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Raja Dharampal Singh vs Director, Small Industries Services Institute and Others

Supreme Court26 February 1980E.S. Venkataramiah · P.N. Bhagwati

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

Where officials of an organization and the Secretary to the Government in overall charge of that organization are impleaded as parties to an eviction application, they sufficiently represent the interest of the Union of India even if the Union is not formally named as a party, and the failure to implead the Union as a separate party does not vitiate the eviction order on technical grounds. The High Court ought not to set aside an eviction order by invoking technical defects in party representation when the substantive interests of the State have been adequately represented and the matter has been fairly adjudicated on its merits, as such interference by extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 defeats rather than advances the cause of justice.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

ORDER

1. The only ground on which the order for eviction passed by the Prescribed Authority and confirmed by the Second Additional Distt. Judge, Agra, has been set aside by the High Court is that the Union of India was not impleaded as a party in the application for eviction made by the appellant before the Prescribed Authority. This is a hyper-technical plea taken by the respondents which does not deserve any consideration, since the Director, Small Industries Services Institute, Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Industrial Development and the Deputy Director/ Office-in-charge of the Small Industries Services Institute were all joined as parties in the application for eviction and an order for eviction was sought against them. It is common ground between the parties that the premises were occupied by the Small Industries Services Institute and the Director and the Deputy Director, who were in charge of the affairs of the Institute sufficiently represented the interest of the Union of India and so also did the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Industrial Development, who was the Secretary in overall charge of the Institute. The High Court was, in our opinion, clearly wrong in setting aside the order of eviction passed in favour of the appellant on the sole ground that the Union of India was not represented in the application for eviction. It is interesting to note that the writ petition which was filed in the High Court challenging the order of eviction was preferred not by the Union of India but by the same three respondents, namely, the Director and the Deputy Director of the Institute and the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Industrial Development. If the contention of the respondents is right, the order of the High Court would also be bad. But we do not think that the contention of the respondents is well founded. The three respondents to the application for eviction, in our opinion, sufficiently represented the Union of India and. therefore, there was no justification for the High Court to set aside the order of eviction. It is a little regrettable that the High Court should have interfered with a fair and just order by relying on a hyper-technicality while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. which is a jurisdiction calculated to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it.

2. We, accordingly, allow the appeal, set aside the order passed by the High Court and restore the order of eviction passed in favour of the appellant.

3. The respondents will pay the costs of the appellant.

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