Ramgopal vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1489 of 2012

Ramgopal & Anr. ..... Appellant(s) VERSUS The State of Madhya Pradesh ..... Respondent WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1488 of 2012

Krishnappa & Ors. ..... Appellant(s) VERSUS State of Karnataka ..... Respondent

JUDGMENT

Surya Kant, J.

These two Criminal Appeals, No. 1489 of 2012 emanating from

the judgment and order dated 27 th November, 2009 of the High Court

of Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior Bench and No. 1488 of 2012 arising out Signature Not Verified

of judgment and order dated 9th January, 2009 passed by the High Digitally signed by SATISH KUMAR YADAV Date: 2021.09.29 16:39:41 IST Reason:

Court of Karnataka, though, pertain to two different and distinct

Page | 1 occurrences, but are proposed to be disposed of by way of a common

order as the short question of law involved in both these appeals is

identical.

BRIEF FACTS OF CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1489 OF 2012

2. The prosecution version, arising out of FIR dated 3rd November

2000, Police Station Ambah, Morena, M.P. is that on account of

certain monetary dispute, the Appellants abused and assaulted

Padam Singh (Complainant). Appellant No.1 is alleged to have struck

the Complainant with a pharsa, which resultantly cut off the little

finger of his left hand. Appellant No.2 also struck lathi blows on the

body of the Complainant. Appellants were thereafter committed for

trial under Sections 294, 323 and 326 read with 34 of Indian Penal

Code, 1860 (hereinafter, ‘IPC’) and Section 3 of the Prevention of

Atrocities (Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes) Act, 1989. Upon

analyzing the evidence, the Learned Judicial Magistrate(FC), Ambah,

convicted the Appellants under Sections 294, 323 and 326 read with

34 IPC with a maximum sentence of three years under Section 326

read with 34 IPC. They were acquitted of the remaining charges.

3. The Appellants assailed their conviction before the Court of

Additional Sessions Judge, Ambah. During the pendency of that

Appeal, the Appellants and the Complainant reconciled their

Page | 2 difference(s) and a compromise ensued between them on 13 th

September 2006. Learned Sessions Judge took notice of the

settlement, moved jointly by the parties, and compounded the offences

under Sections 294 and 323 read with 34 IPC, acquitting the

Appellants of the same. The Court, nevertheless, maintained their

conviction under Section 326 read with 34 IPC, since the said offence

is `non­compoundable’ within the scheme of Section 320 Cr.P.C.

Learned Additional Sessions Judge, taking into consideration the

settlement between the parties, reduced the quantum of sentence from

Rigorous Imprisonment of three years to one year. Still aggrieved, the

Appellants preferred a Criminal Revision before the High Court of

Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior Bench, challenging their conviction and

sentence. Alternatively, they sought compounding of offence under

Section 326 IPC in light of the compromise. However, such a prayer

was not acceded to by the High Court, re­iterating that the offence is

‘non­compoundable’. The High Court, even so, further reduced the

duration of imprisonment to the period already undergone by the

Appellants. The Appellants are now before this Court, seeking

compounding of their Actus Reus under Section 326 IPC in view of the

settlement between parties.

BRIEF FACTS OF CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1488 OF 2012

Page | 3

4. The incident is charted from FIR No. 24 of 1995, Police Station

Thirthahalli, Shimoga, Karnataka, dated 28th January 1995. As per

the allegations, the Appellants and the other accused persons, all of

whom belong to the same family, were aggrieved against the

Complainant as he had imparted some inculpatory information to the

Forest Department officials, which had caused financial loss to them.

The disgruntled Appellants lured the Complainant to their house and

assaulted him with weapons after tying his hands to a window. It is

further alleged that Accused Nos. 5 to 7 instigated the Appellants to

assault the Complainant, besides kicking him with fists and legs. The

Complainant’s family members found him semi­conscious lying in a

pit near their house.

5. The Appellants, together with Accused Nos. 5 and 7 were tried

and convicted under Sections 143, 144, 147, 148, 342, 324 and 326

read with 149 IPC and the maximum sentence awarded to them was

two years simple imprisonment under Section 326 IPC. The trial

against Accused No. 6 was split after filing of the chargesheet, since he

remained absconding. The Appellants along with the co­accused,

approached the High Court of Karnataka, challenging their conviction

and sentence. The High Court acquitted Accused Nos. 5 & 7 finding

insufficient evidence to sustain their involvement in the subject crime,

but maintained the conviction and sentence qua the Appellants. In

Page | 4 this case as well, the parties entered into a compromise. The said

compromise was, however, not placed on record before the Trial Court

or the High Court. The Appellants are now seeking ‘compounding of

the offences’ and their consequential acquittal on the basis of the

compromise reached between them and the Complainant­victim.

6. When both these appeals came up for hearing, a two­Judge

Bench of this Court, vide common order dated 21st September 2012

granted leave to appeal. The Bench further directed the appeals to be

listed after the disposal of reference made in Gian Singh vs. State of

Punjab1, where a 3­Judge Bench of this Court, at that point in time,

was considering the issue as to whether `non­compoundable’ offences

can be `compounded’ by a Court or in the alternative, whether the

High Court in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482

Cr.P.C. could quash non­compoundable offences, based on a

compromise/settlement arrived at between the accused and the

victim­complainant, and if so, under what circumstances.

7. The Appellants, in both the appeals, thus seek the Court to

invoke powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete

justice to them.

ANALYSIS:

1

(2012) 10 SCC 303 Page | 5

8. We have heard learned Counsels for the Appellants and the

State(s) at a considerable length. The questions of law concerning the

power of a High Court to quash proceedings emanating from non­

compoundable offences which have no impact or depraving effect on

the society at large, on the basis of a compromise between the accused

and the victim­complainant, are no longer res integra and the same

have been authoritatively settled by this Court in affirmative. Learned

Counsel for the Appellants and Complainant(s) in both the appeals

have, therefore, heavily counted on the compromise/settlement

between the parties and seek quashing of the criminal prosecution in

its entirety, Learned State Counsel(s) without controverting the factum

of compromise, vehemently opposed such a recourse and asserted that

no substantial question of law is involved in these appeals.

9. Before scrutinizing the facts of these cases and rephrasing the

scope of powers exercisable by a High Court under Section 482

Cr.P.C., it would be apropos to illuminate the following principles laid

down by a 3­Judge Bench of this Court in Gian Singh (Supra) case:

“61. …the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz. :

Page | 6

(i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society.

Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the Page | 7 victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”

(Emphasis Applied)

10. The compendium of these broad fundamentals structured in

more than one judicial precedent, has been recapitulated by another

3­Judge Bench of this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi

Narayan & Ors.2 elaborating:

“(1) That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non­ compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;

(2) Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society; (3) Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public

2 (2019) 5 SCC 688, ¶ 15 Page | 8 servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender;

(4) xxx xxx xxx (5) While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non­compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impact on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise, etc.”

(Emphasis Applied)

11. True it is that offences which are ‘non­compoundable’ cannot be

compounded by a criminal court in purported exercise of its powers

under Section 320 Cr.P.C. Any such attempt by the court would

amount to alteration, addition and modification of Section 320 Cr.P.C,

which is the exclusive domain of Legislature. There is no patent or

latent ambiguity in the language of Section 320 Cr.P.C., which may

justify its wider interpretation and include such offences in the docket

of ‘compoundable’ offences which have been consciously kept out as

non­compoundable. Nevertheless, the limited jurisdiction to

compound an offence within the framework of Section 320 Cr.P.C. is

not an embargo against invoking inherent powers by the High Court

Page | 9 vested in it under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court, keeping in view

the peculiar facts and circumstances of a case and for justifiable

reasons can press Section 482 Cr.P.C. in aid to prevent abuse of the

process of any Court and/or to secure the ends of justice.

12. The High Court, therefore, having regard to the nature of the

offence and the fact that parties have amicably settled their dispute

and the victim has willingly consented to the nullification of criminal

proceedings, can quash such proceedings in exercise of its inherent

powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., even if the offences are non­

compoundable. The High Court can indubitably evaluate the

consequential effects of the offence beyond the body of an individual

and thereafter adopt a pragmatic approach, to ensure that the felony,

even if goes unpunished, does not tinker with or paralyze the very

object of the administration of criminal justice system.

13. It appears to us that criminal proceedings involving non­heinous

offences or where the offences are pre­dominantly of a private nature,

can be annulled irrespective of the fact that trial has already been

concluded or appeal stands dismissed against conviction. Handing out

punishment is not the sole form of delivering justice. Societal method

of applying laws evenly is always subject to lawful exceptions. It goes

without saying, that the cases where compromise is struck post­

conviction, the High Court ought to exercise such discretion with Page | 10 rectitude, keeping in view the circumstances surrounding the incident,

the fashion in which the compromise has been arrived at, and with

due regard to the nature and seriousness of the offence, besides the

conduct of the accused, before and after the incidence. The touchstone

for exercising the extra­ordinary power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

would be to secure the ends of justice. There can be no hard and fast

line constricting the power of the High Court to do substantial justice.

A restrictive construction of inherent powers under Section 482

Cr.P.C. may lead to rigid or specious justice, which in the given facts

and circumstances of a case, may rather lead to grave injustice. On

the other hand, in cases where heinous offences have been proved

against perpetrators, no such benefit ought to be extended, as

cautiously observed by this Court in Narinder Singh & Ors. vs.

State of Punjab & Ors.3 and Laxmi Narayan (Supra).

14. In other words, grave or serious offences or offences which

involve moral turpitude or have a harmful effect on the social and

moral fabric of the society or involve matters concerning public policy,

cannot be construed betwixt two individuals or groups only, for such

offences have the potential to impact the society at large. Effacing

abominable offences through quashing process would not only send a

wrong signal to the community but may also accord an undue benefit

3 (2014) 6 SCC 466, ¶ 29 Page | 11 to unscrupulous habitual or professional offenders, who can secure a

‘settlement’ through duress, threats, social boycotts, bribes or other

dubious means. It is well said that “let no guilty man escape, if it can

be avoided.”

15. Given these settled parameters, the order of the High Court of

Madhya Pradesh culminating into Criminal Appeal No. 1489 of 2012,

to the extent it holds that the High Court does not have power to

compound a non­compoundable offence, is in ignorance of its inherent

powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and is, thus, unsustainable.

However, the judgment and order dated 9 th January, 2009 of the High

Court of Karnataka, giving rise to Criminal Appeal No. 1488 of 2012

cannot be faulted with on this count for the reason that the parties did

not bring any compromise/settlement to the notice of the High Court.

16. Let us now delve into the nature of powers vested in this Court

under Article 142 of the Constitution, with an intent to do complete

justice. It would be ad rem to outrightly cite the Constitution Bench

decision in Union Carbide Corporation & Ors. vs. Union of India &

Ors.4, where this Court has ruled as follows:

“83. It is necessary to set at rest certain misconceptions in the arguments touching the scope of the powers of this Court under Article 142(1) of the Constitution. These issues are 4 (1991) 4 SCC 584, 83 Page | 12 matters of serious public importance. The proposition that a provision in any ordinary law irrespective of the importance of the public policy on which it is founded, operates to limit the powers of the apex Court under Article 142(1) is unsound and erroneous. In both Garg [1963 Supp 1 SCR 885, 899­900 : AIR 1963 SC 996] as well as Antulay cases [(1988) 2 SCC 602 :

1988 SCC (Cri) 372] the point was one of violation of constitutional provisions and constitutional rights. The observations as to the effect of inconsistency with statutory provisions were really unnecessary in those cases as the decisions in the ultimate analysis turned on the breach of constitutional rights. We agree with Shri Nariman that the power of the Court under Article 142 insofar as quashing of criminal proceedings are concerned is not exhausted by Section 320 or 321 or 482 CrPC or all of them put together. The power under Article 142 is at an entirely different level and of a different quality. Prohibitions or limitations or provisions contained in ordinary laws cannot, ipso facto, act as prohibitions or limitations on the constitutional powers under Article 142. Such prohibitions or limitations in the statutes might embody and reflect the scheme of a particular law, taking into account the nature and status of the authority or the court on which conferment of powers — limited in some appropriate way — is contemplated. The limitations may not necessarily reflect or be based on any fundamental considerations of public policy. Sri Sorabjee, learned Attorney General, referring to Garg case [1963 Supp 1 SCR 885, 899­900 : AIR 1963 SC 996] , said that limitation on the powers under Article 142 arising from “inconsistency with express statutory provisions of substantive law” must really mean and be understood as some express prohibition contained in any substantive statutory law. He suggested that if the expression ‘prohibition’ is read in place of ‘provision’ that would perhaps convey the appropriate idea. But we think that such prohibition should also Page | 13 be shown to be based on some underlying fundamental and general issues of public policy and not merely incidental to a particular statutory scheme or pattern. It will again be wholly incorrect to say that powers under Article 142 are subject to such express statutory prohibitions. That would convey the idea that statutory provisions override a constitutional provision. Perhaps, the proper way of expressing the idea is that in exercising powers under Article 142 and in assessing the needs of “complete justice” of a cause or matter, the apex Court will take note of the express prohibitions in any substantive statutory provision based on some fundamental principles of public policy and regulate the exercise of its power and discretion accordingly. The proposition does not relate to the powers of the Court under Article 142, but only to what is or is not ‘complete justice’ of a cause or matter and in the ultimate analysis of the propriety of the exercise of the power. No question of lack of jurisdiction or of nullity can arise.”

(Emphasis Applied)

17. The afore­quoted precept has been consistently followed by this

Court in numerous subsequent decisions, including in Monica

Kumar & Anr. vs. State of U.P. 5, Manohar Lal Sharma vs. Union

of India6 and Supreme Court Bar Association vs. Union of India7,

inter­alia, reiterating that:

“47. The plenary powers of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution are inherent in the Court and are complementary to those powers which 5 (2008) 8 SCC 781, ¶ 45 6 (2014) 2 SCC 532, ¶ 43 7 (1998) 4 SCC 409, ¶ 47 Page | 14 are specifically conferred on the Court by various statutes though are not limited by those statutes.

These powers also exist independent of the statutes with a view to do complete justice between the parties. These powers are of very wide amplitude and are in the nature of supplementary powers. This power exists as a separate and independent basis of jurisdiction apart from the statutes. It stands upon the foundation and the basis for its exercise may be put on a different and perhaps even wider footing, to prevent injustice in the process of litigation and to do complete justice between the parties. This plenary jurisdiction is, thus, the residual source of power which this Court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just and equitable to do so and in particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to do complete justice between the parties, while administering justice according to law. There is no doubt that it is an indispensable adjunct to all other powers and is free from the restraint of jurisdiction and operates as a valuable weapon in the hands of the Court to prevent “clogging or obstruction of the stream of justice”…” (Emphasis Applied)

18. It is now a well crystalized axiom that the plenary jurisdiction of

this Court to impart complete justice under Article 142 cannot ipso

facto be limited or restricted by ordinary statutory provisions. It is also

noteworthy that even in the absence of an express provision akin to

Section 482 Cr.P.C. conferring powers on the Supreme Court to

abrogate and set aside criminal proceedings, the jurisdiction

exercisable under Article 142 of the Constitution embraces this Court

with scopious powers to quash criminal proceedings also, so as to

Page | 15 secure complete justice. In doing so, due regard must be given to the

overarching objective of sentencing in the criminal justice system,

which is grounded on the sub­lime philosophy of maintenance of

peace of the collective and that the rationale of placing an individual

behind bars is aimed at his reformation.

19. We thus sum­up and hold that as opposed to Section 320

Cr.P.C. where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise

between the parties in respect of offences ‘compoundable’ within the

statutory framework, the extra­ordinary power enjoined upon a High

Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or vested in this Court under Article

142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds

of Section 320 Cr.P.C. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of

wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of

quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect

of the offence on the conscious of the society; (ii) Seriousness of the

injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise between the

accused and the victim; & (iv) Conduct of the accused persons, prior

to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other

relevant considerations.

20. Having appraised the afore­stated para­meters and weighing

upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of the two appeals before

Page | 16 us, we are inclined to invoke powers under Article 142 and quash the

criminal proceedings and consequently set aside the conviction in

both the appeals. We say so for the reasons that:

Firstly, the occurrence(s) involved in these appeals can be categorized

as purely personal or having overtones of criminal proceedings of

private nature;

Secondly, the nature of injuries incurred, for which the Appellants

have been convicted, do not appear to exhibit their mental depravity or

commission of an offence of such a serious nature that quashing of

which would override public interest;

Thirdly, given the nature of the offence and injuries, it is immaterial

that the trial against the Appellants had been concluded or their

appeal(s) against conviction stand dismissed;

Fourthly, the parties on their own volition, without any coercion or

compulsion, willingly and voluntarily have buried their differences and

wish to accord a quietus to their dispute(s);

Fifthly, the occurrence(s) in both the cases took place way back in the

years 2000 and 1995, respectively. There is nothing on record to

evince that either before or after the purported compromise, any

untoward incident transpired between the parties;

Page | 17 Sixthly, since the Appellants and the complainant(s) are residents of

the same village(s) and/or work in close vicinity, the quashing of

criminal proceedings will advance peace, harmony, and fellowship

amongst the parties who have decided to forget and forgive any ill­will

and have no vengeance against each other; and

Seventhly, the cause of administration of criminal justice system

would remain un­effected on acceptance of the amicable settlement

between the parties and/or resultant acquittal of the Appellants; more

so looking at their present age.

CONCLUSION:

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1489 OF 2012

21. Consequently, and for the reasons stated above, read with the

settlement dated 13th September 2006, we find it appropriate to invoke

our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution and quash the

criminal proceedings in the aforesaid case. As a sequel thereto, all

offences emanating out of the FIR leading to Criminal Appeal No. 1489

of 2012 stand annulled, and the judgment and orders passed by the

trial court, appellate court and the High Court are set aside.

Resultantly, the Appellants shall be deemed to have been acquitted of

the charged offences for all intents and purposes.

Page | 18 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1488 OF 2012

22. In so far as this appeal is concerned, we note that even though

the Learned Counsel(s) for the Appellants and the Complainant­victim

have jointly stated before this Court that the parties have settled their

dispute(s), but no formal settlement has either been brought on record

nor has it been even clarified that such a deed of settlement has been

recorded. Admittedly, the factum of compromise/settlement between

the parties has been raised for the first time before this Court. In the

absence of any proof of settlement, we find ourselves hard­pressed to

take cognizance of the asseverated compromise. We, therefore, direct

both the Appellants as well as the complainant­victim to appear before

the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shimoga and submit their settlement, if

any, in writing within a period of three months. The C.J.M. shall send

a Report to this Court immediately, recording his satisfaction with

regard to the genuineness of the compromise. In the event, the said

Report would reflect a bona­fide settlement between the parties, the

present appeal shall also be deemed to have been disposed of in same

terms as Criminal Appeal No. 1489 of 2012, referred to above.

Further, the incontrovertible corollary in such event would be that the

Appellants shall be treated to have been acquitted of all the charged

offences for all intents and purposes. On the other hand, if no formal

settlement is placed before C.J.M., Shimoga within the stipulated

Page | 19 period or the Report reflects to the contrary, the criminal appeal shall

stand as dismissed as no other substantial question of law is raised or

involved in this appeal.

23. Both the Criminal Appeals are disposed of in above terms.

……………………….. CJI.

(N.V. RAMANA)

………..………………… J.

(SURYA KANT)

NEW DELHI DATED : 29.09.2021

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