Prabha Devi vs Maa Saraswati Education Trust Fund

Prabha Devi ...Petitioner

Versus

Maa Saraswati Education Trust Fund ...Respondent

Coram

Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? No.

For the Petitioner : Mr. Sarthak Upadhyay, Advocate.

For the Respondent : NEMO.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The petitioner has filed the present petition for

quashing of complaint No.125/24, for the commission of an

offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments

Act (in short "NI Act"), pending before the learned Chief

Judicial Magistrate, Sirmaur, District at Nahan, H.P. (learned

Trial Court). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the

same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court

for convenience.) 2 ( 2025:HHC:18132 )

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present

petition are that the complainant filed a complaint against the

accused for the commission of an offence punishable under

Section 138 of the NI Act. It was asserted that the complainant is

a Group of Professional Educational Institutions. The accused

was a student of the complainant's Institution. The accused

enrolled in the BALLB Course being run by the complainant. She

stated that she belongs to the Scheduled Caste Category and did

not have a sufficient amount with her, however, she promised

to pay the amount subsequently. The accused issued a cheque of

₹1,63,800/- on 30.12.2023 to discharge her liability to pay the

outstanding dues. The complainant presented the cheque before

its Bank, but it was dishonoured with an endorsement "Funds

Insufficient". The complainant sent a notice to the accused

asking her to pay the amount within 15 days from the date of

receipt of the notice. The notice was duly served upon the

accused, but she failed to pay the amount despite the receipt of a

valid notice of demand. Hence, the complaint.

3. I have heard Mr. Sarthak Upadhyay, learned counsel

for the petitioner, who submitted that the allegations in the

complaint are false. The accused has paid the whole amount to 3 ( 2025:HHC:18132 )

the complainant. The complaint was filed without any basis. The

accused has also been awarded a degree by Himachal Pradesh

University, which falsifies the complainant's version that the

accused had not paid the fee. Therefore, he prayed that the

present petition be allowed and the complaint filed by the

complainant - Institution be ordered to be quashed. He relied

upon Rekha Sharad Ushir Vs. Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari

Patsansta Ltd. (2025 INSC 399) in support of his submission.

4. I have given considerable thought to his submissions

and have gone through the records carefully.

5. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was

explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of

U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: -

"7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarized some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words:

"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the 4 ( 2025:HHC:18132 )

inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent 5 ( 2025:HHC:18132 )

person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge." (emphasis added)

8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case.

In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed."

6 ( 2025:HHC:18132 )

6. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of

Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

"8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice.

These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.

9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335).

7. It was held in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v.

Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692: 1988 SCC (Cri)

234: 1988 SCC OnLine SC 80 that the Court has to determine

whether the uncontroverted allegations in the complaint 7 ( 2025:HHC:18132 )

constitute a cognizable offence when the prosecution is at the

initial stage. It was observed on page 695

7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage.

8. It was held in State of Karnataka v. L.

Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC 699: 1977 SCC (Cri) 404 that the High

Court can quash the criminal proceedings if they amount to an

abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed at page 703:

"7. ... In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose, which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, 8 ( 2025:HHC:18132 )

the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests, and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law, though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction."

9. The term abuse of the process was explained in

Chandran Ratnaswami v. K.C. Palanisamy, (2013) 6 SCC 740:

(2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 447: 2013 SCC OnLine SC 450 at page 761:

33. The doctrine of abuse of process of court and the remedy of refusal to allow the trial to proceed is a well-

established and recognised doctrine both by the English courts and courts in India. There are some established principles of law which bar the trial when there appears to be an abuse of the process of the court.

34. Lord Morris in Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1964 AC 1254 : (1964) 2 WLR 1145 : (1964) 2 All ER 401 (HL)], observed: (AC pp. 1301-02) "There can be no doubt that a court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction has powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. ... A court must enjoy such powers in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of its process.

*** 9 ( 2025:HHC:18132 )

The power (which is inherent in a court's jurisdiction) to prevent abuses of its process and to control its procedure must in a criminal court include a power to safeguard an accused person from oppression or prejudice."

In his separate pronouncement, Lord Delvin in the same case observed that where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial.

35. In Hui Chi-ming v. R. [(1992) 1 AC 34 : (1991) 3 WLR 495 : (1991) 3 All ER 897 (PC)], the Privy Council defined the word "abuse of process" as something so unfair and wrong with the prosecution that the court should not allow a prosecutor to proceed with what is, in all other respects, a perfectly supportable case.

36. In the leading case of R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, ex p Bennett [(1994) 1 AC 42 : (1993) 3 WLR 90 :

(1993) 3 All ER 138 (HL)], on the application of the abuse of process, the court confirms that an abuse of process justifying the stay of prosecution could arise in the following circumstances:

(i) where it would be impossible to give the accused a fair trial; or

(ii) where it would amount to misuse/manipulation of the process because it offends the court's sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in the circumstances of the particular case.

37. In R. v. Derby Crown Court, ex p Brooks [(1984) 80 Cr App R 164 (DC)], Lord Chief Justice Ormrod stated:

"It may be an abuse of process if either (a) the prosecution has manipulated or misused the process of the court so as to deprive the defendant of a protection provided by law or to take unfair advantage of a technicality, or (b) on the balance of probability the defendant has been, or will be, prejudiced in the 10 ( 2025:HHC:18132 )

preparation of conduct of his defence by delay on the part of the prosecution which is unjustifiable."

38. Neill, L.J. in R. v. Beckford (Anthony) [(1996) 1 Cr App R 94: 1995 RTR 251 (CA)], observed that:

"The jurisdiction to stay can be exercised in many different circumstances. Nevertheless, two main strands can be detected in the authorities: (a) cases where the court concludes that the defendant cannot receive a fair trial; (b) cases where the court concludes that it would be unfair for the defendant to be tried."

What is unfair and wrong will be for the court to determine on the individual facts of each case.

10. It was held in Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P., (2023) 15

SCC 488: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 950 that where the proceedings are

frivolous or vexatious, the Court owes a duty to quash them.

However, the Court cannot appreciate the material while

exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC. It was

observed at page 498:

13. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection, try to read in between the lines. The Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution, need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take, for instance, the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs

11 ( 2025:HHC:18132 )

assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.

14. State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy [State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805], a two-judge Bench of this Court elaborated on the types of materials the High Court can assess to quash an FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction between consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence and appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for quashing an FIR. The Court held :

(Golconda Linga Swamy case [State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805], SCC p. 527, paras 5-7) "5. ... Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice, and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has the power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent the promotion of justice. In the exercise of its powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of the court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.

When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out, even if the allegations are accepted in toto.

6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21: AIR 1960 SC 866], this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (SCC OnLine SC para 6) 12 ( 2025:HHC:18132 )

(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance, e.g. want of sanction;

(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;

(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.

7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether, on a reasonable appreciation of it, the accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. The judicial process, no doubt, should not be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment. The court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing the process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time, the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death." (emphasis supplied)

11. The present petition is to be decided as per the

parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

13 ( 2025:HHC:18132 )

12. The accused relied upon various documents annexed

to the petition to submit that the contents of the complaint are

false, however, it is not permissible for the Court exercising

jurisdiction under Section 528 of "BNSS" to look into the

documents annexed with the petition and the Court can only

look into the complaint and the documents filed before

the learned Trial Court.

13. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1: 1983 SCC (Cri) 115,

that the proceedings can be quashed if on the face of the

complaint and the papers accompanying the same, no offence is

constituted. It is not permissible to add or subtract anything. It

was observed:

"10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if, on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out, then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code."

14. Madras High Court also held in Ganga Bai v. Shriram,

1990 SCC OnLine MP 213: ILR 1992 MP 964: 1991 Cri LJ 2018, that 14 ( 2025:HHC:18132 )

the fresh evidence is not permissible or desirable in the

proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was observed:

"Proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to be converted into a full-dressed trial. Shri Maheshwari filed a photostate copy of an order dated 28.7.1983, passed in Criminal Case No. 1005 of 1977, to which the present petitioner was not a party. Fresh evidence at this stage is neither permissible nor desirable. The respondent, by filing this document, is virtually introducing additional evidence, which is not the object of Section 482, Cr. P.C."

15. Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view

in Bharat Metal Box Company Limited, Hyderabad and Others vs.

G. K. Strips Private Limited and another, 2004 STPL 43 AP, and

held:

"9. This Court can only look into the complaint and the documents filed along with it, and the sworn statements of the witnesses, if any, recorded. While judging the correctness of the proceedings, it cannot look into the documents, which were not filed before the lower Court. Section 482 Cr.PC debars the Court to look into fresh documents, in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another, 2002 (1) Supreme 192. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows:

"The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no 15 ( 2025:HHC:18132 )

justification for interference by the High Court. When information is lodged at the Police Station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceedings".

16. A similar view was taken in Mahendra K.C. v. State of

Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 129: (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401, wherein it

was observed at page 142:

"16. ... the test to be applied is whether the allegations in the complaint, as they stand, without adding or detracting from the complaint, prima facie establish the ingredients of the offence alleged. At this stage, the High Court cannot test the veracity of the allegations, nor, for that matter, can it proceed in the manner that a judge conducting a trial would, based on the evidence collected during the course of the trial."

17. This position was reiterated in Supriya Jain v. State of

Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765, wherein it

was held:

"13. All these documents, which the petitioner seeks to rely on, if genuine, could be helpful for her defence at the trial, but the same are not material at the stage of deciding whether quashing as prayed for by her before the High Court was warranted or not. We, therefore, see no reason to place any reliance on these three documents."

16 ( 2025:HHC:18132 )

18. A similar view was taken in Iveco Magirus

Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya, (2024) 2

SCC 86: (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 512: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1258, wherein

it was observed:

"63. Adverting to the aspect of the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts under Section 482CrPC, in a case where the offence of defamation is claimed by the accused to have not been committed based on any of the Exceptions and a prayer for quashing is made, the law seems to be well settled that the High Courts can go no further and enlarge the scope of inquiry if the accused seeks to rely on materials which were not there before the Magistrate. This is based on the simple proposition that what the Magistrate could not do, the High Courts may not do. We may not be understood to undermine the High Courts' powers saved by Section 482CrPC; such powers are always available to be exercised ex debito justitiae , i.e., to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the High Courts exist. However, the tests laid down for quashing an FIR or criminal proceedings arising from a police report by the High Courts in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC not being substantially different from the tests laid down for quashing a process issued under Section 204 read with Section 200, the High Courts on recording due satisfaction are empowered to interfere if on a reading of the complaint, the substance of statements on oath of the complainant and the witness, if any, and documentary evidence as produced, no offence is made out and that proceedings, if allowed to continue, would amount to an abuse of the legal process. This, too, would be impermissible if the justice of a given case does not overwhelmingly so demand." (Emphasis supplied) 17 ( 2025:HHC:18132 )

19. Therefore, it is not permissible to look into the

material filed by the petitioner with the petition, and the Court

has to rely upon the material filed with the complaint.

20. Further, this Court cannot determine the

truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the

complaint by conducting a mini-trial. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the

Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot

go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was

observed: -

"13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra).

14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of 18 ( 2025:HHC:18132 )

Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060:

"14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) "16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not."

21. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392:

2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini-

trial while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC. It

was observed at page 397:

"17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is 19 ( 2025:HHC:18132 )

not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7)

6. ... As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. ...

7. ... At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider 'whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not'."

22. It was held in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi),

2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, that the Court exercising jurisdiction

under Section 482 of CrPC has to treat the allegations in the

complaint as correct. It was observed: -

"29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non- interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used in a routine manner according to its whims or caprice."

20 ( 2025:HHC:18132 )

23. Therefore, it is impermissible for this Court to

conduct a mini-trial to determine whether the allegations in the

complaint are correct or not.

24. There is a presumption of consideration attached to

the cheque. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2022 SCC

OnLine SC 513 that the cheque carries with it a presumption of

consideration which is to be rebutted by leading evidence, and

any factual dispute is to be resolved by weighing evidence. It was

observed:

"10. It is also relevant to bear in mind that the burden of proving that there is no existing debt or liability is to be discharged in the trial. For a two-judge Bench in M.M.T.C. Ltd. v. Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd. (2002) 1 SCC 234, Justice S.N. Variava made the following pertinent observation on this aspect: --

"17. There is therefore no requirement that the complainant must specifically allege in the complaint that there was a subsisting liability. The burden of proving that there was no existing debt or liability was on the respondents. This they have to discharge in the trial. At this stage, merely on the basis of averments in the petitions filed by them, the High Court could not have concluded that there was no existing debt or liability."

11. The legal presumption of the cheque having been issued in the discharge of liability must also receive due weightage. In a situation where the accused moves the Court for quashing even before the trial has 21 ( 2025:HHC:18132 )

commenced, the Court's approach should be careful enough not to prematurely extinguish the case by disregarding the legal presumption which supports the complaint. The opinion of Justice K.G. Balakrishnan for a three judges Bench in Rangappa v. Sri Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441 would, at this stage, deserve our attention: --

"26. ... we are in agreement with the respondent claimant that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. As noted in the citations, this is, of course, in the nature of a rebuttable presumption, and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant."

12. At any rate, whenever facts are disputed, the truth should be allowed to emerge by weighing the evidence. On this aspect, we may benefit by referring to the ratio in Rajeshbhai Muljibhai Patel v. State of Gujarat (2020) 3 SCC 794, where the following pertinent opinion was given by Justice R. Banumathi: --

"22. .............. When disputed questions of fact are involved, which need to be adjudicated after the parties adduce evidence, the complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act ought not to have been quashed by the High Court by taking recourse to Section 482 CrPC. Though, the Court has the power to quash the criminal complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI Act on legal issues like limitation, etc. criminal complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI Act against Yogeshbhai ought not to have been quashed merely on the ground that there are inter se disputes between Appellant 3 and Respondent 2. Without keeping in view the statutory presumption raised under Section 139 of the NI Act, the High Court, in our view, committed a serious error in quashing the criminal 22 ( 2025:HHC:18132 )

complaint in CC No. 367 of 2016 filed under Section 138 of the NI Act."

13. Bearing in mind the principles for the exercise of jurisdiction in a proceeding for quashing, let us now turn to the materials in this case. On careful reading of the complaint and the order passed by the Magistrate, what is discernible is that a possible view is taken that the cheques drawn were, in the discharge of a debt for the purchase of shares. In any case, when there is a legal presumption, it would not be judicious for the quashing Court to carry out a detailed enquiry on the facts alleged, without first permitting the trial Court to evaluate the evidence of the parties. The quashing Court should not take upon itself the burden of separating the wheat from the chaff where facts are contested. To say it differently, the quashing proceedings must not become an expedition into the merits of a factual dispute, so as to conclusively vindicate either the complainant or the defence."

25. It was further held that the Courts should be slow in

scuttling the complaint at a pre-trial stage. It was observed:

"14. The parameters for invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to quash the criminal proceedings under S.482 CrPC, have been spelt out by Justice S. Ratnavel Pandian for the two judges' bench in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: AIR 1992 SC 604, and the suggested precautionary principles serve as good law even today, for invocation of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

"103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or 23 ( 2025:HHC:18132 )

genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice."

15. In the impugned judgment, the learned Judge had rightly relied upon the opinion of Justice J.S. Khehar for a Division Bench in Rajiv Thapar (supra), which succinctly expresses the following relevant parameters to be considered by the quashing Court, at the stage of issuing process, committal, or framing of charges, "28. The High Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, must make a just and rightful choice. This is not a stage of evaluating the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant against the accused. Likewise, it is not a stage for determining how weighty the defences raised on behalf of the accused are. Even if the accused is successful in showing some suspicion or doubt, in the allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, it would be impermissible to discharge the accused before trial. This is so because it would result in giving finality to the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without allowing the prosecution or the complainant to adduce evidence to substantiate the same."

16. The proposition of law as set out above makes it abundantly clear that the Court should be slow to grant the relief of quashing a complaint at a pre-trial stage, when the factual controversy is in the realm of possibility, particularly because of the legal presumption, as in this matter. What is also of note is that the factual defence without having to adduce any evidence needs to 24 ( 2025:HHC:18132 )

be of an unimpeachable quality, to altogether disprove the allegations made in the complaint.

17. The consequences of scuttling the criminal process at a pre-trial stage can be grave and irreparable. Quashing proceedings at preliminary stages will result in finality without the parties having had an opportunity to adduce evidence, and the consequence then is that the proper forum, i.e., the trial Court, is ousted from weighing the material evidence. If this is allowed, the accused may be given an un-merited advantage in the criminal process. Also, because of the legal presumption, when the cheque and the signature are not disputed by the appellant, the balance of convenience at this stage is in favour of the complainant/prosecution, as the accused will have due opportunity to adduce defence evidence during the trial, to rebut the presumption.

18. Situated thus, to non-suit the complainant, at the stage of the summoning order, when the factual controversy is yet to be canvassed and considered by the trial court, will not, in our opinion, be judicious. Based upon a prima facie impression, an element of criminality cannot entirely be ruled out here, subject to the determination by the trial Court. Therefore, when the proceedings are at a nascent stage, the scuttling of the criminal process is not merited."

26. Therefore, the Court cannot hold that the cheque was

issued without any legal liability and quash the complaint

without allowing the complainant to prove its case before the

learned Trial Court.

27. The judgment of Rekha Sharad Ushir (supra) does not

apply to the present case, because there is nothing on record to

show that the complainant had concealed the material facts 25 ( 2025:HHC:18132 )

from the Court. Thus, no advantage can be derived from the

cited judgment by the accused.

28. The complaint is pending before the learned Trial

Court, and the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was

laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P.,

(2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge

sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to

appreciate the same. It was observed:

"At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not."

29. No other point was urged.

30. Consequently, the present petition fails, and the

same is dismissed.

26 ( 2025:HHC:18132 )

31. The observations made herein before shall remain

confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing,

whatsoever, on the merits of the case.

(Rakesh Kainthla) 06th June 2025 Judge (Shamsh Tabrez)