Pimpri Chinchwad New Township Development Authority vs Vishnudev Cooperative Housing Society & Ors.

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7649 OF 2018 [Arising out of SLP (C) No.20188 of 2017]

Pimpri Chinchwad New Township Development Authority .. Appellant(s)

Versus

Vishnudev Cooperative Housing Society & Ors. .. Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1) Leave granted.

2) This appeal is filed against the final judgment

Signature Not Verified and order dated 28.02.2017 passed by the High Digitally signed by ANITA MALHOTRA Date: 2018.08.03

Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition 13:25:40 IST Reason:

1

No.5783 of 2006 whereby the High Court allowed

the petition filed by respondent No.1 herein and

directed the State Government to issue notification

in the official gazette for release of the acquired land

from acquisition on the basis of the Revenue

Minister’s order dated 10.06.2004 passed under

Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894

(hereinafter referred to as “the Act”).

3) In order to appreciate the issues involved in

the appeal, it is necessary to set out the factual

background of the case in detail. The facts

mentioned hereinbelow are taken from the SLP

paper books and its List of Dates.

4) Survey No. (Gat. No.210 ­ measuring around

39 H 26 R and Survey No. 211 measuring around 1

H 23 R­Total land 40 H 49 R) situated at Mauje

Wakad, Tehsil Mulshi, District Pune (Maharashtra)

2 was originally owned by the members of one "Deo"

family.

5) On 12.03.1970, the State Government

acquired this land by issuing a notification under

Section 4 of the Act. It was followed by publication

of declaration under Section 6 of the Act. The

acquisition was for a public purpose, namely,

"planned development and utilization of lands in

Pimpri Chinchwad Township Area for industrial,

commercial and residential purposes”. The

development project for which the land was

acquired was to be executed through Pimpri

Chinchwad New Township Development Authority

(for short, called "PCNTDA “) ­ appellant herein.

6) The Special Land Acquisition Officer (for short,

called "SLAO“) then initiated the proceedings under

Section 11 of the Act for determination of the

3 compensation payable to the landowners and

accordingly passed an award dated 23.09.1986. The

SLAO then issued notices to the landowners as

required under Section 12 (2) of the Act. Since the

landowners did not accept the compensation, the

entire amount of compensation was deposited by

the SLAO in Revenue Deposit Account of Treasury.

7) The members of “Deo family” (landowners) felt

aggrieved by the award dated 23.09.1986 and filed

writ petition being W.P. No. 3719/1987 in the High

Court at Bombay. This writ petition was dismissed

by the High Court by order dated 18.07.1989. The

writ petitioners felt aggrieved by the dismissal of

their writ petition filed review petition (R.P. No.

3751/1989) before the High Court, which was also

dismissed as withdrawn on 08.09.1989. Aggrieved

by the dismissal of the writ petition and the review

4 petition, the landowners filed SLP (c)

No.12889/1989 in this Court. It was also dismissed

as withdrawn on 27.11.1989.

8) In the meantime, on 19.09.1989, the members

of “Deo Family” filed an application under Section

48(1) of the Act to the Revenue Minister of the State

of Maharashtra and prayed therein for release of

their acquired land. During pendency of this

application, the landowners filed writ petition

(No.36/1990) in the High Court and prayed therein

for a direction to the State for deciding their

application. By order dated 12.01.1990, the High

Court disposed of the writ petition and directed the

State to decide the landowners' application in

accordance with law.

9) By order dated 07.07.1992, the State

Government partly allowed the landowners'

5 application and while releasing the land measuring

29 H 98 R retained the remaining land measuring10

H 51 R for execution of the development project for

which the entire land had been acquired. The

details of the land retained and released are

mentioned hereinbelow:

Survey Area Area deleted Area No. covered from remained under acquisition under SLAO H:R acquisition H:R to be given to PCNTDA 210 39 H 26 R 28 H 93 R 10 H 33 R 211 1 H 23 R 1 H 5 R 0 H 18 R Total 40 H 49 R 29 H 98 R 10 H 51 R

10) It appears from the record of the proceedings

that after the dismissal of the review petition, the

landowners (members of “Deo family”) transferred

the acquired land in question to the members of one

Co­operative Housing Society called, "Vishnudev Co­

6 operative Housing Society" (for short called "VCHS")­

respondent No.1 herein on or about 25.10.1993.

11) Respondent No.1 (VCHS) claiming to be the

owner of the land in question felt aggrieved and filed

writ petition (1116/1993) questioning therein the

legality of the order of the State dated 07.07.1992 to

the extent it declined to release the remaining land

measuring 10 H 51 R. The High Court, by order

dated 23.03.1993, dismissed the writ petition and

upheld the order of the State. Respondent No.1

(VCHS) carried the matter in this Court by filing SLP

(C) No.10056/1993. By order dated 26.11.1993,

this Court dismissed the SLP. The Divisional

Commissioner then passed a final order dated

20.08.1994 under Section 48 (1) of the Act directing

therein for deletion of 29 H 98 R from Survey No.

210 and retaining of 10 H 33 R as acquired land for

7 completion of development project. This is how, out

of total acquired land, the land measuring 29 H 98

R was released in favour of landowners from the

acquisition proceedings and the land measuring 10

H 33 R was retained to enable the State to execute

the development project on the said land through

the agency of the appellant.

12) Notwithstanding the termination of two rounds

of litigation up to this Court, the landowners­VCHS

again started third round and filed fresh writ

petition (3200/1994) in the High Court and this

time prayed therein for deletion of 10 H 55 R from

Survey No. 210/1. By order dated 07.09.1994, the

High Court dismissed the writ petition. Again the

said order, the VCHS filed SLP (C) No.22907/1994

in this Court and the same was dismissed by order

dated 10.02.1995.

8

13) On 30.05.2000, the SLAO took possession of

the land bearing Gat. No. 210 (10 H 33 R) and

executed panchanama in support thereof. The name

of the State Government was accordingly entered in

the revenue records at Mutation Entry No. 8212(File

No. 7/12) on 21.07.2000. The State Government

then handed over the possession of the land in

question to PCNTDA on 08.11.2005 to enable them

to start the work on the land. It was followed by

entry of name of PCNTDA in the revenue records on

19.11.2005.

14) Despite losing the battle in the first, second

and third round of litigation, as detailed above,

VCHS again renewed their efforts and filed an

application under Section 48 (1) of the Act to the

Revenue Minister of the State of Maharashtra to

start another round of litigation on 20.01.2004. The

9 Revenue Minister on 10.06.2004, however, noted in

the file that the land in question be deleted from the

acquisition proceedings.

15) It is pertinent to mention here that when the

order dated 10.06.2004 was passed, the Code of

Conduct was in force in the State of Maharashtra as

the assembly elections were to be held in September

2004 in the State of Maharashtra. It is also

pertinent to mention that the order of the Revenue

Minister ordering deletion of the land was never

communicated to the landowners. On 04.11.2004,

the State Government directed that all the matters

where the orders were not communicated to the

parties concerned be placed for fresh consideration

for passing appropriate orders. The present being a

case where the order was not communicated to the

landowners, the new Revenue Minister, who took

10 over the charge from the earlier Minister, directed

that the matter relating to the land in question be

considered afresh. The VCHS then wrote a letter to

the State Government on 06.06.2006 insisting

therein for issuance and implementation of the

order dated 10.06.2004 passed by the then Revenue

Minister but since the Government did not yield to

the VCHS insistence, a writ petition (5783/2006)

was filed by VCHS on 21.06.2006 in the High Court

praying for issuance of mandamus directing the

State Government to give effect to the order dated

10.06.2004 passed by the then Revenue Minister

and issue appropriate notification in that behalf by

releasing the remaining land measuring 10 H 55 R.

16) In this writ petition, the VCHS arrayed only

the State Government as party respondent but did

not implead PCNTDA (appellant herein). The

11 PCNTDA then filed an application for intervention in

the said writ petition which was allowed by directing

the VCHS to implead PCNTDA as party respondent

in the writ petition.

17) The State and PCNTDA contested the writ

petition inter alia on the ground that firstly, the writ

petition is not maintainable inasmuch as the entire

issue in relation to the land in question has already

attained finality thrice in favour of the State,

therefore, nothing now remains for further

adjudication; Secondly, since possession of the

land in question has already been taken over by the

State long back on 30.05.2000, the provisions of

Section 48 of the Act were not applicable to the case

and nor Section 48 could be used for further release

of the land from acquisition; and lastly, the so­

called order dated 10.06.2004 passed by the then

12 Revenue Minister was not an order much less a

legal one and more so when it was not

communicated to the landowners, it did not create

any kind of right in favour of the landowners.

18) By impugned order, the High Court allowed

the landowners' writ petition and issued a

mandamus directing the State to give effect to the

order dated 10.06.2004 passed by the then Revenue

Minister. The effect of issuance of mandamus is to

release the remaining land measuring 10 H 33 R

from the acquisition proceedings in favour of the

landowners. It is against this order, PCNTDA filed

this appeal by way of special leave in this Court.

19) The question, which arises for consideration in

this appeal, is whether the High Court was justified

in allowing the writ petition filed by the landowners

(VCHS­respondent No.1 herein) and, in

13 consequence, was justified in issuing directions to

the State in relation to the land in question.

20) Heard Mr. Arvind Datar, learned senior

counsel for the appellant, Ms. Meenakshi Arora,

learned senior counsel for respondent No.1 and Mr.

Nishant R. Katneshwarkar, learned counsel for

respondent Nos. 2 & 3.

21) Mr. Arvind Datar, learned senior counsel

appearing for the appellant (PCNTDA) while

assailing the legality and correctness of the

impugned order has mainly urged six points.

22) In the first place, learned counsel urged that

the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the

High Court in allowing the landowners' writ petition

is, on the face of it, legally unsustainable and being

wholly perverse deserves to be set aside.

14

23) In the second place, learned counsel urged

that an issue as to whether the land in question

was capable of being released or not from the

clutches of the acquisition proceedings in the

context of Section 48 (1) of the Act had attained

finality in the earlier rounds of litigation against the

landowners up to this Court, the same could not

have been again agitated by filing another

application by respondent No.1(landowners) under

Section 48 of the Act.

24) According to learned counsel, it was not legally

permissible to empower the then Revenue Minister

to entertain such application.

25) In the third place, learned counsel contended

that when the State had admittedly taken

possession of the land in question long back on

30.05.2000 strictly in accordance with law as laid

15 down by this Court in Balwant Narayan Bhagde vs.

M.D. Bhagwat & Ors. (1976) 1 SCC 700, the

provisions of Section 48 of the Act had no

application to the facts of the case at hand and

neither the then Revenue Minister nor the State had

any power to invoke the provisions of Section 48 of

the Act to release any part of the land on or after

30.05.2000.

26) In the fourth place, learned counsel contended

that the then Revenue Minister, who passed the

order dated 10.06.2004 had no power to entertain

any such application because admittedly during the

relevant time, due to announcement of date of the

State Assembly elections (September 2004), the

Code of Conduct had come in force which did not

permit any Minister to exercise such power.

16

27) In the fifth place, learned counsel contended

that even otherwise, the so called noting made by

the then Revenue Minister in the file on 10.06.2004

directing release of the land in question from the

acquisition proceedings could never be construed as

an “order" within the meaning of Section 48 of the

Act and nor such noting had any attribute of a legal

order.

28) It was his submission that firstly, such noting

remained only a noting of the then Revenue

Minister, which was never communicated to the

landowners as per the procedure prescribed and

secondly, before it could take the shape of an order

within the meaning of Section 48 of the Act for

being giving effect to, the noting was ordered to be

considered afresh by the State Government by order

dated 04.11.2004.

17

29) In this way, according to learned counsel, the

so called noting never saw the light of the day and

died its own death in the files creating no right and

interest of any kind in favour of the landowners.

30) In the fifth place, learned counsel contended

that the then Revenue Minister had passed similar

orders alike the one in question in relation to other

survey numbers by directing release of the land

from the clutches of the acquisition proceedings but

all such orders were quashed by the High Court in

the writ petition and those orders were also upheld

by this Court. Learned counsel gave the list of the

cases.

31) In the sixth place, learned counsel contended

that while releasing part of the land vide order dated

20.08.1994 (Annexure­P­24) it was made clear to

the landowners that they would not be entitled to

18 claim any compensation for the said land. It was,

therefore, urged that reading of the order dated

20.08.1994 would clearly indicate that the releasing

of the part of the land and retaining of the

remaining land was in the nature of a bargain

between the State and the landowners and,

therefore, there did not arise any occasion to further

release of the remaining land in question which was

undoubtedly needed for accomplishing the public

purpose for which it was acquired.

32) In other words, the submission was that

release of part of the land vide order dated

20.08.1994 disentitled the landowners to claim

further release of the remaining land from

acquisition proceedings. It is apart from the fact

that the release of the land due to obtaining its

19 possession under Section 16 was not possible under

Section 48 of the Act.

33) It is essentially these submissions, learned

counsel elaborated in his arguments by referring to

the record of the case and the decisions of this

Court.

34) In reply, Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned senior

counsel supported the impugned order including

its reasoning. It was her submission that the

impugned order is based on proper reasoning and

hence it does not call for any interference. Learned

counsel elaborated her submission by referring to

the documents to support the reasoning of the High

Court.

35) Having heard the learned counsel for the

parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we

20 find force in the submissions of the learned senior

counsel for the appellant.

36) The main questions which arise for

consideration in this appeal are first, whether the

then Revenue Minister, who was purporting to act

for and on behalf of the State, had the power, in the

background facts of this case, to invoke the

provisions of Section 48 of the Act for release of the

acquired land in question from the acquisition

proceedings; Second, whether the State had taken

possession of the acquired land in question on

30.05.2000 and, if so, its effect; and lastly, what is

the true nature of the order dated 10.06.2004.

37) Sections 16 and 48, which are relevant for this

case read as under:

“Section 16

16. Power to take possession­ When the Collector has made an award under section

21 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances.

Section 48

48. Completion of acquisition not compulsory, but compensation to be awarded when not completed­(1) Except in the case provided for in section 36, the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken.

(2) Whenever the Government withdraws from any such acquisition, the Collector shall determine the amount of compensation due for the damage suffered by the owner in consequence of the notice or of nay proceedings thereunder, and shall pay such amount to the person interested, together with all costs reasonably incurred by him in the prosecution of the proceedings under this Act relating to the said land.

(3) The provisions of Part III of this Act shall apply, so far as may be, to the determination of the compensation payable under this section.”

38) Section 48 of the Act gives liberty to the State

to withdraw from the acquisition of any land "of

22 which possession has not been taken" except in

the cases which fall in Section 36. In other words,

once the possession of the acquired land is taken,

the State has no power to withdraw from the

acquisition because as a result of taking over of the

possession, the acquired land vests with the State

absolutely free from all encumbrances.

39) A fortiori so long as the possession is not taken

of the acquired land, the State is at liberty to

withdraw from the acquisition either partly or fully

depending upon the facts of each case.

40) Section 16 of the Act empowers the Collector

to take possession of the acquired land on passing

of an award under Section 11 of the Act. Once the

Collector takes possession, the acquired land vests

absolutely in the Government free from all

encumbrances as provided therein.

23

41) The question arose before a Bench of three

Judges of this Court in Balwant Narayan Bhagde

(supra) as to how and in what manner possession of

the acquired land is required to be taken as

provided under Section 16 of the Act. The majority

view speaking through Bhagwati J. (as His Lordship

then was) dealt with this issue succinctly in Para 28

thus:

“28………We think it is enough to state that when the Government proceeds to take possession of the land acquired by it under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it must take actual possession of the land, since all interests in the land are sought to be acquired by it. There can be no question of taking “symbolical” possession in the sense understood by judicial decisions under the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor would possession merely on paper be enough. What the Act contemplates as a necessary condition of vesting of the land in the Government is the taking of actual possession of the land. How such possession may be taken would depend on the nature of the land. Such possession would have to be taken as the nature of the land admits of. There can be no hard and fast rule laying

24 down what act would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land. We should not, therefore, be taken as laying down an absolute and inviolable rule that merely going on the spot and making a declaration by beat of drum or otherwise would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land in every case. But here, in our opinion, since the land was lying fallow and there was no crop on it at the material time, the act of the Tehsildar in going on the spot and inspecting the land for the purpose of determining what part was waste and arable and should, therefore, be taken possession of and determining its extent, was sufficient to constitute taking of possession. It appears that the appellant was not present when this was done by the Tehsildar, but the presence of the owner or the occupant of the land is not necessary to effectuate the taking of possession. It is also not strictly necessary as a matter of legal requirement that notice should be given to the owner or the occupant of the land that possession would be taken at a particular time, though it may be desirable where possible, to give such notice before possession is taken by the authorities, as that would eliminate the possibility of any fraudulent or collusive transaction of taking of mere paper possession, without the occupant or the owner ever coming to know of it.”

42) Keeping in view the law laid down in Balwant

Narayan Bhagde (supra), we proceed to examine

25 the question as to whether the possession of the

remaining acquired land was taken by the State

and, if so, whether it was done in accordance with

the test laid down by this Court.

43) Having perused the Panchanama (Annexure­P­

4) dated 30.05.2004, Mutation Entry No. 8212 (file

7/12) (Annexure­P­5), possession receipt

(Annexure­P­12) and Mutation Entry of PCNTDA

(Annexure ­P­28/29) relied upon by the State, we

have no hesitation in holding that the State did take

possession of the acquired land in question on

30.05.2000 as per the test laid down by this Court

in Balwant Narayan Bhagde (supra). This we say

for the following reasons.

44) First, the State gave notice to all the co­owners

of the land in question and informed them to

remain present at the time of taking possession by

26 the SLAO; Second, out of all the co­owners, two,

namely, Chandra Kant Gajanan Dev and

Bhalchandra Chintaman Dev were present at the

time of taking possession. It was sufficient

compliance; Third, possession was taken in the

presence of two witnesses by the SLAO; Fourth,

panchanama evidencing taking of the possession

was duly signed by the witnesses; Fifth, the name of

the State Government was duly entered in the

revenue records after obtaining possession as an

owner; Sixth, the Government, in turn, handed

over the possession of the land to the appellant

(PCNTDA); and Seventh, the name of PCNTDA was

also entered in the revenue records of the land in

question.

45) Once we hold that the possession of the land

in question was taken by the State in accordance

27 with law on 30.05.2004 from the landowners, we

have no hesitation in holding that the provisions of

Section 48 of the Act were not applicable to the case

at hand. In other words, once it is held that the

possession of the acquired land was with the State,

the land stood vested in the State disentitling the

State to release the land from the acquisition

proceedings by taking recourse to the provisions of

Section 48 of the Act.

46) A fortiori, the then Revenue Minister had no

power to deal with the land in question in any

manner whatsoever and nor had any power to

invoke the provisions of Section 48 of the Act for

release of the land in question from the clutches of

the acquisition proceedings.

47) This takes us to examine another question

though in the light of our finding on the issue of

28 possession, it is not necessary for us to examine

this question in detail.

48) The question is whether the order dated

10.06.2004 passed by the then Revenue Minister

directing release of the acquired land in question

has the attributes of an order within the meaning of

Section 48 of the Act or, in other words, whether the

order in question created any right in favour of the

landowners so as to enable them to claim

mandamus for enforcement of such order against

the State

49) Our answer to the question is "no". It is for the

reasons that First, a mere noting in the official files

of the Government while dealing with any matter

pertaining to any person is essentially an internal

matter of the Government and carries with it no

legal sanctity; Second, once the decision on such

29 issue is taken and approved by the competent

authority empowered by the Government in that

behalf, it is required to be communicated to the

person concerned by the State Government.

50) In other words, so long as the decision based

on such internal deliberation is not approved and

communicated by the competent authority as per

the procedure prescribed in that behalf to the

person concerned, such noting does not create any

right in favour of the person concerned nor it

partake the nature of any legal order so as to enable

the person concerned to claim any benefit of any

such internal deliberation. Such noting(s) or/and

deliberation(s) are always capable of being changed

or/and amended or/and withdrawn by the

competent authority.

30

51) Third, though Section 48 of the Act, in terms,

does not provide that release of the land from any

acquisition proceedings is required to be done by

issuance of the notification by the State but, in our

view, having regard to the scheme of the Act, which

begins with the process of issuance of notification

under Section 4 of the Act for acquisition of any

land, the release of land from such acquisition is

complete only when a notification is issued by the

State in that behalf.

52) Indeed, the aforementioned issue remains no

more res integra and was decided by this Court in

several decisions, such as State of Punjab vs.

Sodhi Sukhdev Singh, AIR 1961 SC 493, State of

Bihar vs. Kripalu Shankar, (1987) 3 SCC 34,

Rajasthan Housing Board vs. Shri Krishan, (1993)

2 SCC 84, Sethi Auto Service Station vs. DDA,

31 (2009) 1 SCC 180 and Shanti Sports Club & Anr.

Vs. Union of India & Ors., (2009) 15 SCC 705.

53) In Shanti Sports (supra) a Bench of two

Judges of this Court, speaking through Singhvi, J.,

took note of all the previous case law on the subject

noted above and held as under:

“37…………..Although, the plain language of Section 48(1) does not give any indication of the manner or mode in which the power/discretion to withdraw from the acquisition of any land is required to be exercised, having regard to the scheme of Parts II and VII of the 1894 Act, which postulates publication of notification under Section 4(1), declaration under Section 6 and agreement under Section 42 in the Official Gazette as a condition for valid acquisition of the land for any public purpose or for a company, it is reasonable to take the view that withdrawal from the acquisition, which may adversely affect the public purpose for which, or the company on whose behalf the acquisition is proposed, can be done only by issuing a notification in the Official Gazette.

39. The requirement of issuing a notification for exercise of power under Section 48(1) of the Act to withdraw from the acquisition of the land can also be inferred from the

32 judgments of this Court in Municipal Committee, Bhatinda v. Land Acquisition Collector and others (1993) 3 SCC 24 , U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. v. State of U.P. and others (1995) Supp 3 SCC 538, State of Maharashtra and another v. Umashankar Rajabhau and others (1996) 1 SCC 299 and State of T.N. and others v. L. Krishnan and others (1996) 7 SCC 450.

43. A noting recorded in the file is merely a noting simpliciter and nothing more. It merely represents expression of opinion by the particular individual. By no stretch of imagination, such noting can be treated as a decision of the Government. Even if the competent authority records its opinion in the file on the merits of the matter under consideration, the same cannot be termed as a decision of the Government unless it is sanctified and acted upon by issuing an order in accordance with Articles 77(1) and (2) or Articles 166(1) and (2). The noting in the file or even a decision gets culminated into an order affecting right of the parties only when it is expressed in the name of the President or the Governor, as the case may be, and authenticated in the manner provided in Article 77(2) or Article 166(2). A noting or even a decision recorded in the file can always be reviewed/reversed/overruled or overturned and the court cannot take cognizance of the earlier noting or decision for exercise of the power of judicial review.”

33

54) In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are

of the considered opinion that the then Revenue

Minister, who passed the order dated 10.06.2004

had no power to deal with the matter relating to

release of the land in question. He simply usurped

the power under Section 48 of the Act, which he

never possessed. It was an abuse of exercise of

power by him while dealing with the State's

largesse.

55) That apart, in our view, the filing of the writ

petition by the landowners itself was an abuse of

judicial process. It was for the simple reason that

the earlier litigation, which travelled up to this

Court thrice having ended against the landowners,

it was binding on the parties. It prevented the

landowners to again raise the same issue.

34

56) Indeed, the release of part of the land in

landowners’ favour and retention of the remaining

land for accomplishing the project vide notification

dated 20.08.1994 was in the nature of a bargain. It

disentitled the landowners to seek further release of

the remaining land. This is apart from the fact that

consequent upon obtaining the possession of the

land by the State, the release of the remaining land

under Section 48 of the Act was otherwise not

legally possible.

57) In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are

of the considered view that the High Court failed to

examine the issues arising in the case in its correct

perspective. We cannot, therefore, concur with the

reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the High

Court which wrongly upheld the order dated

35 10.06.2004 passed by the concerned Revenue

Minister.

58) The appeal thus succeeds and is accordingly

allowed. Impugned order is set aside. As a

consequence, the writ petition filed by respondent

No.1 stands dismissed with costs quantified at

Rs.25,000/­ to be payable by respondent No.1 to

the appellant.

………………………………..J. (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)

…..………………………………J. (UDAY UMESH LALIT) New Delhi, August 03, 2018

36