R.S. Sujatha vs State Of Karnataka & Ors

R.S. Sujatha ...Appellant Versus

State of Karnataka & Ors. ...Respondents

JUDGMENT

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. This appeal has been filed against the judgment and order of the

Central Administrative Tribunal, Bangalore Bench (hereinafter called

as the `Tribunal') dated 19.12.2002 in Original Application No. 715

of 2002.

2. (A) Facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that the

State of Karnataka vide order dated 24.1.2001 initiated disciplinary

proceedings against the appellant, an Indian Administrative Service

Officer of Karnataka cadre, on the allegation that she had committed

certain irregularities in the allotment of wheat under a special

programme called the State Funded Wheat Based Nutrition Programme of the Government of India at public distribution system

rates to a supplier called M/s Nandi Agro Industries Ltd. The said

regular enquiry stood initiated on the basis of the preliminary enquiry

report dated 31.3.1997.

(B) The appellant filed O.A. No.715 of 2002 before the Tribunal on

5.8.2002 for quashing the Articles of charge dated 30.11.1999 and

subsequent proceedings on diverse grounds. In the said Original

Application (hereinafter referred to as `O.A.'), the appellant had made

a specific averment that the charge memo dated 30.11.1999 was

received by her only on 19.6.2002, as the copy of the same was

furnished to her by the 3rd respondent i.e. the Enquiry Officer.

Therefore, it had been contended by the appellant that she had

approached the Tribunal within limitation. However, taking abundant

caution, she had also filed an application for condonation of delay.

(C) The reply to the said application was filed by the respondents

therein on 18.10.2002, wherein it was contended that the order dated

30.11.1999 had been issued to the appellant on 2.12.1999 by

Registered Post with AD.

(D) The Tribunal instead of proceeding with the matter on merit or

deciding the issue of limitation, passed an order dated 15.11.2002

2 stating that the appellant had made a false statement in the O.A.

regarding limitation which was intentional and deliberate. Therefore,

prima facie, the Tribunal was of the view that the appellant had

committed criminal contempt and a show cause notice dated

15.11.2002 was issued to the appellant calling upon her "to appear in

person before the Tribunal on 29.11.2002 at 10.30 a.m. to answer the

said show cause notice on which day the matter would be listed for

hearing".

(E) The appellant not only appeared in response to the said notice

personally, but submitted a reply to the show cause notice contending

that she had not made any false statement for the purpose of securing

the order of condonation of delay and in fact the charge memo dated

30.11.1999 had been served upon her first time on 19.6.2002. She also

made a request to summon certain government records to substantiate

her case.

(F) The Tribunal directed the respondent authorities to produce the

documents, i.e. Inward Register, Postal Acknowledge Due and

original letter dated 23.12.1999 and other relevant documents, if any,

3 which would have bearing on the matter by the next date and the

matter was directed to be listed on 12.12.2002.

(G) On 12.12.2002 though learned counsel for the respondent

authorities did not produce any of the required documents, but he

produced the photocopies of letter dated 23.12.1999 and the Inward

Register. The Tribunal adjourned the case to 19.12.2002. The

Tribunal passed the impugned order dated 19.12.2002 holding that the

appellant was guilty of perjury, as well as of criminal contempt of the

Tribunal and imposed the punishment of imprisonment till rising of

the court and a fine of Rs.2,000/-.

3. Being aggrieved, the appellant approached the High Court by

filing a writ petition which was ultimately dismissed vide order dated

2.9.2003, observing that the High Court had no jurisdiction to

entertain the matter placing reliance on the judgment of this Court in

T. Sudhakar Prasad v. Govt. of A.P. & Ors., (2001) 1 SCC 516,

wherein it had been held that against the order under the Contempt of

Court Act, 1971, passed by the Tribunal, the party aggrieved has to

approach this Court. Hence, this appeal.

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4. Shri Rajesh Mahale, learned counsel appearing for the appellant

has submitted that the order impugned had been passed in flagrant

violation of not only the principles of natural justice, but also the

statutory rules known as The Contempt of Courts (C.A.T.) Rules,

1992 (hereinafter called as 1992 Rules) and the appellant had not been

given due opportunity to defend herself. The Tribunal did not decide

the original application filed by the appellant. The Tribunal picked up

one of the pleadings taken by the appellant treating it to be false and

initiated the criminal contempt proceedings which is not permissible

in law. Therefore, the order impugned is liable to be set aside.

5. There is none to oppose the appeal. We have considered the

submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant.

6. The facts mentioned hereinabove make it clear that the Tribunal

has not adjudicated upon the case filed by the appellant at all. The

appellant had approached the Tribunal for quashing of the disciplinary

proceedings initiated against her and the opposite party had raised the

issue of limitation pointing out that she had been served the Articles

of Charges at an earlier stage and the averment made by the appellant

in this regard was false. The Tribunal ought to have framed an issue

on limitation, asked the parties to lead evidence and decide it on merit.

5 It was totally unwarranted and uncalled for to initiate criminal

contempt proceedings merely on the basis of the pleadings taken by

the opposite parties therein. Criminal contempt has been defined

under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which reads

as under:

"(c) "Criminal Contempt" means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which; -

(i) scandalize or tends to scandalize or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court;

or

(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceedings; or

(iii)interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner."

It has been submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that

none of the above referred to provisions was attracted in the facts of

this case.

7. The learned Tribunal proceeded on the basis that this Court in

Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma, (1995) 1 SCC 421, held

that nobody should be permitted to indulge in immoral acts like

6 perjury, prevarication and motivated falsehoods in the judicial

proceedings and if someone does so, it must be dealt with

appropriately. In case the recourse to a false plea is taken with an

oblique motive, it would definitely hinder, hamper or impede the flow

of justice and prevent the courts from performing their legal duties.

8. Before the Tribunal, the case had been at a preliminary stage,

thus, the Tribunal ought not to have initiated the criminal contempt

proceedings at such a pre-mature stage making reference to the

provisions of Sections 191, 193 and 197 of the Indian Penal Code,

1860 (hereinafter called as the IPC). Section 191 IPC deals with

giving false evidence; Section 193 provides for punishment for giving

false evidence; and Section 197 deals with issuing or signing a false

certificate.

9. In Chajoo Ram v. Radhey Shyam & Anr., AIR 1971 SC

1367, this Court while dealing with a similar issue held as

under:

"............No doubt giving of false evidence and filing false affidavits is an evil which must be effectively curbed with a strong hand but to start prosecution for perjury too readily and too frequently without due care and

7 caution and on inconclusive and doubtful material defeats its very purpose. Prosecution should be ordered when it is considered expedient in the interests of justice to punish the delinquent and not merely because there is some inaccuracy in the statement which may be innocent or immaterial. There must be prima facie case of deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance and the Court should be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge....."

10. In Chandrapal Singh & Ors. v. Maharaj Singh & Anr., AIR

1982 SC 1238, this Court while dealing with a case of a false

statement for the purposes of Sections 193 and 199 IPC held as under:

" ........ When it is alleged that a false statement has been made in a declaration which is receivable as evidence in any Court of Justice or before any public servant or other person, the statement alleged to be false has to be set out and its alleged falsity with reference to the truth found in some document has to be referred to pointing out that the two situations cannot co-exist, both being attributable to the same person and, therefore, one to his knowledge must be false. Rival contentions set out in affidavits accepted or rejected by courts with reference to onus probandi do not furnish foundation for a charge under Section 199 IPC. .........Acceptance or rejection of evidence by itself is not a sufficient yardstick to dub the one rejected as false. Falsity can be alleged when truth stands out glaringly and to the knowledge of the person who is making the false statement. Day in and day out in courts averments made by one set of witnesses are accepted and the counter-averments are rejected. If in all such cases complaints under Section 199 IPC are to be filed not only there will open up

8 floodgates of litigation but it would unquestionably be an abuse of the process of the court....."

(Emphasis added)

11. In Pritish v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 2002 SC 236,

this Court dealt with the provision of Section 340 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 extensively, in a case where admittedly

forged document had been filed in a reference under Section 18 of the

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for getting a higher amount of

compensation. The court observed as under :-

"Reading of the sub-section makes it clear that the hub of this provision is formation of an opinion by the court (before which proceedings were to be held) that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should be made into an offence which appears to have been committed............But once the court decides to do so, then the court should make a finding to the effect that on the fact situation it is expedient in the interest of justice that the offence should further be probed into......It should again be remembered that the preliminary inquiry contemplated in the sub-section is not for finding whether any particular person is guilty or not. Far from that, the purpose of preliminary inquiry, even if the court opts to conduct it, is only to decide whether it is expedient in the interest of justice to inquire into the offence which appears to have been committed."

12. Thus, from the above, it is evident that the inquiry/contempt

proceedings should be initiated by the court in exceptional

circumstances where the court is of the opinion that perjury has been

9 committed by a party deliberately to have some beneficial order from

the court. There must be grounds of a nature higher than mere surmise

or suspicion for initiating such proceedings. There must be distinct

evidence of the commission of an offence by such a person as mere

suspicion cannot bring home the charge of perjury. More so, the court

has also to determine as on facts, whether it is expedient in the interest

of justice to inquire into the offence which appears to have been

committed.

13. In the instant case, all the documents summoned by the

Tribunal had not been produced before the Tribunal. More so, any

document sent by Registered Post is presumed to have been received

by the addressee in view of the provisions of Section 27 of the

General Clauses Act, 1897 and Illustration (f) of Section 114 of the

Indian Evidence Act, 1872, but every presumption is rebuttable.

(Vide: Harihar Banerji v. Ramshashi Roy, AIR 1918 PC 102;

Gujarat Electricity Board & Anr. v. Atmaram Sugomal Postani,

AIR 1989 SC 1433; Shimla Development Authority & Ors. v.

Santosh Sharma (Smt.) & Anr., (1997) 2 SCC 637; and Dr. Sunil

Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, JT

2010 (12) SC 287).

1

14. In such a fact-situation, the appellant ought to have been given

time to rebut this presumption and lead evidence to prove that she did

not receive the said document as alleged by the opposite parties, and it

was necessary to do so for the reasons we record later.

15. The Tribunal proceeded in great haste as the show cause notice

was issued by the Tribunal on 15.11.2002 for initiating the said

proceedings, fixed the date for 12.12.2002 and disposed of the matter

on 19.12.2002. The Tribunal failed to appreciate that criminal

contempt proceedings are quasi criminal in nature and any action on

the part of a party by mistake, inadvertence or by misunderstanding

does not amount to contempt. In contempt proceedings, the court is

the accuser as well as judge of the accusation. Therefore, it behoves

the Tribunal to act with great circumspection as far as possible,

making all allowances for errors of judgment. Any action taken in

unclear case is to make the law of contempt do duty for other

measures and therefore is totally unwarranted and should not be

encouraged. The proceedings being quasi criminal in nature, burden

and standard of proof required is the same as required in criminal

cases. The charges have to be framed as per the statutory rules

1 framed for the purpose and proved beyond reasonable doubt keeping

in mind that the alleged contemnor is entitled to the benefit of doubt.

Law does not permit imposing any punishment in contempt

proceedings on mere probabilities. The court cannot punish the

alleged contemnor without any foundation merely on conjectures and

surmises. (See Sahdeo alias Sahdeo Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh

& Ors., (2010) 3 SCC 705).

16. Needless to say, the contempt proceedings being quasi criminal

in nature require strict adherence to the procedure prescribed under

the rules applicable in such proceedings. In L.P. Misra (Dr.) v. State

of U.P., AIR 1998 SC 3337, this court while dealing with the issue of

observance of the statutory rules held as under:

"......... we are of the opinion that the Court while passing the impugned order had not followed the procedure prescribed by law. It is true that the High Court can invoke powers and jurisdiction vested in it under Article 215 of the Constitution of India but such a jurisdiction has to be exercised in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law."

(Emphasis supplied)

17. In Three Cheers Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. v. C.E.S.C. Ltd.,

AIR 2009 SC 735, and Sahdeo (supra), this Court reiterated a similar

1 view observing that in contempt proceedings the court must conclude

the trial and complete the proceedings "in accordance with the

procedure prescribed by law".

18. The instant case has to be dealt with under the 1992 Rules.

The aforesaid rules provide the following procedure:

"Rule 7. Initiation of proceedings: -

(i) .............................

(ii) Every petition for `Criminal Contempt' made in accordance with these rules and every information other than a petition, for initiating action for criminal contempt under the Act on being scrutinized by the Registrar shall first be placed on the administrative side before the Chairman in the case of the principal Bench and the concerned Vice Chairman in the case of other Benches or such other Member as may be designated by him for this purpose and if he considers it expedient and proper to take action under the Act, the said petition or information shall be registered and numbered in the Registry and placed before the Bench for preliminary hearing.

(iii) When suo motu action is taken, the statement of facts constituting the alleged contempt and copy of the draft charges shall be prepared and signed by the Registrar before placing them for preliminary hearing.

Rule 13. Hearing of the case and trial:-

(a) ..........................

(b) ...........................

1 (c) The respondent shall be furnished with a copy of the charge framed, which shall be read over and explained to the respondent. The Tribunal shall then record his plea, if any.

(d) .........................

(e) .........................

Rule 15. Procedure for trial:-

(i) Except as otherwise provided in the Act and these rules, the procedure prescribed for summary trials under Chapter XXI of the Code shall as far as practicable be followed in the trial of case for contempt.

(ii) .......................... (iii) ........................... (iv) .......................... (v) ......................... (Emphasis added)

19. In the instant case, admittedly, the procedure prescribed

hereinabove under the 1992 Rules has not been followed. A criminal

contempt case has neither been registered nor numbered separately.

No charge (s) had ever been framed by the Tribunal as mandatorily

required under the rules. Thus question of furnishing the copy of the

same to the appellant did not arise. Therefore, the contempt

proceedings had not been concluded in conformity with the aforesaid

rules at all. This Court in Sahdeo (supra) while dealing with a similar

situation held as under:

1

"Every statutory provision requires strict adherence, for the reason that the Statute creates rights in favour of persons concerned. The impugned judgment suffered from non-observance of the principles of natural justice and not ensuring the compliance of Statutory Rules, 1952. Thus, the trial itself suffered from material procedural defect and stood vitiated. The impugned judgment and order, so far as the conviction of the appellants in Contempt proceedings are concerned, is liable to be set aside."

(Emphasis added)

20. The ratio of the judgment in Sahdeo (supra) applies to this case

in entirety. The instant case is squarely covered by the aforesaid

judgment. In view of the above, the impugned judgment and order

dated 19.12.2002 in O.A. No. 715 of 2002 passed by the Tribunal is

liable to be set aside. The appeal is allowed. The judgment and order

of the Tribunal is set aside. No costs.

..................

..................J. (P. SATHASIVAM)

.............................

......J. (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

New Delhi;

November 29, 2010

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