Ramesh Chandra Vaishya vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO…………/2023

[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL) NO. 1249/2023]

Ramesh Chandra Vaishya …APPELLANT

VS.

The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. …RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

Leave granted.

2. The present appeal, by special leave, questions the judgment and

order dated 23rd May, 2022 passed by a learned Single Judge of the

High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (“High Court”, hereafter)

dismissing an application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 19731 (“Cr. PC”, hereafter) instituted by the appellant

seeking quashing of the charge-sheet as well as the pending criminal

Signature Not Verifiedproceedings2. Digitally signed by NEETA SAPRA Date: 2023.05.19 16:58:30 IST Reason:

1 Application u/s 482 No. 38374 of 2018 2 Case Crime No. 23 of 2016; Criminal Case No. 376 of 2016

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3. In a nutshell, the prosecution's case is that on 14 th January, 2016, at

about 7.00 am, the appellant was engaged in an altercation with the

second respondent (“complainant”, hereafter) over the issue of

drainage of water. It is alleged that during this altercation, the

appellant verbally hurled caste related abuses towards the complainant

and his family members, and subsequently physically assaulted the

complainant causing him multiple injuries. Consequently, on 20 th

January, 2016, a First Information Report (“first F.I.R”, hereafter) was

registered against the appellant under sections 323 and 504, Indian

Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”, hereafter) and 3(1)(x), the Scheduled Castes

and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (“SC/ST

Act”, hereafter).

4. Investigation was conducted by the concerned Circle Officer (“I.O.”,

hereafter). Upon investigation, which was completed within a day, the

I.O. reached the conclusion that there were materials against the

appellant to send him up for trial and consequently, a charge-sheet

dated 21st January, 2016 under sections 323, 504, IPC and 3(1)(x),

SC/ST Act was filed before the concerned court against him. The court

took cognizance of the offence on 3rd May, 2016.

5. It is important to emphasize at this juncture that the appellant

intended to lodge an F.I.R. arising out of the same incident. According

to him, he was badly beaten up by the complainant and his son with

2 canes and lathis on 14th January, 2016, as a result of which he too

sustained injuries. On the same date, when the appellant approached

the police station to lodge the F.I.R., it was not registered; instead, the

appellant was challaned and kept under detention by the concerned

inspector in-charge under sections 151, 107, and 116, Cr. PC. He was

subsequently released upon furnishing bail bond. Owing to the failure

of the Police to register the F.I.R., the appellant moved an application

under section 156(3), Cr. PC. Pursuant to the order passed by the

Magistrate, an F.I.R. dated 18th February, 2016 (“second F.I.R.”,

hereafter) was registered for the offences under sections 323, 325,

392, 452, 504, 506, IPC against the complainant (second respondent).

6. It is also noted that the appellant has instituted a suit 3 before the civil

court seeking permanent injunction against the complainant’s

continued encroachment upon the appellant’s lands. The same is

pending consideration before the competent court.

7. Aggrieved by the aforesaid charge-sheet, the appellant invoked the

jurisdiction of the High Court on 5 th October, 2018 by applying under

section 482, Cr. PC. He sought quashing thereof as well as the criminal

proceedings against him on the grounds that the said charge sheet

discloses no offence and the present prosecution has been instituted

with mala fide intention for the purposes of harassment.

3 C.S. No. 07 of 2017 3

8. Having held that a prima facie case for grant of interim relief was set

up, the High Court, vide interim order dated 15th November, 2018,

directed that no coercive action be taken against the appellant,

pending consideration of the application under section 482, Cr. PC.

9. However, upon a contested hearing, the High Court found no material

irregularity in the charge-sheet or the procedure followed by the Court

below in taking cognizance, and proceeded to dismiss the appellant's

application under section 482, Cr. PC vide the impugned judgment and

order. The High Court held that, at this stage, it cannot be concluded

that a cognizable offence has not been disclosed, as the allegations are

factual in nature and would require leading of evidence by the parties.

Relying on the decision of this Court in Mohd. Allauddin Khan vs.

The State of Bihar and Ors. 4, the High Court emphasized that at the

stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under section

482, Cr. PC, the court has limited jurisdiction and it cannot appreciate

the evidence in order to determine whether, prima facie, a case has

been made out against the accused. The High Court noted that without

evidence, it is not possible to ascertain the veracity of the allegations

at this stage; the application for quashing of a charge-sheet or criminal

proceedings under section 482 Cr. PC, therefore, cannot sustain.

4 (2019) 6 SCC 107 4

10. Appearing on behalf of the appellant, Ms. Shukla, learned counsel

advanced the following submissions:

a. The first F.I.R., which was registered after a delay of six days, is

an afterthought and creates serious doubts over the allegations

of the complainant.

b. The charge-sheet was filed on the very next day of registration

of the first F.I.R., without conducting proper investigation. The

charge-sheet fails to take note of the second F.I.R. registered at

the instance of the appellant and the medical report.

c. The complainant, being an influential person in the village,

maliciously initiated criminal proceedings against the appellant

with an ulterior motive to scuttle the already pending civil

dispute in the civil court between the parties.

d. The Police did not act on the appellant's complaint. The second

F.I.R. dated 18th February, 2016 was registered only after an

order was passed on the appellant’s application under section

156(3), Cr. PC by the Magistrate.

5 e. State of Haryana and Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal and Ors.5 was

placed in support of the contention that if the contents of the

F.I.R., taken on their face value, does not make out any case

against the appellant, such an F.I.R. registered with ulterior

motive deserves to be quashed.

f. Hitesh Verma vs. The State of Uttarakhand & Anr. 6 was also

placed to support the contention that the High Court ignored the

misuse and abuse of the provisions of the SC/ST Act by the

complainant; neither the contents of the first F.I.R. nor the

charge-sheet discloses the precise content of abusive language

employed by the appellant so as to attract the provisions of

section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act.

11. It was, accordingly, prayed that relief prayed for by the appellant be

granted.

12. Mr. Prasad, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the

first respondent (State) while seeking dismissal of this appeal

contended as follows:

5 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 6 (2020) 10 SCC 710

6 a. The appellant had committed a serious crime as a result of which

the complainant had sustained multiple injuries in the resultant

altercation.

b. The Police, on the basis of the statement given by the

complainant and the investigation that followed, filed the charge-

sheet dated 21st January, 2016 before the trial court after

following due procedure.

c. The High Court, vide the impugned judgment and order, has

rightly dismissed the application for quashing presented by the

appellant.

d. It is settled law that the jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr. PC

should be sparingly exercised with complete circumspection and

caution and the High Court was not in error in refusing to

exercise jurisdiction.

13. Mr. Shukla, learned counsel appearing for the complainant (second

respondent) supported the impugned judgment and order of the High

Court. According to him, completion of investigation within a day by

the I.O. may seem to be unusual but is not an impossibility. He also

contended that the charge-sheet having been filed, the law must be

allowed to take its own course; and, if at all the appellant is

7 aggrieved by framing of charges, he may seek his remedy in

accordance with law. No case for interference having been set up by

the appellant, Mr. Shukla prayed for dismissal of the appeal.

14. We have heard the parties and perused the judgment and order of

the High Court together with the materials on record.

15. Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act, prior to its amendment notified

vide S.O. 152(E) dated 18th January, 2016, read as follows:

“3. Punishments for offences of atrocities. — (1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, — ***

(x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;

***”

16. The first F.I.R., registered at the instance of the complainant, is

silent about the place of occurrence and who, being a member of

the public, was present when the appellant is alleged to have hurled

caste related abuses at the complainant. However, on a reading of

the second F.I.R. registered at the behest of the appellant, it appears

that the incident took place at the house of the appellant.

17. The first question that calls for an answer is whether it was at a place

within public view that the appellant hurled caste related abuses at the

complainant with an intent to insult or intimidate with an intent to

8 humiliate him. From the charge-sheet dated 21 st January, 2016 filed by

the I.O., it appears that the prosecution would seek to rely on the

evidence of three witnesses to drive home the charge against the

appellant of committing offences under sections 323 and 504, IPC and

3(1)(x), SC/ST Act. These three witnesses are none other than the

complainant, his wife and their son. Neither the first F.I.R. nor the

charge-sheet refers to the presence of a fifth individual (a member of

the public) at the place of occurrence (apart from the appellant, the

complainant, his wife and their son). Since the utterances, if any,

made by the appellant were not “in any place within public view”, the

basic ingredient for attracting section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act was

missing/absent. We, therefore, hold that at the relevant point of time

of the incident (of hurling of caste related abuse at the complainant

by the appellant), no member of the public was present.

18. That apart, assuming arguendo that the appellant had hurled caste

related abuses at the complainant with a view to insult or humiliate

him, the same does not advance the case of the complainant any

further to bring it within the ambit of section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST

Act. We have noted from the first F.I.R. as well as the charge- sheet

that the same makes no reference to the utterances of the appellant

during the course of verbal altercation or to the caste to which the

complainant belonged, except for the allegation/observation that

caste-related abuses were hurled. The legislative intent seems to be

9 clear that every insult or intimidation for humiliation to a person

would not amount to an offence under section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST

Act unless, of course, such insult or intimidation is targeted at the

victim because of he being a member of a particular Scheduled Caste

or Tribe. If one calls another an idiot (bewaqoof) or a fool (murkh) or

a thief (chor) in any place within public view, this would obviously

constitute an act intended to insult or humiliate by user of abusive or

offensive language. Even if the same be directed generally to a

person, who happens to be a Scheduled Caste or Tribe, per se, it may

not be sufficient to attract section 3(1)(x) unless such words are

laced with casteist remarks. Since section 18 of the SC/ST Act bars

invocation of the court’s jurisdiction under section 438, Cr.PC and

having regard to the overriding effect of the SC/ST Act over other

laws, it is desirable that before an accused is subjected to a trial for

alleged commission of offence under section 3(1)(x), the utterances

made by him in any place within public view are outlined, if not in the

F.I.R. (which is not required to be an encyclopaedia of all facts and

events), but at least in the charge-sheet (which is prepared based

either on statements of witnesses recorded in course of investigation

or otherwise) so as to enable the court to ascertain whether the

charge sheet makes out a case of an offence under the SC/ST Act

having been committed for forming a proper opinion in the

conspectus of the situation before it, prior to taking cognisance of the

offence. Even for the limited test that has to be applied in a case of

10 the present nature, the charge-sheet dated 21 st January, 2016 does

not make out any case of an offence having been committed by the

appellant under section 3(1)(x) warranting him to stand a trial.

19. Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the decision in Hitesh Verma (supra) cited

by Ms. Shukla can be pressed in aid to support the view that we have

taken above.

20. The second question that would engage our attention is, whether the

criminal proceedings against the appellant should be allowed to be

taken further in view of the appellant facing accusation of offences

punishable under sections 323 and 504, IPC.

21. Section 323, IPC prescribes punishment for voluntarily causing hurt.

Hurt is defined in section 319, IPC as causing bodily pain, disease or

infirmity to any person. The allegation in the first F.I.R. is that the

appellant had beaten up the complainant for which he sustained

multiple injuries. Although the complainant alleged that such incident

was witnessed by many persons and that he sustained injuries on his

hand, the charge-sheet does neither refer to any eye-witness other

than the complainant’s wife and son nor to any medical report. The

nature of hurt suffered by the complainant in the process is neither

reflected from the first F.I.R. nor the charge-sheet. On the contrary,

the appellant had the injuries suffered by him treated immediately

11 after the incident. In the counter-affidavit filed by the first respondent

(State) in the present proceeding, there is no material worthy of

consideration in this behalf except a bald statement that the

complainant sustained multiple injuries “in his hand and other body

parts”. If indeed the complainant’s version were to be believed, the

I.O. ought to have asked for a medical report to support the same.

Completion of investigation within a day in a given case could be

appreciated but in the present case it has resulted in more disservice

than service to the cause of justice. The situation becomes all the

more glaring when in course of this proceeding the parties including

the first respondent are unable to apprise us the outcome of the

second F.I.R. In any event, we do not find any ring of truth in the

prosecution case to allow the proceedings to continue vis-à-vis

section 323, IPC.

22. What remains is section 504, IPC. In Fiona Shrikhande and Anr.

vs. State of Maharashtra7, this Court had the occasion to hold

that:

“13. Section 504 IPC comprises of the following ingredients viz.

(a) intentional insult, (b) the insult must be such as to give provocation to the person insulted, and (c) the accused must intend or know that such provocation would cause another to break the public peace or to commit any other offence. The intentional insult must be of such a degree that should provoke a person to break the public peace or to commit any other offence.

The person who intentionally insults intending or knowing it to be likely that it will give provocation to any other person and such provocation will cause to break the public peace or to commit any 7 (2013) 14 SCC 44

12 other offence, in such a situation, the ingredients of Section 504 are satisfied. One of the essential elements constituting the offence is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult and the mere fact that the accused abused the complainant, as such, is not sufficient by itself to warrant a conviction under Section 504 IPC.”

23. Based on the facts and circumstances of the case, we have little

hesitation in holding that even though the appellant might have

abused the complainant but such abuse by itself and without

anything more does not warrant subjecting the appellant to face a

trial, particularly in the clear absence of the ingredient of intentional

insult of such a degree that it could provoke a person to break public

peace or commit any other offence.

24. We record that the High Court misdirected itself in failing to

appreciate the challenge to the criminal proceedings including the

charge-sheet in the proper perspective and occasioned a grave failure

of justice in rejecting such challenge.

25. For the reasons aforesaid, we unhesitatingly hold that it would be an

abuse of the process of law to allow continuation of Criminal Case

No.376 of 2016. While setting aside the impugned judgment and

order of the High Court, we also quash Criminal Case No.376 of

2016.

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26. Consequently, this appeal succeeds. Parties shall, however, bear their

own costs.

…………………………….J (S. RAVINDRA BHAT)

.……………………………J (DIPANKAR DATTA) NEW DELHI;

19th May, 2023.

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