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Rani Chander Kanta (D) Thr. Lrs. vs Union Of India

Supreme Court24 January 2024C.T. Ravikumar · Rajesh Bindal

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

Where property is offered for sale by a public authority without specification of precise boundaries or area in the tender notice, but the authority's prior valuation documents establish that only a defined portion of the property in the authority's possession was intended to be sold, the sale is limited to that portion so valued and offered, notwithstanding that the purchaser may have been in occupation of a larger area before or after the sale. The identity or popular name of a property does not of itself transfer title to all land within that property's boundaries if the authority consciously decided to sell only a portion thereof. In proceedings under the Displaced Person (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, a review petition under Section 25 of that Act is not maintainable where the applicant seeks to re-argue the merits of a decision already considered threadbare by the Settlement Officer, rather than to correct a clerical or arithmetical error or accidental slip or omission; such re-litigation of decided questions falls outside the scope of review jurisdiction.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

2024 INSC 69 NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 869 OF 2011

RANI CHANDER KANTA (D) THR. LRS. & ORS. … Appellant(s)

VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA & ANR. … Respondent(s)

JUDGMENT

RAJESH BINDAL, J.

1. The judgment1 of the High Court in second appeal 2

has been challenged before this Court in the present appeal.

Vide the aforesaid judgment, the High Court 3 had upheld the

judgment and decree4 passed by the lower Appellate Court 5 and

the judgment and decree6 of the Trial Court7 was reversed. The Signature Not Verified 1 Judgement dated 15.06.2009 Digitally signed by 2 Regular Second Appeal No.197 of 1997 dated 15.06.2009 Vijay Kumar Date: 2024.01.30 3 High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla 12:39:22 IST Reason:

4 Judgement and decree dated 30.04.1997 5 Additional District Judge, Shimla 6 Order dated 31.05.1988 7 Senior Sub Judge, Shimla 1 suit was filed by the appellants for declaration to the effect that

the appellants/plaintiffs are in possession of the suit property as

absolute owners.

2. Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, learned senior counsel appearing

for the appellants, submitted that Md. Yahya Khan, an evacuee

was the owner of the entire property ‘Spring Field’, which

comprised of Khasra Nos.233, 233/1, 233/3, 233/6, 233/7 and

234/4. Late Raja Dhian Singh was the Raja of Shiekhupura

(now in Pakistan). He had taken the entire property including

the buildings constructed thereon except Tarik Cottage and

Coal Shed, measuring 10,500 sq. yards from Md. Yahya Khan on

an annual rent of ₹2500/- in the name of his wife. He used the

place as his holiday home, whenever he visited Shimla before

partition of the country. After partition, Md. Yahya Khan

migrated to Pakistan. The property in question became an

evacuee property. It was to be administered in terms of the

1947 Act8. In terms thereof late Raja Dhian Singh became a

temporary allottee of the said property on payment of an

annual rent of ₹2500/- to the custodian. The rent was regularly

paid. At the time of partition, even Raja Dhian Singh migrated

to India. As he himself was a displaced person from West

8 East Punjab Evacuee’s (Administration of Property) Act, 1947 2 Pakistan, he was also entitled to benefits conferred on the

displaced persons under various enactments including the 1950

Act9 and 1954 Act10. The property in-question came in the

compensation pool under Section 12 of the 1954 Act.

3. In September 1954, Rehabilitation Department

through Regional Settlement Commissioner, Jullundur, invited

tenders for sale of ‘Spring Field’ described as property

No.268/5. Vide the aforesaid tender, the entire evacuee

property was put to sale. Raja Dhian Singh being in occupation

of the said property was given first option to purchase the same

vide letter dated 03.12.1954. Immediately thereafter, vide

letter dated 10.12.1954, late Raja Dhian Singh gave his consent

to purchase the property in-question, known as ‘Spring Field’

for consideration of ₹40,000/-. The sale was confirmed in his

favour vide letter dated 17.12.1954. Letter of allotment dated

03.02.1955 was issued in favour of late Raja Dhian Singh

regarding the property in question. It was also stated that the

compensation due to him will be adjusted against the sale

price. On 02.02.1957, Raja Dhian Singh expired. A fresh sale

certificate was issued in favour of the legal heirs of Late-Raja

Dhian Singh on 24.03.1976. After the aforesaid certificate, the 9 Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 10 Displaced Person (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 19054. 3 appellants approached the revenue/municipal authorities for

transfer of the property in their names. However, the municipal

authorities raised objection stating that serial number and

evacuee number were not in consonance with the land in their

possession. The area and boundaries of the property had not

been provided. Thereafter, the appellants approached the Chief

Settlement Commissioner. Letter dated 28.03.1976 was issued

by the Tax Superintendent, Municipal Corporation, Shimla

stating that Spring Field comprised of 10,582 square yards. On

05.05.1976, another sale certificate was issued by the

Department of Rehabilitation mentioning the area of the

property as 2,786 square yards. Conveyance deed was also

executed on 05.10.1977. Immediately thereafter, the

appellants made representation for correction of the area, as

mentioned in the conveyance deed and the sale certificate. The

Chief Settlement Commissioner, treating the representation of

the appellants as revision petition, passed an order dated

25.06.1979, in exercise of powers under Section 24(1) of the

1954 Act. It was held that the area sold to the appellants was

2,786 square yards, however, at the spot it was found as

3,836.06 square yards. The appellants were directed to pay

cost of the additional area of 1,050.06 square yards @ ₹4/- per 4 square yard, according to the reserved price. Review petition

was filed by the appellants against order dated 25.06.1979.

However, the appellants deposited a sum of ₹4200.24 for the

additional area without prejudice to their rights. On 21.08.1979,

a fresh conveyance deed was executed in favour of the

appellants with reference to the boundaries and the area

mentioned in the sale certificate dated 05.05.1976 i.e. 3,836.06

square yards.

4. The Chief Settlement Commissioner allowed the

review petition vide order dated 07.05.1980 holding that the

entire area of Spring Field was sold to late Raja Dhian Singh but

it was not shown in the sale certificate and the price for the

whole area was not paid, hence, for the additional area of

7,599.94 square yards, the appellants were directed to pay @

₹4/- per square yard. Even this was paid by the appellants to

avoid any litigation, however, under protest. Aggrieved against

the aforesaid order passed by the Chief Settlement

Commissioner, both the parties preferred revision petitions

before the Financial Commissioner (Revenue) Appeals-cum-

Secretary (Relief and Rehabilitation) to the Government of

Himachal Pradesh, Shimla. It was submitted that the order

5 passed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner was totally

without jurisdiction for the reason that after his transfer from

the post, he had ante-dated the order. The certified copy was

applied on 12.06.1981, however, the same was made available

to the appellants on 12.10.1982. He had set aside the order

passed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner, whereby the

additional area of 7,599.94 square yards was directed to be

transferred to the appellants on payment of additional price.

However, sale of 3,836.06 square yards was upheld. Thereafter,

the appellants filed civil suit11 for declaration of title and

ownership of the entire property known as ‘Spring Field’. The

Trial Court, vide judgment dated 31.05.1988 decreed the suit.

The appeal filed by the respondents was allowed by the first

Appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 30.04.1997.

Thereafter, the appellants preferred second appeal before the

High Court, which was dismissed vide impugned judgment

dated 15.06.2009.

5. The argument of learned senior counsel for the

appellants is that the property which was sold initially was

mentioned as ‘Spring Field’ with ID No. 268/5. The entire area

measuring 11435 square yards was in possession of the

11 Civil Suit No. 25 of 1983 6 predecessor-in-interest of the appellants. The tender notice did

not mention any specific area or the boundaries thereof, hence

it was understood that the entire area was forming part of the

identity of the property or the popular name, was put to sale.

The offer was submitted by the predecessor in interest of the

appellants keeping that in view. It was totally unreasonable on

the part of the respondents to have reduced the area later on.

6. It was further submitted that under similar

circumstances, other properties were also sold, which were

having different identity numbers and popular names. There

also, the entire area, which was forming part of that property,

was transferred. Only the appellants have been discriminated.

7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the

respondents submitted that, whatever was proposed to be sold,

was transferred to the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants.

Initially, the area transferred was 2,786 square yards, which

was in consonance with the covered area and reasonable open

area, however, later on even 1,050.06 square yards area was

also transferred in favour of the appellants, on payment of

additional price, to which no issue was raised. However, the

appellants became more greedy. They may be in possession of

7 large area as lessee from Md. Yahya Khan before partition and

thereafter as tenants on that property under the Rehabilitation

Department, however, that would not mean that the entire area

was proposed to be sold. Major part of the area was and still a

forest. He further submitted that the documents, which are

available on file clearly establish that. At the time of valuation

of the property before it was put to sale, Valuation Form ‘A’

clearly noticed the same as 2,786 square yards. The value

thereof was calculated in terms thereof. The draft thereof was

prepared on 13.08.1954 which was approved on 25.08.1954.

However, by tampering the year ‘1954’, it has been made as

‘1956’. The tender notice was issued in September 1954. The

calculation of area and the cost thereof was made much prior

thereto. The area, which was proposed to be sold, was

transferred in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the

appellants. The sale certificate was also issued on 03.02.1955.

From the subsequent events also, the entire factual matrix is

clear as the authorities also found that the initial area sold to

the appellants was 2,786 square yards, however, on account of

some error, additional area of 1,050.06 square yards was

required to be given, which was directed on payment of

additional price, which was paid by the appellants. Even 8 thereafter, the Chief Settlement Commissioner also directed for

transfer of additional area of 7,599 square yards in favour of

the appellants on payment of additional price, which was also

paid by the appellants. The Trial Court had erroneously decreed

the suit. The error was corrected by the lower Appellate Court

and the judgment and decree passed by the lower Appellate

Court was rightly upheld by the High Court. The same does not

call for any interference by this Court.

8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused

the paper book.

9. As is evident from the record of the case, an

estimate was proposed on 12.08.1954 for an area of 2,786

square yards on Valuation Form ‘A’, which was forming part of

‘Spring Field’. The same was approved on 25.08.1954. Tender

notice was issued in September 1954. The predecessor-in-

interest of the appellants being in occupation of the said

property was given first option to purchase the same vide letter

dated 03.12.1954. He consented for purchase of the property

on 10.12.1954. His offer was accepted which was confirmed on

17.12.1954. Allotment letter was issued on 03.02.1955 in his

favour. Raja Dhian Singh expired on 02.02.1957. His legal

9 representatives were substituted. A fresh sale certificate was

issued in their favour on 24.3.1976. The sale certificate, which

was issued in favour of the appellants on 05.05.1976 clearly

mentioned the area as 2,786 square yards. As is evident from

the record, first representation was made by the appellants on

22.11.1976 after issuance of sale certificate on 05.05.1976.

Despite filing the representation, they got the conveyance deed

registered in their favour for 2,786 square yards on 05.10.1977

but still continued to file representations. The Chief Settlement

Commissioner had taken up the matter and after examining the

case found that as per the site plan, the area would come out

to 3,836.06 square yards, which should prevail over the area

mentioned in the conveyance deed, hence the additional area

of 1,050.06 square yards was directed to be transferred in

favour of the appellants @ ₹4/- per square yard. The balance

area of 7,599.94 square yards was directed to be put to public

auction.

10. Section 25 of the 1954 Act, which provides for review

of the orders passed under the Act, mentions that any person

aggrieved by an order of Settlement Officer under Section 5,

from which no appeal is allowed under Section 22, may, within

10 thirty days from the date of the order, file a review petition. It

further provides that a clerical or arithmetical error in any order

passed by an officer or authority under the Act may be

corrected by such officer or authority or the successor-in-office.

In the facts of the case, a review petition may not be

maintainable as it was not a case of an error arising from any

accidental slip or omission. In the earlier order dated

25.06.1979, the Chief Settlement Commissioner considered the

case of the appellants threadbare, on application filed by the

appellants. In fact, the appellants re-argued the matter on

merits which was not the scope of jurisdiction as provided in

Section 25 of the 1954 Act.

11. Even otherwise, it is evident from the order dated

07.05.1980 passed in the review petition that the entire matter

was considered afresh. Merely because the appellants were in

possession of the entire area, which was forming part of ‘Spring

Field’, was presumed to have been sold. Whereas on the other

side, it was admitted that the amount paid by the appellants

was not with reference to the entire area in their possession but

was only for 2,786 square yards. In the revisions filed by both

the parties, the Financial Commissioner had considered the

11 issues raised threadbare. It has even noticed that before the

property was put to sale, the estimated cost thereof was

calculated with an initial area of 2,539 square yards, which was

later on corrected as 2,786 square yards. It was finally

approved on 25.08.1954, however the figure ‘4’ in the year

mentioned was tampered as ‘6’ to make it as 25.08.1956. It

may be for the reason to show that this exercise was done after

the sale was complete, whereas it was done before that. In

continuation of the aforesaid calculation on Valuation Form ‘A’,

the property in question was put to sale. The amount charged

from the appellants was also in terms thereof. It is so evident

even from the subsequent orders where also the additional

area was directed to be transferred to the appellants, they were

directed to pay additional price. Entire case built up is on

presumption only that the entire area in possession of the

appellants was put to sale, though the position was otherwise.

12. In fact, the aforesaid clinching evidence was ignored

by the Trial Court while decreeing the suit in favour of the

appellants. The issue was considered by the lower Appellate

Court in detail. Considering that fact and the other material on

record, the judgment and decree of the Trial Court was

12 reversed. The finding recorded by the lower Appellate Court on

the issue of tampering of record and the fact that valuation of

the property to be sold was done prior to when the same was

put to sale, clinched the issue regarding the area proposed to

be sold and actually sold to the appellants. The High Court also

opined that valuation of the property sold to the appellants was

not made after the sale had been completed, rather it was done

before the same was put to sale. There was no answer to the

aforesaid findings of the lower Appellate Court and the High

Court. Merely with the identity of the property or its number, no

title can be passed on any prospective buyer, once a conscious

decision had been taken by the authority concerned to sell only

a portion thereof and not the entire area.

13. The other examples given by the appellants would

also not come to their rescue for the reason that no such

detailed documents have been placed on record except the

identity number or the popular name of the property.

14. For the reasons mentioned above, we do not find any

merit in the present appeal. The same is accordingly dismissed,

with no order as to costs.

…..……………..J

13 (VIKRAM NATH)

…………………..J (RAJESH BINDAL)

New Delhi January 24, 2024.

14

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