Pic Departmentals Pvt. Ltd vs Sreeleathers Pvt. Ltd

REPORTABLE 2024 INSC 654 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.______ OF 2024

[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.14902 OF 2024]

PIC DEPARTMENTALS PVT. LTD. … APPELLANT

VERSUS

SREELEATHERS PVT. LTD. … RESPONDENT

O R D E R

SUDHANSHU DHULIA & AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, JJ.

Leave granted. The sequence of events relevant to

resolve the short controversy is noticed below.

2. This dispute traces its origins to the alleged act

of putting-up of a signboard by the respondent on the

subject-premises1, which according to the appellant,

obstructed the hoarding put up by the appellant. Thus,

the appellant/plaintiff filed C.S. No.549/1999 on

around Signature Not Verified 30.09.1999 (hereinafter referred to as the Digitally signed by Jagdish Kumar

“suit”) Date: 2024.09.04 11:39:48 IST Reason:

for declaration and permanent injunction

before the Calcutta High Court (hereinafter referred 1 3 and 4, Lindsay Street, Kolkata – 700 087.

2

to as the “High Court”) against the

respondent/defendant. The position of the parties was

that the appellant was a tenant on the ground floor of

the building in question, whereas the respondent was a

tenant on the first floor.

3. Summons in the suit was served on the respondent,

which entered appearance on 03.02.2000. On 29.02.2000,

an interim order of restraint was passed by the High

Court, in terms of prayer (a) made in application G.A.

No.4229/1999 filed by the petitioner in the suit.

4. It appears that the official website of the High

Court showed the status of the suit as having been

‘disposed of’ on 01.03.2000. However, on 11.12.2001,

the appellant filed Contempt Case No.333/2001 alleging

violation of the interim order dated 29.02.2000.

Later, on 25.01.2010, by way of a Deed of Conveyance,

the original owners of the premises sold the same to

M/s TUG Developers Private Limited (hereinafter

referred to as “TUG Developers”), which is a

subsidiary of the respondent.

5. On 08.09.2015, TUG Developers issued a notice of

eviction to the appellant on the grounds of sub- 3

letting and non-payment of rent and for terminating

the tenancy/lease with effect from October, 2015. On

17.01.2017, the suit was listed suddenly before the

High Court, which directed the Registrar (Listing) to

submit a report on the status of the suit as the

learned Single Judge noticed that the website

reflected the status of the suit as being disposed of.

On 25.01.2017, the Registrar (Listing) submitted his

report stating that the case appeared to have been

disposed of on 01.03.2000 and that the matter was

listed as ‘to be mentioned’ on 17.01.2017 in terms of

the instructions received from the High Court. On

30.01.2017, the Court directed the suit to be listed

in February, 2017. This led to the respondent filing

application G.A. No.693/20172 in the suit, seeking

extension of time to file Written Statement, along

with a copy thereof.

6. Ejectment Suit No.34/2018 was filed by TUG

Developers seeking ejectment of the appellant from the

premises.

7. The High Court on 21.04.2023 asked for a report

from its Registry as to how the suit was shown as 2 For clarity, G.A. No.693/2017 was later re-numbered as G.A. No.4/2017. In the context of the suit, both refer to one and the same application.

4

disposed of to which the Registrar (Original Side)

responded by submitting a report on 11.05.2023 stating

that there were no details of any orders available in

the file prior to 17.01.2017. On 12.06.2023, the

learned Single Judge dismissed G.A. No.693/2017.

Contempt Case No.331/2001 was also disposed of on

13.06.2023 on a statement by the appellant that the

same had become infructuous.

8. Aggrieved by the learned Single Judge’s order

dated 12.06.2023 supra, the respondent preferred

A.P.O. No.147/2023 before the Division Bench of the

High Court, which, by judgment dated 22.03.2024

allowed the appeal. This judgment of the Division

Bench is assailed in the instant appeal.

9. By the Impugned Judgment dated 22.03.2024, the

Division Bench found sufficient cause on the ground of

the confusion relating to pendency of the suit as also

the principle that matter is best adjudged on merits

rather than being thrown out on technicalities and the

aim of the Court to do substantial justice between the

parties rather than disposing of the matter on 5

technical grounds unless a party is guilty of gross

negligence or whatever, as described hereinabove; took

note of Chapter XXXVIII Rule 463 of the Rules of The

High Court at Calcutta (Original Side), 1914

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rules’), and;

permitted the Written Statement of the respondent to

be taken on record subject to payment of Rs.25,000/-

(Rupees Twenty Five Thousand) to the appellant as

costs. Resultantly, the Registry of the High Court on

15.04.2024 accepted the Written Statement of the

respondent in the suit. However, though costs of

Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand) were

tendered by the respondent to the appellant, it was

refused to be accepted.

SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANT:

10. Learned senior counsel for the appellant

submitted that the respondent was served with summons

on 28.01.2000, yet it chose not to file any Written

Statement. It was submitted that an application

3 ‘46. Power to enlarge or abridge time. – The Court or a Judge shall have power to enlarge or abridge the time appointed by these rules, or fixed by any order enlarging time, for doing any act or taking any proceeding, upon such terms (if any) as the justice of the case may require, and any such enlargement may be ordered, although the application for the same is Not made until after the expiration of the time appointed or allowed.’ 6

seeking extension of time to file Written Statement

was filed only in the year 2017, which clearly

deserves to be dismissed. It was further contended

that the Rules do not permit condonation of delay in

filing of Written Statement beyond a period of 21

days. For such proposition, reliance was placed on the

judgment of the High Court in Jayshree Tea &

Industries v General Magnets, 2007 SCC Online Cal 577,

which held that the Rules take precedence over the

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Learned senior counsel

informed us that Jayshree Tea (supra) was carried up

to this Court, which dismissed the challenge thereto

by Order dated 20.01.2014 in S.L.P. (C) No.378/2014.

It was submitted that Chapter XXXVIII Rule 46 of the

Rules cannot be used to defeat the very object of the

Rules, specifically in the absence of any cogent

reasons having been shown in this behalf by the

respondent. Reliance was also placed on the judgment

in Prakash Corporates v Dee Vee Projects Limited,

(2022) 5 SCC 112.

11. He submitted that this Court has held that

discretion to allow defendants to file Written 7

Statement beyond the 90-day period, could be exercised

only if it is specifically found that it is not a case

of laxity or gross negligence or if it is an

exceptionally hard case. Reliance was also placed on

the decisions in Kailash v Nanhku, (2005) 4 SCC 480;

Salem Advocate Bar Association T.N. v Union of India,

(2005) 6 SCC 344; R.N. Jadi and Bros. v

Subhashchandra, (2007) 6 SCC 420; Zolba v Keshao,

(2008) 11 SCC 769; Mohammed Yusuf v Faij Mohammad,

(2009) 3 SCC 513, and; Atcom Technologies Limited v

Y.A. Chunawala and Company, (2018) 6 SCC 639.

SUBMISSIONS BY THE RESPONDENT:

12. Per contra, learned senior counsel for the

respondent/caveator submitted that in the facts and

circumstances of the present case, the discretion

employed by the Division Bench in allowing the taking

on record of the Written Statement of the respondent

is perfectly justified. He drew our attention to the

Chapter IX Rules 24 and 35, Chapter X Rule 276 and

Chapter XXXVIII Rule 46 of the Rules. In sum, his 4 ‘2. Written statements when not to be filed. – No written statement of a defendant shall be filed unless an appearance has first been entered. No written statement or voluntary statement shall be filed, after the time limited for filing the same by the writ of summons, or any rule, or any order, as the case may be, has expired, except under an order obtained by summons in Chambers taken out prior to the expiry of such time.’ 8

contention was that the High Court was empowered to

enlarge/abridge the time, as had been done in the

present case. It was further stated that the sequence

of events and list of dates would show that there was

neither any deliberate/wilful laches nor any lacuna on

the part of the respondent in not filing the Written

Statement on time, primarily on the ground that as

early as on 01.03.2000, the status of the suit was

shown as disposed of, which position is factually

verified by the subsequent orders of the High Court in

the suit and by the reports submitted by its Registry.

13. It was further submitted that due to sudden

listing of the suit on 17.01.2017, which surprised the

respondent, by way of abundant caution, it promptly

filed G.A. No.693/2017 in bona fide. He prayed for

5 ‘3. Where written statement is not filed, suit may be transferred to the Peremptory Undefended List. - Except as provided by Chapter X, rule 27, (a) where the written statement of a sole defendant is, or the written statements of all the defendants are, Not filed within the time fixed by the summons, or within such further time as may be allowed, or (b) where one or more of several defendants has or have failed to enter appearance, and the other or others has or have entered appearance but failed to file a written statement within the time fixed by the summons or further time allowed, or (c) where a defendant, who having obtained an order for transfer of a suit to this Court under section 39 of the Presidency Small Cause Court Act (XV of 1882), and having been directed under the provisions of section 40(2) of that Act to file a written statement, has failed to file the same within the time fixed, the suit shall, unless otherwise ordered by the Judge, Registrar or Master, upon requisition by the plaintiff in writing to the Registrar and production of a certificate showing such default, be transferred to the peremptory list of undefended suits.’ 6 ‘27. Undefended suits may be kept out of the Peremptory Undefended List by requisition. - An undefended suit or proceeding Not in the Peremptory List of Undefended Suits, may be kept out of such list for any specified period, on the requisition, in writing of the plaintiff's Advocate acting on the Original Side, or of the plaintiff, if acting in person, under the direction of the Registrar.’ 9

dismissal of the appeal.

[

ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:

14. Having bestowed our anxious thoughts to the

entirety of the lis and the submissions canvassed at

the Bar, we do not find any ground for interference,

particularly with reference to the facts noted above.

The propositions laid down in the precedents pressed

into service by the learned senior counsel for the

appellant cannot be quarrelled with. Yet, they do not

aid the appellant due to the unique factual prism

herein.

[

15. Learned senior counsel for the appellant is

correct that the power to extend time for filing

Written Statement should not be employed as a matter

of course, but with great caution so that the purpose

of the procedural statute is not defeated and

unscrupulous litigants do not abuse the process of the

Court by adopting dilatory tactics. However, the same

cannot be examined in a strait-jacket/sealed

compartment for the peculiar facts and circumstances

of every case have to be carefully and individually 10

appreciated. Thereafter, the Court concerned has to

take a call as to whether the request made is genuine

or, more importantly, whether refusal to accede to

such request may lead to an eventual miscarriage of

justice. It must not be lost sight of that ultimately,

procedural technicalities have to give way to

substantive justice. Procedure, well and truly, is

only the handmaiden of justice.7 The discretion granted

to Courts has to be exercised on a case-specific

basis. Undisputedly, ‘procedural laws are primarily

intended to achieve the ends of justice and, normally,

not to shut the doors of justice for the parties at

the very threshold’8.

[

16. In the present instance, we find that the

sequence of events clearly indicates that the,

respondent cannot be said to be solely at fault for as

it was under the impression that the suit already

stood disposed of and thus, there was no

requirement/occasion to file the Written Statement.

7 For reference, peruse, inter alia, State of Gujarat v Ramprakash P Puri, (1970) 2 SCR 875; Sushil Kumar Sen v State of Bihar, (1975) 1 SCC 774, and the more recent, State v M Subrahmanyam, (2019) 6 SCC 357.

8 Mahadev Govind Gharge v The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Upper Krishna Project, [2011] 8 SCR 829.

11

Admittedly, the case was listed suddenly after a

prolonged gap on 17.01.2017, whereafter that the

respondent filed an appropriate application. Moreover,

the reports dated 25.01.2017 and 11.05.2023 submitted

by the Registry of the High Court indicate that (a)

the official website of the High Court did indeed

state that the suit had been disposed of on

01.03.2000, and; (b) the High Court could not, for

reasons best known to it alone, trace out any orders

in the file of the suit pre-17.01.2017. Stricto sensu,

the situation that prevailed is a direct result of the

confusion created by the Registry of the High Court.

In this view, it would be improper to not permit the

taking on record of the Written Statement of the

respondent apropos the suit.

[

17. We, thus, find that discretion has rightly been

exercised by the Division Bench of the High Court in

favour of the respondent. We are in agreement with the

reasons assigned by the Division Bench for setting

aside the learned Single Judge’s order dated

12.06.2023.18.

18. Payment of costs ordered to be paid to the 12

appellant by the High Court be made within ten days.

19. The High Court is requested to proceed with the

matter keeping in mind the suit being of the year 1999

without giving any time/indulgence to any of the

parties, in accordance with law. We clarify that we

have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the

matter.

20. The appeal is dismissed in the above terms.

POST-SCRIPT: [

[21. We request the High Court to take appropriate

steps, on the administrative side, to ensure that what

has emerged from the reports dated 25.01.2017 and

11.05.2023 does not recur for any other case.

.....................J. [SUDHANSHU DHULIA]

.....................J. [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH] NEW DELHI JULY 30, 2024 13

ITEM NO.17 COURT NO.16 SECTION XVI

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s).14902/2024

(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 22-03-2024 in APO No. 147/2023 passed by the High Court At Calcutta)

PIC DEPARTMENTALS PVT. LTD. Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

SREELEATHERS PVT. LTD. Respondent(s)

(FOR ADMISSION)

Date : 30-07-2024 This petition was called on for hearing today.

CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDHANSHU DHULIA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH

For Petitioner(s) Dr. S.muralidhar, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Indranil Ghosh, Adv.

Mr. Arup Bhattacharyya, Adv.

Mr. Palzer Moktan, Adv.

Ms. Suparna Mukherjee, Adv.

Ms. Mrinal Chaudhry, Adv.

Ms. Mehar Bedi, Adv.

Mr. Kartik, Adv.

Ms. Aanchal Tikmani, AOR

For Respondent(s) Mr. Rana Mukherjee, Sr. Adv.

Ms. Daisy Hannah, AOR Mr. Sumanta Biswas, Adv.

Mr. Bikash Shaw, Adv.

Mr. Samarth Mohanty, Adv.

Ms. Oindrila Sen, Adv.

UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R

Leave granted.

The Appeal stands dismissed in terms of the signed order which

is placed on the file.

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Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

(TUSHAR BISHT) (RENU BALA GAMBHIR) COURT MASTER (SH) COURT MASTER (NSH)