Raju Poojari vs State Of Karnataka

The appellants have filed this appeal under Section 374 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter for brevity referred to as "the Cr.P.C.") challenging the judgment of conviction and order on sentence dated 11.06.2013 passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Chikmagalur, (hereinafter for brevity referred to as the "Sessions Court") in Sessions Case No.92/2012, wherein the Sessions Court acquitted the appellants of the offence punishable under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter for brevity referred to as "the IPC") and convicted the appellants for the offences punishable under Sections 323 and 506 read with Section 34 of IPC and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 6 months and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/- each, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one month for the offence punishable under Sections 323 read with Section 34 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of

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one year and to pay fine of Rs.5,000/- each, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for two months for the offence punishable under Section 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC.

2. The factual matrix of the case of the prosecution is that, on 01.10.2011, PW.4-Sampath Kumar, lodged complaint against the appellants alleging that on 18.09.2011 at 7:00.p m., his father Thammanna Gowda (deceased), had been to the shop of accused No.1-Raju Poojari at Neradi village near Gane cross, at that time accused Nos.1 and 2 took quarrel with Thammanna Gowda in respect of return of Rs.50/-, assaulted Thammanna Gowda. On 20.09.2011, again accused Nos.1 and 2 came near the house of deceased and threatened that they would eliminate the deceased, if he lodged complaint to the Police. Thus, the wife of deceased Shaila - PW.7 requested the accused not to harass her husband. On 22.09.2011, at about 4.30 p.m. deceased consumed poison near Kalalgandi, hence, the villagers of Kalalgandi informed PW.4 and PW.7 about consumption of poison thus, he and his mother, his uncle PW.8 N.G.Uddegowda went to the spot saw his father who had consumed poison, thus, shifted to M.G.Hospital, Chikmagalur for treatment, later, Thammanna Gowda was shifted to

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Holycross Hospital, Chikmagalur for higher treatment and later, he was shifted to K.M.C Hospital Mangalore on 23.09.2011, however, Thammanna Gowda died on account of consumption of poison on 30.09.2011 at 11.00 p.m. In the complaint, it is stated that, as accused Nos.1 and 2 took quarrel with Thammanna Gowda and made criminal intimidation that they will eliminate him, due to the fear, depression and humiliation caused, Thammanna Gowda consumed poison, who was shifted to hospital, took treatment, however he died, thereby, accused Nos.1 and 2 have abated the deceased to commit suicide, hence, PW.4 lodged complaint to the police vide Ex.P3. Based on the complaint, Aldur Police, Chikmagalur District registered a case in Crime No.156 of 2011 for the offences punishable under Sections 323, 506 and 306 read with Section 34 of IPC.

This led to registration of FIR and investigation. Soon after the investigation, PW.16-Investigating Officer filed the charge- sheet against accused Nos.1 and 2 for the aforesaid offences.

3. After perusing the materials placed on record and hearing both side, the Sessions Judge's Court framed a charge against accused Nos.1 and 2 for the offences punishable under Sections 323, 506 and 306 read with Section 34 of IPC. Since

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accused Nos.1 and 2 pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried, the trial was held, wherein, in order to prove the alleged guilt against the accused, the prosecution got examined in all sixteen witnesses as PWs.1 to PW.16, got produced and marked documents from Exs.P1 to P27 and produced Material Object as per MO.1. From the accused' side, neither any witness was examined nor any documents were got marked as exhibits.

4. After hearing both sides, the learned Sessions Judge's Court, by its judgment dated 11.06.2013 and acquitted accused Nos.1 and 2 of the offence punishable under Section 306 read with Section 34 of IPC. However, convicted accused Nos.1 and 2 for the offences punishable under Sections 323 and 506 of IPC. Challenging the same, the appellants-accused Nos.1 and 2 have preferred the present appeal.

5. The appellants/accused Nos.1 and 2 are represented by their respective learned counsel. The respondent-State is represented by the learned High Court Government Pleader.

6. Learned counsel for the respondents/accused Nos.1 and 2 are physically appearing in the Court. Learned High Court

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Government Pleader for the appellant-State, is physically appearing in the Court.

7. The Sessions Judge's Court's records were called for and the same are placed before this Court.

8. Heard the arguments from both side. Perused the materials placed before this Court, including the memorandum of appeal, impugned judgment and the Sessions Judge's Court records.

9. For the sake of convenience, the parties would be henceforth referred to as per their rankings before the learned Sessions Judge's Court.

10. Learned counsel for appellant contended that judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge is not in accordance with law and evidence. The Sessions Judge having acquitted the appellants of the offences punishable under Section 306, but, committed an error in convicting the appellants for offences punishable under Sections 323 and 506 read with 34 of IPC, based on similar evidence, since, the Sessions Judge has disbelieved the prosecution case, in so far as 306 of IPC. The Sessions Judge

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relied on an interested and partition witness. It is contended that accused No.1 has been running a shop. On 18.09.2011 at 7.30 p.m., the deceased Thammanna Gowda had been to the shop of accused No.1 and for the sake of Rs.50/-, which was due by deceased to accused No.1, there was a incident which the appellants assaulted. In this regard, the prosecution got examined PW.3, N.G. Rudregowda (brother of deceased) and PW.4 Sampath Kumar (son of deceased). In fact, PWs.3 and 4, at the time of alleged incident, they were in their respective house and as such they are not eyewitnesses to the incident and they were informed by others. Therefore, the oral testimonies of PWs.3 and 4 is in the nature of hearsay witnesses, but, the Sessions Judge convicted the appellants, placing reliance on the hearsay evidence of PWs.3 and 4. Thus, the evidence of prosecution witness in that regard is contradicted with each other and there is no corroboration to that effect.

11. It is contended that, in so far as, second incident alleged to have been occurred on 20.09.2011, as per the case of prosecution accused Nos.1 and 2 came near the house of deceased and made criminal intimidation to eliminate the

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deceased. In order to establish this aspect the prosecution relied upon oral testimonies of PWs.4, 7 and 8. As per the evidence of these witnesses, at the time of alleged incident they were in garden land and deceased was in house, therefore, there was no occasion for them to witness an alleged incident, more particularly, accused persons making criminal intimidations to the deceased. Therefore, PWs.4, 7 and 8 are interested and hearsay witnesses and their evidence cannot be believed. In the absence of evidence of PWs.4, 7 and 8, absolutely there is no material evidence so as to prove the ingredient of Section 506 of IPC. Hence, the counsel prayed to allow the appeal.

12. Learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for the respondent-State, in his arguments, submitted that the trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and material placed on record in its proper perspective. PWs.3 and 4 have categorically stated that accused Nos.1 and 2 assaulted the deceased in the shop of accused No.1 on 18.09.2011. Further, on 22.09.2011 accused Nos.1 and 2 came near the house of deceased and made criminal intimidation to eliminate him. In this regard, the

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prosecution relied upon the evidence of PWs.4, 7 and 8, which would attract Section 506 of the IPC. The oral testimonies of PWs.3, 4, 7 and 8 are corroborated with each other.

13. It is contended that the Sessions Judge's Court rightly considered that the testimonies of PWs.3, 4, 7 and 8 are accorded a special status in law. The evidence on record does not disclose any material omissions and contradictions in the evidence of PWs.3, 4, 7 and 8, if read as a whole, appears to have a ring of truth to it.

14. It is contended that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt by producing material evidence before the Sessions Court, hence, it has rightly convicted the accused persons. Thus, he prayed to dismiss the appeal.

15. After hearing the learned counsel from both sides, the points that arise for Court consideration in this appeal is:

i. Whether the prosecution has proved beyond

reasonable doubt that on 18.09.2011 at about 07.00 p.m., near the shop of accused No.1 at cross road of Kelagane Village, accused Nos.1 and 2 in furtherance of common intention, voluntarily caused hurt to deceased Thammanna Gowda by assaulting him with hands and on 20.09.2011 near the house of deceased, accused Nos.1 and 2 came and made criminal intimidation by giving life threat to the

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deceased, thereby, committed an offences punishable under Sections 323 and 506 read with Section 34 of IPC?.

ii. Whether the judgment of conviction and

order of sentence under appeal warrants any interference at the hands of this Court?.

16. Before proceeding further in analyzing the evidence led in the matter, it is to be borne in mind that it is an appeal against the judgment of conviction of accused for the offences punishable under Sections 323 and 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC. In the very same judgment, the Sessions Judge acquitted the appellants of the offence punishable under Section 306 read with Section 34 of IPC. It shows that, the Sessions Judge acquitted the appellants for the major Section punishable under Section 306 of IPC and convicted for the minor offences punishable under Sections 323 and 506 of IPC.

Therefore, the accused has primarily the double benefit.

Firstly, the presumption under law is that, unless his guilt is proved, the accused has to be treated as an innocent person in the alleged crime. Secondly, the accused has already been enjoying the benefit of judgment of acquittal in respect of 306 of IPC, passed under the impugned judgment. As such, bearing

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the same in mind, the evidence placed by the prosecution in the matter is required to be analyzed.

(a) The Hon'ble Apex Court, in its judgment in the case of Chandrappa and others -vs- State of Karnataka, reported in (2007) 4 Supreme Court Cases 415, while laying down the general principles regarding powers of the Appellate Court while dealing in an appeal against an order of acquittal, was pleased to observe at paragraph 42(4) and paragraph 42(5) as below:

"42(4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in

mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court.

42(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible

on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court."

(b) In the case of Sudershan Kumar -vs- State of Himachal Pradesh reported in (2014) 15 Supreme Court Cases 666, while referring to Chandrappa's case referred (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court at Paragraph 31 of its

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judgment was pleased to hold that, it is the cardinal principle in criminal jurisprudence that presumption of innocence of the accused is reinforced by an order of acquittal. The Appellate Court, in such a case, would interfere only for very substantial and compelling reasons.

(c) In the case of Jafarudheen and others -vs- State of Kerala reported in (2022) 8 Supreme Court Cases 440, at Paragraph 25 of its judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court was pleased to observe as below:

"25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal

by invoking Section 378 Cr.P.C, the appellate Court has to consider whether the trial Court's view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate Court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial Court rendering acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal parameters."

The above principle laid down by it in its previous case was reaffirmed by the Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of Ravi Sharma -vs- State (Government of NCT of Delhi) and another reported in (2022) 8 Supreme Court Cases 536

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and also in the case of Roopwanti -vs- State of Haryana and others reported in AIR 2023 SUPREME COURT 1199.

17. It is keeping in mind the above principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court and the fact that, the Sessions Court acquitted the appellants for an offence punishable under Section 306 Read with 34 of the IPC which is major offences and convicted for Section 323 and 506 of the IPC. The Court proceed to analyse the evidence placed by the prosecution in this matter.

18. The prosecution, in order to prove the alleged guilt against accused Nos.1 and 2, has examined in all sixteen witnesses as PW.1 to PW.16.

19. PWs.1 and 2 are witness to inquest mahazar- Ex.P1.

Since, accused Nos.1 and 2 were acquitted of offence punishable under Section 306 of IPC, it is not relevant to discuss the evidence of inquest mahazar witness and opinion of the doctor, as to cause of death.

20. PW.3, Sri N.G. Rudregowda, the brother of deceased has stated that his brother deceased Thammanna Gowda died due to consumption of poison, on account of ill-treatment and

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harassment by accused Nos.1 and 2 for having due of Rs.50/-.

It shows that, PW.3 has not witnessed the incident on 18.09.2011 at 7.30 p.m. Hence, his evidence does not come to the aid of prosecution.

21. PW.4, Sampath Kumar, the son of deceased has stated that on 18.09.2011 at about 7:30 p.m., his father had been to the shop of accused No.1. For the sake of Rs.50/- which was due to accused Nos.1 and 2, they assaulted the deceased with their hands. The persons who pacified the quarrel between the deceased and accused Nos.1 and 2 and this fact was narrated by deceased to PW.4. It shows that, PW.4 is also not an eyewitness to the incident dated 18.09.2011 and thus, he is a hearsay witness for all practical purpose. So far as the incident dated 20.09.2011, PW.4 has stated that on 20.09.2011, in the evening hours accused Nos.1 and 2 came to the house of deceased and told that if he files the complaint to the police for having assaulted on two days prior they would eliminate him. At that time, PW.4 and PW.7, the wife of deceased were present in the house, thus, PW.7 requested the accused persons not to harass the deceased, to which, the accused persons told that they would eliminate him

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and throw and later, on 22.09.2011, at 4.30 p.m. the deceased consumed poison and on 30.09.2011, the deceased breathed his last.

22. PW.4 was subjected to cross examination. In the cross examination, he admits that he was not aware of any financial transaction of the deceased. He has not stated in the complaint-Ex.P3 that on 18.09.2011, when quarrel took place in front of shop of accused No.1, the incident has been told by one Gopalagowda PWs.13 and 9 Chandregowda. Hence, he is not an eye witness to the incident dated 18.09.2011 and so far as the incident dated 20.09.2011, when the accused persons came near the house, took quarrel and threatened, he or PW.7 did not lodge any complaint for almost fourteen days.

23. PW.7-Shaila, the wife of deceased, has reiterated the oral testimony of PW.4 and corroborates his evidence.

24. PW.8-Sri. N.G.Uddegowda, the elder brother of deceased, has stated that, on 18.09.2011 at about 8:00.pm., his brother (deceased) came to his house and told that accused Nos.1 and 2 have assaulted him near the shop of accused No.1 in respect of due amount of Rs.50/-. It is further evidence of

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PW.8 that on 20.09.2011, when he was in his garden land, accused Nos.1 and 2 came near the house of deceased and were abusing him and made criminal intimidation and on 22.09.2011, the deceased consumed poison. In the cross examination, he admits that, soon after receipt of information by the deceased in respect of the incident dated 18.09.2011 and 20.09.2011, he did not lodge any complaint. He further admitted that, when quarrel took place at about 4:00.pm. on 20.09.2011 all persons had been to coolie work. He further admitted that, on 20.09.2011, he was attending to his duties in the garden land and on that day, PWs.4 and 7 were also attending their duties in the garden land, however, deceased was in the house. Soon after receipt of phone call, PWs.4 and 7 and 8 went in a bike to kalalgandi. It shows that PWs.4, 7 and 8 were not eye witnesses to the incident dated 20.09.2011 and they are a hearsay witnesses.

25. PW.9 - K.Y.Chandregowda, an eye witness to the incident dated 18.09.2011. He has stated that on 18.09.2011 at about 7:00.pm, he had been to the shop of accused No.1, at that time deceased Thammanna Gowda and accused No.2-Prakash came there. Accused No.1 and deceased were

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quarreling in respect of money transaction. In the cross examination, he admits that, he has not seen accused Nos.1 and 2 assaulting deceased with their hands.

26. In the light of the above evidence, it is just and necessary to analyze Sections 323 and 506 of IPC, to ascertain whether ingredients of these sections are proved or not.

(a) Section 321 of IPC defines Voluntarily causing hurt, which reads as under:

"Whoever does any act with the intention of

thereby causing hurt to any person, or with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause hurt to any person, and does thereby cause hurt to any person, is said "voluntarily to cause hurt".

(b) Section 323 of IPC defines Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt, which reads as under:

"Whoever, except in the case provided for by

section 334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both."

(c) Section 503 of IPC defines Criminal intimidation, which reads as under:

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"Whoever threatens another with any injury to

his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation."

(d) Section 506 of IPC defines punishment for criminal intimidation, which reads as under:

"Whoever commits, the offence of criminal

intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."

27. In the instant case, statement of the complainant and other witnesses contain general allegations that the deceased was assaulted by the appellants. It is no where alleged that the assault and criminal intimidation made by the appellant has provoked the deceased to commit suicide. What was the nature of the assault and injuries inflicted upon the deceased by the appellants is also not forthcoming from the evidence of the complainant and other witnesses. The trial Court has not considered the dying declaration of the deceased and other witnesses so as to convict accused under Section 306 of IPC, but on the similar evidence, how can the trial Court base

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conviction for offence punishable under Section 323 of IPC, in the absence of any legal evidence. Therefore, from the material on record, the ingredients of offence punishable under section 323 IPC are not made out. It is well settled that, where on the evidence two possibilities are available or open, one which goes in favour of the prosecution and the other which benefits an accused, the accused undoubtedly entitled to the benefit of doubt. Further, if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favorable to the accused would be adopted. This principle enunciated in the case of SHARAD BIRDHI CHAND SARADA Vs. STATE OF MAHARASTRA reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116.

28. So far as offence punishable under section 506(1) of the IPC, which according to the trial court is proved against the appellant. Section 506 of the IPC prescribes the punishment for offence of criminal intimidation and section 503 of the IPC defines the offence criminal intimidation. Section 503 of the IPC reads as under:

"503. Criminal intimidation:- Whoever

threatens another with any injury to his person,

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reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of laws avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal Intimidation."

Explanation.- A threat to injure the reputation

of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section.

Illustration A, for the purpose of inducing B to desist from prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn B's house. A is guilty of criminal intimidation."

29. From a perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is clear that in order to satisfy the ingredients of offence of criminal intimidation, there has to be a threat of injury to a person, reputation or property of the complainant by the accused, which should be with the intention to cause alarm to that person or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit as to do, so as to avoid the execution of such threat. In case of Manik Taneja and Another vs. State of Karnataka and Anr., reported in (2015) 7 SCC 423, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had an occasion to examine the ingredients of sections 503 and 506 IPC. The Hon'ble Supreme Court after noticing the provisions

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contained in section 503 IPC, which define offence of criminal intimidation, has observed as under:

"11. XXXXXXXXXXXX A reading of the

definition of "criminal intimidation" would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do."

30. From the foregoing enunciation of law, it is clear that in order to constitute offence of criminal intimidation, there must be threat with an intention to cause alarm to the deceased or to do any act which he is not legally bound to do.

Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm to the deceased or to make him to do or omit to do any act, would not be sufficient to bring the act within the definition of criminal intimidation.

31. In the light of the above proposition of law, it is just and necessary to delve upon the evidence of prosecution witness, whether the prosecution proved the ingredient of Section 506 of IPC or not. In this case, the first incident took

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place on 18.09.2011 at 7:00 p m., in front of shop of accused No.1. All the witnesses have stated that, there was quarrel between the deceased Thammanna Gowda and accused No.1.

None of the witness has stated that, accused No.1 voluntarily caused hurt to deceased. Though, PW.3 and PW.4 have stated that, they have seen the incident, but in the cross examination they admits that they have not seen the incident.

32. It shows that neither an eye witness to the incident nor family members of the deceased have stated that, they have seen accused Nos.1 and 2 assaulting the deceased with their hands on 18.09.2011 at 7:00.pm. in front of shop of accused No.1. So also, there is contradictory evidence as to eye witness, in respect of the incident occurred on 20.09.2011.

As per the evidence of PW.4, he was eye witness to the incident dated 20.09.2011. However, PW.8 has falsified the oral testimonies of PWs.4, 7 and 9 and admitted that at the time of incident they were in garden land and performing their agriculture work and soon after information through mobile phone, they came to the house of deceased in a motorcycle.

Thus, there is an apparent contradictory statement in the oral testimonies of PWs.3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 and hence, their evidence

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cannot be believed so far as the incident occurred on 18.09.2011 and 20.09.2011.

33. In this case, the prosecution relying upon the evidence of hearsay witness and statement of deceased recorded by the Police Officer and Doctor. But, the Sessions Court rejected the dying declaration of deceased in respect of any incident and the evidence of hearsay witness, accordingly, acquitted accused Nos.1 and 2 for the offence punishable under Section 306 read with Section 34 of IPC.

34. As already stated, the trial Court has rendered acquittal judgment for the offence punishable under Section 306 read with Section 34 of IPC and thus, ended in acquittal of major offence punishable under Section 306 of IPC on the evidence of the prosecution. When the offence punishable under Section 306 read with Section 34 of IPC has ended in acquittal, naturally it would dilute the strength of the evidence of the prosecution, as regards the minor offences such as, Sections 323 and 506 of IPC. The motive factor and the intention as regards abatement of suicide and as regards Causing the death of deceased is the main part to be

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considered in the instant case. In this case, the abatement of suicide by the accused persons has not been proved by the prosecution. When the main offence punishable under Section 306 of IPC is not proved, convicting for offence punishable under Sections 323 and 506 of IPC is not required.

35. Thus, the evidence of PWs.1, 7 and 8 are unable to take the case of the prosecution to its desired end, since the evidence of these witnesses do not inspire any confidence to believe in it and the evidence of PW.3, which is independent of any corroborative evidence, is also totally insufficient to take the case of the prosecution any further. Consequently, the case of the prosecution suffers from lack of evidence to prove the alleged guilt against the accused.

36. As analyzed above, since the prosecution could not stand on its own legs and could not able to prove the charge leveled against the accused, whatever, the defences taken by the accused whether established or not, have no consequence.

37. In the instant case, it has been alleged by the complainant in the complaint as well as in his evidence during trial that his father was threatened by the appellants in front of

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their house. What kind of threat was extended to his father is not discernible from the material on record. It has not been alleged by the complainant that while extending the threat, the appellants wanted him to do or omit to do any act. More importantly, the Sessions Court, disbelieving the evidence of PWs.3, 4, 7 and 8 has acquitted the appellants of the offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC. When the Sessions Court disbelieve the evidence of aforesaid witness for major offence, how can it considered similar evidence for minor offence, that too, in the nature of hearsay evidence, as the Sessions Court disbelieve the dying declaration given by the deceased.

38. In the instant case, as already discussed, the material on record coupled with the allegations made in the complaint do not make out offences punishable under sections 323 and 506 of the IPC, as the ingredients of the aforesaid offences are not proved. Thus, it was not open to the learned Sessions Judge to hold that the aforesaid offences are proved against the appellants.

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39. On considering the evidence, both oral and documentary, placed before it in its proper perspective, the learned Sessions Judge's Court has committed error in convicting accused Nos.1 and 2 for the offences punishable under Sections 323 and 506 of the IPC.

40. None of the witnesses have stated that accused persons have assaulted the deceased on 18.09.2011 and made criminal intimidation on 20.09.2011. Hence, in the absence of such material particulars, the conviction imposed by the Sessions Court, in an uncorroborated testimony, requires to be interfering with. Hence, the appeal deserves to be allowed.

Hence, the Court proceeds to pass the following order:

ORDER

1. The Criminal Appeal is allowed.

2. The judgment of conviction and order on

sentence dated 11.06.2013, passed by the

learned Principal Sessions Judge, Chikmagalur

in SC No.92/2012 convicting accused Nos.1

and 2 for the offences punishable under

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Sections 323 and 506 read with 34 of IPC is

set aside.

3. Accused Nos.1 and 2 are acquitted of the

offences punishable under Sections 323 and

506 read with Section 34 of IPC.

4. The bail bond of accused and their surety

stands cancelled.

5. The fine amount deposited by accused Nos.1

and 2 shall be returned to them.

Registry to transmit a copy of this judgment along with Sessions Court records to the concerned Sessions Court immediately.

Sd/-

(VENKATESH NAIK T)

JUDGE

PHM List No.: 1 Sl No.: 2