Rafeeqan (Dead) By Lrs vs Hussan Bano

1. This appeal is directed against the

judgment and order dated 27th May 2003

passed by the Delhi High Court in Civil

Revision No.754 of 2002. By the impugned

judgment and order, the High Court affirmed

the order of the Additional Rent Controller

dated 27th May, 2002 by which the Additional

1 Rent Controller dismissed the application

of the appellant for leave to defend in the

eviction proceeding filed against her by

the respondent under Section 14-D of the

Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter, `the

said Act').

2. The material facts of the case are that the

respondent, a widow, filed a petition under

Section 14-D of the said Act to recover

immediate possession of the premises of

which the appellant is a tenant in one

room, kitchen, bathroom, latrine and

courtyard on the first floor of property

No.4899-A Gali Maulvi Abdul Rahim, Bara

Hindu Rao, Dehli at a rent of Rs.100/- per

month and other charges.

3. Admittedly, the respondent purchased the

property in question by a registered sale

deed dated 31.10.1961 and the appellant was

2 inducted as a tenant in the said property

by the previous owner. In the eviction

petition it was stated by the respondent-

landlord that she and her family require

the tenanted premises for her own

residential purposes. When such eviction

petition came before the Court of the

Additional Rent Controller, Delhi the Court

recorded that nobody appeared on behalf of

the appellant in spite of notice in the

newspaper and no leave application was

filed. However, the Additional Rent

Controller, Delhi by judgment and order

dated 18.3.1999 dismissed the eviction

petition filed by the respondent herein,

inter alia, on the ground that the tenanted

premises was let out by the previous owner

from whom the respondent herein purchased

the tenanted premises. It was not let out

either by the respondent herein or by her

husband or by any of her blood relations

3 and the Additional Rent Controller held

that Section 14-B of the said Act does not

apply.

4. Challenging the said order a revision

petition was filed by the respondent

herein. In such revision petition, the

Delhi High Court vide order dated 11.9.2000

was pleased to set aside the order dated

18.3.1999 passed by the Additional Rent

Controller, Delhi and the Delhi High Court

was pleased to direct the Additional Rent

Controller to decide the eviction petition

on merits. The Delhi High Court was

pleased to hold as follows:-

"Admit.

The petitioner is aggrieved by an order dated 18th March, 1999 passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller, Delhi.

The petitioner was non-suited on the ground that the suit premises were not let out by her husband or by her but were in

4 fact let out by the predecessor-in- interest of the petitioner.

The admitted position is that the suit premises were purchased by the petitioner some time in 1961. She, unfortunately, became a widow in 1980.

It has been held by various judgments of this Court such as Mr. B.M. Chanana Vs. Union of India and others, 1990 (18) DRJ 55; Mrs. Sarla Luthra Vs. M/s. Gedore Tools (India) Pvt. Ltd., 1993 (25) DRJ 52 and Bhupinder Singh Vs. Janak Rani, 1948 (47) DRJ 789 that the provisions of Section 14-D of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 cannot be given restricted meaning. It is immaterial that the suit premises were let out by the predecessor-

in-interest or the widow. The expression "letting out by her or by her husband" has to be given a wider meaning including therein the predecessor-in-interest of the widow.

Under these circumstances, I am of the view that the impugned order passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller cannot be sustained.

The learned Additional Rent Controller should now decide the eviction petition on merits.

The parties will appear before the learned Additional Rent Controller on 25th September, 2000."

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5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant

in this case mainly argued on two points.

His first submission is that the decision

of the Delhi High Court quoted above is

erroneous in view of subsequent

Constitution Bench decision of this Court

in Nathi Devi vs. Radha Devi Gupta - (2005)

2 SCC 271.

6. The Constitution Bench in Nathi Devi

(supra) was formed in view of divergence of

opinion between two Benches of this Court

on the interpretation of Section 14-D of

the said Act.

7. For proper appreciation of the points at

issue, the provision of Section 14-D of the

said Act is set out below:-

14D. Right to recover immediate possession of premises to accrue to a widow. - (1) Where the landlord is a widow and the premises let out by her, or by her 6 husband, are required by her for her own residence, she may apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises.

(2) Where the landlord referred to in sub-section (1) has let out more than one premises, it shall he open to her to make an application under that sub-section in respect of any one of the premises chosen by her."

8. In Nathi Devi (supra) this Court noticed

the difference of opinion between the

decision of this Court in the case of

Surjit Singh Kalra vs. Union of India,

(1991) 2 SCC 87, and the decision of this

Court in Kanta Goel vs. B.P. Pathak, (1977)

2 SCC 814.

9. The Constitution Bench of this Court in

Nathi Devi (supra), upholding the reasoning

given by this Court in Surjit Singh Kalra

(supra) held as follows:

"...The expression "let out by her, or by her husband" is not an expression which 7 permits of any ambiguity. We must, therefore, give it its normal meaning. So understood the conclusion is inescapable that the legislative intent was only to confer a special right on a limited class of widows viz. the widow who let the premises or whose husband had let the premises before his death, and which premises the widow requires for her own use." (Para 28, page 284 of the report)

10. The Constitution Bench made the position

further clear in paragraph 32, in the

following words:-

"...Section 14-D benefits only a class of widows viz. a widow who or whose husband had let out the premises. If the intention was to benefit all widows, the section would have provided that a widow is entitled to obtain immediate possession of the premises owned by her and the expressions "let out by her or by her husband" and "such premises" in Section 14-D would be redundant...."

11. Again in the same paragraph it was held as

follows:

"....in our view, Section 14-D insists that the premises must be one let out by her or by her husband. A widow or her late husband who acquired a tenanted premises by sale or transfer cannot invoke the provisions of Section 14-D to evict a pre- existing tenant."

8 12. In view of the aforesaid clear enunciation

of law by the Constitution Bench of this

Court on Section 14-D of the said Act, the

judgment of the Delhi High Court, extracted

above, is clearly erroneous.

13. It may be true that the decision of the

Delhi High Court, extracted above, giving a

different interpretation of Section 14-D

was not challenged by the appellant herein.

But the High Court judgment on

interpretation of Section 14-D is clearly

erroneous in view of the subsequent

Constitution Bench judgment of this Court

in Nathi Devi (supra). The Constitution

Bench decision in Nathi Devi (supra), in

view of the mandate of Article 141 of the

Constitution is binding on all subordinate

Courts and Delhi High Court and the rights

of the parties in a pending proceeding

9 under Section 14-D of the said Act must be

governed by the law laid down in Nathi Devi

(supra).

14. The learned counsel for the appellant has,

however, argued another point, namely, that

there is no relationship of landlord and

tenant between the appellant and the

respondent.

15. In view of the decision of this Court in

Nathi Devi (supra), this Court need not go

into the aforesaid question.

16. Following the Constitution Bench judgment

of this Court in Nathi Devi (supra) this

Court allows the appeal and holds that

provision of Section 14-D is not applicable

for eviction of the appellant in this case,

since she is admittedly a pre-existing

tenant on the premises prior to the

10 purchase of the property by the husband of

the respondent landlord.

17. This Court, however, makes it clear that

the respondent-landlord, if so advised, is

at liberty to initiate eviction proceedings

against the appellant in accordance with

law. The appeal is, thus, allowed. The

impugned order of the High Court is set

aside. No order as to costs.

.......................J. (G.S. SINGHVI)

.......................J. New Delhi (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY) September 6, 2010

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