Pramod Kumar Mishra vs State Of U.P Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Lko. And Another

Respondent :- State Of U.P Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Lko. And Another

Counsel for Appellant :- Gaurav Shukla

Counsel for Respondent :- G.A.

Hon'ble Saurabh Lavania,J.

1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant, learned AGA for the State and perused the record.

2. By means of instant appeal under Section 14A(2) of Scheduled Cases and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (in short "SC/ST Act"), the appellant has assailed the order dated 04.04.2024 passed by Special Judge (SC/ST) Act/Additional District Judge, District Sitapur in Case No. 18/2017, under Sections 364A/323/504/506 IPC and 3(1)(n) and 3(1)(/k) of S.C./S.T. Act, Police Station- Hargaon, District- Sitapur.

3. Brief facts of the case are to the effect that an application dated 28.02.2017, under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed by opposite party no.2 (Madan).

4. In short, as per application u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C., on 07.12.2016 at about 7 A.M. the opposite party no.2/complainant (Madan Lal) and his brother namely Bhagirath while both were going to their agricultural land, the appellant alongwith Mahendra s/o Bhagwan Baksh and Santosh s/o Jalli appeared and assaulted the complainant and his brother and made casteist remarks and also used abusive language and abducted Bhagirath and thereafter on 21.12.2016 demanded Rs. 70,000/- by making call on phone no. 799890717 of opposite party no.2 and as FIR was not lodged, the opposite party no. 2 made written complaint on 23.12.2016 to Director General of Police and Human Right Commission, and thereafter, Madan Lal got executed the sale deed on 02.02.2017 by Bhagirath and thereafter again the opposite party no.2 made complaint to District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police, Sitapur.

5. On the application dated 28.02.2017, bearing Case No. 18/2017 (Madan Versus Pramod Mishra), under Sections 364A/323/504/506 IPC and 3(1)(n) and 3(1)(/k) of SC/ST Act 1989, the trial court proceeded in the matter, after taking note of the statement(s) under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C., and passed the order dated 13.10.2017, whereby summoned the accused.

6. After aforesaid, an application in the light of the order of this Court dated 08.06.2018 passed in Application under Sections 482/378/407 No. 3828 of 2018 (Pramod Kumar Mishra Versus State of U.P. and another), which was filed for quashing the summoning order dated 13.10.2017 and complaint case, was preferred by the appellant seeking discharge.

7. The trial court after considering the evidence on record rejected the application by means of the order dated 10.08.2018. Relevant portion of the order dated 10.08.2018 on reproduction reads as under:-

"vfHk;qDr izeksn dqekj feJk dh vksj ls vkosnui= 12d bl vk'k; dk izLrqr fd;k x;k gS fd ;g ifjokn xyr o vlR; rF;ksa ij vk/kkfjr gSA ifjoknh dk HkkbZ HkkxhjFk us xzke lsyweÅ ijxuk gjxkWo] rglhy o ftyk lhrkiqj fLFkr Hkwfe xkVk la[;k 28 o 36 esa viuh va'k Hkwfe rFkk xzke ujksRreiqj esa fLFkr xkVk la[;k 60 dh viuh va'k Hkwfe /ku dh vko';drk iM+us ij bUgs iathd`r fodz; foys[k }kjk fodz; dh Fkh rFkk bl lEcU/k esa HkkxhjFk us dysDVj lhrkiqj ls xSj vuqlwfpr tkfr ds O;fDr dks fodz; djus dh vuqKk Hkh izkIr dh FkhA ;g Hkh dgk x;k gS fd mijksDr cSukes ds vk/kkj ij vfHk;qDr izeksn dqekj feJk dk uke jktLo vfHkys[kksa esa] izfroknh enu dh vkifRr;ksa dks [kkfjt djrs gq;s] ukekUrj.k gks x;k gSA mijksDr cSukek fujLrhdj.k ds lEcU/k esa enu o HkkxhjFk }kjk izFkd&izFkd nhokuh okn Hkh izLrqr fd;s x;s Fks rFkk mlesa HkkxhjFk us U;k;ky; esa Lo;a mifLFkr gksdj o 'kiFk i= nsdj cSukek fu"iknu ds rF; dks Lohdkj fd;k FkkA ;g dgk x;k gS fd izLrqr izdj.k tSlh dksbZ ?kVuk dkfjr ugha gqbZ gSA rnuqlkj n.M izfdz;k lafgrk dh /kkjk 245 dh izfdz;k iw.kZ djrs gq;s mUeksfpr fd;s tkus dh ;kpuk dh xbZ gSA

vkosnui= dk fojks/k djrs gq;s ifjoknh dh vksj ls ;g dFku fd;k x;k gS fd bl U;k;ky; ds le{k izLrqr lk{; ds vk/kkj ij vfHk;qDr izeksn dqekj feJk dks Hkk0 na0 la0 dh /kkjk 323] 504] 506] 364, ,oa vuqlwfpr tkfr ,oa tutkfr ¼vR;kpkj fuokj.k½ vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 3¼1½¼n½¼/k½ ds v/khu rYkc fd;k x;k gS rFkk vkjksi fojfpr fd;s tkus ds vk/kkj i;kZIr gSA

izLrqr izdj.k esa laf{kIr dFkkud ;g gS fd enu us U;k;ky; ds le{k n.M izfdz;k lafgrk dh /kkjk 156¼3½ dk vkosnui= bl vk'k; dk izLrqr fd;k fd fnukWd 07-12-2016 dks izkr% 7-00 cts tc og vius HkkbZ HkkxhjFk ds lkFk [ksr ij dke djus tk jgk Fkk rHkh jkLrs esa izeksn dqekj feJk lQsn jax dh ek:fr dkj ysdj jkLrs esa jksd fy;k rFkk vius nks lkfFk;ksa egsUnz o larks"k ds lkFk feydj ifjoknh o mlds HkkbZ dks tkfrlwpd xkfy;kW nh] ykr ?kwlksa o ykBh M.Mksa ls dkQh ekjkihVk rFkk HkkxhjFk dks tku ls ekjus dh /kedh nsdj vius lkFk tcju xkM+h esa cSBdj mBk ys x;sA ?kVuk dh lwpuk Fkkuk gjxkWo ij fn;s tkus ds ckotwn Hkh dksbZ dk;Zokgh ugha gqbZA fnukWd 21-12-2016 dks izeksn dqekj feJk us ifjoknh ds eksckbZy uEcj ij lqcg 10-50 cts fQjkSrh ds :i esa 70]000@& :i;s dh ekWx dh vkSj u nsus ij HkkbZ dks tku ls ekj nsus dh ckr dghA ;g Hkh dgk x;k fd fnukWd 02-02-2017 dks HkkxhjFk ls /kks[ks ls tcjnLrh tehu dk cSukek djk fy;k x;k gS vkSj HkkxhjFk vHkh Hkh vfHk;qDr ds dCts esa gSA rnuqlkj izFke lwpuk fjiksVZ vafdr djk;s tkus dh ;kpuk dh xbZA bl U;k;ky; ds iwokZf/kdkjh }kjk mijksDr okn i= dks ifjokn ds :i esa iathd`r fd;s tkus dk fnukad 24-05-2017 dks fd;k x;k rnqijkUr n.M izfdz;k lafgrk dh /kkjk 200 ds v/khu ifjoknh Lo;a o n.M izfdz;k lafgrk dh /kkjk 202 ds v/khu ih0MCyw0&1 ujsUnz o ih0MCyw0&2 vfuy dqekj ijhf{kr fd;s x;s rFkk bl U;k;ky; ds iwokZf/kdkjh ds vkns'k fnukWd 13-10-2017 ds ek/;e viBuh; izeksn dqekj feJk dks fopkj.k gsrq ryc fd;k x;kA vfHk;qDr izeksn dqekj feJk mifLFkr u gksus ij muds fo:) xSj tekurh okj.V tkjh fd;s x;s rFkk bl U;k;ky; ds mijksDr rych vkns'k rFkk xSj tekurh okj.V ds vkns'k ls O;fFkr gksdj vfHk;qDr dh vksj ls na0iz0la0 dh /kkjk 482] 378] 407 ds v/khu okn la[;k 3828@2018 ;ksftr fd;k x;k rFkk mijksDr izdj.k esa ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; }kjk fnukad 08-06-2018 dks vfHk;qDr@;kph dks ;g Lora=rk nh fd og fopkj.k U;k;ky; ds le{k na0iz0la0 ds lqlaxr izkfo/kkuksa ds v/khu vkosnu izLrqr dj ldrk gS ftl dze esa lanfHkZr vkosnui= 12d izLrqr fd;k x;k gSA

bl U;k;ky; ds le{k na0iz0la0 dh /kkjk 200 o 202 ds v/khu ijhf{kr lkf{k;ksa ds c;kuksa ds vkyksd esa eS bl er dk gwW fd vfHk;qDr izeksn dqekj feJk ds fo:) Hkk0na0la0 dh /kkjk 323] 504] 506] 364, ,oa vuqlwfpr tkfr ,oa tutkfr ¼vR;kpkj fuokj.k½ vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 3¼1½¼n½¼/k½ esa vkjksi fojfpr fd;s tkus ds i;kZIr vk/kkj gSA tgkW rd vkosnui= 12d es of.kZr rF;ksa dk lEcU/k gS ,sls leLr rF;ksa ij lE;d fopkj nkSjku fopkj.k vfHk;kstu o cpko i{k ds }kjk ijhf{kr lk{; ds vkyksd esa fd;k tk ldsxkA rnuqlkj vkonsu i= 12d fujLr gksus ;ksX; gSA

vkns'k

vkosnu i= 12d fujLr fd;k tkrk gSA vfHk;qDr U;k;ky; esa O;fDrxr :i esa fnukad 17-08-2018 dks mifLFkr gksA"

8. After the aforesaid, on 30.09.2021, the trial court framed the charges and thereafter before the trial court the statement(s) of witnesses namely opposite party no.2/Madan and Narendra Pal as P.W.1. and P.W.2 were recorded.

9. It would be apt to indicate at this stage that on 08.11.2023, the statement of P.W. 2 was concluded before the trial court and thereafter, as appeared from Annexure No. 9, after about 9 months, on 02.08.2024 the defence witness namely Ghanshyam Singh was produced before the trial court whose statement was recorded as DW 1 and the statement of DW-1/Ghanshyam Singh, was concluded on 11.03.2024.

10. From the aforesaid, it can be deduced that the appellant wants to delay the proceedings pending before the trial court.

11. It would be again relevant to indicate here that before this Court list of witnesses, if any placed before the trial court by the appellant, has not been placed on record.

12. After recording the statement of DW-1/Ghanshyam Singh, an application dated 01.04.2024, under Section 311 Cr.P.C., was preferred before the trial court, praying therein for summoning one Shyam Singh Bisen, Sub Registrar, District Sitapur. The contents of the application dated 01.04.2024, being relevant are extracted herein under:-

"fuosnu djuk gS fd ifjokn esa ifjoknh }kjk fodszrk HkkxhjFkh dh fQjkSrh fnukad 7-12-2016 dh lqcg 7%00 cts dh n'kkbZ xbZ gS blh dze esa fnukad 2-2-2017 dks foi{kh }kjk ifjoknh ds HkkbZ HkkxhjFk ls /kks[ks ls tcjnLrh mldh tehu dk cSukek djok fy;k x;k gSA ;g rF; ifjokn esa n'kkZ;k x;k gS] ds dFku dks lkfcr djus ds fy, mi fuca/kd lhrkiqj dks ryc djuk U;k;fgr esa vko';d gSA

vr% Jheku th ls izkFkZuk gS fd U;k;fgr esa mi fuca/kd] lhrkiqj dks crkSj lk{kh ryc djus dh d`ik djsaA egku d`ik gksxhA

uke lk{kh&Jh ';ke flag folsu] mi fuca/kd] lhrkiqjA "

13. It is apparent from the contents of application dated 01.04.2024 that the same was preferred to prove the fact that the sale deed was not got executed and registered by the appellant from Bhagirath (brother of complainant/Madan) on 02.02.2017 under coercion or by playing fraud.

14. It would not be out of place to indicate here that complaint case is proceeding under Sections 364A/323/504/506 IPC and 3(1)(n) and 3(1)(/k) of SC/ST Act 1989 and aforesaid application dated 01.04.20224 was opposed by opposite party no.2 by preferring an objection dated 04.04.2024, which reads as under:-

"lfou; fuosnu gS fd izkFkhZ mDr eqdnes esa oknh eqdnek gS rFkk mijksDr eqdnek cgl gsrq Jheku th ds U;k;ky; esa fopkjk/khu gS ijUrq foIk{kh ds }kjk fnukad&01-04-2024 dks izkFkZuk i= /kkjk&311 na0iz0la0 dk fn;k x;k gS tks fd vkSfpR;ghu gS D;ksafd mDr eqdnes esa foi{kh dk vkjksi va0 /kkjk&364,] 323] 506 IPC & 3(1)n] /k SC/ST Act ds rgr fd;k tk jgk gS ftl dkj.k lk{kh mi fucU/kd lhrkiqj dks ryc djus dh dksbZ vko';drk ugh gSA

vr% Jheku th ls fouez fuosnu gS fd U;k;fgr esa foi{kh ds izkFkZuk i= fnukad&01-04-2024 dks fujLr djus dks vkns'k ikfjr djus dh d`ik djsaA "

15. The trial court, thereafter, on 04.04.2024 rejected the application preferred by the appellant under Section 311 Cr.P.C. The order dated 04.04.2024, impugned herein, reads as under:-

"vfHk;qDr izeksn dqekj feJk ds fo}ku vf/koDrk dh vksj ls izkFkZuki= vUrxZr /kkjk 311 na0 iz0 la0 izLrqr dj dFku fd;k x;k gS fd mDr okn esa ifjoknh }kjk fodszrk HkkxhjFkh dh fQjkSrh fnukad 07-12-2016 dh lqcg 7 cts dh n'kkZ;h x;h gS blh dze esa fnukad 2-02-2017 dks foi{khx.k ifjoknh ds HkkbZ HkxhjFkh ls /kks[ks ls tcjnLrh mldh tehu dk cSukek djok fy;k x;k gSA ;g rF; ifjokn esa n'kkZ;k x;k gS ds dFku dks lkfcr djus ds fy;s mi fuca/kd lhrkiqj dks ryc djuk U;k;fgr esa vko';d gSA vr% U;k;fgr esa mifuca/kd lhrkiqj dks crkSj lk{kh ryc djus dh d`ik djsaA

mDr izkFkZuk i= ij fo'ks"k yksd vfHk;kstd }kjk vkifRRk djrs gq;s fojks/k fd;k x;k gSA

lquk rFkk i=koyh dk voyksdu fd;kA

i=koyh ds voyksdu ls fofnr gksrk gS fd i=koyh esa vfHk;qDrx.k dk c;ku vUrxZr /kkjk 313 na0iz0la0 vafdr fd;k tk pqdk gS rFkk i=koyh cgl ds Lrj ij fu;r gSA bl Lrj ij vfHk;qDr dh vksj ls izkFkZuk i= vUrxZr 311 na0iz0la0 izLrqr dj mifuca/kd lhrkiqj dks is'k fd;s tkus dh ;kpuk dh x;h gSA i=koyh ds voyksdu ls Li"V gS fd vfHk;qDr dks izLrqr izdj.k esa lQkbZ lk{; izLrqr djus dk i;kZIr volj fn;k x;k gS fd ftlds ckn vfHk;qDr dh vksj ls Lo;a viuh lk{; lekIr dh x;h gS fdUrq i=koyh cgl gsrq fu;r gksus ds mijkUr vfHk;qDr }kjk iqu% lk{kh izLrqr fd;s tkus dh ;kpuk dh x;h gSA izLrqr izdj.k cSukes ds QzkM ls ugha cfYd vigj.k ds vijk/k ls lEcfU/kr gS rFkk ,slk izrhr gksrk gS fd vfHk;qdr }kjk tku cw>dj ekeys dks foyfEcr djus ds vk'k; ls ;g izkFkZuk i= izLrqr fd;k x;k gS ftls Lohdkj fd;k tkuk U;k;ksfpr izrhr ugha gksrk gSA vr% mDr izkFkZuki= vUrxZRk /kkjk 311 na0iz0la0 fujLr fd;s tkus i;kZIr vk/kkj gSA

vkns'k

vfHk;qDrx.k dh vksj ls izLrqr izkFkZuk i= vUrxZr /kkjk 311 na0iz0la0 fujLr fd;k tkrk gSA i=koyh okLrs cgl fnukad 8-4-2024 dks is'k gksA "

16. Learned Counsel for the appellant impeaching the order dated 04.04.2024 submitted the allegation before the trial court in the complaint are to the effect that appellant abducted the brother of the complainant and got executed and registered a sale deed from him forcefully on 02.02.2017 and as such the presence of Sub Registrar Sitapur is required as witness of defence, as he can prove the fact that sale deed was not got executed and registered by Bhagirath in favour of the appellant under coercion or under some threat or fraudulently.

17. He further submitted that in view of necessity of Sub Registrar as witness the application was preferred by the newly engaged counsel and the trial court is empowered to summon any witness in terms of Section 311 Cr.P.C. at any stage of the proceedings and as such the reasoning given by the trial court in the impugned order is unsustainable in the eyes of law.

18. In support of his submission he placed reliance on the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Natasha Singh v. CBI, (2013) reported in 5 SCC 741. The relevant paragraphs, referred, of the same, are as under:-

"10. In Mohanlal Shamji Soni v. Union of India [Mohanlal Shamji Soni v. Union of India, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 271 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 595 : AIR 1991 SC 1346] this Court examined the scope of Section 311 CrPC, and held that it is a cardinal rule of the law of evidence, that the best available evidence must be brought before the court to prove a fact, or a point in issue. However, the court is under an obligation to discharge its statutory functions, whether discretionary or obligatory, according to law and hence ensure that justice is done. The court has a duty to determine the truth, and to render a just decision. The same is also the object of Section 311 CrPC, wherein the court may exercise its discretionary authority at any stage of the enquiry, trial or other proceedings, to summon any person as a witness though not yet summoned as a witness, or to recall or re-examine any person, though not yet summoned as a witness, who are expected to be able to throw light upon the matter in dispute, because if the judgments happen to be rendered on an inchoate, inconclusive and speculative presentation of facts, the ends of justice would be defeated.

11. In Rajeswar Prasad Misra v. State of W.B. [AIR 1965 SC 1887 : (1965) 2 Cri LJ 817] this Court dealt with the ample power and jurisdiction vested in the court, with respect to taking additional evidence, and observed, that it may not be possible for the legislature to foresee all situations and possibilities and therefore, the court must examine the facts and circumstances of each case before it, and if it comes to the conclusion that additional evidence is necessary, not because it would be impossible to pronounce the judgment without it, but because there would be a failure of justice without such evidence being considered, and if such an action on its part is justified, then the court must exercise such power. The Court further held as under :

"27. ... the criminal court has ample power to summon any person as a witness or recall and re-examine any such person even if the evidence on both sides is closed and the jurisdiction of the court must obviously be dictated by exigency of the situation, and fair play and good sense appear to be the only safe guides and that only the requirements of justice command the examination of any person which would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case."

(emphasis added)

12. In Rajendra Prasad v. Narcotic Cell [(1999) 6 SCC 110 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1062 : AIR 1999 SC 2292] this Court considered a similar issue and held as under :

"8. Lacuna in the prosecution must be understood as the inherent weakness or a latent wedge in the matrix of the prosecution case. The advantage of it should normally go to the accused in the trial of the case, but an oversight in the management of the prosecution cannot be treated as irreparable lacuna. No party in a trial can be foreclosed from correcting errors. If proper evidence was not adduced or a relevant material was not brought on record due to any inadvertence, the court should be magnanimous in permitting such mistakes to be rectified. After all, function of the criminal court is administration of criminal justice and not to count errors committed by the parties or to find out and declare who among the parties performed better."

(emphasis added)

13. Similarly, in P. Sanjeeva Rao v. State of A.P. [(2012) 7 SCC 56 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 1 : AIR 2012 SC 2242] this Court examined the scope of the provisions of Section 311 CrPC and held as under : "20. Grant of fairest opportunity to the accused to prove his innocence is the object of every fair trial, observed this Court in Hoffman Andreas v. Inspector of Customs [(2000) 10 SCC 430 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1488] . The following passage is in this regard apposite :

'6. ... In such circumstances, if the new counsel thought to have the material witnesses further examined the court could adopt latitude and a liberal view in the interest of justice, particularly when the court has unbridled powers in the matter as enshrined in Section 311 of the Code. After all the trial is basically for the prisoners and courts should afford the opportunity to them in the fairest manner possible.'

23. We are conscious of the fact that recall of the witnesses is being directed nearly four years after they were examined-in-chief about an incident that is nearly seven years old. ... we are of the opinion that on a parity of reasoning and looking to the consequences of denial of opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, we would prefer to err in favour of the appellant getting an opportunity rather than protecting the prosecution against a possible prejudice at his cost. Fairness of the trial is a virtue that is sacrosanct in our judicial system and no price is too heavy to protect that virtue. A possible prejudice to the prosecution is not even a price, leave alone one that would justify denial of a fair opportunity to the accused to defend himself."

(emphasis in original)

14. In T. Nagappa v. Y.R. Muralidhar [(2008) 5 SCC 633 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 677 : AIR 2008 SC 2010] , this Court held, that while considering such an application, the court must not imagine or assume what the deposition of the witness would be, in the event that an application under Section 311 CrPC is allowed and appreciate in its entirety, the said anticipated evidence. The Court held as under :

"9. What should be the nature of evidence is not a matter which should be left only to the discretion of the court. It is the accused who knows how to prove his defence. It is true that the court being the master of the proceedings must determine as to whether the application filed by the accused in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 243 of the Code is bona fide or not or whether thereby he intends to bring on record a relevant material. But ordinarily an accused should be allowed to approach the court for obtaining its assistance with regard to summoning of witnesses, etc. If permitted to do so, steps therefor, however, must be taken within a limited time. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the accused should not be allowed to unnecessarily protract the trial or summon witnesses whose evidence would not be at all relevant."

15. The scope and object of the provision is to enable the court to determine the truth and to render a just decision after discovering all relevant facts and obtaining proper proof of such facts, to arrive at a just decision of the case. Power must be exercised judiciously and not capriciously or arbitrarily, as any improper or capricious exercise of such power may lead to undesirable results. An application under Section 311 CrPC must not be allowed only to fill up a lacuna in the case of the prosecution, or of the defence, or to the disadvantage of the accused, or to cause serious prejudiceto the defence of the accused, or to give an unfair advantage to the opposite party. Further, the additional evidence must not be received as a disguise for retrial, or to change the nature of the case against either of the parties. Such a power must be exercised, provided that the evidence that is likely to be tendered by a witness, is germane to the issue involved. An opportunity of rebuttal however, must be given to the other party. The power conferred under Section 311 CrPC must therefore, be invoked by the court only in order to meet the ends of justice, for strong and valid reasons, and the same must be exercised with great caution and circumspection. The very use of words such as "any court", "at any stage", or "or any enquiry, trial or other proceedings", "any person" and "any such person" clearly spells out that the provisions of this section have been expressed in the widest possible terms, and do not limit the discretion of the court in any way. There is thus no escape if the fresh evidence to be obtained is essential to the just decision of the case. The determinative factor should therefore be, whether the summoning/recalling of the said witness is in fact, essential to the just decision of the case."

19. Opposing the present appeal, learned AGA says that the impugned order dated 04.04.2024 is not liable to be interfered with by this Court for the reasons that the trial court after considering the fact pertaining to the charges framed as also the stage of proceeding, rejected the application of the appellant.

20. Considered the aforesaid and perused the record.

21. On the scope and power of trial court under Section 311 Cr.P.C., this Court in the case of Ram Nayak Singh Versus State of U.P. and Others reported in MANU/UP/0248/2022, considered various pronouncements and thereafter observed as under:-

"23. From the above referred exposition of law, it is evident, in brief, that it is no more res-integra that the Trial Court, in the proceedings under the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973, has ample/wide power to summon any material witness or person for examination or re-examination in exercise of its power conferred upon it under Section 311 and this discretionary power, which should be exercised judicially and not arbitrarily, can be exercised by the Trial Court at any stage of proceedings under the Code."

22. No doubt that application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. can be preferred at any stage of proceedings, however, while considering the application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. relevant facts should be considered by the trial court including the intention to move the said application as also the reasons for preferring the application under Section 311 Cr.P.C.

23. Upon due consideration of aforesaid as also taking note of scope of Section 311 Cr.P.C, this Court finds that the trial court has rightly rejected the application filed under Section 311 Cr.P.C. and the trial court has not committed any illegality in passing the order impugned dated 04.04.2024. It is for the following reasons:-

(i) application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. is completely vague as in the same it has not been indicated that Shyam Singh Bisen, Sub Registrar Sitapur, was posted at relevant point of time i.e. on 02.02.2017, at Sitapur;

(ii) the trial court is not proceeding in relation to allegations related to execution and registration of sale deed as after considering the entire facts indicated in the application under section 156(3) Cr.P.C., the trial court framed charges under sections 364A/323/504/506 IPC and 3(1)(n) and 3(1)(/k) of SC/ST Act 1989 and as such the Sub Registrar Sitapur, as witness, is not required before the trial court;

(iii) to prove the facts pertaining to execution of deed, the sale deed in issue itself is sufficient and as such the alleged witness namely Shyam Singh Bisen, Sub Registrar Sitapur, is not required.

(iv) it appears from the record that on one pretext or other the appellant wants to delay the proceedings pending before the trial court;

(v) the application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. was preferred after conclusion of statement of D.W.1, which also shows that appellant wants to delay the proceedings pending before the trial court;

24. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal is accordingly dismissed.

25. No order as to costs.

Order Date :- 18.04.2024

Jyoti/-