Prema vs Nanje Gowda & Ors

Prema ......Appellant

Versus

Nanje Gowda and others ......Respondents

J U D G M E N T

G.S. Singhvi, J.

1. The question which arises for consideration in this appeal is whether

the appellant, who failed in her challenge to the preliminary decree passed in

a suit for partition filed by respondent No.1 can seek enhancement of her

share in the joint family property in the final decree proceedings in terms of

Section 6A inserted in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (for short, "the Act")

by the Hindu Succession (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 1990, which

received Presidential assent on 28.7.1994 and was published in the

Karnataka Gazette dated 30.7.1994.

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2. The suit for partition and separate possession of his share filed by

respondent No.1, which came to be registered as O.S. No.425 of 1989, was

decreed by Munsiff, Srirangapatna (hereinafter described as, `the trial

Court') vide judgment dated 11.8.1992. The trial Court held that plaintiff-

respondent No.1 and defendant No.3 are entitled to 2/7th share and defendant

Nos.1, 4, 5 and 6 are entitled to 1/28th share each.

3. Regular Appeal No.69 of 1992 jointly filed by the appellant, who was

defendant No.6 in the suit and defendant Nos.1, 4 and 5 was dismissed by

Civil Judge (Senior Division), Srirangapatna (hereinafter described as `the

lower appellate Court') vide judgment dated 20.3.1998. Regular Second

Appeal No.624 of 1998 filed by defendant Nos.1, 4 and 5 was dismissed by

the High Court vide order dated 1.10.1999 on the ground that the same was

barred by limitation.

4. In the meanwhile, respondent No.1 instituted final decree proceedings

(FDP No.5 of 1999). On being noticed by the trial Court, the appellant filed

an application under Sections 151, 152 and 153 of the Code of Civil

Procedure (CPC) for amendment of the preliminary decree and for grant of a

declaration that in terms of Section 6A inserted in the Act by the State

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Amendment, she was entitled to 2/7th share in the suit property. The

appellant averred that she had married one Shri M.B. Srinivasaiah on

9.8.1994, i.e. after coming into force of the State Amendment and, as such,

she is entitled to higher share in the joint family property. Respondent No.1

contested the application by asserting that with the dismissal of Regular

Second Appeal No. 624 of 1998, the preliminary decree passed in O.S.

No.425 of 1989 will be deemed to have become final and in the final decree

proceedings the appellant cannot claim higher share by relying upon Section

6A which came into force in 1994. He denied the appellant's assertion about

her marriage on 9.8.1994. In the alternative, he pleaded that even if the

marriage certificate produced by the appellant is treated as genuine, she

cannot claim higher share by relying upon the State Amendment.

5. By an order dated 10.7.2000, the trial Court dismissed the appellant's

application primarily on the ground that Section 6A of the Act is not

retrospective. In the opinion of the trial Court, the amendment made in the

Act can be applied only to those cases in which partition of the joint family

properties is effected after 30.7.1994, but the same cannot be relied upon for

amending the decree, which has become final. The trial Court observed that

even if the daughter remains unmarried, she cannot be treated as coparcener

because after partition, there remains no joint family property. The trial

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Court also held that the application filed by the appellant was barred by

time.

6. The appellant's challenge to the aforesaid order was negatived by the

learned Single Judge, who held that with the dismissal of the second appeal,

the preliminary decree passed by the trial Court had become final and during

the pendency of the second appeal filed by defendant Nos. 1, 4 and 5, the

appellant had not prayed for enhancement of her share in the joint family

property in terms of Section 6A, which was inserted by the State

Amendment. The learned Single Judge relied upon the judgments of this

Court in Venkata Reddy v. Pethi Reddy AIR 1963 SC 992, Gyarsi Bai v.

Dhansukh Lal AIR 1965 SC 1055 and Mool Chand v. Deputy Director,

Consolidation (1995) 5 SCC 631 and held that the application filed by the

appellant could not be entertained in the final decree proceedings instituted

by respondent No.1. The learned Single Judge distinguished the judgment

in S. Sai Reddy v. S. Narayana Reddy (1991) 3 SCC 647, upon which

reliance was placed by the appellant by observing that the two-Judge Bench

had not referred to the earlier judgments of the larger Benches.

7. Shri S.N. Bhat, learned counsel for the appellant argued that even

though the appellant did not seek modification of the preliminary decree by

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joining other defendants who had filed Regular Second Appeal No.

624/1998, the application filed by her could not have been dismissed as not

maintainable because till then the joint family property had not been

partitioned. He submitted that in a partition suit, the preliminary decree

passed by the competent Court does not become effective till the suit

property is actually divided in accordance with law and the same can be

modified for good and sufficient reasons. Learned counsel submitted that by

virtue of Section 6A, the appellant had become entitle to higher share in the

joint family property and the trial Court and the High Court committed

serious error by negating her claim on a wrong assumption that the benefit of

amendment cannot be availed by the appellant in the final decree

proceedings. In support of his arguments, Shri Bhat relied upon the

judgments of this Court in Phoolchand v. Gopal Lal AIR 1967 SC 1470

and S. Sai Reddy v. S. Narayana Reddy (supra).

8. Mrs. K. Sarada Devi, learned counsel for the respondents argued that

the trial Court and the High Court did not commit any error by rejecting the

appellant's claim for higher share because with the passing of decree for

partition and separate possession, the suit property lost its character as joint

family property and the appellant was not entitled to claim anything from the

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shares already allotted to other members of the erstwhile joint family

property.

9. In the pre-Independence era, social reformers like Raja Ram Mohan

Roy, Lokmanya Tilak, Mahatma Phule and Mahatma Gandhi took up the

cause of women and relentlessly worked for promotion of female education,

re-marriage of widows and elimination of child marriage. The concept of

widow's estate was also developed during that period which led to

enactment of Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937. The framers of

the Constitution were great visionaries. They not only placed justice and

equality at the highest pedestal, but also incorporated several provisions for

ensuring that the people are not subjected to discrimination on the ground of

caste, colour, religion or sex. Article 14 of the Constitution declares that the

State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal

protection of the laws within the territory of India. Article 15 lays down that

the State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of

religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them and no citizen shall

be subjected to any disability, liability, restriction or condition on grounds of

religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them in the matter of access

to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment; or the

use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort

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maintained wholly or partly out of State funds dedicated to the use of the

general public. Clause (3) of Article 15 contains an enabling provision and

lays down that nothing in that article shall prevent the State from making

any special provision for women and children. Similar provisions have been

made in Article 16 in the matter of public employment.

10. With a view to achieve the goal of equality enshrined in Articles 14

and 15(1) of the Constitution and to eliminate discrimination against

daughters, who were deprived of their right to participate in the coparcenary

property, the Karnataka legislature amended the Act and inserted Sections

6A to 6C for ensuring that the unmarried daughters get equal share in the

coparcenary property. This is evident from the preamble and Sections 1 and

2 of the Karnataka Act No.23 of 1994, the relevant portions of which are

reproduced below:

"KARNATAKA ACT No. 23 OF 1994

THE HINDU SUCCESSION (KARNATAKA

AMENDMENT) ACT, 1990

An Act to amend the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 in its

application to the State of Karnataka;

WHEREAS the Constitution of India has proclaimed equality

before law as a fundamental right;

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And whereas the exclusion of the daughter from participation in

co-parcenary ownership merely by reason of her sex is contrary

thereto;

And whereas the beneful system of dowry has to be eradicated

by positive measure which will simultaneously ameliorate the

condition of women in the Hindu society;

Be it enacted by the Karnataka State Legislature in the Forty-

first year of the Republic of India as follows:

1. Short title and commencement. - (1) This Act may be called

the Hindu Succession (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 1990.

(2) It shall come into force at once.

2. Insertion of new sections in Central Act XXX of 1956. - In

the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (Central Act XXX of 1956)

after Section 6, the following sections shall be inserted,

namely:-

6A. Equal rights to daughter in co-parcenary property. -

Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 6 of this Act,-

(a) in a joint Hindu family governed by Mitakshara law,

the daughter of a coparcener shall by birth become a coparcener

in her own right in the same manner as the son and have the

same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had

if she had been a son inclusive of the right to claim by

survivorship and shall be subject to the same liabilities and

disabilities in respect thereto as the son;

(b) at a partition in such Joint Hindu Family the co-

parcenary property shall be so divided as to allot to a daughter

the same share as is allotable to a son;

Provided that the share which a predeceased son or a

predeceased daughter would have got at the partition if he or

she had been alive at the time of the partition, shall be allotted

to the surviving child of such predeceased son or of such

predeceased daughter;

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Provided further that the share allotable to the

predeceased child of the predeceased son or of a predeceased

daughter, if such child had been alive at the time of the

partition, shall be allotted to the child of such predeceased child

of the predeceased son or of such predeceased daughter, as the

case may be: -

(c) any property to which a female Hindu becomes

entitled by virtue of the provisions of clause (a) shall be held by

her with the incidents of coparcenary ownership and shall be

regarded, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any

other law for the time being in force, as property capable of

being disposed of by her by will or other testamentary

disposition;

(d) nothing in clause (b) shall apply to a daughter married

prior to or to a partition which had been effected before the

commencement of Hindu Succession (Karnataka Amendment)

Act, 1990."

11. Similar provisions were inserted in the Act by the legislatures of the

States of Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu. The scope of

Section 29A which was inserted in the Act by Andhra Pradesh Act No.13 of

1986 and which is pari materia to Section 6A of the Karnataka Act No.23 of

1994 was considered by the learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh

High Court in S. Narayana Reddy v. S. Sai Reddy, AIR 1990 Andhra

Pradesh 263. The facts of that case were that the preliminary decree passed

by the trial Court in a partition suit was confirmed by the High Court with a

direction that while passing final decree, the trial Court shall make

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appropriate provision for maintenance and marriage expenses of defendant

Nos.5 to 9 and maintenance of the third defendant shall be borne equally by

each of the plaintiff, first defendant and fourth defendant out of the joint

family properties. After insertion of Section 29A in the Act by Andhra

Pradesh Act No.13 of 1986, the first defendant claimed that defendant Nos.6

to 9 being unmarried daughters are entitled to shares at par with their

brothers because the properties had not been divided by then. The trial

Court rejected the claim of the first defendant by observing that with the

dismissal of the appeal by the High Court, the preliminary decree had

become final and the appellant was not entitled to indirectly challenge the

same. The learned Single Judge referred to Section 29A, the judgments of

Mysore High Court in R. Gurubasaviah Rumale Karibasappa and others

AIR 1955 Mysore 6, Parshuram Rajaram Tiwari v. Hirabai Rajaram

Tiwari, AIR 1957 Bombay 59 and Jadunath Roy and others v.

Parameswar Mullick and others AIR 1940 PC 11 and held that if after

passing of preliminary decree in a partition suit but before passing of final

decree, there has been enlargement or diminution of the shares of the parties

or their rights have been altered by statutory amendment, the Court is duty

bound to decide the matter and pass final decree keeping in view the change

scenario.

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The learned Single Judge then referred to the judgment of this Court

in Phoolchand v. Gopal Lal (supra) and observed:

"19. Since the parties have invoked the jurisdiction of the Civil

Court to decide their rights in a partition suit, their rights can be

considered at any stage till the passing of the final decree. Till

the final decree as stated above is passed in a partition suit, it is

well settled that the suit is said to be pending, till the final

decree is signed by the Judge after engrossing the same on the

stamps. In view of the insertion of S. 29-A in the Hindu

Succession Act by Act (13 of 1986) the statute conferred a right

on the daughters and they become coparceners in their own

right in the same manner as sons and have the same rights in the

coparcenary property. In this case, admittedly the daughters are

already on record and, therefore, they are entitled to claim a

right and request the Court to pass a final decree by taking into

account the altered situation...................................

20. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Phoolchand's case,

(AIR 1967 SC 1470) (supra) there is no prohibition in the Code

of Civil Procedure against passing a second preliminary decree

particularly in partition suits where shares specified in the

preliminary decree have to be adjusted so long as a final decree

has not been passed in that suit. On facts in this case, a

preliminary decree has been passed giving 1/3rd share to the

plaintiff. The shares of the other persons also have to be

ascertained and the rights of the unmarried daughters have been

recognised in the preliminary decree. There is a statutory

change by the introduction of Section 29A of the Hindu

Succession Act which came into force on 5th September, 1985

and the preliminary decree has been passed on 26th December,

1973, but no final decree has been passed. The plaintiff himself

filed an application for passing a final decree and the trial court

is bound to implement the statutory rights conferred on the

daughters and it ought to have allowed the petition in

accordance with law."

(emphasis supplied)

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12. While dismissing the appeal preferred against the judgment of the

High Court, this Court observed as under:

"...........................The crucial question, however, is as to

when a partition can be said to have been effected for the

purposes of the amended provision. A partition of the joint

Hindu family can be effected by various modes, viz., by a

family settlement, by a registered instrument of partition, by

oral arrangement by the parties, or by a decree of the court.

When a suit for partition is filed in a court, a preliminary decree

is passed determining shares of the members of the family. The

final decree follows, thereafter, allotting specific properties and

directing the partition of the immovable properties by metes

and bounds. Unless and until the final decree is passed and the

allottees of the shares are put in possession of the respective

property, the partition is not complete. The preliminary decree

which determines shares does not bring about the final

partition. For, pending the final decree the shares themselves

are liable to be varied on account of the intervening events. In

the instant case, there is no dispute that only a preliminary

decree had been passed and before the final decree could be

passed the amending Act came into force as a result of which

clause (ii) of Section 29-A of the Act became applicable. ......

.............. Since the legislation is beneficial and placed on the

statute book with the avowed object of benefitting women

which is a vulnerable section of the society in all its stratas, it is

necessary to give a liberal effect to it. For this reason also, we

cannot equate the concept of partition that the legislature has in

mind in the present case with a mere severance of the status of

the joint family which can be effected by an expression of a

mere desire by a family member to do so. The partition that the

legislature has in mind in the present case is undoubtedly a

partition completed in all respects and which has brought about

an irreversible situation. A preliminary decree which merely

declares shares which are themselves liable to change does not

bring about any irreversible situation. Hence, we are of the

view that unless a partition of the property is effected by metes

and bounds, the daughters cannot be deprived of the benefits

conferred by the Act. Any other view is likely to deprive a vast

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section of the fair sex of the benefits conferred by the

amendment........................"

(emphasis supplied)

13. In the present case, the preliminary decree was passed on 11.8.1992.

The first appeal was dismissed on 20.3.1998 and the second appeal was

dismissed on 1.10.1999 as barred by limitation. By the preliminary decree,

shares of the parties were determined but the actual partition/division had

not taken place. Therefore, the proceedings of the suit instituted by

respondent No.1 cannot be treated to have become final so far as the actual

partition of the joint family properties is concerned and in view of the law

laid down in Phoolchand v. Gopal Lal (supra) and S. Sai Reddy v. S.

Narayana Reddy (supra), it was open to the appellant to claim enhancement

of her share in the joint family properties because she had not married till the

enforcement of the Karnataka Act No.23 of 1994. Section 6A of the

Karnataka Act No.23 of 1994 is identical to Section 29A of the Andhra

Pradesh Act. Therefore, there is no reason why ratio of the judgment in S.

Sai Reddy v. S. Narayana Reddy (supra) should not be applied for

deciding the appellant's claim for grant of share at par with male members

of the joint family. In our considered view, the trial Court and the learned

Single Judge were clearly in error when they held that the appellant was not

entitled to the benefit of the Karnataka Act No.23 of 1994 because she had

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not filed an application for enforcing the right accruing to her under Section

6A during the pendency of the first and the second appeals or that she had

not challenged the preliminary decree by joining defendant Nos.1, 4 and 5 in

filing the second appeal.

14. We may add that by virtue of the preliminary decree passed by the

trial Court, which was confirmed by the lower appellate Court and the High

Court, the issues decided therein will be deemed to have become final but as

the partition suit is required to be decided in stages, the same can be

regarded as fully and completely decided only when the final decree is

passed. If in the interregnum any party to the partition suit dies, then his/her

share is required to be allotted to the surviving parties and this can be done

in the final decree proceedings. Likewise, if law governing the parties is

amended before conclusion of the final decree proceedings, the party

benefited by such amendment can make a request to the Court to take

cognizance of the amendment and give effect to the same. If the rights of

the parties to the suit change due to other reasons, the Court ceased with the

final decree proceedings is not only entitled but is duty bound to take notice

of such change and pass appropriate order. In this case, the Act was

amended by the State legislature and Sections 6A to 6C were inserted for

achieving the goal of equality set out in the Preamble of the Constitution. In

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terms of Section 2 of the Karnataka Act No.23 of 1994, Section 6A came

into force on 30.7.1994, i.e. the date on which the amendment was

published. As on that day, the final decree proceedings were pending.

Therefore, the appellant had every right to seek enlargement of her share by

pointing out that the discrimination practiced against the unmarried daughter

had been removed by the legislative intervention and there is no reason why

the Court should hesitate in giving effect to an amendment made by the

State legislature in exercise of the power vested in it under Article 15(3) of

the Constitution.

15. The issue which remains to be considered is whether the learned

Single Judge of the High Court was justified in refusing to follow the law

laid down in S. Sai Reddy v. S. Narayana Reddy (supra) on the ground

that the same was based on the judgment of three-Judge Bench in

Phoolchand v. Gopal Lal (supra) and a contrary view had been expressed

by the larger Bench in Venkata Reddy v. Pethi Reddy (supra).

16. In Phoolchand v. Gopal Lal (supra), this Court considered the

question whether the preliminary decree passed in a partition suit is

conclusive for all purposes and the Court before whom final decree

proceedings are pending cannot take note the changes which may have

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occurred after passing of the preliminary decree. The facts of that case were

that appellant-Phoolchand had filed a suit in 1937 for partition of his 1/5th

share in the plaint schedule properties. Sohanlal (father of the appellant),

Gopal Lal (brother of the appellant), Rajmal (minor adopted son of

Gokalchand (deceased), who was another brother of the appellant) and Smt.

Gulab Bai (mother of the appellant) impleaded as defendants along with two

other persons. The suit was contested up to Mahkma Khas of the former

State of Jaipur and a preliminary decree for partition was passed on 1.8.1942

specifying the shares of the appellant and four defendants. Before a final

decree could be passed, Sohanlal and his wife Smt Gulab Bai died. Gopal

Lal claimed that his father Sohanlal had executed a Will in his favour on

2.6.1940 and bequeathed all his property to him. Appellant-Phoolchand

challenged the genuineness of the Will. He also claimed that Smt Gulab Bai

had executed a sale deed dated 19.10.1947 in his favour, which was duly

registered on 10.1.1948. Gopal Lal challenged the sale deed by contending

that Gulab Bai had executed the sale deed because she was a limited owner

of the share in the ancestral property. The trial Court held that the Will

allegedly executed by Sohan Lal in favour of Gopal Lal had not been proved

but the sale deed executed by Gulab Bai in favour of Phoolchand was valid.

As a sequel to these findings, the trial Court redistributed the shares

indicated in the preliminary decree. As a result, Phoolchand's share was

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increased from one-fifth to one-half and Gopal Lal's share was increased

from one-fifth to one-fourth and that of Rajmal from one-fifth to one-fourth.

The High Court allowed the appeal filed by Gopal Lal and held that Gulab

Bai was not entitled to sell her share in favour of appellant-Phoolchand. The

High Court also held that the Will executed by Sohan Lal in favour of Gopal

Lal was genuine. One of the points considered by this Court was whether

there could be more than one preliminary decree. This Court referred to the

judgments of various High Courts, which took the view that in a partition

suit, the High Court has jurisdiction to amend the shares suitably even if the

preliminary decree has been passed and then proceeded to observe:

"We are of opinion that there is nothing in the Code of Civil

Procedure which prohibits the passing of more than one

preliminary decree if circumstances justify the same and that it

may be necessary to do so particularly in partition suits when

after the preliminary decree some parties die and shares of other

parties are thereby augmented. We have already said that it is

not disputed that in partition suits the court can do so even after

the preliminary decree is passed. It would in our opinion be

convenient to the court and advantageous to the parties,

specially in partition suits, to have disputed rights finally settled

and specification of shares in the preliminary decree varied

before a final decree is prepared. If this is done, there is a clear

determination of the rights of parties to the suit on the question

in dispute and we see no difficulty in holding that in such cases

there is a decree deciding these disputed rights; if so, there is no

reason why a second preliminary decree correcting the shares in

a partition suit cannot be passed by the court. So far therefore as

partition suits are concerned we have no doubt that if an event

transpires after the preliminary decree which necessitates a

change in shares, the court can and should do so; and if there is

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a dispute in that behalf, the order of the court deciding that

dispute and making variation in shares specified in the

preliminary decree already passed is a decree in itself which

would be liable to appeal. We should however like to point out

that what we are saying must be confined to partition suits, for

we are not concerned in the present appeal with other kinds of

suits in which also preliminary and final decrees are passed...

.................................."

(emphasis supplied)

17. In Venkata Reddy v. Pethi Reddy (supra), the Constitution Bench

was called upon to consider the question as to what meaning should be given

to the expression `final decision' occurring in the first proviso to Section

28A of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920. The facts of that case were that

Venkata Reddy, the father of the appellants, was adjudicated an insolvent by

the Sub-Court, Salem in I.P. No. 73 of 1935. At that time only appellants

Nos.1 and 2 were born while the third appellant was born later. The father's

one-third share was put up for auction by the Official Receiver and was

purchased by one Karuppan Pillai for Rs 80/-. The Official Receiver then put

up for auction the two-third share belonging to appellant Nos.1 and 2 on

27.7.1936 which was purchased by the same person for Rs 341/-. He sold

the entire property to the respondent Pethi Reddy on 25.5.1939 for Rs 300/-.

The appellants instituted a suit on 1.2.1943 for the partition of the joint

family property to which suit they made Pethi Reddy a party and claimed

thereunder two-third share in the property purchased by him. In that suit, it

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was contended on behalf of the respondent that on their father's insolvency

the share of the appellants in the joint family property also vested in the

Official Receiver and that he had the power to sell it. The contention was

negatived by the trial Court which passed preliminary decree for partition in

favour of the appellants. The decree was affirmed in appeal by the District

Judge and eventually by the High Court in second appeal, except with a

slight variation regarding the amount of mesne profits. On 18.1.1946, the

appellants made an application for a final decree which was granted ex parte

on 17.8.1946. However, the decree was set aside at the instance of the

respondent. By relying upon Section 28A of the Provincial Insolvency Act,

it was contended by the respondent that the appellants were not entitled to

the allotment of their two-third share in the property purchased by him

inasmuch as that share had vested in the Official Receiver. The District

Munsiff rejected the contention of the respondent and restored the ex parte

decree. The appeal preferred by the respondent was dismissed by Principal

Subordinate Judge, Salem. However, the second appeal filed by him was

allowed by the High Court and the application filed by the appellants for

passing final decree was dismissed. The Constitution Bench referred to

Section 28A of the Provincial Insolvency Act, which was as under:

"The property of the insolvent shall comprise and shall always

be deemed to have comprised also the capacity to exercise and

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to take proceedings for exercising all such powers in or over or

in respect of property as might have been exercised by the

insolvent for his own benefit at the commencement of his

insolvency or before his discharge:

Provided that nothing in this section shall affect any sale,

mortgage or other transfer of the property of the insolvent by a

Court or Receiver or the Collector acting under Section 60

made before the commencement of the Provincial Insolvency

(Amendment) Act, 1948, which has been the subject of a final

decision by a competent court:

Provided further that the property of the insolvent shall

not be deemed by any reason of anything contained in this

section to comprise his capacity referred to in this section in

respect of any such sale, mortgage or other transfer of property

made in the State of Madras after July 28, 1942 and before the

commencement of the Provincial Insolvency (Amendment) Act,

1948."

The Court then referred to Objects and Reasons set out in the Bill,

which led to the enactment of Section 28A and observed:

"The new provision makes it clear that the law is and has

always been that upon the father's insolvency his disposing

power over the interest of his undivided sons in the joint family

property vests in the Official Receiver and that consequently

the latter has a right to sell that interest. The provision is thus

declaratory of the law and was intended to apply to all cases

except those covered by the two provisos. We are concerned

here only with the first proviso. This proviso excepts from the

operation of the Act a transaction such as a sale by an Official

Receiver which has been the subject of a final decision by a

competent Court......................."

The Court then held that the preliminary decree passed, whether it is

in a mortgage suit or a partition suit, is not a tentative decree but is final in

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so far as the matters dealt with by it are concerned. This is evident from the

following observations made in the judgment:

".......................................A decision is said to be final

when, so far as the court rendering it is concerned, it is

unalterable except by resort to such provisions of the Code of

Civil Procedure as permit its reversal, modification or

amendment. Similarly, a final decision would mean a decision

which would operate as res judicata between the parties if it is

not sought to be modified or reversed by preferring an appeal or

a revision or a review application as is permitted by the Code.

A preliminary decree passed, whether it is in a mortgage suit or

a partition suit, is not a tentative decree but must, in so far as

the matters dealt with by it are concerned, be regarded as

conclusive. No doubt, in suits which contemplate the making of

two decrees a preliminary decree and a final decree -- the

decree which would be executable would be the final decree.

But the finality of a decree or a decision does not necessarily

depend upon its being executable. The legislature in its wisdom

has thought that suits of certain types should be decided in

stages and though the suit in such cases can be regarded as fully

and completely decided only after a final decree is made the

decision of the court arrived at the earlier stage also has a

finality attached to it. It would be relevant to refer to Section 97

of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that where a

party aggrieved by a preliminary decree does not appeal from it,

he is precluded from disputing its correctness in any appeal

which may be preferred from the final decree. This provision

thus clearly indicates that as to the matters covered by it, a

preliminary decree is regarded as embodying the final decision

of the court passing that decree."

(emphasis supplied)

18. In Gyarsi Bai v. Dhansukh Lal (supra), the three-Judge Bench

considered the nature of the preliminary and final decrees in a mortgage suit

and the question whether the mortgagor is entitled to raise the plea in the

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final decree proceedings which he did not raise during the pendency of the

suit up to the stage of preliminary decree. The facts of the case, as contained

in the judgment, were that the plaint-schedule properties originally belonged

to one Noor Mohammad, his wife and son. On 14.9.1936, they mortgaged

the said properties with possession to B.F. Marfatia for a sum Rs. 25,000.

On 22.2.1938, the said mortgagors executed a simple mortgage in respect of

the same properties to one Novat Mal for Rs. 5000. On 21.12.1942, Radha

Kishan, Har Prasad and Pokhi Ram acquired the equity of redemption in the

said properties in an auction-sale held in execution of a money decree

against the mortgagors. On 14.2.1950 and 13.3.1950, Seth Girdhari Lal, the

husband of appellant No.1 herein, purchased the mortgagee rights of Novat

Mal and Marfatia respectively. On 1.5.1950, Girdhari Lal was put in

possession of the mortgaged properties. On 22.7.1950, respondent Nos.9 to

11 purchased the equity of redemption of the mortgaged properties from

Radha Kishan, Har Prasad and Pokhi Ram. On 10.8.1950, Girdhari Lal

instituted Civil Suit No. 739 of 1950 in the Court of the Senior Subordinate

Judge, Ajmer, for enforcing the said two mortgages. In the suit, he claimed

Rs. 48,919-12-6 as the amount due to him under the said two mortgages. On

25.4.1953, the Senior Subordinate Judge, Ajmer, gave a preliminary decree

in the suit for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 34,003-1-6 with proportionate

costs and future interest; he disallowed interest from 14.9.1936 to 13.3.1950,

23

on the mortgage of Rs. 25,000. The plaintiff-mortgagee preferred an appeal,

being Civil Appeal No.71 of 1953 to the Judicial Commissioner, Ajmer,

against the said decree insofar as it disallowed interest to him. The

defendants preferred cross-objections in respect of that part of the decree

awarding costs against them. On 25.7.1953, the defendants filed an

application under Order XXXIV Rule 5(1) of the CPC, seeking permission

to deposit the decretal amount in court and praying that possession of the

properties may be directed to be delivered to them and also for directing the

decree-holder to render accounts of the profits of the mortgaged properties

received by him. On 29.7.1953, the respondents deposited Rs. 35,155-2-6 in

the trial Court. On 17.8.1953, the decree-holder filed objections to the said

deposit on the ground that it was much less than the decretal amount. On

27.8.1953, the trial Court made an order permitting the decree-holder to

withdraw the said amount with the reservation that the question as to what

was due under the decree would be decided later. On 25.8.1954, both the

appeal of the decree-holder and the cross-objections of the defendants were

dismissed. On 7.12.1954, the defendants filed an application in the trial

Court for the determination of the amount due under the decree and for

directing the decree-holder to render accounts of all the realizations from the

mortgaged properties. On 14.3.1955, this Court granted special leave to the

decree-holder for preferring an appeal against the judgment of the Judicial

24

Commissioner dismissing Civil Appeal No. 71 of 1953. On 15.2.1956, the

trial Court dismissed the application filed by the defendants for directions on

the ground that the mortgage deed had merged in the preliminary decree and

that the said decree contained no directions to the plaintiff to render

accounts. On 29.2.1956, the defendants applied to the Judicial

Commissioner, Ajmer under Section 152 of the CPC for amending the

preliminary decree by including therein a direction against the plaintiff for

rendition of account in respect of the profits received by him from the

mortgaged properties. On 12.4.1956, the Judicial Commissioner dismissed

the said application. On 25.4.1956, the defendants filed a revision petition

against the order of the trial Court dated 15.2.1956, in the Court of the

Judicial Commissioner, Ajmer. By judgment dated 16.12.1960, this Court

modified the preliminary decree and directed the trial Court to pass a fresh

final decree. Thereafter, the High Court allowed the revision filed by the

defendants and remanded the case to the trial Court with a direction to take

into account the receipts from the mortgaged properties and expenses

properly incurred for management thereof and to determine what sum

remained to be paid to the mortgagees taking into account the judgment of

this Court. On appeal, this Court referred to Section 76(h) of the Transfer of

Property Act and held that if the mortgagor does not raise a particular plea at

the stage of preliminary decree, he would be debarred on the principle of res

25

judicata from raising the same at a later stage and then proceeded to

observe:

"But the same cannot be said of the net receipts realized by the

mortgagee subsequent to the preliminary decree. None of the

principles relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants

helps him in this regard. It is true that a preliminary decree is

final in respect of the matters to be decided before it is made:

See Venkata Reddy v. Pethi Reddy AIR 1963 SC 992 and

Section 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is indisputable

that in a mortgage suit there will be two decrees, namely,

preliminary decree and final decree, and that ordinarily the

preliminary decree settles the rights of the parties and the final

decree works out those rights: see Talebali v. Abdul Azia, ILR

57 Cal 1013; (AIR 1929 Cal 689 FB) and Kausalya v.

Kauleshwar, ILR 25 Pat 305: (AIR 1947 Pat 113). It cannot

also be disputed that a mortgage merges in the preliminary

decree and the rights of the parties are thereafter governed by

the said decree: See Kusum Kumari v. Debi Prosad

Dhandhania, 63 Ind App 114: (AIR 1936 PC 63). But we do not

see any relevancy of the said principles to the problem that

arises in this case in regard to the liability of the mortgagee to

account for the net receipts under Section 76(h) of the Transfer

of Property Act. A preliminary decree is only concerned with

disputes germane to the suit up to the date of the passing of the

said decree. The net receipts of the mortgaged property by the

mortgagee subsequent to the preliminary decree are outside the

scope of the preliminary decree: they are analogous to amounts

paid to a mortgagee by a mortgagor subsequent to the

preliminary decree."

19. In Mool Chand v. Deputy Director, Consolidation (supra), the

Court considered the provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act,

1953 and held that the preliminary decree passed in a suit for partition can

be given effect to in proceedings before the consolidation authorities. 26

20. In our view, neither of the aforesaid three judgments can be read as

laying down a proposition of law that in a partition suit, preliminary decree

cannot be varied in the final decree proceedings despite amendment of the

law governing the parties by which the discrimination practiced against

unmarried daughter was removed and the statute was brought in conformity

with Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. We are further of the view that

the ratio of Phoolchand v. Gopal Lal (supra) and S. Sai Reddy v. S.

Narayana Reddy (supra) has direct bearing on this case and the trial Court

and the High Court committed serious error by dismissing the application

filed by the appellant for grant of equal share in the suit property in terms of

Section 6A of the Karnataka Act No.23 of 1994.

21. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment as also

the order passed by the trial Court are set aside. As a sequel to this, the

application filed by the appellant under Sections 151, 152 and 153 CPC is

allowed in terms of the prayer made. If the final decree has not been passed

so far, then the trial Court shall do so within six months from the date of

production/receipt of the copy of this judgment. If the final decree has

already been passed, then the trial Court shall amend the same in terms of

27

this judgment and give effect to the right acquired by the appellant under

Section 6A of the Karnataka Act No.23 of 1994. The parties are left to bear

their own costs.

.............................................J.

[G.S. Singhvi]

................................

..............J.

[K.S. Panicker Radhakrishnan]

New Delhi

10th May, 2011.