Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation vs Bharat Singh Jhala (Dead) Son of Shri Nathu Singh, through Legal Heirs & Anr.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6942 of 2022

Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation … Appellant

Versus

Bharat Singh Jhala (Dead) Son of Shri Nathu Singh, through Legal Heirs & Anr. … Respondents

JUDGMENT

M. R. Shah, J.

1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned

judgment and order dated 12.08.2021 passed by the Division

Bench of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur

passed in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No.645 of 2020 by

which the Division Bench of the High Court has dismissed the Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by SNEHA Date: 2022.09.30 said appeal challenging the order passed by the learned Single 16:26:24 IST Reason:

Judge dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant 2

confirming the order passed by the Labour Court setting aside

the order of termination passed against the workman, the

Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation has preferred the

present appeal.

2. The facts leading to the present appeal in a nutshell are

as under:

2.1 The workman was serving on the post of Conductor. A

departmental enquiry was initiated against him alleging not

issuing the tickets to 10 passengers though he collected the

amount of tickets. In the department inquiry he was found

guilty for the misconduct alleged. The employer – Rajasthan

State Road Transport Corporation terminated his services vide

Order dated 31.07.2001.

2.2 An application for approval of punishment order under

Section 33(2)(b) of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (hereafter

referred to as “the I.D. Act”) was submitted before the

Industrial Tribunal on 31.07.2001. The Industrial Tribunal 3

held the enquiry bad. However, the Industrial Tribunal vide

Order dated 12.12.2012 allowed the appellant – Corporation to

prove the charges before the Tribunal. Both the parties led the

evidence before the Tribunal on the charges alleged. The

appellants led, both, oral as well as documentary evidences.

That on appreciation of entire evidence on record and

considering the submissions made on behalf of both the

parties, the Industrial Tribunal vide order dated 21.07.2015

allowed the application under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act

and granted the approval of the order of termination. That

thereafter and after a period of approximately 19 years from

the date of passing the order of termination, the workman

again raised the Industrial Dispute challenging the order of

termination of 2001. By Judgment and Award dated

19.11.2019 the Labour Court, Jaipur allowed the said

reference and set aside the order of termination. As in the

meantime the workman died and the dispute was raised after

a period of 19 years, the Labour Court passed an order

awarding 50% back wages from the date of termination till his 4

death i.e. 10.12.2018. The Judgment and Award passed by

the Labour Court was challenged before the learned Single

Judge of the High Court. The learned Single Judge dismissed

the writ petition. Against the award passed by the learned

Single Judge dismissing the writ petition the appellant

preferred the appeal before the Division Bench. By impugned

judgment and order the High Court has dismissed the said

appeal which has given rise to the present appeal.

3. Learned Counsel for the appellant has vehemently

submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case the

Hon’ble High Court has committed a serious error in

dismissing the writ appeal/writ petition confirming the

judgment and order passed by the learned Labour Court.

3.1 It is submitted that once in an application under Section

33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act and pursuant to the earlier order

passed by the Industrial Tribunal, the appellant was permitted

to lead the evidence and prove the charge/misconduct and

thereafter when the order of termination was approved by the 5

Industrial Tribunal, thereafter it was not open for the

workman to again raise the Industrial Dispute that too after a

period of 19 years. It is submitted that the Hon’ble High Court

has materially erred in confirming the judgment and award

passed by the learned Labour Court quashing and setting

aside the order of termination which as such was approved by

the Industrial Tribunal by order dated 21.07.2015.

3.2 Making above submissions, it is prayed to allow the

present appeal.

4. Present appeal is vehemently opposed by Shri H.D.

Thanvi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

respondents.

4.1 Relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of

John D’Souza vs. Karnataka State Road Transport

Corporation, (2019) 14 Scale 57, it is vehemently submitted

that as observed and held by this Hon’ble Court the

proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) and Section 10 of the I.D. 6

Act are distinct and different. It is submitted that as observed

and held by this Hon’ble Court in the aforesaid decision the

proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act are

summary in nature and findings recorded while deciding the

application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act shall not affect

the substantive right in a reference under Section 10 of the

I.D. Act.

4.2 It is submitted that therefore, the Labour Court did not

commit any error in considering the validity of the order of

termination and thereafter quashing and setting aside the

same and ordering 50% back wages.

4.3 It is submitted that considering the fact that the

workman has died and his heir ­ widow is awarded 50% back

wages only, the same may not be interfered by this Court in

exercise of powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of

India.

7

5. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective

parties at length.

5.1. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the workman

was subjected to departmental enquiry and the charge against

the deceased workman was not issuing the tickets to 10

passengers though he collected the fare. On conclusion of the

departmental enquiry his services were terminated. The

termination was the subject matter of the approval application

before the Industrial Tribunal in an application under Section

33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act. In the said proceedings the

management was permitted to lead the evidence and prove the

charge/misconduct before the Tribunal. In the said

application the parties led the evidence, both, oral as well as

documentary. Thereafter on appreciation of evidence on

record, the Industrial Tribunal by order dated 21.07.2015

approved the order of termination. That thereafter the

workman raised the Industrial Dispute challenging the order

of termination which as such was proved by the Industrial 8

Tribunal by order dated 21.07.2015. Therefore, once the order

of termination was approved by the Industrial Tribunal and

the management was permitted to lead the evidence and prove

the misconduct before the Court and thereafter on

appreciation of evidence the order of termination was

approved, thereafter the fresh reference under Section 10 of

the I.D. Act challenging the order of termination was not

permissible. It is required to be noted that the order dated

21.07.2015 passed by the Industrial Tribunal which as such is

a higher forum than the Labour Court had attained the

finality. Though the aforesaid fact was pointed out before the

High Court, the High Court has not at all considered and/or

appreciated the same and has confirmed the judgment and

award passed by the Labour Court for setting aside the order

of termination which as such was approved by the Industrial

Tribunal.

5.2 Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of

this Court in the case of John D’Souza (supra) by the learned 9

counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent is concerned,

on facts the said decision shall not be applicable to the facts of

the case on hand. In the present case by specific order the

Industrial Tribunal permitted the management to lead the

evidence and prove the misconduct before the Court which as

such was permissible. That thereafter the Industrial Tribunal

approved the order of termination. Once the order of

termination was approved by the Industrial Tribunal on

appreciation of evidence led before it, thereafter the findings

recorded by the Industrial Tribunal were binding between the

parties. No contrary view could have been taken by the

Labour Court contrary to the findings recorded by the

Industrial Tribunal.

6. In view of the above, the judgment and award passed by

the Labour Court confirmed by the High Court is

unsustainable. The High Court has committed a very serious

error in dismissing the writ petition/writ appeal confirming the 10

judgment and award passed by the Labour Court setting aside

the order of termination.

7. In view of the above and for the reason stated above the

present appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and order

passed by the High Court confirming the judgment and award

passed by the Labour Court setting aside the order of

termination and the judgment and award passed by the

Labour Court setting aside the order of termination are hereby

quashed and set aside.

The Present Appeal is Allowed to the aforesaid extent.

However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there

shall be no order as to costs.

…………………………………J. (M. R. SHAH)

…………………………………J. New Delhi, (KRISHNA MURARI) September 30, 2022.