Pani Devi vs Pramod Kumar Mansingghka & Anr

Date of Order: August 1, 2013.

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P.K. LOHRA, J.

Mr. Niranjan Kumar Jain, for the petitioner.

***

The petitioner-tenant has laid this writ petition

challenging the impugned order dated 1st of March 2013

passed by the learned Rent Tribunal, Bhilwara, whereby the

application of the petitioner-tenant under Order 6 Rule 17

was rejected.

The learned counsel for the petitioner has argued

that the proposed amendment was necessary for

adjudication of the lis involved in the matter and therefore

by declining the prayer of the petitioner-tenant, the learned

Tribunal has committed grave and serious error of law which

is apparent on the face of record. Learned counsel for the

petitioner has also argued that in the matters of

amendment, the Courts are required to adopt a very [2]

lenient and pragmatic approach, and for avoiding

multiplicity of proceedings normally prayer for amendment

cannot be refused. In support of his contention, learned

counsel has placed reliance on a decision rendered in case

of Murlidhar Vs. Nand Kishore & Anr. [RLW 2006 (2) Raj.

1687].

I have heard the learned counsel for the

petitioner, perused the materials on record and the

impugned order.

The Apex Court in case of Gaya Prasad Vs.

Pradeep Shrivastava (AIR 2001 SC 803) in the matter

of amendment in respect of subsequent developments has

made following observations in Para 13 :

13. In our opinion, the subsequent events to overshadow the genuineness of the need must be of such nature and of such a dimension that the need propounded by the petitioning party should have been completely eclipsed by such subsequent events. A three-

Judge Bench of this Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu vs. Motor and General Traders [1975 (1) SCC 770] which pointed to the need for re-moulding the reliefs on the strength of subsequent events affecting the cause of action in the field of rent control litigation, forewarned that cognizance of such subsequent events should be taken very cautiously. This is what learned Judges of the Bench said then:

"We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the [3]

party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceedings provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed."

This Court also in case of Tola Ram Vs. Addl.

District Judge & Anr. [2012(2) RLW 1160 (Raj.)] has

held in clear and unequivocal terms that bonafide necessity

of landlord is to be considered on the day when the

necessity arose and the crucial date is the date of the

petition. Analyzing the law on pleadings, the Court has

made following observations in Para 14 of the verdict.

14. Adverting to the facts of the instant case, it is noticed that the learned appellate C ourt having discussed all the facts and circum- stance of the case adlongum and placing re- liance on the decision of this Court and of the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that the crucial date for determining the bona fide necessity of the landlord was the date when the lis com- menced. The judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is of no consequence and renders no assistance to the petitioner. It is a settled law that the bonafide necessity of the landlord is to be considered of the day when the necessity arose and the crucial date is the date of the petition. If any subsequent event emerges, the necessity of the landlord does not cease nor the bonafide necessity of that day becomes non-existent. Viewed from this angle, the appellate Court is found to have rightly dismissed the application of the peti- tioner-tenant seeking amendment in the writ- ten statement of defence. The impugned order rendered by the appellate Court is found to be just and proper and suffers from no infirmity and thus, the same warrants no intervention.

[4] The petitioner's present petition is under Article

227 of the Constitution of India for invoking supervisory

jurisdiction of this Court. It is a trite law that supervisory

jurisdiction is to be exercised with great care and

circumspection and the said jurisdiction is not akin to that

of an appellate jurisdiction. The Apex Court while examining

the scope of supervisory jurisdiction in case of Surya Dev

Rai Vs. Ramchander Rai [(2003) 6 SCC 675], has

prescribed certain parameters in exercise of the said

jurisdiction in Para 24 of the verdict. Para 24 of the

judgment reads as under:

24. The difference between Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution was well brought out in Umaji Keshao Meshram Vs. Radhikabai.

Proceedings under Article 226 are in exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court while proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution are not original but only supervi- sory. Article 227 substantially reproduces the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 excepting that the power of superintendence has been extended by this Article to tribunals as well. Though the power is akin to that of an ordinary court of appeal, yet the power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cas- es for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. The power may be exercised in cases occa- sioning grave injustice or failure of justice such as when (i) the court or tribunal has as- sumed a jurisdiction which it does not have,

(ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have, such failure occasioning a failure [5]

of justice, and (iii) the jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner which tantamounts to overstepping the limits of ju- risdiction.

While summing up the conclusions, in a nutshell,

the Apex Court in Para 38(4) to 38 (8) of the verdict has

prescribed the following guidelines:

(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When the subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exer- cise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (iii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned there- by.

(6) A patent error is an error which is self-ev-

ident, i.e., which can be perceived or demon- strated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn pro- cess of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view the error cannot be called gross or patent.

(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exer- cised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion.

[6] Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two ju- risdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a sub- ordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an ap- peal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early dispos- al of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very mo- ment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such re- fusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis.

(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-ap- preciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character.

Thus, applying the ratio decidendi of Surya Dev's

case (supra) and the law on the law of amendment in plead-

ings, I am convinced that the learned Tribunal has not com-

mitted any error much less an error apparent on the face of

record while rejecting the application. In the background of

the fact situation of the instant case and taking into

account legislative intent of the Act of 2001, the judgments

in the case of Gaya Prasad's case (supra) clearly clinches

the issue in favour of the respondent-landlord.

Learned Tribunal, while considering the [7]

application for amendment has recorded cogent and

convincing reasons for its adjudication. By virtue of

amended CPC, a proviso is inserted which clearly envisage

that no application for amendment shall be allowed after

the trial has commenced unless the Court comes to the

conclusion that in spite of due diligence the party could not

have raised the matter before the commencement of the

trial. The learned counsel for the petitioner has informed

during the course of hearing that the trial is at the fag end

and posted for final arguments. Therefore, I am not

inclined to interfere in the matter at this stage. The

Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 is self contained Code

and the procedure, which is required to be followed for

deciding the petitions under the Act of 2001, is envisaged

under Section 21 of the Act of 2001. In this view of the

matter, I am in complete agreement with the Tribunal that

the endeavour made by the petitioner-tenant is only to

prolong the proceedings and no fruitful purpose will be

served by permitting proposed amendment.

Consequently, there is no force in this petition,

and the same is accordingly dismissed summarily.

(P.K. LOHRA), J.

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