Ramji Singh Dangi vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh

Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and another ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Present :-

Shri D.K. Tripathi, Advocate for the petitioner. Shri K.N. Bundela, Government Advocate for the respondent No.1/State. Shri Naveen Dubey, Advocate for the respondent No.2.

ORDER

(Passed on this the 06th day of May, 2019)

This miscellaneous petition under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner

against the order dated 31.12.2018 passed by the

Commissioner, Sagar (M.P.) whereby the Commissioner

has allowed the application filed by the respondent No.2

herein under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC to implead him as a

party respondent in a proceeding initiated under Section 40

and 92 of the M.P. Panchayat Raj Evam Gram Swaraj

Adhiniyam, 1993 (in short 'the Panchayat Act ').

2. In brief the facts of the case are that the petitioner is 2 M.P. No.697 of 2019

an elected Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Jhagri, Janpad

Panchayat Banda, District Sagar (M.P.). However one

Omkar Singh who also contested the election of Sarpanch

and lost against the petitioner lodged a complaint against

him, on the basis of which the Chief Executive Officer,

Jila Panchayat, Sagar initiated proceeding under Section

40(1) i.e. removal of office bearers of Panchayat and

Section 92 i.e. power to recover records articles and

money of the Panchayat Act

3. A show cause notice was issued to the petitioner

wherein it was alleged that the petitioner, while posted on

the said post did not complete certain works, however

money was still withdrawn, hence in the show cause notice

dated 29.11.2017 the petitioner was asked as to why he

should not be removed from the said post of Sarpanch. A

reply to the said show cause notice was submitted by the

petitioner but on 09.03.2018, the prescribed authority

removed the petitioner from the post of Sarpanch and also

restrained him from contesting the election for the next six

years.

4. An appeal against the aforesaid order was preferred

by the petitioner before the Commissioner, Sagar (M.P.). 3 M.P. No.697 of 2019

In the aforesaid appeal, since the stay application was

rejected by the Commissioner vide order dated 13.03.2018

against which the petitioner had filed W.P. No.6571/2018

and this Court set aside the order dated 13.03.2018 and

directed the Commissioner to pass the order afresh on the

question of stay application and this time after remand the

stay order was granted in favour of the petitioner on

22.03.2018.

5. Against the interim order dated 22.03.2018 passed by

the learned Commissioner, the respondent No.2 who was

not a party before the Commissioner filed W.P.

No.8063/2018 before this Court, however, this Court

declined to entertain the petition and disposed of the same

with liberty to the respondent no.2 to file appropriate

application for impleadment before the Commissioner

along with the application for vacation of stay order dated

22.03.2018. Thereafter, the respondent No.2 filed an

application under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC for impleading

him as a necessary party which was allowed on

31.12.2018.

6. Counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued

before this Court and has submitted that only because the 4 M.P. No.697 of 2019

respondent No.2 was a complainant, he was not a

necessary party as the role of the complainant was to bring

certain facts to the knowledge of the authorities. The

counsel has also relied upon the judgment rendered by the

coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Omprakash

Uike vs. State of M.P. and others passed in W.P.

No.1191/2017 decided on 06.02.2019. The counsel has

also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the

case of Bhogadi Kannababu and others vs Yuggina

Pydamma and others, (2006) 5 SCC 532. Thus it is

submitted that the impugned order be set aside and the

petition be allowed.

7. Counsel for the respondent No.1/State on the other

hand has opposed the prayer and has submitted that no

illegality has been committed by the learned Commissioner

and has submitted that the proceeding under Section 40 of

the Panchayat Act was initiated against the petitioner only

on a complaint made by the respondent No.2 and the other

person, hence his presence is also necessary in the case for

its proper adjudication.

8. Learned counsel for the respondent No.2 has

submitted that since the respondent State had not taken any 5 M.P. No.697 of 2019

action against the petitioner on its own, hence he had filed

a complaint which resulted in exposing the corruption of

the petitioner, hence, although he was not a party before

the Chief Executive Officer who passed the initial order

dated 09.03.2018, but still he was the complainant in the

said case and was very much interested in the outcome of

his complaint. It is further submitted that the respondent

No.2 being the complainant, is well aware of the facts and

circumstances of the case which has exposed the petitioner

and thus it cannot be said that he is not a necessary party

in the litigation.

9. Learned counsel for the respondent No.2 has further

drawn the attention of this court to the fact that in the

memo of appeal also the petitioner has made allegations

against the present respondent No.2 and thus it is

submitted that in the absence of respondent No.2 being

made a party to the litigation, his interest would be

prejudiced. The counsel has also submitted that in the

Writ Petition No.8063/2018 filed by respondent No.2

against the interim order passed by the Commissioner in

favour of the petitioner herein, this Court although

declined to interfere but it was observed that if the 6 M.P. No.697 of 2019

petitioner wants to participate in the proceeding before the

Commissioner, he may file appropriate application for

impleadment as a party and on the basis of which only he

had filed an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC and

no illegality has been committed by the Commissioner in

allowing the said application.

10. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

record.

11. From the perusal of the impugned order dated

31.12.2018 it is found that the Commissioner, while

allowing the application filed by the respondent No.2

Omkar Singh for his impleadment as a party has noted that

only on a complaint filed by the respondent No.2, a

proceeding was initiated against the petitioner under

Section 40(1) of the Panchayat Act and in the aforesaid

proceeding vide order dated 09.03.2018, the petitioner was

found to be involved in the defalcation, hence it is held

that he is a necessary party.

12. From the order dated 09.03.2018 this Court finds that

a detailed order has been passed by the Chief Executive

Officer wherein the present respondent No.2 is referred to

as the complainant and whose evidence has also been 7 M.P. No.697 of 2019

recorded.

13. This Court in the case of Omprakash Uikey (supra)

while dislodging the claim of a complainant has also relied

upon the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of

Ravi Yashwant Bhoir Vs. District Collector, Raigad and other

(2012) 4 SCC 407, the relevant paras of the same read as under:-

"58. Shri Chintaman Raghunath Gharat, ex- President was the complainant, thus, at the most, he could lead evidence as a witness. He could not claim the status of an adversarial litigant. The complainant cannot be the party to the lis. A legal right is an averment of entitlement arising out of law. In fact, it is a benefit conferred upon a person by the rule of law. Thus, a person who suffers from legal injury can only challenge the act or omission. There may be some harm or loss that may not be wrongful in the eye of the law because it may not result in injury to a legal right or legally protected interest of the complainant but juridically harm of this description is called damnum sine injuria.

59. The complainant has to establish that he has been deprived of or denied of a legal right and he has sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In case he has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on, he cannot be heard as a party in a lis. A fanciful or sentimental grievance may not be sufficient to confer a locus standi to sue upon the individual. There must be injuria or a legal grievance which can be appreciated and not a stat pro ratione voluntas reasons i.e. a claim devoid of reasons.

60. Under the garb of being a necessary party, a person cannot be permitted to make a case as that of general public interest. A person having a remote interest cannot be permitted to become a party in the lis, as the person who wants to become a party in a case, has to establish that he has a 8 M.P. No.697 of 2019

proprietary right which has been or is threatened to be violated, for the reason that a legal injury creates a remedial right in the injured person. A person cannot be heard as a party unless he answers the description of aggrieved party. (Vide Adi Pherozshah Gandhi v. Advocate General of Maharashtra, Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar47, Maharaj Singh v. State of U.P., Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal and Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba v. Tosiba Appliances Co.) The High Court failed to appreciate that it was a case of political rivalry. The case of the appellant has not been considered in the correct perspective at all."

(emphasis supplied)

14. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Apex

Court in the case of Bhogadi Kannababu (supra) wherein

in para 11 of the judgment the Apex Court has held as

under :

"11. It is true, as noted hereinabove, that in an application for impleadment under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, the court would only decide whether the presence of the applicant before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the proceedings."

15. In the case of Bhogadi Kannababu (supra) also the

relevance of a party seeking to be impleaded in a lis is

emphasized only when it is held that the presence of the

said applicant before the Court may be necessary in order

order to enable the Court effectually and completely to 9 M.P. No.697 of 2019

adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the

proceedings and finally it is held that the petitioner 's

locus was not as would entitle her to intervene in the

matter.

16. Thus, considering the facts of the case on hand on the

touchstone of the aforesaid dictums of the Apex Court, this

Court finds that in the present case also the respondent

no.2 is claiming the right of audience on the basis of his

being the complaint only. Which, in the considered opinion

of the this court cannot be allowed.

17. As a result, the petition stands allowed and the

impugned order dated 31.12.2018 whereby the respondent

No.2 has been allowed to be impleaded as a party is hereby

quashed

18. No costs.

(Subodh Abhyankar) Judge 06/05/2019

DV

Digitally signed by DINESH VERMA Date: 2019.05.07 13:38:36 +05'30'