Pawan Kumar Agrawal vs The State Of Chhattisgarh

4. The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present appeal

are as under:

4.1 On 2nd April 2003, the Chhattisgarh State Public

Service Commission issued Advertisement No.01/2003/Exam

inviting applications for recruitment to the post of Civil Judge,

Class-II.

4.2 The appellants submitted their applications,

participated in the examination as well as the interview.

Thereafter, while preparing the final select list, the appellants

who secured 127 and 125 marks respectively, were placed in

the supplementary select list/waiting list, despite securing

better marks than two women candidates.

4.3 Aggrieved thereby, the appellants filed Writ Petition

No.1827 of 2004 before the High Court challenging the legality

and validity of the selection on the ground that the selection

under the reserved quota for women has been made in excess

of the quota prescribed under Rule 6-A of the Chhattisgarh

2 Lower Judicial (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules,

1994 and Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India.

4.4 On 2nd May 2012, the Division Bench of the High

Court allowed the writ petition and directed the appointment

of the appellants, subject to the fulfilment of necessary

formalities such as police verification etc., against the available

vacancies for the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division). The High

Court further held that the seniority of the appellants will be

reckoned from the date of their appointment.

4.5 Consequently, the appellants were appointed on 8th

July 2013 and confirmed on 4th December 2015.

4.6 Discontented by the fact that though the appellants

were appointed pursuant to the selection process held in the

year 2003, they were placed below the candidates selected in

the year 2006, 2008 and 2012, the appellants made a

representation before the Registrar General of the

Chhattisgarh High Court claiming seniority over the candidate

prior to 2006 batch on the ground that the Chhattisgarh Civil

Services (General Conditions of Services) Rules, 1961 provides

that seniority of the direct recruits shall be determined on the

3 basis of order of merit irrespective of the date of appointment.

4.7 On 24th June 2016, the representation of the

appellants was rejected by the Registrar General of the High

Court stating that the order of the High Court in Writ Petition

No.1827 of 2004 clearly states that the seniority will be

determined from the date of appointment and the said order

has attained finality.

4.8 Consequently, the appellants filed an application

being MCC No.681 of 2016 in Writ Petition No.1827 of 2004

seeking clarification of the order dated 2nd May 2012.

4.9 On 28th September 2016, the Division Bench of the

High Court dismissed the aforesaid application stating that the

order dated 2nd May 2012 requires no clarification as it does

not suffer from any ambiguity.

4.10 Aggrieved thereby, the appellants filed Writ Petition

No.3620 of 2019 before the High Court seeking quashing of the

letter dated 24th June 2016 issued by the Registrar General of

the High Court rejecting the appellants’ claim of seniority.

4.11 On 13th May 2019, the learned Single Judge of the

High Court rejected the writ petition of the appellants stating

4 that the Division Bench of the High Court vide order dated 2nd

May 2012 in Writ Petition No.1827 of 2004 had stated in

categorical terms that the seniority of the appellants would be

reckoned from the date of appointment. If the appellants were

aggrieved by the said direction, they ought to have challenged

the same at that point of time, which the appellants did not do.

Therefore, the said direction issued by the Division Bench of

the High Court has attained finality.

4.12 Discontented by the order of the learned Single

Judge of the High Court, the appellants filed Writ Appeal No.

341 of 2019.

4.13 Vide impugned judgment and final order dated 30th

July 2019, the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the

writ appeal stating that the Court is not in a position to deal

with the said issue on merits since the order dated 2nd May

2012 stands till date and the review petition filed against the

same also stands dismissed.

4.14 Aggrieved thereby, the appellants preferred an

appeal to this Court by way of special leave.

4.15 It is to be noted that though candidates from the

5 2006, 2008 and 2012 batch were impleaded in representative

capacity, no one has put in appearance on their behalf.

5. We have heard Shri. P.S. Patwalia, learned Senior

Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants, Shri B.S.

Rajesh Agrajit, learned Deputy Advocate General on behalf of

Respondent No.1/State, Shri. Harsh Pathak, learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the Respondent No.2 and Shri. Apoorv

Kurup, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the

Respondent No.3 at length.

6. Shri P.S. Patwalia, learned Senior Counsel

appearing on behalf of the appellants, submits that the

appellants, having been selected in the selection process of

2003, ought to have been granted seniority over all such

candidates who were selected in pursuance to the subsequent

selection process conducted in the years 2006, 2008 and 2012.

He submits that, in any case, the appellants were entitled to

seniority over the candidates who were appointed after the

order of the Division Bench of the High court dated 2nd May

2012. It is, therefore, submitted that the appellants ought to

have at least been placed above the batch appointed on 10th

6 July 2012.

7. Per contra, learned counsel for the State submits

that the order of the High Court dated 2nd May 2012 is clear.

As per the said order, the seniority of the appellants was to be

reckoned from the date of their appointment. It is submitted

that though the order of the High Court was passed on 2nd May

2012, the same was challenged before this Court by way of

Special Leave Petition (“SLP” for short) being SLP(C) No. 21673

of 2012 and after the said SLP was rejected on 30th November

2012, the appellants were appointed on 8th July 2013. It is

submitted that, in the meantime, the 2012 batch came to be

appointed on 10th July 2012. It is thus submitted that since it

is clear from the order of the High Court dated 2nd May 2012

that the appellants’ seniority was to be reckoned from the date

of their appointment, their seniority has rightly been

considered from the date of their appointment i.e. from 8th July

2013. The said order having attained finality, it is now not

open for the appellants to say that they ought to have been

granted seniority with retrospective effect.

8. At the outset, we do not propose to go into the merits

7 and demerits of the order passed by the Division Bench of the

High Court dated 2nd May 2012, inasmuch as it has attained

finality in view of the dismissal of the SLP by this Court vide

order dated 30th November 2012. We would only consider as

to from which date the appellants could be entitled to seniority

in the cadre of Civil Judge (Junior Division).

9. Undisputedly, in the order dated 2nd May 2012, the

Division Bench of the High Court has clearly observed as

under:

“16. Thus, in the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, we deem it appropriate to direct respondent No.1 to appoint the petitioners, subject to fulfillment of necessary formalities like police verification etc. against the available vacancies for the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division).

The seniority of the petitioners will, however, be reckoned from the date of their appointment.” [Emphasis supplied]

10. It can thus be seen that the seniority of the

appellants was to be reckoned from the date of their

appointment. As such, we do not find merit in the claim of the

8 appellants with regard to the grant of seniority vis-à-vis those

candidates who were appointed prior to the date of the order

of the High Court i.e. 2nd May 2012.

11. The only question that will have to be considered is.

as to whether the appellants would be entitled to seniority over

the batch of Judicial Officers who were appointed on 10th July

2012.

12. It is clear from the record that the writ petition filed

by the appellants was decided on 2nd May 2012. As such, the

State ought to have appointed the appellants within a

reasonable time. Though the State had challenged the said

order in an SLP before this Court, the order of the High Court

was never stayed by this Court. Ultimately, the SLP came to

be dismissed on 30th November 2012. Even thereafter, for a

period of around 8 months, no action was taken by the State

in issuing an order of appointment to the appellants.

13. Undisputedly, the 2012 batch was appointed on 10th

July 2012 i.e., after a period of more than 2 months from the

date of the order of the High Court. As already pointed out by

us hereinabove, no one has appeared for the candidate from

9 the 2012 batch of the Judicial Officers who was impleaded in

the present case.

14. We are of the considered opinion that the right to be

appointed accrued to the appellants on the date of the order of

the High Court i.e. on 2nd May 2012. The period between the

date of the order of the High Court and the appointment of the

batch of 2012 is more than 2 months. During the said period,

the respondent-State could very well have fulfilled the

necessary formalities like police verification, etc., and issued

an order of appointment to the appellants.

15. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the

delay in giving effect to the order of the High Court dated 2nd

May 2012 by the State Government should not be permitted to

act to the prejudice of the appellants. In this respect, we may

gainfully refer to the order passed by this Court in the case of

Pilla Sitaram Patrudu and others v. Union of India and

others1.

16. We are, therefore, inclined to partly allow the

present appeal. Accordingly, we pass the following order:

1 (1996) 8 SCC 637

10

(i) The appeal is partly allowed.

(ii) It is directed that in the seniority list, the

appellants be shown senior to the Judicial

Officers who were appointed on 10th July 2012.

17. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there

shall be no order as to costs.

..............................J (B.R. GAVAI)

…..………...............................J (AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)

NEW DELHI;

APRIL 23, 2025

11