Pashimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam ... vs Deepak Kumar Garg Interim Resolution ...

Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 1673 of 2026 & I.A. No. 6383 of 2026

IN THE MATTER OF: Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. ...Appellant

Versus Deepak Kumar Garg ...Respondent Present:

For Appellant : Mr. Vivek Narayan Sharma, Ms. Prachi Johri, Ms. Palak Kaushik, Mrs. Mahima Bhardwaj Kalucha, Mr. Akash Singh & Mr. Ajay Kumar Narula, Adv.

For Respondents : None.

ORDER

(Hybrid Mode)

10.09.2026 I.A. No. 6383 of 2026

1. We have heard Learned Counsel for the Appellant and perused the

record.

2. The instant appeal has been moved by the Appellant to condone the

delay of 80 days which has occurred in preferring the instant appeal filed

against the Impugned Order dated 22.04.2026 passed by the Learned

Adjudicating Authority in IA No.631 of 2025 IN CP (IB) No.152 of 2024.

3. Learned Counsel for the Appellant submits that though under Section

61(2) of the Code, the appeal is required to be filed within 30 days and at

the most, within the extended 15 days time which can be condoned by this

Appellate Tribunal on showing the sufficient cause, however, the appeal

could not be filed within time despite best efforts made by the Appellant.

Page 1 of 9

4. It is further submitted that to file the appeal, various approvals were

required to be taken from different authorities and therefore, an

unintentional delay had occurred due to the circumstances which was not

under the control of the Appellant.

5. It is further submitted that the Appellant is having a very strong case,

so far as the merits of the appeal are concerned, however, despite remained

diligent he could not prefer the appeal within time and therefore, the delay

which has occurred in preferring the appeal is unintentional and may kindly

be condone.

6. We have heard Learned Counsel for the Appellant and perused the

record.

7. Perusal of record will reveal that the Impugned Order was passed by

the Learned Adjudicating Authority on 22.04.2026 and the 30days

limitation would end on 22.05.2026. The Appeal has been filed on

11.08.2026. Thus, the delay of 80 days has occurred in filing this appeal.

8. Section 61(1) of the IBC stipulates that notwithstanding anything to

the contrary contained in the Companies Act 2013, any person aggrieved by

the order of the Adjudicating Authority "under this Part" may prefer an

appeal to NCLAT. Sub-Section (2) of Section 61 provides for a period of

limitation in the following terms:

"61. Appeals and Appellate Authority--

(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained under the Companies Act, 2013, any person aggrieved by the order of the

Page 2 of 9 Adjudicating Authority under this part may prefer an appeal to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal.

(2) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within thirty days before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal: Provided that the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal may allow an appeal to be filed after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal but such period shall not exceed fifteen days.

[...]"

Sub-Section (2) of Section 61 provides for a limitation period of thirty days. The proviso to Section 61(2) provides that NLCAT may allow an appeal to be filed beyond a period of thirty days by a maximum of fifteen days on the demonstration of sufficient cause for the delay.

9. Rule 3 of the NCLAT Rules 2016 stipulates that for computation of a

time period as provided, the day from which the said period is to be

reckoned shall be excluded. Rule 3 provides as follows:

"3. Computation of time period--

Where a period is prescribed by the Act and these rules or under any other law or is fixed by the Appellate Tribunal for doing any act, in computing the time, the day from which the said period is to be reckoned shall be excluded, and if the last day expires on a day when the office of the Appellate Tribunal is closed, that day and

Page 3 of 9 any succeeding day on which the Appellate Tribunal remains closed shall also be excluded."

10. In V Nagarajan v. SKS Ispat and Power Limited & Ors., (2021)

ibclaw.in 157 SC, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that

when the judgment has been pronounced in open court, the period of

limitation starts running from that very day. The only concession an

applicant may get is by excluding the period consumed by the Ld.,

Adjudicating Authority for preparation of the certified copy, if the application

for the certified copy has been presented within the stipulated 30 days. The

relevant part of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under;

"19......The import of Section 12 of the Limitation Act and its explanation is to assign the responsibility of applying for a certified copy of the order on a party. A person wishing to file an appeal is expected to file an application for a certified copy before the expiry of the limitation period, upon which the "time requisite" for obtaining a copy is to be excluded. However, the time taken by the court to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy is made cannot be excluded. If no application for a certified copy has been made, no exclusion can ensue. In fact, the explanation to the provision is a clear indicator of the legal position that the time which is taken by the court to prepare the decree or order cannot be excluded before the application to obtain a copy is made. It cannot be said that the right to receive a free copy under Section 420(3) of the Companies Act obviated the obligation on the appellant to seek a certified copy through an

Page 4 of 9 application. The appellant has urged that Rule 14 of the NCLAT Rules empowers the NCLAT to exempt parties from compliance with the requirement of any of the rules in the interests of substantial justice, which has been typically exercised in favour of allowing a downloaded copy in lieu of a certified copy. While it may well be true that waivers on filing an appeal with a certified copy are often granted for the purposes of judicial determination, they do not confer an automatic right on an applicant to dispense with compliance and render Rule 22(2) of the NCLAT Rules nugatory. The act of filing an application for a certified copy is not just a technical requirement for computation of limitation but also an indication of the diligence of the aggrieved party in pursuing the litigation in a timely fashion. In a similar factual scenario, the NCLAT had dismissed an appeal as time-barred under Section 61(2) of the IBC since the appellant therein was present in court, and yet chose to file for a certified copy after five months of the pronouncement of the order."

21. The answer to the two issues set out in Section C of the judgement- (i) when will the clock for calculating the limitation period run for proceedings under the IBC; and (ii) is the annexation of a certified copy mandatory for an appeal to the NCLAT against an order passed under the IBC - must be based on a harmonious interpretation of the applicable legal regime, given that the IBC is a Code in itself and has overriding effect. Sections 61(1) and (2) of the IBC

Page 5 of 9 consciously omit the requirement of limitation being computed from when the "order is made available to the aggrieved party", in contradistinction to Section 421(3) of the Companies Act. Owing to the special nature of the IBC, the aggrieved party is expected to exercise due diligence and apply for a certified copy upon pronouncement of the order it seeks to assail, in consonance with the requirements of Rule 22(2) of the NCLAT Rules. Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act allows for an exclusion of the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree or order appealed against. It is not open to a person aggrieved by an order under the IBC to await the receipt of a free certified copy under Section 420(3) of the Companies Act 2013 read with Rule 50 of the NCLT and prevent limitation from running. Accepting such a construction will upset the timely framework of the IBC. The litigant has to file its appeal within thirty days, which can be extended up to a period of fifteen days, and no more, upon showing sufficient cause. A sleight of interpretation of procedural rules cannot be used to defeat the substantive objective of a legislation that has an impact on the economic health of a nation.

22. On the second question, Rule 22(2) of the NCLAT Rules mandates the certified copy being annexed to an appeal, which continues to bind litigants under the IBC. While it is true that the tribunals, and even this Court, may choose to exempt parties from compliance with this procedural requirement in the interest of

Page 6 of 9 substantial justice, as re-iterated in Rule 14 of the NCLAT Rules, the discretionary waiver does not act as an automatic exception where litigants make no efforts to pursue a timely resolution of their grievance. The appellant having failed to apply for a certified copy, rendered the appeal filed before the NCLAT as clearly barred by limitation."

11. In Sanket Kumar Agarwal v. APG Logistics Private Limited,

(2023) ibclaw.in 72 SC, Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the same

principle and clarified the law laid down in V Nagarajan and held that (i)

the limitation stops running on the e-filing of an appeal before the NCLAT

and not on presentation of a physical copy; (ii) the date on which the order

is pronounced is to be excluded from the calculation of limitation, and (iii)

the time taken by the NCLT to provide the appellant with the certified copy

would be excluded from the calculation of limitation, provided the appellant

applies within the prescribed period of limitation under Section 61(2) of the

IBC.

12. In Tata Steel Ltd. Vs Raj Kumar Banerjee, (2025) ibclaw.in 177

SC, Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under;

"11.1. Once the prescribed and condonable periods (i.e., 30 + 15 days) expire, the NCLAT has no jurisdiction to entertain appeals, regardless of the reason for the delay. In Mobilox Innovations Private Limited v. Kirusa Software Private Limited [(2017) ibclaw.in 01 SC], while interpreting Section 9 IBC, this Court underscores the IBC's strict procedural discipline i.e., only applications strictly

Page 7 of 9 conforming to statutory requirements can be entertained. This principle is also applicable to limitation issues under section 61(2), as it supports the idea that tribunals must operate within the bounds of the Code, without adding equitable or discretionary powers not conferred by statute. This Court in Kalpraj Dharamshi v. Kotak Investment Advisors Limited & Another [(2021) ibclaw.in 40 SC] has categorically held that the NCLAT cannot condone any delay beyond 15 days even on equitable grounds; and that the appellate mechanism under IBC is strictly time- bound by design to preserve the speed and certainty of the insolvency resolution process. 11.2. Thus, the NCLAT has no power to condone delay beyond the period stipulated under the statute. Accordingly, the second issue is answered by us."

The appellants were represented before the NCLT on 18 November 2025 when impugned orders were passed/pronounced. The appellants have demonstrated no effort on their part to secure certified copy of the said orders and has relied on the date of the uploading of the order (12 December 2025) on the website of the NCLT. The period of limitation for filing the appeals under Section 61(1) against the orders of the NCLT dated18 November 2025, expired on 18 December 2025 in view of the thirty-day period prescribed under Section 61(2) of the Code. Any scope for condonation of delay expired on 02 January 2026, in view of the expiry of outer condonable

Page 8 of 9 limit of 15 days prescribed under the proviso to Section 61(2)".

13. Therefore, keeping in view all the facts and circumstances of this

case, we are of the considered view that the impugned order was

pronounced on 22.04.2026, and the appeal has been filed on 11.08.2026,

beyond the stipulated 45 days, while this Appellate Tribunal has

jurisdiction only to condone the delay up to 15 days, beyond stipulated 30

days. Thus, the above application moved by the appellant to condone the

delay of 80 days appears to be not maintainable and is dismissed as such.

14. Since, the aforesaid delay condonation application has been

dismissed, the appeal would also not survive and consequently the appeal is

also dismissed.

15. There is no order as to cost. Pending I.A.'s, if any, are also closed.

[Justice Mohammad Faiz Alam Khan] Member (Judicial)

[Mr. Naresh Salecha] Member (Technical)

Sim/mr

Page 9 of 9