Pazhassi Raja Chritable Trust & Anr vs Union Of India & Anr

inspite of the artistic and historic importance of the film, it has

been arbitrarily not accepted for screening at the International

Film Festival of India - 2009. Aggrieved against the wholly

arbitrary conduct and actions of the selectors at the Film

Festival, the petitioner has unsuccessfully approached the

Kerala, as well, Delhi High Court.

3. Learned counsel submitted that the Learned Single

Judge of the Delhi High Court misdirected itself in not

granting the interim relief. In view of the fact that the film

festival was coming to an end on 3rd December 2009, in the

absence of interim relief, the petitioner will be left remedy-less.

Learned counsel submitted that the Learned Single Judge

failed to address any of the issues alleged in the writ petition.

In view of the fact that there had been a flagrant disregard of a

mandatory regulation, viz., the Regulation 8.2 of the Indian 3

Panorama Regulation, 2009, grant of interim relief would be a

natural consequence.

4. The petitioner has filed a writ petition in the Delhi High

Court which is pending adjudication. In the aforesaid writ

petition the Learned Single Judge of the High Court has issued

notice to the respondents to show cause as to why rule nisi be

not issued. Necessary direction has been issued for exchange

of affidavits. The matter has been directed to be listed for

hearing on 13th of April 2010. The petitioner approached the

High Court earlier by way of writ petition making similar

grievance as is made in the present proceedings. This writ

petition was disposed of on 27.10.2009 by granting liberty to

the petitioner to make a representation to the respondent.

Consequently a representation was made on 30.10.2009.

Several issues relating to the merits of the petitioner's film

including its historical importance as well as other

irregularities and illegalities in the procedure followed by the

Jury in the selection process were highlighted. When the

representation was not disposed of the petitioner filed the

second writ petition. At the motion hearing of the writ petition 4

an assurance was given by the respondents to consider the

representation of the petitioner forthwith. Thus, this writ

petition was also disposed of with a direction to the

respondents to take a view on the representation. Ultimately,

the representation submitted by the petitioner has been

decided on 19.11.2009. The claim of the petitioner has been

rejected. Therefore, petitioner approached the Delhi High

Court for the third time by way of writ petition i.e., Writ

Petition (c) No.13352 of 2009. In this writ petition a Civil

Miscellaneous Application No.14682 of 2009 was filed seeking

a direction to the respondent for screening the film of the

petitioner as a special entry. This Civil Miscellaneous

Application has been dismissed by the Learned Single Judge of

the Delhi High Court by the impugned order dated

26.11.2009.

5. We may also notice here that another aggrieved producer

of another film had approached the Kerala High Court with

similar relief. Initially a Single Judge of the Kerala High Court

granted interim relief and stayed the screening of all films.

The matter was carried in appeal before the Division Bench. 5

Before the Division Bench it was submitted that the writ

petitioner will not come in the way of conducting the festival.

He would be satisfied if it is ensured that the respondents

strictly complied with the regulation in future. Necessary

direction was issued by the Division Bench to the respondent

that it shall abide by the regulation in future.

6. Mr. Venugopal vehemently argued that if the petitioner

is denied the interim relief the writ petition itself would be

rendered infructuous. Learned counsel also submitted that

even though the remedy of approaching the Division Bench in

Letters Patent Appeal is available, in the facts of this case it

was necessary to move this Court as this Court can mould the

relief under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Learned

counsel submitted that the superior courts are not powerless

to grant interim relief, even in cases, where there is a flagrant

breach of statutory rules which are mandatory in nature.

7. Learned counsel has highlighted three main legal issues.

Firstly, he submits, that where there is a right there is a

remedy. In any event according to him the Learned Single

Judge failed to exercise its jurisdiction in not addressing the 6

controversy in issue. Learned counsel further submitted that

this Court can entertain an SLP in compelling circumstances

even if the normal remedy of Letters Patent Appeal is not

availed by a party. In support of his submission, Learned

Counsel relied on a judgment of this Court in Pawan Kumar

vs. State of Haryana, (2003) 11 SCC 241. We are of the

considered opinion that the aforesaid judgment is of no

assistance to the petitioner. In that case this Court observed

as follows:

"Apart from the salutary powers exercisable by this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution for doing complete justice to the parties, the powers under Article 136 of the Constitution can be exercised by it in favour of a party even suo motu when the court is satisfied that compelling grounds for its exercise exist but it should be used very sparingly with caution and circumspection inasmuch as only the rarest of rare cases. One of such grounds may be, as it exists like in the present case, where this Court while considering appeal of one of the accused comes to the conclusion that conviction of appealing as well as non-appealing accused both was unwarranted. Upon the aforesaid conclusion arrived at by the Apex Court of the land, further detention of the non- appealing accused, by virtue of the 7

judgment rendered by the High Court upholding his conviction, being without any authority of law, infringes upon the right to personal liberty guaranteed to the citizen as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution. In our view, in cases akin to the present one, where there is wither a flagrant violation of mandatory provision of any statute or any provision of the Constitution, it is not that this Court has a discretion to exercise its suo motu power but a duty is enjoined upon it to exercise the same by setting right the illegality in the judgment of the High Court as it is well settled that illegality should not be allowed to be perpetuated and failure by this Court to interfere with the same would amount to allowing the illegality to be perpetuated. In view o f the foregoing discussion, we are of the opinion that accused Balwinder Singh alias Binder is also entitled to be extended the same benefit which we are granting in favour of the appellant."

8. In our opinion the aforesaid observations reiterate the

well-settled propositions of law as well as the parameters

within which this court will exercise its power under Article

142 of the Constitution of India to do complete justice in a

particular case. But those are the matters which are relatable

directly to Article 21 and akin to deprivation of life. In other

words issues which would fall within the category of `rarest of 8

rare' cases. This Court can grant the relief in cases: where

manifest injustice has been done: or where there is manifest

illegality or manifest want of jurisdiction. In the present case

we are concerned with a purely commercial venture, where the

film in question "Pazhassi Raja" is vying for fame with another

commercial film called "Mangal Pandey". It is not disputed

that the film "Pazhassi Raja" has already been released on the

commercial sectors. It seeks to depict a view point on the first

war of Independence which may or may not be generally

acceptable. We are not called upon to decide on the issue in

these proceedings. In any event the film is a view point of the

individuals or the team involved in the production of the film.

We are unable to see how Article 21 can be said to have been

infringed in the facts and circumstances of this case. We are

also not impressed with the submission of Mr. Venugopal that

without grant of interim relief the petitioner would be rendered

remedy-less. In case it is ultimately found by the Delhi High

Court or in any other proceedings that the Jury, selectors of

the films to be screened, have acted arbitrarily or in

infringement of the statutory regulations, remedy of damages 9

by way of a civil suit would always be available to the

petitioner. The judgment relied upon by Mr. Venugopal in the

case of Dhannalal vs. Kalawatibai and others (2002) 6

SCC 16 reiterates the principle in the legal maxim Ubi jus ibi

remedium which translates that "there is no wrong without a

remedy. Where there is a right there is a forum for its

enforcement." We have no reason to take a different view on

this legal principle . We are however of the opinion that the

petitioner has not been rendered remedy-less merely by denial

of interim relief.

9. We are also not impressed with the submission of Mr.

Venugopal that merely because the petitioner has been vigilant

in projecting the grievance as well as his rights, interim relief

ought to follow. The film of the petitioner has to compete with

all other entries. Its entry was dependent upon the relative

merit assessment by the panel of jurors. Its merit cannot be

adjudged individually.

10. Mr. Venugopal then submitted that the selection

process has been vitiated as there has been a breach of

Regulation 8.2. The regulation is as under:

10

"8.2 The Chairperson of the Feature Film Jury may constitute a maximum of two panels from amongst the members of the jury. Each panel will recommend not more than 33 % of the films viewed by it for combined viewing by the full jury."

11. A perusal of the above would show that the Chairperson

of the Feature Film Jury has the power to constitute a

maximum two panels, for viewing all the films and to

recommend not more than 33 % of the films to be viewed by

the full Jury. According to Mr. Venugopal one of the Jury

members, Mr. Bobby Bedi was not present for 13 out of a total

15 days that the Juries saw the movies. This fact was

admitted by the respondents in the counter filed by them

before the High Court of Kerala. According to the learned

counsel the whole selection process has been conducted

arbitrarily, there has been criticism in the media with regard

to the functioning of the Jury. In our opinion, the learned

Single Judge, considering the same submissions, has

correctly observed that all these issues will be determined at

the final hearing, upon receipt of the counter of the 11

respondents. The Court normally would not substitute its

own opinion for that of the experts. Decision about the quality

and merit of the film of the petitioner can only be taken in

comparison to other entries. That is the job of the experts.

We see no reason to defer with the view expressed by the

learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court. It is also held

by the Delhi High court that merely because a person has

come to court, would not ipso facto entitle the petitioner to

relief on the very terms on which a prayer is made. In our

opinion the aforesaid observation cannot be said to be as

either illegal or erroneous.

12. Mr. Venugopal, has then submitted that the selection

process has been altered midway. This was in response to the

submissions made by the learned counsel for the Union of

India before the High Court. The learned counsel had also

made a reference to the communication dated 15.10.2009

received from Mr. Bobby Bedi which was placed before the

Delhi High Court. The response was to the following effect:

"This is with reference to my appointment as a member of the above jury.

12 Due to the change in the final dates for the jury viewings I had to reschedule some of my travel plans and as a result was unable to attend some of the viewings. However, I had discussed this with the Directorate and the chairman of the Jury and my other jury group members and carried a DVD copy of all the films that I would be missing. I can confirm that all the films in my group have been seen by me and discussed with my team members Gautaman Bhaskaran and Raja Mitra and we have come up with a final list of recommendations."

13. It was also submitted before the High Court by the

learned counsel for the Union of India as follows:

"Mr. A.S. Chandhlok, learned Additional Solicitor General has pointed out that on viewing the film in question, it was the unanimous decision of the jury not to include it in the Indian Panorama 2009."

14. We are unable to discern from the aforesaid any change

in the criteria. We have however refrained from expressing any

opinion on the same since the writ petition filed by the

petitioner is pending adjudication before the High Court.

15. We may reiterate that the facts and circumstances in the

present case were not such as to permit the petitioner to

bypass the normal procedure of filing, Letters Patent Appeal 13

against the order of the learned Single Judge before

approaching this Court by special leave petition.

16. In view of the aforesaid we decline to interfere with the

order passed by the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High

Court. The special leave petition is dismissed.

.........................................J (TARUN CHATTERJEE)

.............................................J (SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR)

NEW DELHI DECEMBER 02, 2009