Parag Gupta & Associates vs B.K. Educational Services Pvt. Ltd
- CitationCompany Petition No. (IB)-
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is a complete code in itself on the subject of insolvency of corporate persons, and the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process under Sections 7, 9 and 10 of the Code. The exclusion is ascertained from the scheme of the Code, its legislative history and its provisions prescribing separate time periods, applying the principle that a special enactment excludes the general law's limitation provisions where its scheme shows such intent. Section 433 of the Companies Act, 2013, which applies the Limitation Act to proceedings before the Tribunal, is not applicable to proceedings under the Code, as Section 424 alone was incorporated by the Eleventh Schedule and Section 433 was not. Sections 24 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 and 36 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 do not apply to initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process, as those provisions were not amended to be made applicable to the Code. Although the Limitation Act does not apply, the doctrine of limitation and prescription, grounded in the presumption that stale rights are abandoned and in the policy of finality in litigation, is relevant. An application under Section 7 or 9 based on a stale claim without explanation of delay ordinarily should not be entertained, and the Adjudicating Authority may call upon the applicant to explain the delay, subject to the absence of laches and the existence of any continuing cause of action. This principle does not apply to applications under Section 10. Where a right to apply under Sections 7, 9 or 10 accrued after the Code came into force on 1 December 2016, the application cannot be rejected as time-barred on the basis of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, which is itself inapplicable.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
(Arising out of Order dated 11.04.2017 passed by the National Company Law Tribunal, New Delhi Bench, New Delhi in Company Petition No. (IB)- 41(ND)/2017)
Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 47 of 2017
IN THE MATTER OF:
MIs. Speculum Plast Pvt. Ltd. ... Appellant
Versus
PTC Techno Pvt. Ltd. ... Respondent
Present: For Appellant: Shri Shubho Jana and Ms. Kanti Mohan Rustagi, Advocates
For Respondent: Shri Dhruv Gupta, Advocate
WITH
Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 76 of 2017
(Arising out of Order dated 25.04.2017 passed by the National Company Law Tribunal, New Delhi Bench, New Delhi in Company Petition No. (IB)- 27(PB)/2017)
IN THE MATTER OF:
Parag Gupta & Associates Appellant
Versus
B.K. Educational Services Pvt. Ltd. Respondent
Present: For Appellant: Shri Mukul K. Gupta and Shri N.K. Singh, Advocates
For Respondent: Ms. Ruchi Khurana and Shri Pertpal Singh, Advocates
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 2
WITH
Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 78 of 2017
(Arising out of Order dated 04.05.2017 passed by the National Company Law Tribunal, New Delhi Bench, New Delhi in Company Petition No. (IB)- 77(ND)/2017)
IN THE MATTER OF:
Ashlay Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Appellant
Versus
LDS Engineers Pvt. Ltd. Respondent
Present: For Appellant: Ms. Jhankar Rastogi with Shri Navodaya Singh Rajpurohit, Advocates
For Respondent: Shri H.D. Arya, Advocate
JUDGEMENT
SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.
In all these appeals as common question of law is involved, they were
heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.
The question that arises for determination in these appeals is: -
Whether Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable for triggering
'Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process' under Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as "I&B Code")?
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017
3. According to Learned Counsel for the appellant(s) 'I&B Code' is a
'Special Act' enacted by Parliament and is a 'self-contained code' and in
absence of any specific provision made therein the Limitation Act, 1963 is
not applicable for triggering 'Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process'.
4. To substantiate the arguments, Learned Counsel for the appellant(s)
relied on the report of the 'Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee' to suggest
that the legislative intent behind the formulation of the 'I&B Code' is to
formulate a 'single law', independent of any other law including the
Limitation Act.
5. On the other hand, according to learned counsel for the Respondents-
'Corporate Debtor(s)' the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable for triggering
'Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process' under 'I&B Code' which is to be
read in conjunction with the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 and
other Acts, as far as they are applicable.
6. It was submitted that the 'Adjudicating Authority', as defined in sub-
section (1) of Section 5 of the 'I&B Code' being 'National Company Law
Tribunal' as constituted under Section 408 of the Companies Act, 2013, the
provisions of Chapter XXVII of the Companies Act, 2013 including Section
433 of the said Act are applicable as it is not in conflict with the provisions
of the 'I&B Code'.
7. Further, according to learned counsel for the 'Corporate Debtor(s)', as
the 'I&B Code' nowhere specifically bars the applicability of the Companies
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 4
Act, 2013, Section 433 of the Companies Act, 2013 is applicable to 'I&B
Code'.
8. Referring to Sections 424, 425, 433, 434 and 430 of the Companies
Act, 2013, it was contended that the aforesaid provisions necessarily imply
that the law of limitation and procedure of the Tribunal are applicable to the
'I&B Code'.
9. On merit, Learned Counsel for the 'Corporate Debtor(s)' submitted
that all the application in question, having filed beyond the period of three
years, the application for triggering 'Corporate Insolvency Resolution
Process' were not maintainable.
10. Mr. A.S. Chandhiok, Learned Senior Counsel, who assisted the Court
as Amicus Curiae, submitted that the Doctrine of Limitation and
Prescription is based on two broad considerations.
First, there is a presumption that the right not exercised for a long
time becomes non-existent. The second is that the rights of debt or right on
property or rights in general should not be in a state of constant
uncertainty, doubt and suspense.
Reliance was placed on Salmond: Jurisprudence 12th Ed. Page 438
and 439, and observation of Hon'ble Abbott CJ in Battley v. Faulkner
[(1820) 3 B & Aid 288].
11. It was submitted that the above principles were also recognised by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in "Rajinder Singh v. Santa Singh, AIR
1973 SC 2537".
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 5
12. It was further submitted that the object of fixing time-limit for
litigation is based on Public Policy, fixing a life span of legal remedies for the
purpose of general welfare as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in "N. Balakrishnan V. M.A. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123"
13. According to Learned Amicus Curiae, the Limitation Act was enacted
in the year 1963, when the provisions relating to all kinds of winding up of
the Companies were governed by the Companies Act, 1956 wherein the
question of limitation arose at two stages i.e.
(i) When winding up petition was presented before the Hon'ble High
Court, and
(ii) When the creditor presented its claim against the company in
winding up before the Official Liquidator.
14. It was contended that it is a settled principle of law, that bar of
limitation applied to the winding up petitions which used to be presented
before the Hon'ble High Court and a creditor is not entitled to file a winding
up petition based on a debt, if the debt is, otherwise time-barred.
15. Learned Amicus Curiae referred to Section 3 of Limitation Act, 1963
and submitted that the bar of limitation would apply to a claim filed by a
creditor before the Official Liquidator attached to the Hon'ble High Court in
terms of Companies Act, 1956, though the Official Liquidator is not a Court
or a Judicial Tribunal or Quasi-Judicial Tribunal, but an executive
appointed and authority recognized under the Companies Act, 1956. Such
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 6
'Official Liquidator' merely invites claims and submits report before the
Hon'ble High Court.
16. According to him now under the 'I&B Code' the Insolvency
Professional takes the position of the 'Official Liquidator', but with greater
role to play, than the 'Official Liquidator'.
17. Learned Amicus Curiae also relied on Section 433 of the Companies
Act, which provides that the provision of Limitation Act, 1963 shall, as far as
may be, apply to proceedings or appeals before the Tribunal or the Appellate
Tribunal as the case may be. It was also submitted that the Limitation Act,
1963 is also applicable for 'Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process'.
18. Learned Amicus Curiae placing reliance on sub-section (6) of Section
60 of the 'I&B Code' submitted that the said provision makes it clear that
the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to the proceedings under 'I&B Code'.
19. It was further submitted that the legislature in sub-section (5) of
Section 60 has not used the expression 'Adjudicating Authority', but
retained the word 'National Company Law Tribunal' which also clears the
intent of the legislature that Section 433 of the Companies Act, 2013 is
applicable for triggering the 'Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process' under
Sections 7 or 9 and 10 of the 'I&B Code'.
Reliance was also placed on definition of 'Adjudicating Authority' as
defined under sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the 'I&B Code' which means
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 7
'National Company Law Tribunal' constituted under Section 408 of the
Companies Act, 2013
20. According to Learned Senior Counsel, even if it is accepted that 'I&B
Code' is 'self-contained Code', unless it expressly bars the provision(s), the
other provisions can be made applicable. Reliance was placed on Hon'ble
Supreme Court decision in "Girnar Traders (3) v. State of Maharashtra
& Ors. (2011) 3 SCC 1", wherein two legislations fell for consideration
before the Apex Court, namely the 'Maharashtra Regional and Town
Planning Act, 1966 (MRTP Act)', and the 'Land Acquisition Act, 1894'. The
appellant in the said case had urged that the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act would mutatis mutandis apply to an acquisition under the
MRTP Act. The respondent had, in contradiction, taken plea that MRTP Act
was a 'self-contained Code' in itself and as such the provisions of Land
Acquisition Act could not be referred to. In the said case, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court considering the aforesaid question raised by the parties
held: -
"69. For an Act to be a "self-contained code", it is
required to be shown that it is a complete legislation
for the purpose for which it is enacted. The provisions
of the MRTP Act relate to preparation, submission and
sanction of approval of different plans by the
authorities concerned which are aimed at achieving
the object of planned development in contradistinction
to haphazard development. An owner/person
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 8
interested in the land and who wishes to object to the
plans at the appropriate stage a self-contained
adjudicatory machinery has been spelt out in the
MRTP Act. Even the remedy of appeal is available
under the MRTP Act with a complete chapter being
devoted to acquisition of land for the planned
development. Providing adjudicatory mechanism is
one of the most important facets of deciding whether
a particular statute is a "complete code" in itself or
not.
21. We have noticed the rival contentions, the relevant provisions of law
and decisions, as referred to above.
22. For determination of the issue, it is to be noticed as to whether 'I&B
Code' is a 'self- contained Code' or not.
In 'MIs. Innoventive Industries Ltd v. ICICI Bank & Anr', 2017
SCC OnLine Sc 10251, the Hon'ble Supreme Court noticed the statement of
objects and reasons in passing the 'l&B Code' based on various reports,
most important of which the report of Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee
of November, 2015, and observed: -
"13. One of the important objectives of the Code is to
bring the insolvency law in India under a single
unified umbrella with the object of speeding up of the
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 9
insolvency process. As per the data available with the
World Bank in 2016, insolvency resolution in India
took 4.3 years on an average, which was much
higher when compared with the United Kingdom (1
year), USA (1.5 years) and South Africa (2 years). The
World Bank's Ease of Doing Business Index, 2015,
ranked India as country number 135 out of 190
countries on the ease of resolving insolvency based on
various indicia."
23. In paragraph 16 of the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
noticed the Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee Report of November, 2015
and the 'key economic question' in the Bankruptcy Process highlighted by
Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee, as quoted below: -
"The key economic question in the bankruptcy
process
When a firm (referred to as the corporate debtor in the
draft law) defaults, the question arises about what is
to be done. Many possibilities can be envisioned. One
possibility is to take the firm into liquidation. Another
possibility is to negotiate a debt restructuring, where
the creditors accept a reduction of debt on an NPV
basis, and hope that the negotiated value exceeds the
liquidation value. Another possibility is to sell the firm
as a going concern and use the proceeds to pay
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 10
creditors. Many hybrid structures of these broad
categories can be envisioned.
The Committee believes that there is only one correct
forum for evaluatinq such possibilities, and making a
decision: a creditors committee, where all financial
creditors have votes in proportion to the magnitude of
debt that they hold. In the past, laws in India have
brought arms of the government (legislature, executive
or judiciary) into this question. This has been strictly
avoided by the Committee. The appropriate
disposition of a defaulting firm is a business decision,
and only the creditors should make it."
xxx xxx xxx xxx "Speed is of essence
Speed is of essence for the working of the bankruptcy
code, for two reasons. First, while the 'calm period'
can help keep an organisation afloat, without the full
clarity of ownership and control, significant decisions
cannot be made. Without effective leadership, the firm
will tend to atrophy and fail. The longer the delay, the
more likely it is that liquidation will be the only
answer. Second, the liquidation value tends to go
down with time as many assets suffer from a high
economic rate of depreciation.
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 11
From the viewpoint of creditors, a good realisation
can generally be obtained if the firm is sold as a
going concern. Hence, when delays induce
liquidation, there is value destruction. Further, even
in liquidation, the realisation is lower when there are
delays. Hence, delays cause value destruction. Thus,
achieving a high recovery rate is primarily about
identifying and combating the sources of delay."
xxx xxx xxx xxx "The role that insolvency and bankruptcy plays
in debt financing
Creditors put money into debt investments today in
return for the promise of fixed future cash flows. But
the returns expected on these investments are still
uncertain because at the time of repayment, the seller
(debtor) may make repayments as promised, or he
may default and does not make the payment. When
this happens, the debtor is considered insolvent.
Other than cases of outright fraud, the debtor may be
insolvent because of
Financial failure - a persistent mismatch
between payments by the enterprise and
receivables into the enterprise, even though the
business model is generating revenues, or
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 12
• Business failure - which is a breakdown in
the business model of the enterprise, and it is
unable to generate sufficient revenues to meet
payments.
Often, an enterprise may be a successfIii business
model while still failing to repay its creditors. A sound
bankruptcy process is one that helps creditors and
debtors realise and agree on whether the entity is
facing financial failure and business failure. This is
important to allow both parties to realise the
maximum value of the business in the insolvency."
xxx xxx xxx xxx "Control of a company is not divine right. When afirm
defaults on its debt, control of the company should
shift to the creditors. In the absence of swift and
decisive mechanisms for achieving this, management
teams and shareholders retain control after default.
Bankruptcy law must address this."
24. In the said decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court the 'Principles driving
the design' the new Insolvency and Bankruptcy Resolution framework has
been noticed as quoted below: -
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 13
"Principles driving the design
The Committee chose the following principles to
design the new insolvency and bankruptcy resolution
framework:
I. The Code will facilitate the assessment of viability
of the enterprise at a very early stage.
1. The law must explicitly state that the viability of
the enterprise is a matter of business, and that
matters of business can only be negotiated between
creditors and debtor. While viability is assessed as a
negotiation between creditors and debtor, the final
decision has to be an agreement among creditors who
are the financiers willing to bear the loss in the
insolvency.
2. The legislature and the courts must control the
process of resolution, but not be 'burdened to make
business decisions.
3. The law must set up a calm period for insolvency
resolution where the debtor can negotiate in the
assessment of viability without fear of debt recovery
enforcement by creditors.
4. The law must appoint a resolution professional as
the manager of the resolution period, so that the
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 14
creditors can negotiate the assessment of viability
with the confidence that the debtors will not take any
action to erode the value of the enterprise. The
professional will have the power and responsibility to
monitor and manage the operations and assets of the
enterprise. The professional will manage the
resolution process of negotiation to ensure balance of
power between the creditors and debtor, and protect
the rights of all creditors. The professional will ensure
the reduction of asymmetry of information between
creditors and debtor in the resolution process.
II. The Code will enable symmetry of information
between creditors and debtors.
5. The law must ensure that information that is
essential for the insolvency and the bankruptcy
resolution process is created and available when it is
required.
6. The law must ensure that access to this
information is made available to all creditors to the
enterprise, either directly or through the regulated
professional.
7. The law must enable access to this information to
third parties who can participate in the resolution
process, through the regulated professional.
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 15
III. The Code will ensure a time-bound process to
better preserve economic value.
8. The law must ensure that time value of money is
preserved, and that delaying tactics in these
negotiations will not extend the time set for
negotiations at the start.
IV. The Code will ensure a collective process.
9. The law must ensure that all key stakeholders will
participate to collectively assess viability. The law
must ensure that all creditors who have the capability
and the willingness to restructure their liabilities must
be part of the negotiation process. The liabilities of all
creditors who are not part of the negotiation process
must also be met in any negotiated solution.
V. The Code will respect the rights of all creditors
equally.
10. The law must be impartial to the type of creditor
in counting their weight in the vote on the final
solution in resolving insolvency.
VL The Code must ensure that, when the negotiations
fail to establish viability, the outcome of bankruptcy
must be binding.
11. The law must order the liquidation of an
enterprise which has been found unviable. This
outcome, of the negotiations should be protected
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 16
against all appeals other than for very exceptional
cases.
VIL The Code must ensure clarity of priority, and that
the rights of all stakeholders are upheld in resolving
bankruptcy.
12. The law must clearly lay out the priority of
distributions in bankruptcy to all stakeholders. The
priority must be designed so as to incentivise all
stakeholders to participate in the cycle of building
enterprises with confidence.
13. While the law must incentivise collective action in
resolving bankruptcy, there must be a greater
flexibility to allow individual action in resolution and
recovery during bankruptcy compared with the phase
of insolvency resolution."
25. The aforesaid 'principles driving the design' shows that the Code has
been framed to facilitate the assessment of viability of the enterprise at a
very early stage; to enable symmetry of information between creditors and
debtors; to ensure a time-bound process to better preserve economic value;
to ensure a collective process; to respect the rights of all creditors equally; to
ensure that when the negotiations fail to establish viability; the outcome of
bankruptcy must be binding and to ensure clarity of priority, and that the
rights of all stakeholders are upheld in resolving bankruptcy.
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 17
26. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in "MIs. Innoventive Industries Ltd. Vs.
ICICI Bank & Anr. 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1025" referring to different
provisions of the 'I&B Code', observed:
"59. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is
an Act to consolidate and amend the laws relating to
reorganization and insolvency resolution, inter alia of
corporate persons. Insofar as corporate persons are
concerned, amendments are made to the following
enactments by Sections 249 to 252 and 255
The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held: -
"60. It is settled law that a consolidating and
amending act like the present Central enactment
forms a code complete in itself and is exhaustive of
the matters dealt with therein
The Hon'ble Supreme Court further proceeded to hold: -
"63. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the
Code is a Parliamentary law that is an exhaustive
code on the subject matter of insolvency in relation
to corporate entities, and is made under Entry 9, List
HI in the 7th Schedule which reads as under.-
nder:
"9.
'9. Bankruptcy and insolvency"
27. Thereby it is clear that the 'I&B Code' is complete code in itself.
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 18
28. Limitation Act, 1963 is the general legislation on the law of limitation.
Section 3 prescribes 'bar of limitation', as quoted below: -
"3. Bar of limitation.-- (1) Subject to the provisions
contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit
instituted, appeal preferred, and application made
after the prescribed period shall be dismissed,
although limitation has not been set up as a defence.
(2) For the purposes of this Act-- (2) For the purposes
of this Act--"
(a) a suit is instituted--
(i) in an ordinary case, when the plaint is
presented to the proper officer;
(ii) in the case of a pauper, when his
application for leave to sue as a pauper is
made; and
(iii) in the case of a claim against a
company which is being wound up by the
court, when the claimant first sends in
his claim to the official liquidator;
(b) any claim by way of a set off or a counter
claim, shall be treated as a separate suit and shall be
deemed to have been instituted--
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 19
(i) in the case of a set off, on the same
date as the suit in which the set off is
pleaded;
(ii) in the case of a counter claim, on the
date on which the counter claim is made
in court;
(c) an application by notice of motion in a High
Court is made when the application is presented to
the proper officer of that court."
29. In view of aforesaid provisions in 'Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat
Puthanpuravil Aboobacker (1995) 5 SCC 5', the Hon'ble Supreme Court
examined the question whether Limitation Act, 1963 will apply to the Kerala
Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act, 1965. Though, the Court noticed
that the Act prescribes a period of limitation, which is different from the
period of limitation under the Limitation Act, 1963, in absence of any
exclusion of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act 1963, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that those Sections 4 to 24 of Limitation Act, 1963
shall be applicable to the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act,
1965.
30. However, in 'Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra
(1974) 2 SCC 133', a three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court,
while examining the question as to whether the Limitation Act, 1963 would
be applicable to the provisions of Representation of People Act, held as
under:
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 20
"17 but what we have to see is whether the
scheme of the special law, that is in this case the Act,
and the nature of the remedy provided therein are
such that the Legislature intended it to be a complete
code by itself which alone should govern the several
matters provided by it. If on an examination of the
relevant provisions it is clear that the provisions of the
Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the
benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to
supplement the provisions of the Act. In our view,
even in a case where the special law does not exclude
the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act
by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open
to the Court to examine whether and to what extent
the nature of those provisions or the nature of the
subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude
their operation."
31. From the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in 'Hukumdev Narain
Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra (1974) 2 SCC 133', it is clear that even if
there exists no express exclusion in the special law, the court reserves the
right to examine the provisions of the special law, to arrive at a conclusion
as to whether the legislative intent was to exclude the operation of the
Limitation Act, 1963 or not.
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 21
32. To examine the legislative intent to decide whether the 'I&B Code'
excludes the operation of the Limitation Act, 1963, it is desirable to refer the
previous Acts on Insolvency, namely the 'Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act,
1909' and the 'Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920'.
33.. In Part VII of the 'Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act, 1909', the period
of limitation was prescribed under Sections 101, which reads as follows:
"Limitation
101. The period of limitation for an appeal from any
act or decision of the official assignee, or from an
order made by an officer of the Court empowered
under section 6, shall be twenty days from the date of
such act, decision or order, as the case may be."
34. Section 101A related to computing the period of limitation for any suit
or other legal proceedings, which reads as follows: -
"101A. Where an order of adjudication has been
annulled under this Act, in computing the period of
limitation prescribed for any suit or other legal
proceeding (other than a suit or legal proceeding in
respect of which the leave of the Court was obtained
under section 17) which might have been brought but
for the making of an order of adjudication under this
Act, the period from the date of the order of
adjudication to the date of the order of annulment
shall be excluded:
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 22
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply
to any suit or other legal proceeding in respect of a
debt provable but not proved under this Act."
35. Similarly in the 'Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920' under Section 78 the
limitation was prescribed, as quoted below: -
"78. Limitation.--(1) The provisions of sections 5
and 1.2 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (9 of
1908), shall apply to appeals and applications under
this Act, and for the purpose of the said section 12, a
decision under section 4 shall be deemed to be a
decree
(2) Where an order of adjudication has been
annulled under this Act, in computing the period of
limitation prescribed for any suit or application for
the execution of a decree or (other than a suit or
application in respect of which the leave of the Court
was obtained under sub-section (2) of section 28)
which might have been brought or made but for the
making of an order of adjudication under this Act,
the period from the date of the order of adjudication
to the date of the order of annulment shall be
excluded:
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 23
Provided that nothing in this section shall
apply to a suit or application in respect of a debt
provable but not proved under this Act."
36. The 'Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act, 1909' and the 'Provincial
Insolvency Act, 1920' have been repealed by Section 243 of the 'I&B Code',
relevant provision of which reads as follows: -
"243. Repeal of certain enactments and
savings. - (1) The Presidency Towns Insolvency
Act, 1909 and the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920
are hereby repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding the repeal under sub-sections
(1), -
(i) all proceedings pending under and relating
to the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act 1909,
and the Provincial Insolvency Act 1920
immediately before the commencement of this
Code shall continue to be governed under the
aforementioned Acts and be heard and
disposed of by the concerned courts or
tribunals, as if the aforementioned Acts have
not been repealed;
(ii) any order, rule, not fication, regulation,
appointment, conveyance, mortgage, deed,
document or agreement made, fee directed,
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 24
resolution passed, direction given, proceeding
taken, instrument executed or issued, or thing
done under or in pursuance of any repealed
enactment shall, if in force at the
commencement of this Code, continue to be in
force, and shall have effect as if the
aforementioned Acts have not been repealed;
(iii) anything done or any action taken or
purported to have been done or taken,
including any rule, notification, inspection,
order or notice made or issued or any
appointment or declaration made or any
operation undertaken or any direction given or
any proceeding taken or any penalty,
punishment, forfeiture or fine imposed under
the repealed enactments, shall be deemed
valid;
(iv) any principle or rule of law, or established
jurisdiction, form or course of pleading,
practice or procedure or existing usage,
custom, privilege, restriction or exemption
shall not be affected, notwithstanding that the
same respectively may have been in any
manner affirmed or recognised or derived by,
in, or from, the repealed enactments;
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 25
(v) any prosecution instituted under the
repealed enactments and pending
immediately before the commencement of this
Code before any court or tribunal shall,
subject to the provisions of this Code, continue
to be heard and disposed of by the concerned
court or tribunal;
(vi) any person appointed to any office under
or by virtue of any repealed enactment shall
continue to hold such office until such time as
may be prescribed; and
(vii) any jurisdiction, custom, liability, right,
title, privilege, restriction, exemption, usage,
practice, procedure or other matter or thing not
in existence or in force shall not be revised or
restored.
(3) The mention of particular matters in sub-section
(2) shall not be held to prejudice the general
application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act,
1897 with regard to the effect of repeal of the
repealed enactments or provisions of the
enactments mentioned in the Schedule."
37. Though theaforesaid two Acts have been repealed, in the 'I&B Code',
the Legislature did not choose to prescribe any separate provisions of
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 26
'limitation' as was made in Section 101 of the 'Presidency-Towns Insolvency
Act, 1909' or sub-section (1) of Section 78 of the 'Provincial Insolvency Act,
1920' whereunder provisions of Sections 5 and 12 of the 'Indian Limitation
Act, 1908' were made applicable to appeals and applications under the
aforesaid Acts and the decision under the provisions was treated to be
decree.
38. However, the provision of computing the period of limitation prescribed
for any suit or other legal proceeding, as ordered to be excluded in Section
101A of the 'Presidency-Towns Insolvency Act, 1909' and sub-section (2) of
Section 78 of the 'Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920' has been retained with
appropriate modification under sub-section (6) of Section 60 of the 'I&B
Code', as quoted- below: -
"60. Adjudicating Authority for corporate
persons. - (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in
the Limitation Act, 193 or in any other law for the time
being in force, in computing the period of limitation
specified for any suit or application by or' against a
corporate debtor for which an order of moratorium has
been made under this Part, the period during which
such moratorium is in place shall be excluded."
39. The aforesaid provisions, makes clear the intent of the Legislature
which necessarily excluded the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the
Limitation Act, 1963.
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78012017 27
40. A separate time period has been prescribed under different provisions
of the 'I&B Code' such as: -
Fourteen days' time allowed under sub-section (4) of Section 7 and
sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the 'I&B Code' has been allowed to the
Adjudicating Authority to ascertain fact and thereafter to admit or reject the
application, if incomplete.
41. Similarly, ten days' expiry period prescribed under sub-section (1) of
Section 9 from the date of delivery of the notice or invoice demanding
payment under sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the 'I&B Code' has been
prescribed for filing an application under section 9 of the 'I&B Code'.
42. Like, Sections 7 and 8 of the 'I&B Code' under sub-section (5) of
Section 9, the Adjudicating Authority has been allowed fourteen days' time
to admit or reject the application if incomplete, provided before rejecting an
application seven days' time is to be granted to the Applicant to remove the
defects.
43. Under Section 12 of the 'I&B Code', one hundred and eighty days time
has been prescribed for completion of 'Insolvency Resolution Process' though
it is open to the Adjudicating Authority to extend the period, but not
exceeding ninety days' (Total 270 days). If the Resolution Plan is not received
within the aforesaid period by Adjudicating Authority or it rejects the same,
under Section 33 liquidation proceedings shall be initiated.
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 28
44. For preferring appeals under Section 61 while thirty days time has
been allowed, the Appellate Tribunal has been allowed only fifteen days time
beyond thirty days to condone the delay.
45. Under Section 62 of the 'I&B Code', against order of Appellate
Tribunal, an appeal can be preferred by aggrieved person to the Hon'ble
Supreme Court but such appeal is required to be preferred within forty-five
days and the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been allowed to condone the delay
but not exceeding fifteen days.
There are other provisions where such time limit has been prescribed,
which is different from the time prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963.
46. From the aforesaid provision, we find that the scheme of the 'Special
Act' i.e. the 'l&B Code', and the nature of the remedy provided therein are
such that the Legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which
alone should govern the several matters provided by it.
47. In so far as, the application under Section 433 of the Companies Act,
2013 is concerned, we are of the view that the said provision is not
applicable for the following reasons: -
Under Section 255 of the 'I&B Code', certain provisions of the
Companies Act, 2013 have been amended in the manner specified in the
Eleventh Schedule of the 'I&B Code'. Thereunder Section 424 of the
Companies Act, 2013 has been made part of the 'I&B Code' for the purpose
of following procedural or principles of natural justice.
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 29 Section 433 of the Companies Act, 2013 relates to limitation as quoted
below: -
"433. Limitation. - The provisions of the Limitation Act,
1963 (36 of 1963) shall, as far as may be, apply to
proceedings or appeals before the Tribunal or the
Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be."
However, Section 433 of the Companies Act, 2013 has not been
amended to make it as a part of the 'I&B Code', therefore, we hold that
Section 433 which relates to limitation of the Companies Act, 2013, ipso
facto will not be applicable to 'I&B Code'.
48. There is a provision of limitation under the 'Recovery of Debts Due to
Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993' (hereinafter referred to as "DRT
Act") and 'Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and
Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002' (hereinafter referred to as
"SARFAESI Act").
49. By Section 249 of the 'I&B Code', the 'Recovery of Debts Due to Banks
and Financial Institutions Act, 1993' has been amended in the manner
specified in the Fifth Schedule. In the said Act, sub-section (1) and sub-
section (4) of Section 1 has been amended, as quoted below: -
"(a) In sub-section (1), for the words "Due to Banks and Financial
Institutions" the words "and Bankruptcy" shall be substituted;
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 30
(b) In sub-section (4), for the words The provision of this Code",
the words "Save as otherwise provided, the provisions of this
Code", shall be substituted."
50. Section 24 of the 'Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial
Institutions Act, 1993' relates to limitation, as quoted below: -
"24. Limitation.-- The provisions of the Limitation Act,
1963 (36 of 1963), shall, as far as may be, apply to an
application made to a Tribunal."
Section 24 of the said Act has not been amended by 'I&B Code' and
thereby not made applicable to 'I&B Code'.
51. Similarly, by Section 251 of the 'I&B Code' the SARFAESI Act has
been amended in the manner specified in the Seventh Schedule.
Thereunder in sub-section (9) of Section 13, for the words "In the case of',
the words and figures "Subject to the provisions of the 'I&B Code, in the
case of' have been substituted.
52. Section 36 of the SARFAESI Act relate to limitation, as quoted below:-
`36. Limitation. - No secured creditor shall be entitled to
take all or any of the measures under sub-section (4) of
section 13, unless his claim in respect of financial asset is
made within the period of limitation prescribed under the
Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963)."
However, Section 36 of the SARFAESI Act has not been amended to
make applicable to 'I&B Code'..
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 31
53. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold that Section 24 of the
Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 and Section 36 of the
SARFAESI Act, 2002 are not applicable to the proceedings for initiation of
'Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process'.
54. On the other hand, the Committee by its report suggested to frame
law for 'Insolvency Resolution Process' to facilitate the assessment of
viability of the enterprise at a very early stage; to enable symmetry of
information between creditors and debtors; to ensure a time-bound process
to better preserve economic value; to ensure a collective process; to respect
the rights of all creditors equally; to ensure that when the negotiations fail to
establish viability, the outcome of bankruptcy must be binding and to
ensure clarity of priority, and that the rights of all stakeholders are upheld
in resolving bankruptcy, as noticed above.
55. In 'MIs. Innoventive Industries Ltd v. ICICI Bank & Anr' (Supra)
the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that one of the important objectives of the
Code is to bring the insolvency law in India under a single unified umbrella
with the object of speeding up of the insolvency process. While noticing the
key economic question in the bankruptcy process, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court noticed the report of the Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee, and
observed that there is only one forum for evaluating possibilities, and for
taking a decision there is a creditors committee, where all 'Financial
Creditors' have votes in proportion to the magnitude of debt that they hold.
As mentioned, the Hon'ble Supreme Court also noticed that 'speed is the
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 75 and 78 of 2017 32
essence' under 'I&B Code'. We find that the Committee never suggested that
for admitting the 'Resolution Process' question of limitation, should also be
considered.
56. The matter can be looked at from another angle. If law of limitation
prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963 is made applicable, one may take
a plea that default of debt is barred by limitation to initiate 'Corporate
Insolvency Resolution Process' under Section 7 or Section 9 of the 'l&B
Code'. However, such stand cannot be taken, where a 'Corporate Applicant'
applies for initiation of 'Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process' against
itself ('Corporate Debtor'), having no capacity to pay back the debt and
default having occurred. The law of limitation cannot be made applicable for
filing an application under section 10, which otherwise will render the
provisions of Section 10 of the 'I&B Code' redundant as the 'Corporate
Applicants', do not file application for money claim. This apart, there may be
companies which are closed for more than three years and having failed to
pay a debt, such sick companies will have to be allowed to continue
resulting in depreciation of the value of its assets for time to come, which is
against the statement and object of the 'I&B Code'.
57. Similarly, in a case which is not barred by limitation, if application
filed under Section 7 or Section 9 or Section 10 of the 'I&B Code' is
admitted, pursuant to public notice under Section 15 of the 'I&B Code', the
'Interim Resolution Professional' is required to receive and collect all the
claims as may be submitted by creditors to him, as stipulated in clause (b)
of sub-section (1) of Section 18. In such case, once the creditors put their
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 33
claim, the 'Insolvency Resolution Professional' cannot reject the claim on the
ground that the claim is barred by limitation, as the provision of Limitation
Act, 1963 will not be applicable for filing a claim before the 'Interim
Resolution Professional'. Similarly, the Committee of Creditors while
deciding the resolution plan, cannot reject any such claim, on the ground
that the same is barred by limitation though the Committee of Creditors
may not make any provision in the resolution plan on the ground of
unexplained delay.
58. Even if it is accepted that the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable,
though we have held otherwise, in that case also application under Section
7 or 9 or 10 cannot be rejected on the ground that the application is barred
by limitation for being filed beyond three years for following reasons.
Except Article 137 of Part II i.e. 'other applications', as quoted below,
no other provisions of Limitation is applicable in the matter of filing
application under Sections 7 or 9 or 10: -
Part TI-OTHER APPLICATION Description of application Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run
137. Any other application for which Three years When the right to no period of limitation is provided apply accrues elsewhere in this division.
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 34
59. From Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, it is clear that the period
of three years' is to be counted from the date right to apply accrues to a
'Financial Creditor' or 'Operational Creditor' or 'Corporate Debtor'.
60. For initiation of 'Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process', the right to
apply accrues under Section 7 or Section 9 or Section 10 only with effect
from 1st December, 2016 when 'I&B Code' has come into force, therefore, the
right to apply under Section 7 or Section 9 or Section 10 in all present cases
having accrued after 1st December 2016, such applications cannot be
rejected on the ground that the application is barred by limitation.
61. Learned Amicus Curiae rightly contended that there should be a time
limit for raising claim, including money claim. In this regard, it is desirable
to refer the definition of 'Debt' and 'Default' as defined in sub-section (11)
and (12) of Section 3 of the 'I&B Code', and quoted below: -
"3(11) "debt" means a liability or obligation in respect of
a claim which is due from any person and includes a
financial debt and operational debt;
3(12) "default" means non-payment of debt when whole
or any part or instalment of the amount of debt has
become due and payable and is not repaid by the debtor
or the corporate debtor, as the case may be"
62. From the aforesaid definition, it is clear that 'debt' is a liability or
obligation in respect of a claim which is due from any person and includes a
'Financial Debt' and 'Operational Debt'. It is further clear that when whole or
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 35
any part or instalment of the amount of debt has become due and payable
and is not repaid by the debtor or the 'Corporate Debtor', it amounts to
'default'.
63. Now, the question arises, whether a person can claim any amount due
from another, a 'Corporate Debtor' after long delay on the ground that
Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable?
64. To decide the aforesaid issue, it is necessary to notice the Doctrine of
Limitation and Prescription, as held by jurists and Hon'ble Courts. The
Doctrine of Limitation and Prescription is based on two broad
considerations. First, there is 'a presumption that the right not exercised for
a long time is non-existent. In Salmond: Jurisprudence 12th Ed. Page 438
and 439, the learned author described the doctrine in the following words:
"In order to avoid the difficulty and error that necessarily result from lapse of time the presumption of the coincidence of fact and right is rightly accepted as final after a certain number of years. Whoever wishes to dispute this presumption must do so within the period, otherwise his right, if has one will be forfeited as a penalty for his neglect, vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subvenient (Laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy)"
65. It is also necessary to ensure that the rights of debt, in property or
rights in general should not be in a state of constant uncertainty, doubt and
suspense. In Abbott CJ in Battley v. Faulkner [(1820) 3 B & Aid 288] the
Court observed that "the statute of limitation was intended for relief and quiet
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 36
of the defendant and to prevent the persons from being harassed at a distant
period of time after the committing of the injury complained of".
66. The above principles have been also recognised by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court of India in Rajinder Singh v. Santa Singh, AIR 1973 SC
2537, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed:
"The object of law of limitation is to prevent disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or latches."
67. The object of fixing time-limit for litigation is based on Public Policy,
fixing a life span of legal remedies for the purpose of general welfare. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court in N. Balakrishnan v. M.A. Krishnamurthy, (1998)
7 scc 123, inter alia observed:
"the rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties but are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly and the law of limitation fixes a life span for legal injury suffered and that it is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae Ut sit finis litum i.e. it is for the general welfare that a period to be put to litigation and this is not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, but they are meant to see that the party do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly because the idea is that every legal remedy must be alive for a legislatively fixed period of time."
68. In view of the settled principle, while we hold that the Limitation Act,
1963 is not applicable for initiation of 'Corporate Insolvency Resolution
Process', we further hold that the Doctrine of Limitation and Prescription is
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 37
necessary to be looked into for determining the question whether the
application under Section 7 or Section 9 can be entertained after long delay,
amounting to laches and thereby the person forfeited his claim.
69. If there is a delay of more than three years from the date of cause of
action and no laches on the part of the Applicant, the Applicant can explain
the delay. Where there is a continuing cause of action, the question of
rejecting any application on the ground of delay does not arise.
70. Therefore, if it comes to the notice of the Adjudicating Authority that
the application for initiation of 'Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process'
under section 7 or Section 9 has been filed after long delay, the Adjudicating
Authority may give opportunity to the Applicant to explain the delay within a
reasonable period to find out whether there are any laches on the part of the
Applicant.
71. The stale claim of dues without explaining delay, normally should not
be entertained for triggering 'Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process' under
Section 7 and 9 of the 'I&B Code'.
72. However, the aforesaid principle for triggering an application under
Section 10 of the 'I&B Code' cannot be made applicable as the 'Corporate
Applicant' does not claim money but prays for initiation of 'Corporate
Insolvency Resolution Process' against itself, having defaulted to pay the
dues of creditors.
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 38
In so far it relates to filing of claim before the 'Insolvency Resolution
Professional', in case of stale claim, long delay and in absence of any
continuous cause of action, it is open to resolution applicant to decide
whether such claim is to be accepted or not, and on submission of
resolution plan, the Committee of Creditors may decide such question. If
any adverse decision is taken in regard to any creditor disputing the claim
on ground of delay and laches, it will be open to the aggrieved creditor to file
objection before the Adjudicating Authority against resolution plan and for
its necessary correction who may decide the same in accordance with the.
observations as made above.
73. Coming to merits of present matter, in the case of M/s. Speculum
Plast Pvt. Ltd. Vs. PTC Techno Pvt. Ltd. in Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency)
No. 47 of 2017, the Adjudicating Authority by impugned order dated 11th
April, 2017 has not decided the question whether Limitation Act, 1963 is
applicable in the proceeding for initiation of 'Corporate Insolvency
Resolution Process' or not and without deciding the same rejected the case
on the ground that the amount legally recoverable is beyond the period of
limitation. It has not been noticed that the invoices raised are of the period
from 1st April, 2013 to 19th September, 2013, and, therefore, default must
have occurred after September, 2013. The 'I&B Code' having come into effect
on 1st December 2016, the Adjudicating Authority was not correct in
dismissing the application on the ground that the application is beyond the
period of limitation.
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 39
74. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned order dated 11th
April, 2017 passed by the Adjudicating Authority (National Company Law
Tribunal) New Delhi in Company Petition No. (IB)-41(ND)/2017 and remit
back the case to the Adjudicating Authority, New Delhi to find out whether
the application is otherwise complete or not and, after notice and hearing
the parties, will pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. In case, the
application is complete, the Adjudicating Authority will admit the
application preferred by the Appellants. In case it is incomplete, the
Appellant be granted minimum seven days' time to remove the defects in
terms of proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 9 of the 'I&B Code'.
75. In Parag Gupta Vs. M/s. B K Educational Services Pvt. Ltd. in
Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 76 of 2017, the Adjudicating
Authority observed that the. amount haying been paid between the period 1st
October, 2012 and 5th February, 2013, there was nothing on the record to
suggest that it would extend the limitation to recover the same. The Income
Tax Returns filed by 'Corporate Debtor' for the assessment years 2014-15 &
2015-16 were, not taken into consideration as it does not specify that the
short term borrowings of over 8 crores including the loans alleged to have
been given by the Appellants as barred by limitation has taken into
consideration for rejecting the application for non-initiation of 'Corporate
Insolvency Resolution Process', the impugned order dated 25th April, 2017
cannot be sustained.
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 40
76. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order dated 25th April, 2017
passed by the Adjudicating Authority in Company Petition No. (IB)-
27(PB)/2017 is set aside and we remit the case to the Adjudicating
Authority who after notice and hearing the parties will consider the
application under Section 7 of the 'I&B Code' preferred by the Appellant- Mr.
Parag Gupta and without going into question of limitation, if application is
complete, will admit the application. In case of any defect, the appellant be
granted seven days' time to remove the defects in terms of proviso to sub-
section (5) of Section 9 of the 'I&B Code. Further, if the application is not
maintainable for any other reasons, the Adjudicating Authority record such
reason.
77. In Ashlay Infrastructure Private Limited Vs. LDS Engineers Pvt. Ltd. in
Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 78 of 2017, the Adjudicating
Authority rejected the application preferred by the Appellant on the ground
that it is time barred. The impugned order dated 4th May, 2017 having been
passed on the basis that the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable for initiation
of 'Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process', the said order cannot be
sustained.
78. We accordingly set aside the impugned order dated 4th May, 2017
passed in Company Petition No. (IB)-77(ND)/ 2017 and remit the case to the
Adjudicating Authority who after notice and hearing the parties will consider
the application preferred by Appellant under Section 9 of the 'I&B Code' and
without going into question of limitation, if application is complete, will
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78 of 2017 41.
admit the application. In case of any defect, the appellant be granted seven
days' time to remove the defects in terms of proviso to sub-section (5) of
Section 9 of the 'l&B Code. Further, if the application is not maintainable for
any other reasons, the Adjudicating Authority may record such reason.
79. All the appeals are allowed with aforesaid observations and directions.
However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to cost.
(Balvinder Singh) (Justice S .J. Mukhopadhaya) Member (Technical) Chairperson
NEW DELHI
7th November, 2017
AR
Company Appeals (AT) (Insolvency) Nos. 47, 76 and 78012017
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