds that it was not made bonafide. Under Section 12

it has been made very clear that the apology must be to

the satisfaction of the Court. Therefore, it is not

incumbent upon the Court to accept the apology as soon

as it is offered. Before an apology can be accepted, the

Court must find that it is bonafide and is to the

satisfaction of the Court. However, Court cannot reject

an apology just because it is qualified and conditional

provided the Court finds it is bonafide.

28.An apology in a contempt proceeding must be offered at

the earliest possible opportunity. A belated apology

hardly shows the `contrition which is the essence of the

purging of a contempt'.

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29. This Court in the case of Debabrata Bandopadhyay and

others vs. The State of West Bengal and another reported

in AIR 1969 SC 189, observed "an apology must be offered

and that too clearly and at the earliest opportunity. A

person who offers a belated apology runs the risk that

it may not be accepted for such an apology hardly shows

the contrition which is the essence of the purging of a

contempt" (See para 7 page 193 of the report).

30. Apart from belated apology in many cases such apology is

not accepted unless it is bonafide.

31. Even in a case of civil contempt this Court held in the

case of Principal, Rajni Parekh Arts, K.B. Commerce and

B.C.J. Science College, Khambhat and another vs.

Mahendra Ambalal Shah reported in 1986 (2) SCC 560 that

an apology offered at a late stage would encourage the

litigants to flout the orders of Courts with impunity

and accordingly the Court refused to accept the apology

(See para 7 page 566 of the report).

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32. Equally in the case of Secretary, Hailakandi Bar

Association vs. State of Assam and another reported in

(1996) 9 SCC 74, this Court in a case of criminal

contempt refused to accept an apology which was belated.

The Court held that such belated apology cannot be

accepted because it has not been given in good faith

(See para 24 page 82).

33. Even if it is not belated where apology is without real

contrition and remorse and was merely tendered as a

weapon of defence, the Court may refuse to accept it.

(See

Chandra Shashi vs. Anil Kumar Verma, (1995) 1 SCC 421).

34. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal fails, the

judgment of the High Court is affirmed. The appellant

is to serve the sentence in terms of the High Court

order. Notices issued on other respondents, namely,

Bharat Yadav, Bimal Yadav, Ajay Yadav, Pandav Yadav and

Madan Yadav are discharged.

15 .......................J. (G.S. SINGHVI)

.......................J. New Delhi (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY) May 12, 2010

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