Priya Vrat Singh & Ors vs Shyam Ji Sahai

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned

Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court dismissing the

application filed in terms of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

1 Procedure, 1973 (in short the `Cr.P.C'). Appellants have filed the

petition for quashing criminal proceeding against them in

Complaint Case No. 896 of 1994 subsequently numbered as

Criminal Case No. 931 of 1995 relating to alleged commission of

offences punishable under Sections 494, 120B and 109 of the

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the `IPC') and Sections 3 & 4 of

the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (in short the `Dowry Act')

pending in the Court of Special Chief Judicial Magistrate,

Varanasi. The prayer was rejected by the High Court being of

the view that the trial court can be directed to conclude the trial

expeditiously and at the time of framing charges, the appellants

can raise such points as has been raised in the present dispute.

Liberty was also granted to appear within one month from the

date of order before the trial court and to obtain bail.

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as under:

Daughter of the respondent namely Madhulika Singh was

married to appellant No.1 Priya Vrat Singh. According to the

appellants, Madhulika started behaving rudely with her husband

2 and his family members as Priya Vrat was unemployed. Tension

between two reached to such an extent that Madhulika tried to

commit suicide on 7.3.1992. She thereafter started giving

repeated threats to commit suicide and appellant was seriously

harassed. From 16.7.1992 onwards appellant No.1 and

Madhulika started living separately in the same house. However,

shortly thereafter Madhulika left her matrimonial house and

started living in the parental house. In the meantime, appellant

No.1 filed a suit in Original Suit No. 188 of 1992 in the Civil

Court at Barabanki for dissolution of marriage between him and

Madhulika on the ground of cruelty and harassment meted out

to him by Madhulika. The said suit was decreed on 1.1.1993 ex

parte in favour of appellant No.1. Time for filing appeal against

the ex-parte decree dated 1.1.1993 under Section 28(4) of the

Hindu Marriage Act, 1956 (in short the `Marriage Act') expired on

31.1.1993. On 21.2.1993 after dissolution of marriage,

appellant No.1 re-married one Neha alias Sunita at Jalgaon in

Maharashtra on 2.3.1993. On 6.12.1994 respondent filed a

private complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Varanasi

wherein all the appellants were arrayed as accused persons. It

3 was alleged that in 21.2.1993 appellant No.1 had re married in

Sankat Mochan Mandir, Varanasi. Allegations of dowry

harassment were also made. It was submitted that the marriage

attracted punishment under Sections 494, 120B and 109 IPC

and Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Act. On 1.6.1995 learned

Special CJM, Varanasi issued summons. Long thereafter, on

9.7.1996 Madhulika filed a Restoration Petition before the Civil

Judge for recalling the order of ex parte. On 9.8.1996, appellants

moved an application before the learned Special CJM, Varanasi,

and protested to the summoning order. However, the same was

rejected by order dated 9.8.1996. On 24.9.1996 petition under

Section 482 Cr.P.C. was filed which was numbered as Criminal

Misc. Case No. 4501 of 1996. On 2.3.1997 the restoration

petition was allowed. On 25.10.2001 the High Court dismissed

the Criminal Misc. Case.

4. In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant

submitted that the marriage of appellant No. 1 with appellant No.

3 is protected under Section 15 of the Marriage Act and

therefore, the proceedings under Section 494 IPC are clearly not

4 maintainable. Further it is pointed out that the allegation of

alleged demand for dowry was made for the first time in

December, 1994. In the complaint filed, the allegation is that the

dowry torture was made some times in 1992. It has not been

explained as to why for more than two years no action was

taken. Further it appears that in the Complaint Petition apart

from the husband, the mother of the husband, the subsequently

married wife, husband's mother's sister, husband's brother in

law and Sunita's father were impleaded as party. No role has

been specifically ascribed to anybody except the husband and

that too of a dowry demand in February, 1993 when the

complaint was filed on 6.12.1994 i.e. nearly after 22 months. It

is to be noted that in spite of service of notice, none has

appeared on behalf of respondent No.1.

5. The parameters for exercise of power under Section 482

have been laid down by this Court in several cases.

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6. The Section does not confer any new power on the High

Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court

possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three

circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be

exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code,

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise

secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to

lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of

inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with

procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise.

Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express

provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of

functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the

doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely

recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All

courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any

express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such

powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in

course of administration of justice on the principle "quando lex

aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae

6 esse non potest" (when the law gives a person anything it gives

him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers

under the section, the court does not function as a court of

appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section

though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with

caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests

specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex

debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the

administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court

exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to

abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has

power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the

court to allow any action which would result in injustice and

prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court

would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that

initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of

court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the

ends of justice.

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7. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court

under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very

plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise.

Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this

power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should

not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High

Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain

from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts

are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not

been collected and produced before the Court and the issues

involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot

be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of

course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases

in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary

jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. (See: Janata

Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary (1992 (4) SCC 305), Raghubir Saran (Dr.)

v. State of Bihar (AIR 1964 SC 1) and Minu Kumari v. State of

Bihar (2006 (4) SCC 359).

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8. The present case appears to be one where the category 7 of

the illustrations given in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1952

(supp.) 1 SCC 335) is clearly applicable.

9. That being so the appeal deserves to be allowed, which we

direct. The proceedings in Case No.896 of 1994 pending before

the Special CJM, Varanasi stand quashed.

10. Appeal is allowed.

.................................J. (DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

.................................J. (P. SATHASIVAM) New Delhi:

August 5, 2008

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