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Ramgarh Farms & Ind. Ltd. vs State Of U.P. .

Supreme Court21 April 2015M. Y. Eqbal

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

1. A person who acquires land from a landlord by lease deed to hold as a hereditary tenant—or in the capacity of a tenant generally—cannot be treated as a "tenure holder" (Bhumidar) within the meaning of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960, notwithstanding that a Prescribed Authority may in an earlier administrative proceeding have characterized him as such. 2. Where land is held under a lease arrangement and the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 is amended to reduce the permissible ceiling area, a fresh ceiling proceeding is initiated and the Prescribed Authority must determine entitlement under the new amended ceiling limit, applying the correct legal classification of the landholder's tenure status. 3. Upon determining that a landholder is entitled to retain land only up to the amended ceiling limit, the Prescribed Authority is obliged to afford that landholder a reasonable opportunity to exercise an option as to which portion of his land he wishes to retain within that permissible limit.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOs.3375-3376 OF 2005

Ramgarh Farms and Industries Ltd. …..Appellant(s)

versus

State of Uttar Pradesh and others ..Respondent(s)

JUDGMENT

M. Y. EQBAL, J.

These appeals by special leave are directed against the

judgment and order dated 12 th December, 2003 of the

Allahabad High Court whereby Division Bench of the High

Court allowed the special appeals preferred by the State of

Uttar Pradesh and set aside order dated 17.2.2000 passed by

the learned Single Judge in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Peitition,

who directed the authorities to correct the revenue record, pay

compensation and deliver the possession of the disputed land

to the appellant.

Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Sukhbir Paul Kaur Date: 2015.04.22 16:58:26 IST Reason: 1

2. The factual matrix of the case is that the name of the

appellant was recorded as Bhumidar of various lands in

Nagina Tehsil. In the proceedings initiated under the U.P.

Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 (for short

‘Act of 1960’), the appellant was served with a notice under

Section 10 and the Prescribed Authority declared an area of

5446 acres to be surplus land vide order dated 31.05.1962

and the appellant was held to be entitled to certain amount of

compensation. However, later on in 1976, on the application

moved by the Collector, Bijnor, the order dated 31.05.1962

was reviewed and set aside by the Prescribed Authority and

the appellant was held to be not entitled to any compensation

as the appellant was not the Bhumidar and the notice issued

to it under Section 10 was erroneous. The appeal filed by the

aggrieved appellant was dismissed by the District Court as not

maintainable.

3. The appellant, thereafter, moved the High Court by way

of writ petition praying therein for issuance of appropriate writ

for quashing the orders of the Prescribed Authority as also

2 that of District Court. Learned Single Judge of the High Court

allowed writ petition of the appellant with costs holding that

the order passed by the Prescribed Authority on 31.5.1962

had become final and it was no longer open to the said

Authority to determine as to whether the appellant was a

tenure holder or not. The appeal by special leave (being Civil

Appeal No.3047 of 1983) preferred by the State Government

before the Supreme Court was dismissed vide order dated

15.1.1996 for non-prosecution.

4. Meanwhile, the Ceiling Act was amended and the

permissible extent of land to be held was reduced to 18 acres.

Notice dated 7.10.1976 was issued to the appellant and vide

order dated 29.11.1976, the Prescribed Authority declared

1067.53 acres of land of the appellant in two villages to be

excess and this order was not challenged by the appellant.

Notification dated 16.2.1966 was issued under Section 4 of the

Indian Forest Act whereby lands of the appellant in other

villages were proposed to be declared as reserved forest and

vide notification dated 27.7.1970 under Section 20 of the

3 Forest Act, such lands were declared as reserved forest area.

These notifications were also not challenged by the appellant.

5. After the Apex Court dismissed the appeal preferred by

the State Government, the appellant approached the

authorities for correction of the revenue record and payment of

compensation in accordance with order dated 31.05.1962.

However, as the request was not heeded to, the appellant filed

a writ petition for complying with the High Court judgment

dated 05.07.1982 and paying compensation of Rs.4,19,484/-

with interest from 1962 onwards, for returning possession of

the land and for correcting the revenue entries in favour of the

appellant in compliance with the orders passed in 1962.

Learned Single Judge of the High Court, vide judgment dated

17.2.2000, directed the authorities to correct the revenue

record, pay compensation and hand over the possession of the

property.

6. Aggrieved by the judgment of the learned Single Judge of

the High Court, the State Government preferred an appeal

through the Collector who was the Prescribed Authority and

4 another appeal through the Chief Conservator of Forest. The

appellant contested the appeals on the ground that the order

dated 29.11.1976 was based on the order dated 30.07.1976

which was set aside by the High Court vide order dated

05.07.1982 and hence order dated 29.11.1976 was not

required to be challenged separately. The notice dated

07.10.1976 preceding the order dated 29.11.1976 was also

alleged to have been sent to Nagina Tehsil and not at the

registered office of the appellant. It was also contended that

the Notifications under Section 4 and Section 20 of the Forest

Act were a nullity as the statutory procedure was not complied

with and as the land was declared to be a holding of the

company vide order dated 31.05.1962 and such lands were

not permitted to be declared as part of a reserved forest in

view of Section 3 of the Forest Act. The Forest Department was

alleged to be bound by the order dated 31.05.1962 as it was

part of the State of U.P. and had no separate identity and the

maintainability of the appeal filed by it was challenged on the

said ground. It was argued that the Notifications under

5 Sections 4 and 20 could not have been produced before the

court for the first time.

7. The Division Bench of the High Court, allowing the

appeals preferred by the State, held that order dated

29.11.1976 was an independent order made in pursuance of

notice dated 07.10.1976 re-determining the surplus area after

the Ceiling Act was amended in 1973 and 1976 and not an

order made as a consequence to or to give effect to the order

dated 30.07.1976. The High Court held that as order dated

29.11.1976 was not challenged, the same had to be given

effect to and considered while making any correction in the

revenue record, even if it was made without valid service of

notice. The High Court further held that the Forest

Department was a part of the State Government and bound by

orders passed in relation to other State Departments. It was

further held that the Court had the power to permit the

production of additional evidence in appeal and held that such

power had to be exercised herein for doing complete justice

between the parties as the Forest Department was not a party

6 to the writ petition and hence could not bring the proceedings

under the Forest Act to the notice of the Court and as the

Notifications under the Forest Act were required to be taken

on record as they had attained finality.

8. The contention that the Notification under Section 4

could not have been issued in relation to a holding was

rejected by the High Court on the ground that the same would

render the purpose of inviting objections under Section 6 and

holding enquiry under Section 7 unnecessary. Having not

made any objection under Section 6 of the Forest Act, the

rights of the appellant were held to have been extinguished

under Section 9. The Notifications under Sections 4 and 20

were also held liable to be given effect to as a decree of the civil

court as the same had not been challenged by the appellant

despite being aware of the same. The appellant had mentioned

the notifications in the memorandum of writ petition (being

W.P. No.23625/2000) wherein the appellant had sought relief

based on a purported assurance by the Forest Settlement

Officer to issue corrigendum for excluding the land from the

7 category of reserved forest area. However, this writ petition

was noted to have been dismissed as being premature vide

judgment dated 25.05.2000. Aggrieved by the impugned

decision of the High Court, the Company has preferred present

appeals by special leave.

9. Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel appearing for

the appellant submitted that the impugned order passed by

the High Court is contrary to the settled principles of law.

While elaborating the case of the appellant, learned counsel

submitted that once the order dated 31.5.1962 passed by the

Prescribed Authority had become final and binding between

the parties, every order running contrary to the said order

would have lost its force. According to the learned counsel,

the order dated 29.11.1976 and Notification dated 27.7.1970

issued under the Indian Forest Act automatically lost its force

in the light of the judgment rendered by the High Court on

5.7.1982. Learned counsel further contended that the High

Court has failed to consider that the order dated 30.7.1976

passed in review petition by the Prescribed Authority has been

8 set aside by the High Court and the Civil Appeal was

dismissed. Learned counsel further contended that the High

Court in its earlier order dated 5.7.1982 has categorically held

that the rights of the appellant have been finally determined

by the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 31.5.1962.

There cannot be any dispute that the order dated 31.5.1962

attained its finality after the challenge of the order by the State

attained finality up to this Court.

10. Mr. Dwivedi, learned senior counsel assailing the

procedure adopted in the ceiling proceedings, submitted that

the order passed by the Authority without affording reasonable

opportunity of hearing is null and void and cannot be

sustained in law. The declaration issued under the Indian

Forest Act declaring the land as forest is also wholly without

jurisdiction.

11. Mr. P.N. Misra, learned senior counsel appearing for the

respondent, on the other hand submitted that as a matter of

fact out of the land which already stood vested in the State

pursuant to U.P. Zamidari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,

9 1950 (for short, “Act of 1950”), a portion measuring 8874

bighas was transferred to the appellant on the basis of lease

deed dated 25.1.1951. Learned counsel submitted that no

scrutiny or examination was done by the Tehsildar, Nagina

before passing the order dated 28.4.1954 whereby the name

of the appellant was entered in the khatauni.

12. Learned counsel further submitted that the Prescribed

Authority vide order dated 31.5.1962 declared 5466 acres of

land as surplus land under the ceiling proceedings. The said

order dated 31.5.1962 was passed by the Authority without

adjudicating as to whether the appellant is a tenure holder in

terms of the lease deed. Learned counsel submitted that the

ex-zamindar after the vesting of the entire land received

compensation for nine villages and bonds to that effect were

also dispatched to the said landlord.

13. Justifying the correctness of the proceeding and the

Notification under the Indian Forest Act, learned counsel

submitted that the said order and notification declaring the

land in question as forest land were never challenged by the

10 appellant. On the contrary, the respondent-State filed

application seeking review of the order dated 31.5.1962 on the

ground that the appellant was never the tenure holder and

Bhumidar of the land declared surplus.

14. Much stress has been given by the learned counsel for

the appellant on the notice dated 8.01.1961 issued under

Section 10(2) of the U.P. Act and the order dated 31.05.1962

whereby the prescribed authority treated the appellant as a

tenure holder. We do not find any force in the submission of

the learned counsel. Indisputably, the appellant came in

possession of the land by virtue of the lease dated 25.01.1951

executed by Raja Harishchandra Singh which came into effect

from 01.07.1951. By the said lease deed about 8874 bighas of

land was transferred by way of permanent lease. The relevant

portion of the lease deed is extracted hereinbelow:-

“…In consideration of the rent hereinafter reserved and on the covenants, stipulations and conditions hereinafter contained and on the part of lease paid, observed and performed, the lessor doth hereby demise with the lessee the said lands hereinafter particularly described in the Schedule hereinafter written ---- with all surface rights, easements and appurtenances whatsoever belonging or in anyway

11 appurteneancing thereto as and by way of a permanent lease to hold the said land as hereditary tenants as meant under Uttar Pradesh tenancy Act (Act XVII of 1939) subject to such conditions (Ramgarh Farm & Industries Ltd. Badri Narain Singh, Director, Ramgarh Farm & Industries Ltd., Sindh Nath Singh, Director for Ramgarh Farm & Industries Ltd, Ram Narqain Singh & Co., B.N. Singh, Managing agents Hari Chandra Raj Singh ) [page 4] conditions, restrictions and limitations as imposed uinder these present yielding and paying therefore, the rent hereinafter specified provided however that this lease deed shall be deemed to have commenced on and from the 1 st day of fasli year 1358 corresponding to the 1 st day of July, 1951…” (Emphasis given)

15. It will not be out of place to mention here that before the

lease was executed in 1951, the Act of 1950 was enacted and

the said Act came into effect from 24.01.1951 putting a

restriction on the transfer of land and, further all transfers

made after 01.07.1948 were held not to be recognised. Hence,

neither the lease deed nor any authority would have

recognised the appellant as a tenure holder. Moreover, the

lease of the land was granted to the appellant on payment of

rent and on the terms and conditions contained in the said

lease deed.

12

16. Be that as it may, admittedly, the appellant was

permitted to retain 428 bighas of land spread in three villages

while determining the surplus land under Section 12 of the

Act. It is also not in dispute that Act of 1960 was amended

with effect from 08.06.1973 whereby the ceiling area of the

land was reduced from 40 acres to 18.03 acres. As a result, a

fresh ceiling proceeding was initiated under the amended Act.

17. Taking into consideration the entire facts of the case and

the sequence of events the High Court came to the conclusion

that the appellant is entitled to 18.03 acres of land in terms of

the order dated 29.11.1976 passed in the ceiling proceeding

redetermining the surplus area held by the Company after

amendment came into effect in the Act.

18. We have given our anxious consideration to the matter

and in our view once it is held that the appellant came in

possession of the land from the ex-landlord on the basis of

lease treating the appellant as a tenant, the appellant cannot

be held to be a tenure holder. Hence, without going into other

questions it can safely be concluded that in any circumstance

13 the appellant would be entitled to retain the land to the extent

of 18 acres which is the ceiling limit. Hence, the prescribed

authority is under an obligation to give an opportunity to the

appellant to exercise its option as to which land it opts to

retain to the extent of 18 acres and not more than that.

19. For the reason aforesaid, we do not find any reason to

interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court.

The appeals are, therefore, dismissed with the observation and

direction made hereinabove.

…………………………….J. (M.Y. Eqbal)

…………………………….J. (Amitava Roy) New Delhi April 21, 2015

14 ITEM NO.1A COURT NO.9 SECTION XI (For Judgment)

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Civil Appeal No(s). 3375-3376/2005

RAMGARH FARMS & IND. LTD. Appellant(s)

VERSUS

STATE OF U.P. & ORS. Respondent(s)

Date : 21/04/2015 These appeals were called on for pronouncement of judgment today.

For Appellant(s) Ms. Ruby Singh Ahuja,Adv.

For Respondent(s) Mr. Anil Kumar Jha,Adv.

Mr. Vinay Garg,Adv.

Mr. Abhishek Chaudhary,Adv.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.Y. Eqbal pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising of His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amitava Roy.

These appeals are dismissed in terms of the signed reportable judgment.

[INDU POKHRIYAL] [SUKHBIR PAUL KAUR] COURT MASTER A.R.-CUM-P.S.

(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)

15

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