Rahul Gupta vs Station House Officer

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 13755 of 2025

Rahul Gupta … Petitioner

versus

Station House Officer and others … Respondents

JUDGMENT

SANJAY KUMAR, J

1. Matrimonial relations having soured between the couple, the fallout

was litigation and exchange of acrimonious allegations. FIR No. 03 of

2023 was registered on 07.01.2023 by the Mahila Thana, Ambikapur, on

the complaint made by the wife, Radhika Gupta, respondent No. 7,

against the husband, Rahul Gupta, the petitioner, and his family members

for offences punishable under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code,

1860 1, and Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 19612. The petitioner’s Signature Not Verified

grievance is that a FIR was not registered on his complaint dated Digitally signed by babita pandey Date: 2026.04.16 17:23:42 IST Reason:

1 For short, ‘IPC’ 2 For short, ‘the DP Act’

1 25.12.2023, wherein he had alleged that the complaint and statements

made by his wife and her family members amounted to acceptance of their

giving dowry and that Section 3 of the DP Act criminalized both the ‘giving’

and the ‘taking’ of dowry, requiring registration of an FIR against them.

2. The petitioner’s endeavour to get an FIR registered failed before the

learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur, and then, in revision,

before the learned IV Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur. Thereupon, he

approached the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur, by way of Criminal

Miscellaneous Petition No. 2754 of 2024, under Section 528 of the

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 3. However, this attempt also

met with failure as the High Court dismissed his petition on 23.04.2025.

Aggrieved thereby, he filed the present petition.

3. Upon hearing the petitioner, who appears as a party-in-person; the

learned senior counsel appearing for the contesting respondents; and the

learned counsel for the State of Chhattisgarh, this Court, by order dated

22.01.2026, requested Mr. Dhananjaya Mishra, learned counsel, to assist

the Court as amicus curiae.

4. Facts relevant for the purposes of this order may now be set out.

The marriage between the couple was solemnised on 24.11.2007 at

Raipur, Chhattisgarh. They have three children, two daughters and a son,

3 For short, ‘the BNSS’

2 who are stated to be residing with the father at Raipur. The wife left the

matrimonial home on 25.12.2021 and returned to her parental home. She

sought a divorce while the husband sought restitution of conjugal rights.

5. FIR No. 03 of 2023 was registered on 07.01.2022 at the behest of

the wife against the petitioner and his family members. In her statement

recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19734,

the wife spoke of dowry being discussed at the time of her marriage and

the payment of dowry before the marriage itself. Similar statements were

made by her family members. After completion of the investigation in

relation to the said FIR, chargesheet dated 07.01.2023 was filed against

the petitioner and his parents for offences under Section 498A IPC and

Section 3 of the DP Act. Thereafter, the petitioner addressed written

complaint dated 25.12.2023 seeking registration of a separate FIR against

his wife and her family members. His allegation was that though dowry

was not taken by him and his family, the statements made by his wife and

her family members to the effect that they had given dowry constituted the

offence of ‘giving’ dowry under Section 3 of the DP Act. He also made

certain other allegations which are not relevant for our purposes presently.

6. As his complaint failed to evoke the expected response, the

petitioner filed an application under Section 156(3) CrPC before the

4 For short, ‘the CrPC’

3 learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur. This application was

dismissed by order dated 19.01.2024. Perusal of the order reflects that

the learned Magistrate was of the opinion that accepting the plea of the

petitioner would amount to directing reinvestigation in the FIR already

registered at the instance of the wife. Holding that he had no such power

to direct reinvestigation or de novo investigation, the learned Magistrate

rejected the plea of the petitioner. Thereupon, the petitioner applied for

review of the aforestated order dated 19.01.2024 passed by the learned

Magistrate under Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. This

application was rejected on 15.02.2024 by the learned Magistrate, holding

that there was no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,

enabling review of an order passed thereunder.

7. The petitioner then filed a revision under Section 397 CrPC before

the learned IV Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur, assailing the orders

dated 19.01.2024 and 15.02.2024. However, the revision was dismissed

by order dated 23.08.2024. Therein, the learned Sessions Judge upheld

the view of the learned Magistrate that there was no provision permitting

review of an order passed in a criminal case. On the rejection of the

petitioner’s application under Section 156(3) CrPC, the learned Sessions

Judge held that, based on the allegations made by the petitioner, it could

not be said that a cognizable offence was made out and the Magistrate

had, therefore, not committed any error in dismissing the said application. 4

8. Assailing this order, the petitioner approached the High Court by

way of the subject petition under Section 528 BNSS. However, by the

order dated 30.07.2025, the High Court dismissed the petition. Perusal of

the said order reflects that the High Court agreed with the petitioner that

he was not seeking further investigation in FIR No. 03 of 2023 and his

grievance was with regard to the failure to register a separate FIR based

on the statements made by his wife and her family members during the

course of investigation in FIR No. 03 of 2023. The High Court, however,

opined that the allegations made by the petitioner would necessarily entail

oblique reinvestigation in FIR No. 03 of 2023. The High Court held that a

Magistrate could not be reduced to a post office to direct registration of an

FIR. In the light of the concurrent orders passed by the learned Magistrate

and the learned Sessions Judge, the High Court concluded that there was

no scope to interfere. The petition was, accordingly, dismissed.

9. Perusal of the petitioner’s complaint dated 25.12.2023 and his

application under Section 156(3) CrPC manifests that the wife’s written

complaint and the statements made by the wife and her family members,

recorded under Section 161 CrPC, were the only material relied upon by

the petitioner to seek initiation of criminal proceedings against them for

the offence under Section 3 of the DP Act. He also relied upon the decision

of the Delhi High Court in Neera Singh vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

5 and others5, which held that action must also be taken against those who

give dowry. In effect, the only foundation laid by the petitioner for

registration of an FIR under Section 3 of the DP Act was the wife’s

complaint and the statements of the wife and her family members,

recorded under Section 161 CrPC. No independent evidence in proof of

the ‘giving’ of dowry was offered by the petitioner. Whether this was

sufficient to set the process of criminal law in motion is the question.

10. The DP Act was promulgated to address the evil of dowry system

prevalent in our country. The Statement of Objects and Reasons records

that this legislation aimed at prohibiting the evil practice of ‘giving and

taking’ of dowry. The DP Act came into force on 01.07.1961. Section 3

thereof is titled ‘Penalty for giving or taking dowry’. Section 3 of the DP

Act, as it originally stood, read as under: -

‘3. If any person, after the commencement of this Act, gives or takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both.’

11. Section 3(1), which was the original Section 3, with later

amendments, now states that if any person, after the commencement of

the DP Act, gives or takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shall

be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than

5 (2007) 138 DLT 152 = ILR (2007) 1 DEL 691

6 five years and with fine which shall not be less than ₹15,000/- or the

amount of the value of such dowry, whichever is more. The proviso

thereto, however, empowers the Court to impose a sentence of

imprisonment for a term of less than five years after recording adequate

and special reasons therefor.

12. Mr. Dhananjaya Mishra, learned amicus curiae, placed before us

extracts from the Joint Parliamentary Committee Report dated 11.08.1982

in the context of Section 3 of the DP Act and the offence of ‘giving’ dowry.

The objections of the members of the Committee to the same were

broadly on the ground that the parents of the bride, who submit a

complaint in relation to dowry, would then be open to prosecution; that the

giver of dowry is usually compelled to do so, as girls would remain

unmarried otherwise; that the giver of the dowry should not be dealt with

on equal footing as the taker, being the aggrieved party; and that the giver

of dowry is forced to do so by societal and customary norms. One of the

recommendations of the Committee was that the givers of dowry, i.e., the

parents, should not be equated with those who take the dowry, as the

givers are victims rather than criminals, as parents are compelled to give

dowry and they do not do so out of their free will. The Committee also

observed that if both the giver and the taker are penalised, no giver of

dowry can be expected to come forward to make a complaint, being under

the threat of being prosecuted himself.

7

13. It was pursuant to this Joint Parliamentary Committee Report dated

11.08.1982, that major amendments were made to the DP Act. The first

set of amendments were made in the year 1984 and, thereafter, Act 43 of

1986 brought about further changes therein. It is in this context that the

learned amicus curiae drew our attention to Section 7(3) of the DP Act,

which is of utmost significance. This sub-section was inserted in the DP

Act with effect from 19.11.1986 by Act 43 of 1986. Section 7 is titled

‘Cognizance of offences’. It reads as under: -

‘7. Cognizance of offences.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),—

(a) no Court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence under this Act;

(b) no court shall take cognizance of an offence under this Act except upon—

(i) its own knowledge or a police report of the facts which constitute such offence, or

(ii) a complaint by the person aggrieved by the offence or a parent or other relative of such person, or by any recognized welfare institution or organisation;

(c) it shall be lawful for a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class to pass any sentence authorised by this Act on any person convicted of an offence under this Act.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, "recognized welfare institution or organisation" means a social welfare institution or organisation recognized in this behalf by the Central or State Government.

(2) Nothing in Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), shall apply to any offence punishable under this Act.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force a statement made by the person aggrieved by the offence shall not subject such person to a prosecution under this Act.’

8 In essence, Section 7(3) provides that statements made by the wife

and her family members, being the persons aggrieved, against the

husband and his family with regard to the ‘taking’ of dowry cannot be the

substratum for launching prosecution against the wife and her family

members for the offence of ‘giving dowry’ under Section 3 of the DP Act.

14. Significantly, in Neera Singh (supra), a learned Judge of the Delhi

High Court observed that the complaint made by the wife therein showed

that dowry demands were made even before the marriage and despite

being well-educated, the wife went ahead with the marriage. Opining that

these kinds of allegations made after the breakdown of marriage indicated

the mentality of the complainants, the High Court concluded that such

allegations should result in the police registering a case under the DP Act

against the parents of the wife as well, who had gotten their daughter

married despite demand for dowry. Reference was made to Section 3 of

the Act, which prohibits ‘giving and taking’ of dowry but, surprisingly, the

High Court failed to notice Section 7(3), which specifically states that a

statement made by the ‘person aggrieved’ by the offence shall not subject

such person to prosecution under the DP Act. Failing to stop short at this

blunder, the High Court went on to state that Metropolitan Magistrates

should take cognizance under the DP Act in respect of the offence of

‘giving’ dowry whenever allegations were made that dowry was given as

a consideration for the marriage.

9

15. Notably, Neera Singh (supra) was a case where the wife’s

complaint of dowry harassment was not accepted by the learned

Magistrate and, thereafter, the learned Sessions Judge held that no prima

facie case was made out under Section 498A IPC against the husband

and his family. This was, thus, not even a case involving an allegation as

to the wife’s family being liable for prosecution for ‘giving’ dowry. The

observations and comments made by the High Court in that regard were,

therefore, completely uncalled for and unnecessary.

16. Section 7(3) of the DP Act did fall for consideration before various

High Courts thereafter. The Delhi High Court had occasion to deal with it

in Pooja Saxena vs. State and another 6. Therein, the wife had sought

quashing of the FIR registered against her under Section 3 of the DP Act

for the offence of ‘giving’ dowry. Adverting to Neera Singh (supra), the

learned Judge held that the observations made therein were in the nature

of obiter dicta. Further, the learned Judge noted that Section 7(3) of the

DP Act had not been taken into account and, therefore, Neera Singh

(supra) was not of guidance. On facts, the learned Judge held that Section

7(3) of the DP Act would come to the rescue of the wife and she could not,

therefore, be subjected to prosecution under Section 3 of the DP Act. This

Court confirmed the view taken by the learned Judge, as SLP (Crl.) Nos.

6 2011(1) Crimes 378 (Del) = 2010 SCC OnLine Del 3652

10 1339-1340 of 2011 filed against his order were dismissed on 07.03.2011. Again, in Yashpal Kumar vs. Bhola Nath Khanna and another 7, the

Delhi High Court followed the view taken in Pooja Saxena (supra).

17. The Madras High Court had occasion to consider the provision in

Ajita David vs. State, by Inspector of Police, and another 8. Therein,

the Madras High Court held that Section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the DP Act could not

be interpreted to mean that a parent of the bride would not fall within the

category of a ‘person aggrieved’. It was observed that the parent of the

victim girl is definitely a person aggrieved by the offence and, by no stretch

of imagination, the legislature would have thought of excluding the parent

from the purview of the ‘person aggrieved’ by the offence, while drafting

Section 7(3) of the DP Act. The High Court concluded that, at any rate, the

phrase ‘person aggrieved by the offence’ employed in Section 7(3) of the

DP Act could not be construed in such a manner that it would only refer to

the bride as, in its considered opinion, the parents and other relatives of

the bride can safely be classified as ‘persons aggrieved’ by the offence,

as contemplated under Section 7(3) of the DP Act.

18. Similar views were expressed by the Jharkhand High Court in Ram

Gopal Sah vs. State of Jharkhand9 and by the Madhya Pradesh High

7 (2012) 2 DLT (Cri) 41 8 (2009) 2 MWN (Cri) 257 9 2009 (1) JLJR 432 (HC)

11 Court in Haji Sayyad vs. State of M.P. and another 10. The Allahabad

High Court also followed suit in Ram Charitra Tiwari and others vs.

State of UP and another 11. Given the weighty judicial thought process

reflected in the aforestated decisions, with which we are in complete

agreement, the decision in Neera Singh (supra), relied upon by the

petitioner, has no value. The observations therein have no precedential

effect, having been made in ignorance of Section 7(3) of the DP Act.

19. However, as rightly pointed out by the learned amicus curiae, we

may clarify that a second FIR can be registered on the strength of a

complaint, which presents a rival version or a counter claim (See Upkar

Singh vs. Ved Prakash and others12). Elaborating on this principle in

Anju Chaudhary vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another 13, this Court

opined that there cannot be two FIRs registered for the same offence but

where the incident is separate; offences are similar or different, or even

where the subsequent crime is of such magnitude that it does not fall

within the ambit and scope of the first FIR, then a second FIR can be

registered. The recent decision of this Court in State of Rajasthan vs.

Surendra Singh Rathore 14 culled out five principles on the issue of

registration of a second FIR: -

10 ILR 2012 MP 2610 11 ILR (2021) 7 ALL 379 12 (2004) 13 SCC 292 13 (2013) 6 SCC 384 14 2025 INSC 248 = 2025 SCC OnLine SC 358

12 ‘9.1 When the second FIR is counter-complaint or presents a rival version of a set of facts, in reference to which an earlier FIR already stands registered.

9.2 When the ambit of the two FIRs is different even though they may arise from the same set of circumstances. 9.3 When investigation and/or other avenues reveal the earlier FIR or set of facts to be part of a larger conspiracy. 9.4 When investigation and/or persons related to the incident bring to the light hitherto unknown facts or circumstances. 9.5 Where the incident is separate; offences are similar or different.’

20. Therefore, had it been a case where independent evidence was

presented with regard to the ‘giving’ of dowry and reliance was not placed

only upon the complaint and statements made by the persons aggrieved,

i.e., the wife and her family members, it would have been possible to

register an FIR for the offence of ‘giving’ dowry under Section 3 of the DP

Act as, in such a situation, the protection afforded to the ‘persons

aggrieved’, under Section 7(3) of the DP Act, would not be available to

them. However, if in a given case all that is projected to establish the

offence of ‘giving’ dowry under Section 3 of the DP Act is the complaint

and/or the statements made by the wife and her family members, it would

invariably mean that they, being the ‘persons aggrieved’, would be fully

covered by the shield of immunity raised under Section 7(3) of the DP Act

and would not be liable to be prosecuted on the strength thereof.

21. On the above analysis, we find no grounds made out to interfere

with the orders passed by the learned Magistrate and the learned

Sessions Judge, which stood confirmed by the impugned order passed by

13 the High Court, though on the grounds cited hereinabove. To sum up, we

find that the grievance of the petitioner has no merit as his attack against

his wife, Radhika Gupta, respondent No.7, and her family members was

based only upon her complaint and the statements recorded by her and

her family members, under Section 161 CrPC, and the statutory protection

under Section 7(3) of the DP Act was, therefore, applicable to them.

22. The special leave petition is bereft of merit and is, accordingly,

dismissed.

Last, but not the least, we must place on record our earnest

gratitude and appreciation for the erudite and invaluable assistance

provided by Mr. Dhananjay Mishra, learned amicus curiae.

Pending applications, if any, shall also stand dismissed.

……………………...J [SANJAY KUMAR]

.……………………...J [K. VINOD CHANDRAN] New Delhi;

April 16, 2026.

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