Parag Singhal vs Ak Singh & Ors

(Arising out of Order dated 17.09.2025 passed by the Adjudicating Authority (National Company Law Tribunal, New Delhi Bench-VI, New Delhi) in I.A No.3629 of 2022 and I.A No.1221 of 2025 in C.P. (IB) No. 176 (PB) of 2020)

IN THE MATTER OF: ARUN KUMAR SINGH (Proprietor of Ak Singh & Company) Sole Scc Member of Genius Exports Private Limited 204, D-248/10, Balaji Complex, (Near Metro Gate-1), Laxmi Nagar, Delhi - 110 092. ...Appellant

Vs GENIUS EXPORTS PRIVATE LIMITED Through Liquidator Mr. Ruchir Batra IBBI/IPA-003/IPA-ICAI-N-00225/2019 -2020/12626 P-15A, Jangpura Extension, New Delhi - 110 014.

Mr. NRIPENDRA KUMAR TRIPATHI Flat No. 323, Guru Apartment, Sector 6, Dwarka, New Delhi - 110 075. ...Respondents

Present: For Appellant : Mr. Deep Bisht and Mr. Astitwa Kumar, Advocates.

For Respondents : Mr. Sujal Bhatt, Advocate for R-2

WITH

1 Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1701 & 1702 of 2025

(Arising out of Order dated 17.09.2025 passed by the Adjudicating Authority (National Company Law Tribunal, New Delhi Bench-VI, New Delhi) in IA No.3629/2022 and order dated 08.10.2025 passed in IA No.4924/2025 in C.P. (IB) No. 176 (PB) of 2020)

IN THE MATTER OF: PARAG SINGHAL Erstwhile Resolution Professional of Genius Exports Pvt. Ltd. 1002-B, ELDECO Apartments, Plot No.11, Sector - 4, Vaishali, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh - 201 010. ...Appellant Vs ARUN KUMAR SINGH (Proprietor of AK Singh & Company) Sole SCC Member of Genius Exports Pvt. Ltd. 204, D-248/10, Balaji Complex, (Near Metro Gate -1), Laxmi Nagar, Delhi - 110 092.

GENIUS EXPORTS PRIVATE LIMITED Through Liquidator Mr. Ruchir Batra IBBI/IPA-003/IPA-ICAI-N-00225/2019 -2020/12626 P-15A, Jangpura Extension, New Delhi - 110 014. ...Respondents

Present: For Appellant : Mr. Shubham Budhiraja, Advocate

For Respondents : Mr. Deep Bisht and Mr. Astitwa Kumar, Advocates

2 JUDGMENT

(Hybrid Mode)

Per: Justice N. Seshasayee, Member (Judicial)

There are in effect four appeals, two are filed by the operational creditor

(C.A.1699 of 2025 and 1700 of 2025) and the other two by the resolution

professional of the corporate debtor (C.A.1701 of 2025 and C.A.1702 of 2025).

In both these set of appeals, both the operational creditor and the resolution

professional separately challenge an order of the Adjudicating Authority

ordering liquidation, dated 17.09.2025, passed in I.A.3629 of 2022, but for

different reasons. In addition, the operational creditor challenges another

Order I.A.1221 of 2025 which the resolution professional had filed for

withdrawing the CIRP under Sec.12A of the Code in C.A.1699 of 2025 and

1700 of 2025.

1.2 Besides his challenge to the Order in I.A.3629 of 2022, the resolution

professional has on his part challenged another order passed in I.A.4924 of

2025 in C.A 1701 of 2025 and C.A.1702 of 2025. His grievance is that while

passing the Order of liquidation, the Adjudicating Authority has appointed a

liquidator of its choice and not him. It may however, be stated, that the need

for deciding the appeals preferred by the resolution professional depends on

the outcome of C.A.1699 of 2025 and C.A.1700 of 2025.

2. The facts are uncomplicatedly pointed and they run as below:

a) the insolvency proceeding of the corporate debtor was heading for a

successful resolution, when on 22.05.2022, the resolution plan of

certain Shri. Digvijay Nath Tripathi was approved by the CoC, which

3 was comprised only of the operational creditor. This operational

creditor is the appellant in one set of appeals. Pursuant to the same,

the resolution professional has taken out I.A.3629 of 2022 for

obtaining the approval of the Adjudicating Authority to the said plan

under Sec.31 of the Code.

b) Even as the plan of Digvijay Nath Tripathi was pending consideration

of the Adjudicating Authority, on 03.09.2024, he passed away. This

fact was placed before the Adjudicating Authority by the resolution

professional. While the matter stood thus, the suspended director of

the corporate debtor and the operational creditor (the appellant in

C.A.1699 of 2025 & 1700 of 2025) have engaged in a negotiation for

the settlement of the debt.

c) On 25.01.2025, the operational creditor sent an e-mail to the

resolution professional about the settlement arrived. And in the 25th

meeting of the one-member CoC, a resolution came to be passed for

the withdrawal of the CIRP and the resolution professional was

authorized to file a petition under Sec.12A of the Code. Accordingly,

on 20.02.2025, the resolution professional filed I.A.1221 of 2025

under Sec.12A of the Code.

d) Both I.A.3629 of 2022 filed for the approval of the resolution plan,

and I.A.1221 of 2025 filed under Sec.12A came up for the

consideration of the Adjudicating Authority. So far as the application

filed for approval of the plan goes, the Adjudicating Authority has held

that the office and the obligations of the resolution applicant are

4 neither transferable nor heritable, consequent to which the plan was

rendered non-implementable under the proviso to Section 31(1) of the

Code and proceeded to reject the plan and ordered liquidation of the

corporate debtor under Sec.33(1) of the Code, and appointed Shri.

Yudhishter Sharma as the liquidator.

e) In view of the Order in I.A.3629 of 2022, it dismissed I.A.1221 of 2025

filed under Sec.12A as having become infructuous.

Arguments

3. As indicated earlier, since the outcome of C.A.1699 of 2025 and C.A.1700

of 2025 would determine whether we need to discuss the C.A.1701 of 2025

and C.A.1702 of 2025, we choose to consider the former set of appeals first.

4. The pointed submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that

when once the plan was rejected by the Adjudicating Authority, not because

the resolution plan was bristled with illegalities or material irregularity, but

on grounds of perceived unimplementability of the plan owing to the demise

of the resolution applicant, the best option open to the tribunal was to order

issuance of fresh Form G, and not liquidation. And, having chosen to reject

the plan he should not have mechanically dismissed I.A.1221 of 2025 filed

under Sec.12A. When a settlement has been reached between the suspended

director of the corporate debtor and the operational creditor, who constitute

the one member the CoC, the Adjudicating Authority should have seized the

opportunity to keep alive the corporate debtor rather than ordering

liquidation.

5 Discussion and Decision

5. Before considering the issue required to be resolved in this case, an

ancillary issue makes compelling demands for an engagement in the deeper

layers of insolvency jurisprudence as designed by the Code. The Adjudicating

Authority, in our view, has over-simplified it, while the appellant is

unconcerned about it as it has little relevance to his current pursuit. Hence

this judgement is divided into two parts: Part A will deal with the issue on the

effect of the death of the resolution applicant on the insolvency resolution

process, and Part B will deal with the point required to be decided in this

appeal. And to borrow the suggestion of Hon'ble V. Ramasubramanian J (as

His Lordship then was) in Consim Info Pvt., Ltd., Vs Google India Pvt., Ltd.,

and others [2010(6) CTC 813], those who are interested in Part A "are

welcome to join us", and "others are free to stay back, relax and come on board

at the stage where the discussion" on Part B begins from paragraph 21. It is

still advised to read at least up to paragraph 7 and 8 since they provide the

pivot for the conclusion to be arrived in Part B.

Part A

Effect of the Death of the Resolution Applicant

6. The heart of the issue lies in the reasoning of the Adjudicating Authority

that where a resolution applicant is an individual, he holds an 'office' with

'obligations' attached thereto, and that this office and the obligations are not

heritable, and consequently on the death of the resolution applicant, his

resolution plan becomes incapable of being implemented, or plainly

6 unimplementable. Then on this basic premise, the Adjudicating Authority

proceeded to reject the plan as if it is a situation that falls within Sec.33(1) of

the Code, and ordered liquidation. And, when it ordered liquidation, curiously

enough an application under Sec.12A is pending consideration, but sadly it

was overlooked. Now, when the claim of the sole member of the CoC, the

petitioning operational creditor, is satisfied through settlement, for whose

benefit has the liquidation been ordered?

7. If the approach of the Adjudicating Authority is analysed, it can be divided

into three parts: (a) It's understanding that resolution applicant is an office

and hence not heritable; (b) rejection of his plan for its unimplementability

owing to the death of the resolution applicant; and (c) ordering liquidation

under Sec.33(1) of the Code. The fundamental error in the approach of the

Adjudicating Authority is that unlike a resolution professional or a liquidator,

resolution applicant is not an 'office' with obligation attached to it, and his is

more in the nature of a promisor in a contract through an invitation to offer

as in an auction. Moving further, in ordering liquidation in the contextual

setting of this case, few legal aspects are very evidently overlooked:

a) Liquidation under Sec.33(1) can be ordered only under two

circumstances: (a) where within the CIRP period no resolution plan is

received; and (b) where, even though plans have been received and one

of which has been approved by the CoC yet has been rejected by the

Adjudicating Authority under Sec.31. There is no third situation

provided for ordering liquidation under Sec.33(1) on the death of the

resolution applicant. It may not therefore, be appropriate to read a

7 condition that is not statutorily provided into Sec.33(1). This would

imply that the order of liquidation cannot be made or sustained under

Sec.33(1).

b) Under the scheme of the Code, if liquidation is still contemplated as the

only leftover choice, then it may be, and can be attempted only under

Sec.33(2), but this provision is CoC enabled. Therefore, the

Adjudicating Authority may not have too many choices left with it than

to send the plan back to the CoC with its observations, if felt necessary.

Accordingly, any situation where a resolution applicant dies pending

approval of the resolution plan by the Adjudicating Authority, the plan

may have to be re-send to the CoC.

8. The Adjudicating Authority ought to have paused, no matter how it has

chosen to deal with the resolution plan, for liquidation is amputation of the

corporate assets for free sale in the market whereas CIRP requires preserving

the soul of the corporate debtor by saving its body and life - the business of

the corporate debtor. And, the Code stands for the latter and it recommends

liquidation only when it has become imminent and unavoidable, a feature of

the Code that frequently gets echoed through the judgements in this genre.

9.1 The significance of the issue as to how to deal with the death of the

resolution applicant at a certain stage of the insolvency resolution process lies

not in the reasoning of the Adjudicating Authority but what it holds for an

insolvency resolution process. There is no provision either in the Code or in

the Regulation that backs its working, for negotiating a situation involving the

8 death of resolution applicant, even as the Code approves a natural person to

be a resolution applicant. Indeed, the gyrating force behind the working of the

Code are the human failures and their default in and during the insolvency

resolution process, and it whispers in silence in addressing any force majeure

or vis majeure1 events intervening or threatening to sabotage its prescription

for insolvency resolution.

9.2 If a plan is not implemented, the Code has a solution. If a resolution

applicant dies midway through the implementation of the resolution plan and

thereby rendering it difficult to implement the plan, the Code has no solution

to secure the continued implementation, but only tends to treat the situation

as 'plan not implemented', which may now pave way for liquidation of the

corporate debtor. But liquidation is not a ready-reckoner solution as it does

not align with the underlying philosophical structure of the Code which puts

premium on the sale of corporate debtor as a going concern as the first-option-

solution. However, despite this not-so-evident conflict, working of the Code

must still align with its objective.

9.3 When a resolution plan is approved, it is not just an aspect or a stage in

the statutory model for insolvency resolution, but is an expression of a

resolution applicant's assessment that the business of the corporate debtor

1 The only provision in the Code that deals with death of a natural person in the IBC scenario is Sec.169. It reads: If a bankrupt dies, the bankruptcy proceedings shall continue as if he were alive". But what is significant here is that it is in the bankruptcy proceedings where only the personal estate of the bankrupt will be sold for which existence of the bankrupt is irrelevant. At any rate it will not have any application in a CIRP situation involving the death of the resolution applicant.

9 is still viable despite its indebtedness. It aligns with the objective of the Code.

However, if the successful resolution applicant fails to implement the plan in

the manner he has undertaken, it will be his default. And the Code responds

with two options to deal with it: either to restart the CIRP or to opt for

liquidation, but both are time consuming, and the Code is acutely impatient

and will be painfully restless. This is understandable. Even if it is

compromised, still there is no assurance that when the CIRP restarts,

someone might still show interest to buy the corporate debtor as a going

concern. Therefore, why should it be believed that if the successful resolution

applicant dies midway through the implementation, it will necessarily render

the resolution plan unimplementable in all circumstances?

9.4 Whether the sustainability of a resolution plan is served by its inherent

strength or the survival of its maker? Should it be presumed that where a

resolution applicant is a natural person, his existence is an indispensable pre-

requisite for the implementation of the plan? If ever it is believed any such

presumption exists, its absurdity does not deserve any elaboration. The

legislature that has enacted the Code symbolizes the collective wisdom of the

citizens to lead the nation to light and not to lay the road to absurdity.

9.5 Is it not then necessary to explore the possibility of engaging with the plan

for its continued relevance even post the death of the resolution applicant?

In other words, like reducing liquidation as the last option, should not

abandoning a plan, not due to the fault of the resolution applicant but due to

his death, must be the last option? And, here in this case, the resolution

applicant has died during the interregnum between the approval of his plan

10 by the CoC and that of the Adjudicating Authority. Now, if a resolution plan

has its inherent strength to demonstrate its sustainability, why should it be

abandoned without a scrutiny for no fault of the plan but due to the death of

its maker? When death is an inevitable and inescapable incidence of every

life, should the objective of the Code to keep alive the business of the corporate

debtor be sacrificed merely because the Code has left a blank space in

negotiating the death of the resolution applicant? It will be a startling, if not

a baffling experience, in law and logic if the Code were to be understood as

enabling any such extravagant interpretation.

9.6 There is therefore, a blind spot in the Code; a jurisprudential quagmire in

the IBC terrain. It is hence, we consider that the issue deserves a degree of

attention despite the mask of innocence veiling it, since this statutorily

overlooked but critical aspect of insolvency resolution process cannot be

reduced to a kindergarten story of an 'Elephant and Five blindmen'.

9.7 A long preludial statement, but we consider that it is justly necessary.

When faced with, what may not be the right approach, it will be disquieting

to stay silent and to waste an opportuning beckoning us to provide a blueprint

for a better approach. It is necessary.

10. Now, returning to the issue, as underscored in paragraph 7(b) above, on

the death of the resolution applicant, even if the Adjudicating Authority

resends the resolution plan to CoC, what would the latter do with the plan?

Is the CoC expected to resolve that the resolution plan has become

unimplementable, something which the Adjudicating Authority itself has

11 attempted but without requisite statutory support? One easy route to the

issue is to hold it in the affirmative. But as already stated a couple of times

earlier, this course will have an antithetical effect on the prominence of Code's

design to sell the corporate debtor as a going concern. It is true that time is

of the essence in the conclusion of the insolvency resolution process, but it

cannot be more important than the attempt to preserve the corporate debtor

as a going concern and its sale in a CIRP, though this may vary with the facts

of individual cases. Sec.12(3) signifies it. Sec.33(1A) inserted vide IBC

(Amendment)Act (Central Act 6 of 2026), which enables a reversal from

liquidation to CIRP, reflects it. The unassailable basic premise therefore is,

and should be, to pursue CIRP since the situation has arisen not due to

human default but due to act of nature.

11. The point is, should the CIRP commence de novo from the stage of

invitation of Expression of Interest, or is it possible to proceed with the

resolution plan already approved by the CoC but within the statutory

framework? This now leads to two issues: (a) Does the insolvency resolution

framework under the Code depends on the heritability of the right of the

resolution applicant; and (b) where to obtain the statutory support for it.

12. Dealing with the second aspect first, if there is no immediate solution in

general principles of jurisprudence to deal with it, this tribunal cannot plead

helplessness and resign, but to engage with it to develop a meaningful concept

in aid of its working till the legislature steps in with its fillers. If the Code has

a unique structure of its own, it should be matched with new tools in the

12 forensic kit to negotiate the challenges it throws up2. Therefore, where a

statute is silent, then requisite power can be drawn from the inherent

authority of the tribunal for advancing and balancing the working of the Code.

13.1 Turning to the point on the heritability of the right of the resolution

applicant, in EBIX Singapore Pvt. Ltd., Vs CoC of Educomp solutions

Ltd., & another [(2022)2 SCC 401], while dealing with the issue of the right

of the resolution applicant to withdraw or modify his resolution plan after the

plan has successfully crossed the first stage filtering by the CoC for its plan-

offer coupled with its viability, feasibility and implementability, the Hon'ble

Supreme Court has held that it is impermissible for the resolution applicant

to resile from it as the approval to the plan cannot be equated to the formation

of a contract. It reasoned that an approved resolution plan is a product of a

statutory process sans any consensus ad idem between the CoC and the

resolution applicant, and hence the successful resolution applicant will not

have any of the remedies available under the Contract Act.

13.2 This ratio only emphasis the binding character of an approved resolution

plan, yet it should also be added that that a resolution applicant is not doing

any charity, since he invests his funds in return for an advantage, which

necessarily is an aspect of right to property. But this advantage may not

constitute a heritable right till the resolution plan is approved by the

Adjudicating Authority, and perhaps till it is fully implemented. What then is

2 In CoC of Think & Learn Pvt. Ltd., Vs Riju Ravindran and others, [(2026) ibclaw.in.222 NCLAT], this tribunal has held that CoC, an assorted group of financial creditors, as a juristic entity for the purpose of working of the Code, even though it may not be considered as one in terms of general principles of jurisprudence.

13 the nature of the advantage which the resolution applicant acquires after the

plan is approved by the CoC, except perhaps a legitimate expectation of his

plan being approved by the Adjudicating Authority? After all, approval by the

CoC is but a stage in the statutory process and not a stage in the formation

of a contract3. A mere legitimate expectation that the resolution plan might

be approved by the Adjudicating Authority does not confer any advantage on

the resolution applicant as to constitute a right to property, to be precise, a

heritable right to property.

14. That the jurisprudential conceptualization of a heritable right may not

also be made applicable for a different reason. If the purpose behind an

insolvency resolution process is to mobilize funds through preservation of

business of the corporate debtor, then it is mandatory that such resolution

applicant must have adequate knowledge, skill and experience in such

business. This is also factored in while approving a plan. Therefore, the

corporate debtor is made available in the resolution process, not to the one

who opts to pay the maximum value but to the one who also has the greater

prospects of running the said business, more so where the resolution

applicant is a natural person.

15. However, here arises another issue. If suppose, a successful resolution

applicant dies midway through the implementation of the resolution plan, and

his heirs are willing to complete the implementation of the plan, and his estate

3 Even cases involving conclusion of a contract through auction but subject to confirmation by another, judicial views are conflicting as to the nature of right a successful a bidder acquires but before its confirmation. See: Motilal Vs Sadabai [AIR 1970 Bombay 67].

14 is capable of supporting it, will the plan be recalled? The Code is silent on it.

The Code that insists hard in running the corporate debtor as a going concern,

does not provide for any mechanism to monitor if the successful resolution

applicant holds on to his or its promise and runs the corporate debtor as a

going concern after its implementation. Therefore, that which is an

indispensable criterion before the two-tier approval of the plan is no longer

relevant after the plan has been implemented. This is paradoxical yet real.

Therefore, if the successful resolution applicant dies after the resolution plan

is implemented, then it will be only about right to property and its heritability.

16. The point is why not the incidence that attaches to a resolution plan post

its approval under Sec.31 be telescoped backwards to meet a situation where

the resolution applicant dies, a vis majeure contingency, as in the present

case? The inherent strength of the plan has already been tested once by the

CoC, and now the plan is searching for the one who will bear the responsibility

to implement it, subject however, to the concurrence of the Adjudicating

Authority under Sec.31 of the Code. Why not the heirs of the deceased

resolution applicant be considered? After all, there is no specific embargo in

the Code that prohibits it. This course of action will save time which may be

lost in a de novo resolution process (with its inherent risk of failing without

none showing any interest in submitting a plan) and also advancing the goal

of the Code to sell the corporate debtor as a going concern.

17. Here, it needs to be re-emphasized that giving the heir of the deceased

resolution applicant an opportunity to stay with the plan and its

implementation cannot assume the character of right to property, for no right

15 or interest has vested absolutely in the latter for it be inherited by the former.

If the contract route is considered as to whether the advantage which the

resolution applicant has obtained after the CoC has approved his plan can be

treated as a property and hence heritable post his death, it is not free from

difficulty either. To repeat, in EBIX Singapore case it is held that a

resolution plan, despite the fact that it conforms to the basic features

necessary for the formation of a contract through an invitation to offer, yet it

cannot be termed as a contract stricto sensu. Consequently, it forecloses any

possibility of vesting a heritable contractual right on the deceased resolution

applicant, more so in situations where the process of insolvency resolution is

incomplete. Therefore, a middle path has to be charted out within the

framework of the Code:

a) Focus may at the first instance be on the RFRP. If the RFRP provides

for any contingency arising from the death of the resolution applicant,

then such term of RFRP will automatically govern the situation.

b) If, however, the RFRP is silent, then any term of the resolution plan will

come for scrutiny. If the plan has made any provision for dealing with

the death of a resolution applicant, and if the CoC has approved the

resolution plan, then it may prevail.

c) Where both the RFRP as well as the resolution plan do not provide for

meeting a situation arising out of the death of a resolution applicant,

then necessarily, inherent powers under Rule.11 have to be exercised

16 to direct the CoC to consider if the plan can be sustained within the

statutory framework even after the demise of the resolution applicant.

18. Allowing the heir of the resolution applicant to participate in the resolution

process, however, cannot be absolute, for it has to still pass the test which

the resolution applicant has established. Accordingly, once the resolution

plan is send back to the CoC, it is required to ensure that (a) such heir of the

deceased resolution applicant has the requisite knowledge, skill and

experience in running the business of the corporate debtor; (b) that he or she

does not suffer any personal disqualification under Sec.29A; and (c) if such

heir is willing to implement the plan with all the strings attached to the

implementation of the plan.

19. To make the reappraisal of the plan in cases of death of resolution

applicant broad based, other plans which have been submitted earlier may

also be reconsidered. The idea is to avoid forced-liquidation of the corporate

debtor and to re-engage in CIRP.

Part B

C.A.1699 of 2025 and C.A.1700 of 2025

20. For those who may have chosen to skip Part A, they are told that the

order of the Adjudicating Authority rejecting the resolution plan as having

become unimplementable owing to the death of the resolution applicant and

ordering liquidation under Sec.33(1) of the Code is erroneous since this

approach cannot be fitted within the straight-jacketed provision in Sec.33(1).

Please go to paragraphs 7 and 8 above.

17

21. Irrespective of the outcome on the rejection of the resolution plan, even if

it is considered as sustainable, then the Adjudicating Authority ought not to

have mechanically proceeded to order liquidation when I.A.1221 of 2025

under Sec.12A is pending before it. It is puzzling as to why the legal process

providing an exit route to Sec.12A must be denied to the parties4. It is already

explained why the order of liquidation cannot be sustained and the possible

course that might have to be adopted when the resolution applicant dies in

the interregnum between the approval of the resolution plan by the CoC and

that of the Adjudicating Authority is already explained. Necessarily, the order

of the Adjudicating Authority ordering liquidation vide its Order in I.A.3629

of 2022 cannot be sustained and must be set aside, and by default CIRP of

the corporate debtor is revived. Necessarily, I.A.1221 of 2025 filed under

Sec.12A must be pursued.

C.A.1701 of 2025 and C.A.1702 of 2025

22. Since the CIRP has now been revived, there is hardly any need to consider

C.A.1701 and C.A.1702 of 2025, which the resolution professional has filed,

even though we do not appreciate resolution professionals and liquidators

believing that they have a vested right to continue in their office, when in law

they have none. He may now continue to pursue I.A.1221 of 2025.

4 In Babu Manoharan Jaikumar Christhurajan Vs Umesh Garg, Liquidator of Jeppiaar Cements Pvt. Ltd, [C.A.(AT)(CH)(Ins) 358 oof 2022, dated 24.08.2026], this tribunal has held that Sec.12A route is integral to insolvency resolution process alongside Sec.31 route

18 The Result

23. To conclude, C.A.1699 of 2025 is and C.A.1700 of 2025 are allowed and

the Order of the Adjudicating Authority in I.A.3629 of 2022 is set aside and

the CIRP is directed to be revived. The Adjudicating Authority is further

required to consider I.A.1221 of 2025 filed under Sec.12A of the Code as per

law. C.A.1701 of 2025 and C.A.1702 of 2025 are closed. No costs.

[Justice N. Seshasayee] Member (Judicial)

[Indevar Pandey] Member (Technical) VG

19