Rajendra Singh And Ors. Etc vs State Of Uttarakhand

2025 INSC 1193 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs. 476-477 OF 2013

RAJENDRA SINGH AND ORS. …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF UTTARANCHAL ETC. …RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

PANKAJ MITHAL, J.

1. All the three appellants, father, son and son-in-law are

accused in Session Trial No.215 of 2000 for the murder of

Pushpendra Singh, son of Diler Singh.

2. They were acquitted by the Trial Court but have been

convicted under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code (for short,

‘IPC’) with life imprisonment and a fine of Rs.10,000/- each

Signature Not Verified by the High Court vide the judgment and order dated Digitally signed by

02.01.2013 passed in Government Appeal No.347 of 2007 geeta ahuja Date: 2025.10.07 17:36:23 IST Reason:

(State of Uttaranchal vs. Rajendra Singh and Ors.).

1 3. All the three accused have challenged the aforesaid

judgment and order of their conviction and sentence by

means of this appeal.

4. The prosecution story in brief is that on the morning of

03.06.2000, the appellant no.1 – Rajendra Singh and his

son appellant no.2 – Bhupender Singh started digging the

field of Diler Singh, the father of the deceased, for laying

down plinth. Due to the aforesaid action of the appellants,

an altercation took place between them and Diler Singh.

5. On the same day at about 1.30 p.m. when the deceased –

Pushpendra Singh was sitting at the Jogither diversion

(Tiraha), his father – Diler Singh who had gone to the flour

mill of Kakka Singh, while returning accompanied by his

brother-in-law - Papender Singh, saw the appellants coming

on the motorcycle driven by the appellant no.3 – Ranjeet

Singh at the said spot. They parked their vehicle and

exhorted the deceased who started running followed by all

the three accused persons armed with swords and carrying

a kanta (a sharp edged weapon).

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6. The deceased ran for some time towards the northern fields

raising an alarm. Witnessing the same, Diler Singh,

Papender Singh and some other persons including Jwala

Singh started running behind the accused persons to save

the deceased. The deceased, attempting to save his life,

entered into the house of one Mukhtyar Singh. The

appellants also entered the said premises and inflicted

blows with swords and Kanta upon the deceased who

ultimately died on the spot. The father of the deceased Diler

Singh (PW-1) on the same day lodged an FIR at 02.50 p.m.

at Police Station, Nanak Matta under Section 302 of IPC

(Section 103(1) BNS). The panchnama was prepared,

statement of the witnesses were recorded, site plan was also

prepared and the dead body was sent for post-mortem,

which was conducted the next day.

7. The appellant nos.1 and 3 were arrested on 05.06.2000 and

one sword and the Kanta, the alleged weapons of crime,

were recovered as per the disclosure made by the

appellants.

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8. The appellant no.2 was arrested on 07.06.2000 and the

sword used by him in the commission of the offence was

recovered based on his disclosure.

9. Upon completion of investigation, the police submitted the

chargesheet on 14.06.2000 charging all the three accused

for an offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the

IPC.

10. We had heard Shri Rajul Bhargava, senior advocate and

Shri Siddharth Agarwal, senior advocate along with Shri

Vivek Singh, advocate-on-record from the side of the

appellants and Shri Kuldeep Parihar, D.A.G and Ms.

Anubha Dhulia, advocate for the State of Uttarakhand.

11. The primary submission on behalf of the appellants is that

they have been falsely implicated. There is no reliable

evidence to establish the identity of the appellants as the

alleged assailants. There is no eyewitness to the incident,

except the lady of the house into which the deceased had

entered to save his life. There are large contradictions in the

statements of the witnesses and that the discovery of the

4 weapons of crime is false and otherwise also has no

relevance to establish the identity of the accused with that

of the assailants.

12. The State counsel has stoutly opposed the submissions

advanced from the side of the appellants and has submitted

that all the three accused were seen by the witnesses

chasing the deceased, who had entered the house of

Mukhtyar Singh, and assaulted him with the swords and

the kanta which fact was witnessed by the lady of the

house, Amarjeet Kaur (PW-7). The clothes of PW-7 which

had blood stains were sealed by the police and the FSL

report confirmed the presence of blood on the clothes. On

the disclosure of the appellants, the weapons of crime were

recovered, and they admitted to having committed the crime

with the same. The above evidence leaves no scope for

doubt about the commission of the offence at the hands of

the appellants. Therefore, the High Court rightly reversed

the decision of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court, so as

5 to convict the appellants for the offence under Section 302

of IPC and sentenced them to life imprisonment.

13. There is no dispute to the fact that on the morning of the

fateful day, appellant nos.1 and 2 had a quarrel with the

father of the deceased – Diler Singh, as they were stopped

from digging the field for laying the plinth. The aforesaid

altercation between the two groups may be a motive to

attack and kill the son of Diler Singh, but that by itself

would not be sufficient to rope in the appellants unless their

involvement in the offence is established by cogent evidence.

Therefore, the primary issue which arises for our

consideration is, whether the appellants are the real

persons who chased the deceased and killed him. This has

to be ascertained on the basis of the ocular evidence.

14. In this connection, the primary evidence is of the lady of the

house Amarjeet Kaur (PW-7). The said witness, who is the

wife of Mukhtyar Singh, the owner of the house, clearly

deposed that the three accused persons killed the boy in

the house. They entered carrying swords and other weapons

6 in their hands. She tried to refrain them from assaulting

the boy, and in that process, her kurta received blood

stains. The victim fell down on the dewan after sustaining

injuries. Nobody inflicted any injury after the victim fell on

the dewan. The victim’s father and other people came there

within half an hour of the departure of the assailants. The

police took her blood-stained kurta and even the bedsheet

in their possession, which she identified as Exhibit-1 and

Exhibit-2. She categorically stated that she did not know

the name of the accused persons.

15. The aforesaid testimony of PW-7 clearly reflects that she had

seen three unknown persons, assaulting the deceased with

weapons like swords and that the deceased fell down on the

dewan, whereafter the assailants left without inflicting

further injuries upon him. The father of the deceased and

other persons came there only after about half an hour. A

careful reading of the testimony of PW-7, as a whole, would

indicate that she did not know the names of the accused

persons and thus, could not disclose their identity. She had

7 only seen three persons attacking and assaulting the boy

but could not identify those persons.

16. No identification parade was carried out and PW-7 was not

even asked to confirm whether the appellants were the

accused persons. The police failed to get the appellants

identified by her. Therefore, it is doubtful whether the

persons who assaulted the deceased were actually the

appellants.

17. The prosecution sought to establish the identity of the

accused persons with the help of testimony of Diler Singh

(PW-1) and Jwala Singh (PW-2).

18. A close look at the testimony of PW-1 would reveal that on

03.06.2000 at about 1.30 p.m., on returning from the flour

mill of Kakka Singh, he saw his deceased son sitting at

Jogither diversion on a bench, when all the three appellants

came on motorcycle carrying naked swords. They parked

the motorcycle and threatened/provoked his son,

whereupon his son started running towards the fields. The

appellants chased him with swords and kanta. His son kept

8 crying “Save Me, Save Me”. Thereupon, on hearing the

scream, he and his brother-in-law - Papender Singh, ran

after the accused persons to save the deceased. They were

followed by Jwala Singh, Bachan Singh and Bhagat Singh.

The deceased entered the house of Mukhtyar Singh to save

himself. The appellants also went inside. He saw the

appellants striking his son with weapons. His son fell on the

dewan and died due to the injuries. The appellants,

thereafter, fled from the scene.

19. In his cross-examination, he admitted that the Jogither

diversion is about 1.5 kms. away from his house and that

there are three to four shops at the diversion itself. The

house of Mukhtyar Singh is also at a distance of 1.25 kms.

At the time of the incident, people were working in the fields

and they also saw the appellants chasing his son. He also

stated that he chased the appellants for about 10-15

minutes towards the house of Mukhtyar Singh and was

about 40 to 50 steps behind them when his son entered the

house of Mukhtyar Singh. The appellants attacked his son

9 with swords and Kanta even after he fell down on the

dewan. They kept hitting him, mainly on the head, for

about a minute. Amarjeet Kaur (PW-7) had tried to save his

son and, in the process, her clothes got blood stains.

Thereafter, he hugged his son due to which his clothes also

got blood stains. He went to the police station in those very

clothes, but the clothes were neither taken nor seized by the

police.

20. If the testimony of PW-1 is seen in the light of the testimony

of PW-7, there are striking contradictions in the statements

of the two witnesses. The testimony of PW-7 is quite

trustworthy and natural. She is an independent witness

and therefore, it is safer to rely upon her statement. She has

categorically stated that the father of the deceased and

other persons had arrived at her house about half an hour

after the incident or after the accused had left the place.

The testimony of PW-7 is apparently quite trustworthy as

there is no reason to disbelieve it. It is clear from her

statement that PW-1 had reached the place of incident after

10 half an hour of the incident. He is, therefore, not actually an

eyewitness who was present at the time when the

appellants allegedly attacked the deceased. He had come

there after about half an hour and as such cannot be an

eyewitness to the incident of attack. Secondly, PW-1

categorically stated that when his son fell down on the

dewan, he hugged him and, in the process, his clothes were

stained with blood. He never offered his blood-stained

clothes to the police for investigation, nor did the police

seized the same, despite the fact that he had gone to the

police station wearing them. Rather, he stated that he

washed them and wore them again. This is quite unnatural

and an indicator to the fact that the PW-1 was not actually

present when the incident of assault took place in the

house of Mukhtyar Singh, and that the story of hugging the

deceased is concocted.

21. It is also very unnatural for PW-1 to go to the Jogither

diversion while returning from the flour mill of Kakka Singh

as admittedly the said diversion is not on the way back to

11 his home. He is, therefore, a chance witness and probably

may not have seen the appellants coming on the bike or

even chasing the deceased. In these circumstances, PW-1

cannot be treated as a trustworthy witness and his evidence

cannot be relied upon to identify the appellants as the

persons who have attacked and assaulted the deceased.

22. PW-2 - Jwala Singh also appears to be a chance witness. He

was going to Jogither Diversion to purchase a soap but

when he found the PW-1 chasing the appellants, he also ran

behind him in order to help him and save the life of the

deceased. He categorically stated that he was 60-70 steps

behind PW-1. Naturally, his entry in the house of Mukhtyar

Singh would have been only after PW-1, who had entered

the house as per the ocular evidence of PW-7, about half an

hour after the incident. In the above situation, PW-1 could

not have been an actual eyewitness of the incident of

assault or the person who would have seen the appellants

well enough to recognize them as the real assailants.

12 Therefore, his evidence also could not have established the

identity of the appellants.

23. Furthermore, no independent person of the area, the

shopkeepers or the labourers working in the fields, who

allegedly saw the appellants chasing the deceased, were

called upon to enter the witness box to corroborate the

evidence of PW-1 and PW-2.

24. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the ocular

evidence of PW-7, PW-1 and PW-2, if read together, is not

sufficient to identify the appellants as the persons who

attacked and assaulted the deceased resulting in his death.

It may be pertinent to mention here that even PW-4 - Kakka

Singh, to whose flour mill PW-1 had allegedly gone and was

said to be returning from there also did not support the

statement of PW-1. He has nowhere stated that PW-1 had

been to his flour mill, as alleged by him. Therefore, the

presence of PW-1 at the scene of crime becomes doubtful.

Once his presence is doubtful, the presence of PW-2 also

13 stands belied, because he categorically stated that he was

following PW-1 and was 60-70 steps behind him.

25. The prosecution did not ask any of these witnesses to

identify the accused persons.

26. This Court, in several decisions, while considering the

evidentiary value of a chance witness, has held that the

deposition of a chance witness whose presence at the place

of incident is doubtful should be discarded, or at least be

treated with great caution and close scrutiny. Such a

chance witness must adequately explain his presence at the

place of incident, which has not been satisfactorily done in

the instant case.

27. Now, what remains before us is the recovery of the weapons

of crime to establish the identity of the appellants as the

persons involved in the crime. On the basis of the recovery

of the said weapons, we have to determine if the said

recoveries are good enough to connect the appellants with

the crime.

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28. Undoubtedly, the recovery of one of the swords was made

from a garage, and the recovery of another sword and the

Kanta was made from bushes in sugarcane field, which was

an open space. The weapons were no doubt recovered

allegedly on the pointing out of the appellants. However, no

effort was made to match the blood on the said weapons

with that of the deceased. The weapons were sent for

forensic examination but no report of the forensic

laboratory was produced to establish that the weapons so

recovered were smeared with the blood of the deceased to

prove that they were actually used in the murder of the

deceased.

29. We are afraid that the submission of the State counsel, that

as the appellants themselves stated that they took the police

to the place where they hid the weapons, by which they

committed the offence indicates that the appellants

admitted to have committed the offence with the above

weapons, cannot be accepted. The statement of the

appellants that the weapons recovered were the weapons of

15 crime cannot be read against them in view of Sections 25

and 26 read with Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act,

1872. Only that part of the statement which leads the police

to the recovery of the weapons is admissible, and not the

part which alleges that the weapons recovered were actually

the weapons of crime.

30. The above three provisions of the Evidence Act are

beneficial to bring home the point. They read as under:

“25. Confession to police officer not to be proved.––No confession made to a police officer, shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence.

26. Confession by accused while in custody of police not to be proved against him.––No confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person.

Explanation.––In this section “Magistrate” does not include the head of a village discharging magisterial functions in the Presidency of Fort St. George or elsewhere, unless such headman is a Magistrate exercising the powers of a Magistrate under

16 the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882 (10 of 1882)

27. How much of information received from accused may be proved.––Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.”

31. A simple reading of all the three provisions conjointly

reveals that the first two provisions are substantive,

whereas Section 27 is in the nature of an exception.

Sections 25 and 26, at one hand, provide that no confession

made to a police officer or to any person while in custody of

the police, shall be admissible against a person accused of

any offence, on the other hand, Section 27 provides an

exception to the above provisions. It states that so much of

the information, received from an accused person in

custody of the police, whether in the nature of confession or

otherwise, as related distinctly to the fact thereby

discovered, may be admissible. This means that not all

17 information disclosed by a person in police custody is

required to be proved as against the accused person; only

that part which distinctly relates to the discovery of a fact is

admissible and can be proved.

32. In Pulukuri Kottaya and Ors. vs. The King Emperor 1,

the Privy Council while analysing the aforesaid three

provisions of the Evidence Act, held that the fact of

discovery, on information supplied by the accused is a

relevant fact except in a case in which the possession or

concealment of an object constitute the gist of the offence

charged. Information supplied by a person in custody such

as “I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house”,

only leads to the discovery of the knife concealed in the

house of the informant, but whether the knife is proved to

have been used in the commission of an offence is another

question. So if the above information is followed by the

words, “with which I stabbed A”, those words would be

inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the

knife from the house of the informant, but are rather 1 1947 MWN CR 45

18 independent in nature, amounting to confession of the

crime which cannot be used against the person making it

i.e. the accused, in view of prohibition contained under

Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act.

33. The aforesaid decision has recently been followed with

approval by the Division Bench of this Court in Manjunath

and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka 2 wherein it has been

said that only “so much of the information” as relates

distinctly to the fact thereby discovered is admissible, and

the rest of the information stands excluded. In other words,

the information leading to the recovery of the weapons of

crime is admissible, but not the information that the crime

was actually committed by the said weapons.

34. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the

identity of the appellants as the persons involved in the

offence has not been established either by any ocular

evidence or from the recovery of the weapons of crime.

2 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1421

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35. It is important to note that the order of acquittal passed by

the Trial Court was not open to interference by the First

Appellate Court until and unless the findings recorded by

the Trial Court were per se perverse or erroneous. It is safer

and more appropriate to rely upon the findings of the Trial

Court which has seen the demeanor of the witnesses rather

than to rely upon the findings of the First Appellate Court.

In our opinion, the High Court erred in reversing the finding

of the Trial Court without coming to the conclusion that the

findings of the Trial Court were perverse.

36. Thus, in the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case,

we are of the view that High Court manifestly erred in

interfering with the findings of acquittal recorded by the

Trial Court and reversing the judgment so as to convict the

appellants. It is doubtful whether the offence has been

committed by the appellants. The conviction of the

appellants is accordingly set aside. The appeals are allowed,

and the appellants are acquitted of the alleged offence by

granting them the benefit of doubt.

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37. The appellants are on bail. Their bail bonds stand

discharged.

.............……………………………….. J.

(PANKAJ MITHAL)

.............……………………………….. J.

(PRASANNA B. VARALE) NEW DELHI;

OCTOBER 7, 2025.

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