Phulel Singh vs State Of Haryana
- SCC(2023) 10 SCC 268
- Neutral2023 INSC 863
- SCR[2023] 12 SCR 793
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
Where a court relies on a dying declaration as the sole basis for conviction, the court must be satisfied that the declaration is trustworthy, reliable and inspires confidence; mere proof of the formal procedure of recording the statement by a magistrate is insufficient where there are grave doubts as to whether it was voluntary or tutored by the deceased's relatives. A dying declaration is compromised and rendered unreliable where the statement was recorded in proximity in time to the relatives' representations regarding what should be told to the deceased, where related persons who had conveyed the relatives' narrative were present in the room at recording, and where the medical opinion as to the declarant's fitness appears to have been given after, rather than before, the statement was recorded. The High Court's disbelief of a dying declaration as against one accused on the same evidence creates inconsistency that undermines reliance on the same declaration to convict another accused, and such inconsistent application of the same evidence cannot sustain a conviction. For an offence under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code (causing dowry death), there must be affirmative evidence that the deceased was harassed on account of a demand for dowry; evidence of harassment by in-laws stated vaguely without specific reference to dowry demands, or evidence from a village headman that he was merely informed generally of harassment without mention of dowry-related cause, is insufficient to prove the causal element of the offence beyond reasonable doubt.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
2023INSC863 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 396 OF 2010
PHULEL SINGH …APPELLANT(S) VERSUS STATE OF HARAYANA …RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. This appeal challenges the judgment and order dated 24th
July 2009 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court for
the States of Punjab and Haryana in Criminal Appeal Nos.
413-DBA of 2001 and 909-SB of 1999 along with Criminal
Revision No. 134 of 2000, wherein the Division Bench partly
allowed the appeal filed by the accused persons; whereby Jora
Singh (Accused No. 1), father of the appellant herein was
acquitted of the charge under Section 304-B of the Indian Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC” for short) and the conviction and Narendra Prasad Date: 2023.09.27 17:21:55 IST
sentence qua the appellant herein rendered by the learned Reason:
1
court of Mrs. Nirmal Yadav, Sessions Judge, Sirsa (hereinafter
referred to as “the trial court”) in Sessions Trial No. 122 of
1994 vide judgment and order dated 14th September 1999 for
the offence punishable under Section 304-B of IPC and
sentence to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of
seven years was upheld. Whereas, Criminal Appeal No. 413-
DBA of 2001 filed by the State of Haryana and Criminal
Revision No. 134 of 2000 filed by Pavitar Singh (PW-3), brother
of Kiran Kaur (hereinafter referred to as “deceased”)
challenging the acquittal of the accused persons for the charge
under Section 302 of IPC were dismissed.
2. Shorn of details, the facts leading to the present appeal,
are as under:
2.1 The marriage between the deceased and the appellant
was solemnized in March, 1987, and they were blessed with a
girl and a boy. It is the prosecution case that the appellant
used to harass the deceased on account of insufficiency of
dowry. It is further the prosecution case that, succumbing to
the demands of the appellant, the parents of the deceased paid
Rs.20,000/- to the appellant in cash and in 1990, they gave a
scooter and gold ornaments weighing 2.5-3 tolas to the
2 appellant. Further, the deceased would tell her parents and
her brother about the harassment and ill-treatment meted out
to her at the hands of the appellant whenever she visited her
parental house and eventually refused to reside in the house
of the appellant. However, on account of the assurance and
responsibility undertaken by Mohan Singh, the son-in-law of
Jora Singh, father-in-law of the deceased, she was brought
back to her matrimonial house. Even then, the deceased was
not treated properly by the appellant. According to the
prosecution allegations, Pavitar Singh (PW-3), brother of the
deceased had come to see the deceased at her matrimonial
home in village Chatha about 3 to 4 days prior to the Diwali of
1991 when the deceased had informed him about the demand
for dowry being made by the appellant and his family. When
Pavitar Singh (PW-3) returned home and informed his parents
about the said harassment being meted out to the deceased in
lieu of demand for dowry, Randhir Singh (PW-4), father of the
deceased, went to Major Singh (PW-6), Sarpanch of his village,
who assured him that they would go to the house of the
appellant for counselling them after Diwali. Following which,
on 5th November 1991, i.e., on the festive day of Diwali, Dr.
3 Sharma of Bhagwangarh had come to Rama Mandi. On his
return, he informed Pavitar Singh (PW-3) and other family
members that the deceased had been burnt and that she was
being taken to Ludhiana. Thereupon, Pavitar Singh (PW-3),
Randhir Singh (PW-4) and cousin Gur Raj Singh reached the
Daya Nand Medical College and Hospital, Ludhiana
(hereinafter referred to as “DMC, Ludhiana”) where the
deceased was admitted and lay unconscious. On 5th November
1991, Dr. Jasmeet Singh Dhir (PW-7), the Medical Officer at
DMC, Ludhiana, who had medico-legally examined the
deceased, opined that she had 91% burns on her body and
accordingly sent ruqa (Ex.-P.J) to the Station House Officer
(SHO), Police Station Sarabha Nagar, Ludhiana on the same
day at about 05.10 p.m. regarding admission of the deceased
in the hospital.
2.2 On 7th November 2011, when the deceased regained
consciousness, she told Pavitar Singh (PW-3) and others that
it was the appellant who had burnt her. Following which,
Randhir Singh (PW-4) made an application (Ex. P.D./1) to the
Sub-Divisional Magistrate (SDM), Ludhiana, for recording of
the statement of the deceased. On the following day, i.e., 8th
4 November 2011, Mr. Sadhu Singh (PW-5), the then Executive
Magistrate, Ludhiana received the said application along with
endorsements of the SDM, Ludhiana (Ex. P.D/2 and P.D/3).
Upon receiving the same, the Executive Magistrate, Ludhiana
reached the DMC, Ludhiana and moved another application
(Ex. P.S.) before the Medical Officer at about 04.15 p.m.
thereby seeking his opinion with regards to the fitness of the
deceased. When Dr. Jatinder Pal Singh (PW-8) gave his opinion
(Ex. P.S/1) that the deceased was fit to make a statement, Mr.
Sadhu Singh (PW-5) proceeded to record the statement of the
deceased (Ex. P.L.) on the same day at about 04.40 p.m. The
statement was read over and explained to the deceased, who
had put her thumb impression on the same after admitting to
its contents to be correct. A First Information Report (“FIR” for
short) (Ex. P.E./1) was recorded based on the said statement
of the deceased against Jora Singh, father-in-law of the
deceased, appellant herein and Dhan Kaur, mother-in-law of
the deceased, for the offences punishable under Sections 498-
A, 307, 406 and 34 of IPC. On 18th November 1991, at about
06.00 p.m., Dr. Jatinder Pal Singh (PW-8) sent ruqa (Ex. P.M.)
to the Police Station Sarabha Nagar, Ludhiana, regarding the
5 death of the deceased. Following which, the Assistant Sub
Inspector (ASI), Sri Bhagwan (PW-9) prepared an inquest
report at the DMC, Ludhiana on 19th November 1991 with
regards to the dead body of the deceased and made an
application for conducting of post-mortem examination as well
(Ex. P.R./1).
2.3 Upon completion of investigation, a charge-sheet came to
be filed in the court of jurisdictional Magistrate. Since the case
was exclusively triable by the learned Sessions Judge, it came
to be committed to the learned Sessions Court. Charges were
framed for the offences punishable under Section 302 read
with Section 34 of IPC and Section 304-B of IPC. The accused
pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
2.4 In order to substantiate the charges levelled against the
accused persons, the prosecution examined as many as nine
witnesses. Thereafter, the accused persons were examined
under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(“Cr.P.C.” for short). They denied the prosecution allegations
regarding demand for dowry and harassment of the deceased
and alleged that they were being falsely implicated. The
accused persons also denied that the deceased was set ablaze
6 by them. At the conclusion of trial, the learned trial court
convicted all the three accused persons for the offence
punishable under Section 304-B of IPC for causing the dowry
death of the deceased and accordingly sentenced them to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years
along with fine. However, the learned trial court was pleased
to extend the benefit of doubt qua the charge under Section
302 of IPC and thus, acquitted the accused persons of the said
charge.
2.5 Being aggrieved thereby, the accused persons preferred
an appeal before the High Court with regards to the conviction
and sentence awarded by the learned trial court; whereas, the
State of Haryana and Pavitar Singh (PW-3) also filed their
respective appeals before the High Court with regards to the
acquittal of the accused persons for the charge under Section
302 of IPC. The High Court, by the impugned judgement, while
observing that the appeal preferred by Dhan Kaur, mother-in-
law of the deceased stood abated as she had died during the
proceedings; dismissed the appeals filed by the State of
Haryana and Pavitar Singh (PW-3), and partly allowed the
appeals filed by Jora Singh, father-in-law of the deceased and
7 the appellant herein thereby acquitting Jora Singh, father-in-
law of the charge levelled against him under Section 304-B of
IPC, but confirmed the conviction and sentence awarded by
the learned trial court to the appellant herein.
3. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal.
4. We have heard Shri Rajul Bhargav, learned Senior
Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant and Shri Samar
Vijay Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State.
5. Shri Bhargav submitted that the trial court as well as the
High Court has grossly erred in convicting the appellant. He
submits that the reliance placed on the dying declaration is
totally unsustainable. He submits that the very first
information given by the deceased herself to the doctor while
admitting to the hospital, would show that the deceased had
put up kerosene on herself and set herself on fire. He submits
that as a matter of fact, it is the present appellant who had
tried to extinguish the fire. The learned Senior Counsel
therefore submits that the subsequent dying declaration,
which is recorded after 3-4 days of the accident, could not have
been relied on by the courts. He submits that the said dying
declaration was a tutored one at the instance of her relatives
8 and the conviction solely based on the same is not sustainable.
The learned Senior Counsel relies on a recent judgment of this
Court in the case of Makhan Singh v. State of Haryana1
decided on 16th August 2022 to which two of us (B.R. Gavai,
J., Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.) were on the Bench.
6. Shri Bhargav further submitted that the case under
Section 304-B of IPC is also not made out. He submitted that
there is no evidence on record to show that the deceased was
meted out to any harassment on account of non-fulfillment of
demand of dowry. He submitted that even if the evidence of
the relatives of the deceased is taken on face value, it would
not show that there was any harassment to the deceased on
account of non-fulfillment of demand of dowry. He submitted
that even the evidence of independent witness Major Singh
(PW-6), Sarpanch of the village would also not support the
prosecution case.
7. Shri Singh, on the contrary, submitted that the
prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. He
further submitted that the dying declaration is recorded by the
Executive Magistrate. He further submitted that Dr. Jatinder
1 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1019
9 Pal Singh (PW-8) has testified that the deceased was in the
sound state of mind and fit to make the statement. He
therefore submitted that the conviction recorded on the basis
of the said dying declaration warrants no interference.
8. Shri Singh further submitted that the evidence of PWs 3
and 4, who were relatives of the deceased along with Major
Singh (PW-6), Sarpanch of the village would establish, beyond
all reasonable doubt, that the deceased was meted out
harassment on account of non-fulfillment of demand of dowry.
He therefore prays for dismissal of the present appeal.
9. With the assistance of the parties, we have perused the
evidence and materials placed on record.
10. The present case mainly rests on the dying declaration of
the deceased. No doubt, that a conviction can be solely
recorded on the basis of dying declaration. However, for doing
so, the court must come to a conclusion that the dying
declaration is trustworthy, reliable and one which inspires
confidence. In the present case, the dying declaration is
recorded by Shri Sadhu Singh (PW-5), Executive Magistrate.
He stated that he obtained the certificate from the doctor
regarding the fitness of the deceased to make the statement.
10 He further stated that he recorded the statement of the
deceased and thereafter it was read over and explained to her.
He further states that she had thumb marked the same after
admitting its contents to be correct. In the dying declaration
recorded by Shri Sadhu Singh (PW-5), Executive Magistrate,
the deceased is said to have stated that on 5th November 1991
at around 12.00 noon, her husband Phulel Singh, i.e., the
appellant herein, Jora Singh, father-in-law and Dhan Kaur,
mother-in-law caught hold of her. Her husband, the appellant
herein put kerosene on her person and set her ablaze. She
further stated that when she was set on fire, she raised an
alarm but the accused overpowered her.
11. It is relevant to note that the deceased received burn
injuries on 5th November 1991 but the dying declaration came
to be recorded on 8th November 1991 after an application was
made by the relatives of the deceased to the SDM, Ludhiana.
Shri Sadhu Singh (PW-5), Executive Magistrate, in his
evidence, admitted that the boys, who had brought the
application containing the order of the SDM, Ludhiana had
told him that the statement of the deceased should be recorded
and that she was in a position to make the statement. He
11 further admitted that those boys had told him that whatever
they had to tell the deceased, they had told her and that he
should accompany them to record her statement. He has
further admitted that those 2-3 boys were related to the
deceased and some other persons were also in the room in
which he recorded the statement of the deceased.
12. It could thus be seen that there is a grave doubt as to
whether the dying declaration recorded by Shri Sadhu Singh
(PW-5), Executive Magistrate was a voluntary one or tutored
at the instance of respondent No.5. It is further relevant to
note that Dr. Jatinder Pal Singh (PW-8), in his deposition itself,
states that Shri Sadhu Singh (PW-5), Executive Magistrate had
recorded the dying declaration of the deceased on 8 th
November 1991 at 04.40 p.m. whereas the opinion with regard
to her fitness was given by him at 06.00 p.m. on 8th November
1991. He has further admitted that he had not mentioned in
the bed-head ticket that he had attested the statement of the
deceased at 04.40 p.m. on 8th November 1991. It is thus
doubtful as to whether Dr. Jatinder Pal Singh (PW-8) had
really examined the deceased with regard to her fitness prior
12 to her statement being recorded by Shri Sadhu Singh (PW-5),
Executive Magistrate.
13. It is further relevant to note that Dr. Jasmeet Singh Dhir
(PW-7) has stated that the history recorded by him while
admitting the deceased, was narrated by the deceased herself.
He has further stated that the deceased had also narrated that
her husband had extinguished fire by pouring water on her.
14. In the totality of the circumstances, it cannot be said that
the dying declaration (Ex. P.L.) is free from doubt.
15. The most glaring aspect that is required to be considered
is that the High Court itself has disbelieved the dying
declaration insofar as Jora Singh, father-in-law of the
deceased is concerned. We fail to understand as to how the
same dying declaration could have been made basis for
conviction of the appellant when the same was disbelieved
insofar as another accused is concerned.
16. It will also be apposite to refer to the deposition of Shri
Bhagwan, ASI, Investigating Officer (PW-9). He has stated in
his deposition that he had come to the conclusion that the
present case was not a case under Section 307 of IPC or
Section 498-A of IPC but a case under Section 309 of IPC. He 13 has further stated that the higher authorities that is Shri
Sukhdev Singh, DSP and Shri Rajinder Singh, SHO had
verified the investigation conducted by him and found the
same as correct and agreed with his conclusions. He has
further stated that during investigation, it was revealed that
the deceased was short-tempered and that accused Jora Singh
was not there in the village on the fateful day and that he had
gone to Rama Mandi for making purchases for Diwali.
17. Insofar as the evidence regarding harassment on account
of non-fulfillment of demand of dowry is concerned, the
prosecution relies on the evidence of Pavitar Singh (PW-3),
brother of the deceased, Randhir Singh (PW-4), father of the
deceased and Major Singh (PW-6), Sarpanch of the village.
Insofar as PWs 3 and 4 are concerned, they are relatives of the
deceased and their evidence will have to be scrutinized with
greater care, caution and circumspection. Insofar as
harassment with regard to non-fulfillment of demand of dowry
is concerned, except the vague allegation, there is nothing in
their evidence to support the prosecution case. Insofar as
Major Singh (PW-6), Sarpanch of the village is concerned, he
stated that he was informed by Randhir Singh (PW-4), father
14 of the deceased that in-laws of the deceased were harassing
her and therefore they should go to village Chatha. However,
he also does not state that he was informed by Randhir Singh
(PW-4), father of the deceased that the deceased was meted
out to any harassment on account of non-fulfillment of
demand of dowry. We are therefore of the considered view that
there is no evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
deceased was harassed on account of non-fulfillment of
demand of dowry. We therefore find that the case under
Section 304-B of IPC is not made out by the prosecution.
18. In the result, we pass the following order:
(i) The appeal is allowed;
(ii) The judgment and order of conviction as recorded by
the trial court dated 14th September 1999 and affirmed
by the High Court vide its impugned judgment and
order dated 24th July 2009 are quashed and set aside;
and
(iii) The appellant is acquitted of all the charges levelled
against him and his bail bonds shall stand discharged.
15
19. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of in
the above terms.
….……..….......................J. [B.R. GAVAI]
……………………..….........................J. [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA]
……………..….........................J. [PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA]
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 27, 2023.
16
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