Rajesh Kumar @ Raju vs Yudhvir Singh & Anr
- SCC(2008) 7 SCC 305
- Neutral2008 INSC 655
- AIRAIR 2008 SC 2396
- SCR[2008] 8 SCR 532
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
Where a claim is filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act (requiring proof of fault) rather than under Section 163A (no-fault liability), the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 are not incorporated by reference and do not apply to the assessment of disability or compensation, notwithstanding that Section 163A's Explanation defines permanent disability by reference to that Act. A contention that the Workmen's Compensation Act applies to a Section 166 claim cannot be raised for the first time in appeal before the Supreme Court if it was not raised before the Tribunal or the High Court, and the lower courts accordingly proceeded on the materials actually brought on record by the parties. Where a disability certificate is issued years after the accident by a medical officer who did not treat the claimant, who is not examined as a witness, and whose qualifications and the methodology used to calculate the disability percentage are not established on the record, the certificate does not receive conclusive weight and the courts below are entitled to assess the credible disability on the evidence actually adduced.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
Yudhvir Singh & Anr. ... Respondents
JUDGMENT
S.B. Sinha, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Claimant before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is the
appellant before us. On 11.8.2001, he was driving a two wheeler vehicle
being a scooter. It was hit by a bus bearing Registration No.DL-1P-A-
0746. He was a motor mechanic.
In July 2003, he filed a claim in terms of Section 166 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, `the Act') claiming a sum of 2
Rs.10,00,000/- along with interest at the rate of 18% per annum.
Allegedly, he suffered 60% total disability. His claim was based on the
premise that he was earning a sum of Rs.4,500/- per month.
3. Before the Tribunal, the appellant relied upon a certificate
purported to have been issued by the Civil Surgeon, Faridabad on
11.11.2003 stating that he had suffered 60% disability. The learned
Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs.1,68,941
by way of compensation opining that his income was Rs.3,000/- per
month and he was entitled to compensation upon taking 30% of his
income at the rate of Rs.900/- per month being a total sum of Rs.20,000
besides the amount of compensation towards pain and sufferings and a
sum of Rs.5,000/- as general damages including conveyance, special diet
etc. An interest at the rate of 7% per annum was also awarded.
4. He preferred an appeal thereagainst. The High Court awarded a
further sum of Rs.84,800/-, opining :
"Minimum wages notified on 1.1.1980 for skilled workers was Rs.320/- per month. It rose to Rs.1043/- as on 1.1.1990. It rose to Rs.3,016/- as on 1.1.2001. The trend shows that minimum wages double every 10 years.
Considering the age of the deceased being 34 years, it would be safe to assume that by the time he would turn 60, his income would have doubled. I accordingly treat the average monthly income of the deceased at Rs.4,500/-.
3 Aplying the disability certificate, Ex.PW 2/2, being 30% disability, loss on account of disability comes to Rs.1350/- per month. Since multiplier adopted by the tribunal is 12 and the Respondents have raised no objection thereto, loss of future income comes to Rs. 1350/- x 12 x 12 = 1,94,400/-."
It was further observed :
"Damages on account of compensation for loss of amenities of life, hardship and discomfort including frustration and stress under general damages awarded in sum of Rs.5,000/- is inadequate. I increase the same to Rs.25,000/-. "
5. Mr. Gaurav Goel, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant, would submit that having regard to the provisions contained in
Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, for the purpose of awarding
compensation on disability, the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, 1923 would be attracted. According to him, in view
of the fact that there is no dispute in regard to the genuineness of the said
disability certificate, the High Court committed a serious error in
assessing the total disability at 30% only. It was pointed out that the
appellant was an indoor patient in the Lady Harding Hospital for a
month. The injury suffered by him was considered to be a grievous one
and allegedly one-third of his lower limb had been amputated. In view of 4
the fact that no evidence, contrary thereto, has been produced by the
respondents, it was urged that the learned Tribunal as also the High
Court committed a serious illegality in arriving at the aforementioned
finding.
6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-insurance
company, however, supported the impugned judgment.
7. The claim petition was filed under Section 166 of the Act and not
under Section 163A thereof. It was contended by the claimant-appellant
that the driver of the bus in question was rash and negligent as a result
whereof, the accident took place. By reason of Section 167 of the Act,
an injured person had the option either to file a claim under the Motor
Vehicles Act or the Workmen's Compensation Act, if both the Acts
apply. It is, therefore, a case where the claimant could have filed at his
option an application under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Section 163A provides for filing of a claim petition where an
accident took place by reason of use of the motor vehicle. It is not
necessary to prove any fault on the part of the driver or the vehicle. The
Tribunal in a proceeding arising under Section 166 of the Act is required
to hold a full fledged trial. It is required to collect datas on the basis
whereof, the amount of compensation can be determined. Under Section
163A of the Act, however, the question of liability and extent of proof 5
thereof are not justiciable. The Tribunal can determine the amount on
the basis of the basic datas provided therefor.
Explanation appended to Section 163A of the Act, reads, thus :
Explanation.--For the purposes of this sub- section, `permanent disability' shall have the same meaning and extent as in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923."
8. The reference to Workmen's Compensation Act by incorporation
was only for the purpose of sub-section (1) of Section 163A. It was not
meant to apply in a case falling under Section 166 of the Act. Had the
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act were applicable, the
procedure laid down therein would also apply. For the purpose of the
definition of total disablement as also person who can grant a certificate
therefor, namely, a qualified medical practitioner, Section 2(e) and 2(i)
would be attracted. In terms of the 1923 Act, the amount of
compensation is required to be determined as specified in Section 4. The
Rules made in terms of Section 32 of the Act known as Workmen's
Compensation Rules 1924, would also be applicable.
9. The certificate in question in this case was obtained after two
years. It is not known as to whether the Civil Surgeon of the hospital
treated the appellant. On what basis, such a certificate was issued two
years after the accident took place is not known. The author of the said 6
certificate had not been examined. Unless the author of the certificate
examined himself, it was not admissible in evidence. Whether the
disability at 60% was calculated on the basis of the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act or otherwise is not known. It is also not
known as to whether he was competent to issue such a certificate. It
even does not appear that the contentions raised before us had either
been raised before the Tribunal or the High Court. The Tribunal as also
the High Court, therefore, proceeded on the materials brought on record
by the parties. In absence of any contention having been raised in regard
to the applicability of the Workmen's Compensation Act which, in our
opinion, ex facie has no application, the same, in our opinion, cannot be
permitted to be raised for the first time.
10. We are of the opinion, that it is not a case where we should
interfere in the impugned judgment of the High Court as also the award
of the Tribunal. The appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
.............................J. [S.B. Sinha]
.............................J. [Lokeshwar Singh Panta]
New Delhi May 13, 2008
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