Raghbir Singh Sehrawat vs State Of Haryana & Ors

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 10080-10081 OF 2011

(Arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 12042-12043 of 2011)

Raghbir Singh Sehrawat ..Appellant(s)

Versus

State of Haryana and others ..Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

G.S. SINGHVI, J.

1. Delay condoned.

2. Leave granted.

3. More than 16 decades ago, John Stuart Mill wrote: "land differs from other

elements of production, labour and capital in not being susceptible to infinite increase.

Its extent is limited and the extent of the more productive kinds of it more limited still.

It is also evident that the quantity of produce capable of being raised on any given

piece of land is not indefinite. These limited quantities of land, and limited

productiveness of it, are the real limits to the increase of production".

4. In 1947, the first Prime Minister of India Pt. Jawahar Lal Nehru said

"everything else can wait, but not agriculture". In its fifth and final report, the

National Commission on Farmers headed by Dr. M.S. Swaminathan observed that

prime farmland must be conserved for agriculture and should not be diverted for non-

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agricultural purposes, else it would seriously affect availability of food in the country

where 60% population still depends on agriculture and people living below poverty

line are finding it difficult to survive.

5. Unfortunately, these words of wisdom appear to have become irrelevant for

the State apparatus which has used the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, 'the

Act') in last two decades for massive acquisition of the agricultural land in different

parts of the country, which has not only adversely impacted the farmers, but also

generated huge litigation adjudication consumes substantial time of the Courts. These

appeals filed against orders dated 17.5.2010 and 19.11.2010 of the Division Bench of

the Punjab and Haryana High Court is one of many such cases which the landowners

are compelled to file with the hope that by Court's intervention they will be able to

save their land.

6. The appellant purchased 8 Kanals 4 Marlas land in village Jatheri, District

Sonepat in 1984 and is cultivating the same. He claims to have constructed a

boundary wall and is growing different crops. His land is surrounded by agricultural

fields, factories and residential houses. In the south of his land, there is a canal and a

school.

7. By Notification dated 22.6.2006 issued under Section 4(1) of the Act, the

Government of Haryana proposed the acquisition of 3813 Kanals 17 Marlas (476

Acres 5 Kanals 17 Marlas) land situated at villages Badhmalik, Badkhalsa, Jatheri,

Liwan, Pritampura and Rai, Tehsil and District Sonepat for the development of

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Industrial Sector 38, Sonepat. The appellant filed objections under Section

5A(1) and pleaded that his land may not be acquired because the same was being used

for agricultural purposes and was the only source of income for his family. The other

landowners also submitted their respective objections. District Revenue Officer-cum-

Land Acquisition Collector, Sonepat (for short, 'the Land Acquisition Collector') is

said to have heard the objectors on 29.10.2006 and made recommendations for the

acquisition of some parcels of land and for release of some other parcels of land

specified in Notification dated 22.6.2006. Thereafter, the State Government issued

declaration under Section 6 (1), which was notified on 20.6.2007 for the acquisition of

216 Acres 7 Kanals and 11 Marlas land. As a sequel to this, the Land Acquisition

Collector passed award dated 28.11.2008.

8. The appellant challenged the acquisition of his land in Writ Petition No.8441

of 2009 on several grounds including the following:

(i) that the notification issued under Section 4(1) had not been published as per

the requirement of the statute,

(ii) that he was not given opportunity of hearing in terms of Section 5A(2),

(iii) that land of large number of persons had been excluded from acquisition

at the stage of Section 6 declaration but his land was not released and, in

this manner, he had been discriminated,

(iv) that there was no justification to acquire his land, which was the only

source of livelihood for him and his family,

(v) that he was not served with notice in terms of Section 9 (3), and

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(vi) that the declaration issued under Section 6(1) was not published as per

the requirement of Section 6(3).

9. In the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents, it was averred

that the notifications issued under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) were duly published; that the

appellant was given opportunity of personal hearing and that after issue of declaration

under Section 6(1), the Land Acquisition Collector passed the award. It was further

averred that possession of the acquired land had been taken and delivered to Haryana

State Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation (HSIIDC) on 28.11.2008.

10. The appellant filed rejoinder affidavit and reiterated that the notifications

issued under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) had not been duly published; that he was not

given opportunity of hearing by the Land Acquisition Collector; that notice had not

been served upon him as per the mandate of Section 9(3). He also pleaded that

possession of land was still with him and the paper possession taken by the

respondents was inconsequential.

11. The Division Bench of the High Court did not examine the grounds on which

the appellant challenged the acquisition of his land and dismissed the writ petition by

relying upon the judgments of this Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay

v. Industrial Development and Investment Company (P) Limited (1996) 11 SCC 501,

Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana (1996) 11 SCC 698, C. Padma v. Deputy

Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu (1997) 2 SCC 627, Municipal Council,

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Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig (2000) 2 SCC 48 and Swaika Properties (P) Ltd. v.

State of Rajasthan (2008) 4 SCC 695, wherein it has been held that once the award is

passed and possession taken, the acquired land will be deemed to have vested in the

Government and the High Court cannot entertain the writ petition filed for quashing

the acquisition proceedings.

12. The appellant challenged the order of the High Court in SLP(C) No.26631 of

2010 but withdrew the same with liberty to seek review of the impugned order.

Thereafter, he filed Review Application No.321 of 2010. He relied upon the judgment

of this Court in NTPC Limited v. Mahesh Dutta (2009) 8 SCC 339 and pleaded that

possession of the acquired land cannot be treated to have been taken because the

procedure laid down in Order XXI Rule 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure had not

been followed. He also pleaded that paper possession taken by the respondents does

not have any sanctity in the eye of law and physical possession of land was still with

him. The Division Bench rejected the review application by observing that the order

dismissing the writ petition does not suffer from any error apparent. However, the

date of filing the writ petition mentioned in paragraph (1) of order dated 17.5.2010

was corrected from 27.3.2010 to 27.3.2009.

13. Shri Neeraj Jain, learned senior counsel for the appellant argued that the

view taken by the High Court on the issue of maintainability of the writ petition is

clearly erroneous and the impugned orders are liable to be set aside because

possession taken by the respondents was only on papers and the same did not result in

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vesting of land in the State Government. Learned senior counsel further argued that

the acquisition of the appellant's land is liable to be quashed because the Land

Acquisition Collector had made recommendations under Section 5A(2) without giving

him opportunity of hearing. He submitted that the official to whom the Land

Acquisition Collector had entrusted the task of serving the notice had not performed

his duty and submitted false report showing delivery of notice to the appellant and his

wife. Shri Jain referred to the typed and xerox copies of notices dated 2.11.2006

issued to S/Shri Madan Lal s/o. Shri Jagdish, Ram Singh s/o. Chhote Lal, Jai Bhagwan

s/o. of Hoshiar Singh, Mukhtar Singh s/o. Lakhi Ram, Rajender Singh s/o. Hoshiar

Singh, Mohinder Singh s/o. Swarup Singh, the appellant and his wife Smt. Moorti

Devi and pointed out that while other addressees acknowledged the receipt of notices

by putting their signatures, the notices shown as duly served upon the appellant and

his wife do not contain their signatures acknowledging the receipt thereof. Learned

senior counsel also invited our attention to Annexure R-3 filed with the counter

affidavit of the respondents to show that the name of the appellant's wife has been

shown as Moorti Devi widow of Raghbir though he is very much alive. He then

pointed out that the signatures appended against the appellant's name in the list of

objectors, who are said to have appeared before the Land Acquisition Collector on

29.10.2006 are not that of the appellant and someone had forged the signatures to

show his presence. Learned senior counsel submitted that notice under Section 9(3)

was not served upon the appellant before passing of award dated 28.11.2008 and

physical possession of the acquired land is still with him. In support of this argument,

Shri Jain relied upon the entries contained in the copy of Girdawari/Record of

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cultivation of village Jatheri, Tehsil and District Sonepat for the years 2001 to 2010,

which have been placed on record as Annexure P-20. Learned senior counsel

emphasized that the High Court failed to notice that the respondents had prepared

false record showing delivery of possession of the acquired land to HSIIDC and this

has caused serious prejudice to the appellant. In the end, Shri Jain argued that release

of more than 50% of land proposed to be acquired is clearly indicative of total non-

application of mind by the concerned functionaries of the State and the entire exercise

undertaken by them for the acquisition of land is liable to be nullified on the ground of

violation of the mandate of Sections 4, 5A, 6 and 9 of the Act and, in any case, there is

no justification for uprooting persons like the appellant, whose livelihood is dependent

on small parcels of land or who have constructed residential houses or have set up

small industrial units by spending lifetime earnings.

14. Learned counsel for the respondents supported the impugned orders and

argued that even though the appellant may not have been given opportunity of

personal hearing by the Land Acquisition Collector, he cannot question the acquisition

proceedings because possession of the acquired land has already been taken by the

competent authority and handed over to HSIIDC. Learned counsel submitted that

minor discrepancies in the list containing signatures of the objectors, who appeared

before the Land Acquisition Collector on 29.10.2006, cannot lead to an inference that

the concerned officer had not given opportunity of personal hearing to the appellant

and his wife. He further submitted that the Land Acquisition Collector had made

recommendations after giving due opportunity of hearing to the objectors and the

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declaration under Section 6(1) was issued by the State Government after duly

considering the recommendations of the Land Acquisition Collector and this is

evinced from the fact that various parcels of land on which residential houses and

factories were existing on the date of Section 4(1) notification were not included in the

declaration issued under Section 6(1). Learned counsel invited our attention to Part

Layout Plan of Sector 38 (Phase II), which has been placed on record as Annexure R-1

along with affidavit dated 12.8.2011 of Shri Yogesh Mohan Mehra, Senior Manager

(IA), HSIIDC to show that the acquired land has already been utilised for development

of industrial estate and plots have been allotted to entrepreneurs, who are desirous of

setting up industries. He submitted that HSIIDC has taken up development of the

acquired land at an estimated cost of rupees fifty eight crores and submitted that the

acquisition of the appellant's land may not be quashed at this stage because 24 meter

wide road has already been constructed through his land.

15. We have considered the respective submissions and carefully scrutinized the

record.

16. Since the appellant has been non suited by the High Court only on the

ground that possession of the acquired land had been taken by the concerned officers

and the same will be deemed to have vested in the State Government free from all

encumbrances, we think that it will be appropriate to first consider this facet of his

challenge to the impugned orders. In the writ petition filed by him, the appellant

categorically averred that physical possession of the acquired land was with him and

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he has been cultivating the same. This assertion finds support from the entries

contained in Girdawari/Record of cultivation, Book No.1, village Jatheri, Tehsil and

District Sonepat (years 2001 to 2010). A reading of these entries shows that during

those years crops of wheat, paddy and chari were grown by the appellant and at the

relevant time, i.e. the date on which possession of the acquired land is said to have

been taken and delivered to HSIIDC, paddy crop was standing on 5 Kanals 2 Marlas

of land. The respondents have not questioned the genuineness and correctness of the

entries contained in the Girdawaris. Therefore, there is no reason to disbelieve or

discard the same. That apart, it is neither the pleaded case of the respondents nor any

evidence has been produced before this Court to show that the appellant had

unauthorisedly taken possession of the acquired land after 28.11.2008. It is also not

the pleaded case of the respondents that the appellant had been given notice that

possession of the acquired land would be taken on 28.11.2008 and he should remain

present at the site. Therefore, Rojnamcha Vakyati prepared by Sadar Kanungo and

three Patwaris showing delivery of possession to Shri Yogesh Mohan Mehra, Senior

Manager (IA), HSIIDC, Rai, which is a self serving document, cannot be made basis

for recording a finding that possession of the acquired land had been taken by the

concerned revenue authorities. The respondents have not produced any other

evidence to show that actual possession of the land, on which crop was standing, had

been taken after giving notice to the appellant or that he was present at the site when

possession of the acquired land was delivered to the Senior Manager of HSIIDC.

Indeed, it is not even the case of the respondents that any independent witness was

present at the time of taking possession of the acquired land. The Land Acquisition

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Collector and his subordinates may claim credit of having acted swiftly inasmuch as

immediately after pronouncement of the award, possession of the acquired land of

village Jatheri is said to have taken from the landowners and handed over to the

officer of HSIIDC but keeping in view the fact that crop was standing on the land, the

exercise undertaken by the respondents showing delivery of possession cannot but be

treated as farce and inconsequential. We have no doubt that if the High Court had

summoned the relevant records and scrutinized the same, it would not have summarily

dismissed the writ petition on the premise that possession of the acquired land had

been taken and the same vested in the State Government.

17. The legality of the mode and manner of taking possession of the acquired

land has been considered in a number of cases. In Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M. D.

Bhagwat (1976) 1 SCC 700, Untwalia, J. referred to provisions of Order 21 Rules 35,

36, 95 and 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure and opined that delivery of symbolic

possession should be construed as delivery of actual possession of the right, title and

interest of the judgment-debtor. His Lordship further observed that if the property is

land over which there is no building or structure, then delivery of possession over the

judgment-debtor's property becomes complete and effective against him the moment

the delivery is effected by going upon the land. The learned Judge went on to say:

"When a public notice is published at a convenient place or near the land

to be taken stating that the Government intends to take possession of the

land, then ordinarily and generally there should be no question of resisting

or impeding the taking of possession. Delivery or giving of possession by

the owner or the occupant of the land is not required. The Collector can

enforce the surrender of the land to himself under Section 47 of the Act if

impeded in taking possession. On publication of the notice under Section

9(1) claims to compensation for all interests in the land has to be made; be

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it the interest of the owner or of a person entitled to the occupation of the

land. On the taking of possession of the land under Section 16 or 17(1) it

vests absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. It is,

therefore, clear that taking of possession within the meaning of Section 16

or 17(1) means taking of possession on the spot. It is neither a possession

on paper nor a `symbolical' possession as generally understood in civil

law. But the question is what is the mode of taking possession? The Act is

silent on the point. Unless possession is taken by the written agreement of

the party concerned the mode of taking possession obviously would be for

the authority to go upon the land and to do some act which would indicate

that the authority has taken possession of the land. It may be in the form of

a declaration by beat of drum or otherwise or by hanging a written

declaration on the spot that the authority has taken possession of the land.

The presence of the owner or the occupant of the land to effectuate the

taking of possession is not necessary. No further notice beyond that under

Section 9(1) of the Act is required. When possession has been taken, the

owner or the occupant of the land is dispossessed. Once possession has

been taken the land vests in the Government."

Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) and Gupta, J., who constituted the majority did

not agree with Untwalia, J. and observed as under :

"We think it is enough to state that when the Government proceeds to take

possession of the land acquired by it under the Land Acquisition Act,

1894, it must take actual possession of the land, since all interests in the

land are sought to be acquired by it. There can be no question of taking

`symbolical' possession in the sense understood by judicial decisions

under the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor would possession merely on paper

be enough. What the Act contemplates as a necessary condition of vesting

of the land in the Government is the taking of actual possession of the

land. How such possession may be taken would depend on the nature of

the land. Such possession would have to be taken as the nature of the land

admits of. There can be no hard-and-fast rule laying down what act would

be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land. We should not,

therefore, be taken as laying down an absolute and inviolable rule that

merely going on the spot and making a declaration by beat of drum or

otherwise would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land in

every case. But here, in our opinion, since the land was lying fallow and

there was no crop on it at the material time, the act of the Tahsildar in

going on the spot and inspecting the land for the purpose of determining

what part was waste and arable and should, therefore, be taken possession

of and determining its extent, was sufficient to constitute taking of

possession. It appears that the appellant was not present when this was

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done by the Tahsildar, but the presence of the owner or the occupant of the

land is not necessary to effectuate the taking of possession . It is also not

strictly necessary as a matter of legal requirement that notice should be

given to the owner or the occupant of the land that possession would be

taken at a particular time, though it may be desirable where possible, to

give such notice before possession is taken by the authorities, as that

would eliminate the possibility of any fraudulent or collusive transaction

of taking of mere paper possession, without the occupant or the owner

ever coming to know of it."

18. In Banda Development Authority, Banda v. Moti Lal Agarwal and others

(2011) 5 SCC 394, the Court referred to the judgments in Balwant Narayan Bhagde v.

M. D. Bhagwat (supra), Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust v. State

of Punjab (1996) 4 SCC 212, P. K. Kalburqi v. State of Karnataka (2005) 12 SCC

489, NTPC Ltd. v. Mahesh Dutta (supra), Sita Ram Bhandar Society v. Govt. of NCT

of Delhi (2009) 10 SCC 501 and culled out the following propositions:

"(i) No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to what act would constitute

taking of possession of the acquired land.

(ii) If the acquired land is vacant, the act of the State authority concerned

to go to the spot and prepare a panchnama will ordinarily be treated as

sufficient to constitute taking of possession.

(iii) If crop is standing on the acquired land or building/structure exists,

mere going on the spot by the authority concerned will, by itself, be not

sufficient for taking possession. Ordinarily, in such cases, the authority

concerned will have to give notice to the occupier of the building/structure

or the person who has cultivated the land and take possession in the

presence of independent witnesses and get their signatures on the

panchnama. Of course, refusal of the owner of the land or

building/structure may not lead to an inference that the possession of the

acquired land has not been taken.

(iv) If the acquisition is of a large tract of land, it may not be possible for

the acquiring/designated authority to take physical possession of each and

every parcel of the land and it will be sufficient that symbolic possession

is taken by preparing appropriate document in the presence of independent

witnesses and getting their signatures on such document.

(v) If beneficiary of the acquisition is an agency/instrumentality of the

State and 80% of the total compensation is deposited in terms of Section

13 17(3-A) and substantial portion of the acquired land has been utilised in

furtherance of the particular public purpose, then the court may reasonably

presume that possession of the acquired land has been taken."

19. If the appellant's case is examined in the light of the propositions culled out

in Banda Development Authority, Banda v. Moti Lal Agarwal and others, we have no

hesitation to hold that possession of the acquired land had not been taken from the

appellant on 28.11.2008, i.e. the day on which the award was declared by the Land

Acquisition Collector because crops were standing on several parcels of land

including the appellant's land and possession thereof could not have been taken

without giving notice to the landowners. That apart, it was humanly impossible to

give notice to large number of persons on the same day and take actual possession of

land comprised in various survey numbers (total measuring 214 Acres 5 Kanals and 2

Marlas).

20. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the record prepared by the

revenue authorities showing delivery of possession of the acquired land to HSIIDC

has no legal sanctity and the High Court committed serious error by dismissing the

writ petition on the specious ground that possession of the acquired land had been

taken and the same vested in the State Government in terms of Section 16.

21. The judgments on which reliance has been placed in the impugned order are

clearly distinguishable. In Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial

Development and Investment Company (P) Limited (supra), this Court reversed the

judgment of the Bombay High Court which had quashed the acquisition of land under

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the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 read with the provisions of Maharashtra Regional and

Town Planning Act, 1966. This Court noted that the respondent had approached the

High Court after a gap of four years' and held:

"It is thus well-settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the

writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have

become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications. The High

Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of the

Constitution to quash the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration

under Section 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into

pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was

taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award

which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising

the power under Article 226. The fact that no third party rights were created

in the case is hardly a ground for interference. The Division Bench of the

High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the

learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches."

Similar view was expressed in C. Padma v. Deputy Secretary to the

Government of Tamil Nadu (supra), Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana (supra),

Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig (supra) and Swaika Properties

(P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan (supra). In all the cases, challenge to the acquisition

proceedings was negatived primarily on the ground of delay. An additional factor

which influenced this Court was that physical possession of the acquired land had

been taken by the concerned authorities. In none of these cases, the landowners

appear to have questioned the legality of the mode adopted by the concerned

authorities for taking possession of the acquired land. Therefore, these judgments

cannot be relied upon for sustaining the High Court's negation of the appellant's

challenge to the acquisition of his land.

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22. The next issue which merits consideration is whether the acquisition of the

appellant's land is vitiated due to violation of Section 5A(2) and the rules of natural

justice. A careful scrutiny of record reveals that the Land Acquisition Collector had

fixed 29.10.2006 as the date for hearing the objections. He issued notices dated

2.11.2006 to inform the objectors that hearing will take place on 29.11.2006 at 11 a.m.

in P.W.D. Rest House, Rai and asked them to appear either in person or through their

agent. The notices were delivered to some of the landowners, who acknowledged the

receipt thereof. However, the notices issued to the appellant and his wife were not

served upon them. This is evident from the fact that other objectors had

acknowledged the receipt of notices by putting their signatures, the notices allegedly

served upon the appellant and his wife do not bear their signatures and no explanation

has been offered by the respondents about this omission. The Land Acquisition

Collector proceeded to decide the objections by assuming that the notice has been

delivered to all the objectors. Not only this, someone in the office of Land

Acquisition Collector forged the appellant's signature to show his presence in P.W.D.

Rest House, Rai on 29.11.2006. A bare comparison of the signatures appearing

against the appellant's name at serial No.90 (page 184 of the paper book) and those

appearing on the vakalatnama and affidavit filed in support of the special leave

petitions shows that there is no similarity in the two signatures. Not only this, in the

list, appended with Annexure R-3, the appellant's wife has been shown as widow of

Raghbir Singh. It is impossible to believe that a woman who knows how to sign a

document would put signatures against her name showing her as a widow despite the

fact that her husband is alive. When the Court pointed out to the learned

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counsel for the respondents that the signatures appearing against serial No. 90 at page

8 of Annexure R-3 (page 184 of the paper book) do not tally with the signatures of the

appellant on the vakalatnama and the affidavit filed in support of special leave

petitions, the learned counsel expressed his inability to offer any explanation. He also

expressed helplessness in defending the description of the appellant's wife Smt.

Moorti Devi as widow of Raghbir Singh.

23. From what we have stated above, it is clear that the appellant had not been

given opportunity of hearing as per the mandate of Section 5A(2). The importance of

Section 5A(2) was highlighted by this Court in Munshi Singh v. Union of India (1973)

2 SCC 337 in the following words:

"Sub-section (2) of Section 5-A makes it obligatory on the Collector to

give an objector an opportunity of being heard. After hearing all

objections and making further inquiry he is to make a report to the

appropriate Government containing his recommendation on the

objections. The decision of the appropriate Government on the objections

is then final. The declaration under Section 6 has to be made after the

appropriate Government is satisfied, on a consideration of the report, if

any, made by the Collector under Section 5-A(2). The legislature has,

therefore, made complete provisions for the persons interested to file

objections against the proposed acquisition and for the disposal of their

objections. It is only in cases of urgency that special powers have been

conferred on the appropriate Government to dispense with the provisions

of Section 5-A."

In State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471, this Court observed:

"....it is fundamental that compulsory taking of a man's property is

a serious matter and the smaller the man the more serious the

matter. Hearing him before depriving him is both reasonable and

pre-emptive of arbitrariness, and denial of this administrative

fairness is constitutional anathema except for good reasons. Save in

real urgency where public interest does not brook even the

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minimum time needed to give a hearing land acquisition authorities

should not, having regard to Articles 14 (and 19), burke an enquiry

under Section 17 of the Act. Here a slumbering process, pending for

years and suddenly exciting itself into immediate forcible taking,

makes a travesty of emergency power."

In Shyam Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar (1993) 4 SCC 255, this Court

reiterated that compliance with provisions of Section 5A is sine qua non for valid

acquisition and observed as under:

"The decision of the Collector is supposedly final unless the

appropriate Government chooses to interfere therein and cause

affectation, suo motu or on the application of any person interested

in the land. These requirements obviously lead to the positive

conclusion that the proceeding before the Collector is a blend of

public and individual enquiry. The person interested, or known to

be interested, in the land is to be served personally of the

notification, giving him the opportunity of objecting to the

acquisition and awakening him to such right. That the objection is

to be in writing, is indicative of the fact that the enquiry into the

objection is to focus his individual cause as well as public cause.

That at the time of the enquiry, for which prior notice shall be

essential, the objector has the right to appear in person or through

pleader and substantiate his objection by evidence and argument."

24. The same view has been reiterated in Union of India v. Mukesh Hans (2004)

8 SCC 14, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai (2005) 7

SCC 627, Anand Singh v. State of U.P. (supra) and Radhy Shyam v. State of U. P.

(supra).

25. In this context, it is necessary to remember that the rules of natural justice

have been ingrained in the scheme of Section 5A with a view to ensure that before any

person is deprived of his land by way of compulsory acquisition, he must get an

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opportunity to oppose the decision of the State Government and/or its

agencies/instrumentalities to acquire the particular parcel of land. At the hearing, the

objector can make an effort to convince the Land Acquisition Collector to make

recommendation against the acquisition of his land. He can also point out that land

proposed to be acquired is not suitable for the purpose specified in the notification

issued under Section 4(1). Not only this, he can produce evidence to show that

another piece of land is available and the same can be utilized for execution of the

particular project or scheme. Though, it is neither possible nor desirable to make a list

of the grounds on which the landowner can persuade the Collector to make

recommendations against the proposed acquisition of land, but what is important is

that the Collector should give a fair opportunity of hearing to the objector and

objectively consider his plea against the acquisition of land. Only thereafter, he

should make recommendations supported by brief reasons as to why the particular

piece of land should or should not be acquired and whether or not the plea put forward

by the objector merits acceptance. In other words, the recommendations made by the

Collector must reflect objective application of mind to the objections filed by the

landowners and other interested persons.

26. Before concluding, we deem it necessary to observe that in recent past,

various State Governments and their functionaries have adopted very casual approach

in dealing with matters relating to the acquisition of land in general and the rural areas

in particular and in a large number of cases, the notifications issued under Sections

4(1) and 6(1) with or without the aid of Section 17 and the consequential actions have

19

been nullified by the Courts on the ground of violation of the mandatory procedure

and the rules of natural justice. The disposal of cases filed by the landowners and

others take some time and the resultant delay has great adverse impact on

implementation of the projects of public importance. Of course, the delay in deciding

such cases may not be of much significance when the State and its agencies want to

confer benefit upon private parties by acquiring land in the name of public purpose.

It if difficult, if not impossible, to appreciate as to why the State and its

instrumentalities resort to massive acquisition of land and that too without complying

with the mandate of the statute. As noted by the National Commission on Farmers,

the acquisition of agricultural land in the name of planned development or industrial

growth would seriously affect the availability of food in future. After independence,

the administrative apparatus of the State has not spent enough investment in the rural

areas and those who have been doing agriculture have not been educated and

empowered to adopt alternative sources of livelihood. If land of such persons is

acquired, not only the current but the future generations are ruined and this is one of

the reasons why the farmers who are deprived of their holdings commit suicide. It

also appears that the concerned authorities are totally unmindful of the plight of those

sections of the society, who are deprived of their only asset like small house, small

industrial unit etc. They do not realise that having one's own house is a lifetime

dream of majority of population of this country. Economically affluent class of

society can easily afford to have one or more houses at any place or locality in the

country but other sections of the society find it extremely difficult to purchase land

and construct house. Majority of people spend their lifetime savings for building a

20

small house so that their families may be able to live with a semblance of dignity.

Therefore, it is wholly unjust, arbitrary and unreasonable to deprive such persons of

their houses by way of the acquisition of land in the name of development of

infrastructure or industrialisation. Similarly, some people set up small industrial unit

after seeking permission from the competent authority. They do so with the hope of

generating additional income for their family. If the land on which small units are

established is acquired, their hopes are shattered. Therefore, before acquiring private

land the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities should, as far as possible, use land

belonging to the State for the specified public purposes. If the acquisition of private

land becomes absolutely necessary, then too, the concerned authorities must strictly

comply with the relevant statutory provisions and the rules of natural justice.

27. In the result, the appeals are allowed. The impugned orders are set aside. As a

corollary to this, the writ petition filed by the appellant is allowed and the acquisition of

his land is declared illegal and quashed. The appellant shall get cost of Rs.2,50,000/- from

the respondents.

........................................J.

(G.S. Singhvi)

............................................J.

(Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya)

New Delhi,

November 23, 2011.

ITEM NO.1A COURT NO.6 SECTION IVB

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Civil Appeals Nos......./2011 @

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No(s).12042- 12043/2011

21

(From the judgement and order(s) dated 17/05/2010 in CWP No.8441/2009 and order dated 19/11/2010 in RA No.321/2010 in CWP No.8441/2009 of The HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH)

RAGHBIR SINGH SEHRAWAT Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. Respondent(s)

[HEARD BY HON'BLE G.S.SINGHVI AND HON'BLE SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, JJ.]

Date: 23/11/2011 These Petitions were called on for Judgment today.

For Petitioner(s) Dr. Kailash Chand,Adv.(Not present)

For Respondent(s) Mr. Ravindra Bana,Adv. Nos.1 to 3

Hon'ble Mr. Justice G.S. Singhvi pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr.Justice Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya.

Delay condoned.

Leave granted.

For the reasons recorded in the Reportable Judgment which is placed on the file, the appeals are allowed. The impugned orders are set aside. As a corollary to this, the writ petition filed by the appellant is allowed and the acquisition of his land is declared illegal and quashed.

The appellant shall get cost of Rs.2,50,000/- from the respondents.

(Parveen Kr. Chawla) (Phoolan Wati Arora) Court Master Court Master

[Signed Reportable judgment is placed on the file]