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Pallawi Resources Ltd vs Protos Engineering Company Pvt.Ltd

Supreme Court26 March 2010Mukundakam Sharma · V.S. Sirpurkar

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

Where a statute prescribes different modes or procedures for determining a matter across multiple provisions, those provisions must be read together as an integrated whole rather than in isolation; a provision prescribing the criteria for determining a matter does not operate in an independent or self-executing manner if the statute contains other provisions establishing the procedural machinery and authority for that determination. When statutory language deliberately employs different terminology in related provisions — such as "automatically increased" in one section and "determined" in another — the choice of language indicates distinct legislative intent regarding the mode and manner of application of each provision. The word "determine" in a statutory provision imports an element of adjudication or formal decision-making that presupposes the exercise of authority by a designated statutory body through formal application of that body's powers; mere mathematical calculation or ministerial assessment does not constitute determination in the statutory sense. Where a statute confers jurisdiction upon a specific authority (here, the Rent Controller) to fix or determine a matter through application to that authority, that authority cannot be bypassed or rendered otiose by reading another provision as creating an automatic or self-executing right, even if the calculation required under that other provision is purely formulaic. The non-amendment or non-modification of procedural rules prescribed for making applications to a statutory authority (here, Rule 8 prescribing the manner of making applications under Section 17) after insertion of a new substantive provision in the statute indicates that the legislature did not intend the new provision to operate as an exception to, or bypass of, the procedure established by such rules.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2763 OF 2010[Arising out of SLP (C) No. 15983 of 2008]
Pallawi Resources Ltd. ....... Appellant
Versus
Protos Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. ...... Respondent
JUDGMENT
Dr. Mukundakam Sharma, J.
1. Leave Granted.
2. This appeal by special leave is directed against the
judgment and order dated 26.03.2008 passed by the
Calcutta High Court under its ordinary original civil
jurisdiction whereby the High Court dismissed the
application G.A. No. 800 of 2008 in C.S. No. 14 of 2008
1moved by the appellant herein under Chapter XIIIA of the
Rules on the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta High
Court for a summary judgment.
3. The issue and the controversy that falls for consideration
in the present appeal deals with the interpretation of the
provisions of sub-section 4A of Section 17 of the West
Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997. The question that
arises for our consideration is whether the fair rent in
respect of a tenancy which subsists for 20 years or more
in respect of the premises constructed in or before the
year 1984 and used for commercial purpose is required
to be determined by the Rent Controller or whether the
same would stand automatically determined under sub-
section 4A of Section 17 read with Section 20 of the West
Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997.
4. At this juncture, it will be pertinent to set out a brief
statement of facts in the backdrop of which the present
controversy has arisen before us. A lease deed dated
215.02.1969 was executed between the appellant and the
respondent herein for grant of lease, for office purposes,
of the entire first floor of premises no. 20, Rajendra Nath
Mukherjee Road, Calcutta for a period of twenty years
from 01.02.1969 to 31.01.1989 and the rent mutually
settled and agreed upon by the parties was Rs. 2,250/-
per month as the basic component of the rent (the service
charges and other additional payments excluded).
5. Upon the expiry of the term of twenty years, the appellant
herein instituted a suit being C.S. No. 778 of 1989 before
the Calcutta High Court. The appellant herein, however,
had withdrawn the said suit by way of an order dated
18.04.2006. In the meanwhile, the West Bengal Premises
Tenancy Act, 1997 came into force which repealed the
earlier Act of 1956. Section 17(4A) was inserted by the
West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 2002
with retrospective effect from 10.07.2001.
3
6. The appellant therefore issued to the respondent a notice
dated 12.03.2007 under Section 20 of the West Bengal
Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 intending to increase the
rent of the said premises to Rs. 13,500/- per month, it
being five times the rent earlier agreed upon by the
parties due and recoverable from the month of May 2007.
A notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882 dated 09.06.2007 terminating the tenancy and
calling upon the respondent to hand over vacant,
peaceful and khas possession of the said premises was
served upon the respondent by the appellant.
7. Since the respondent continued to occupy the said
premises, the appellants instituted a suit C.S. No. 14 of
2008 in the High Court of Calcutta under its ordinary

original civil jurisdiction, praying, inter alia, for a decree

of peaceful, vacant and khas possession of the said

premises. Subsequently, an application G.A. No. 800 of

2008 for a summary judgment was moved by the

appellant wherein it was contended by the appellant that

4 under sub-section 4A of Section 17 there is a mandate

for increase of rent which automatically comes in

operation upon a notice in that regard being issued

under Section 20 without the landlord requiring to

perfect the demand before any other authority. It was

also urged that if there is no dispute as to the quantum,

the increased rent becomes payable from the month or

period of tenancy next after the expiry of 30 days from

the date of the notice and the refusal without any dispute

as to the quantum would not make the landlord liable to

apply before the Rent Controller for fixation of rent. It

was further contended that only where a tenant refused

to accept the increase as suggested by a landlord, the

landlord has perforce to seek the increase before the Rent

Controller. However, the Court relying on an earlier

judgment of the Division Bench of that Court reported as

2006 (2) CHN 386 dismissed the said application. Hence,

the parties are in appeal before us.

5

8. Before proceeding further, we wish to refer to the rival

contentions made by the learned counsel appearing for

the parties. Dr. A.M. Singhvi and Mr. Ranjit Kumar,

learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the

appellant, contended before us that Section 17(4A) of the

West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 as inserted by

the 2002 Amendment Act, envisages that the

determination of the fair rent would be automatic under

Section 17(4A) read with Section 20 of the West Bengal

Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 without reference to the

Rent Controller once the three pre-conditions which

govern the applicability of Section 17(4A) spelt out in that

Section are fulfilled. According to the counsel for the

appellant, fixation of the rent is automatic because

Section 17(4A) prescribes a formal method of fixing the

rent requiring only minimal calculation. The counsel

further forcefully submitted before us that since the job

of fixing the rent does not involve any adjudicatory

6 process, it is a ministerial task, and hence reference to

the Rent Controller is not required.

9. Mr. Bhaskar P. Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing

on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand,

contended that sub-section 4A of Section 17 has to be

read in conjunction with the other sub-sections of that

Section and that application of Section 17(1) which

requires the Rent Controller to fix the fair rent cannot be

dispensed with. Mr. Gupta also laid emphasis on the fact

that Rule 8 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Rules,

1999 which prescribes the manner of making

applications under Section 17 for fixation of the fair rent

remains unamended even after the amendment of the

1997 Act, thereby keeping the manner of fixation of the

fair rent intact even for cases falling under sub-section

4A of Section 17.

10. We have carefully considered the aforesaid submission of

the counsel appearing for the parties. In order to

7 appreciate the said contentions we have also perused not

only the statutory provisions of the West Bengal Premises

Tenancy Act, 1997 but also the Statement of Objects and

Reasons leading to framing of the aforesaid legislation as

also the Statement of Objects and Reasons for bringing in

an amendment of the said Act in 2002 giving

retrospective effect to the said provisions from 2001.

Before the enactment of the West Bengal Premises

Tenancy Act, 1997, the field was covered by the West

Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. However, the

aforesaid Act of 1997 was legislated after repealing the

West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. We may now

have a look at the definition of the term "fair rent" under

the Act of 1997. The definition of "fair rent" is given in

Section 2(b), where it is stated that fair rent means rent

fixed under Section 17 of the Act. At this stage, reference

is also to be made to the relevant text of Section 17 which

is reproduced below for the purpose of convenience but

restricted only to the relevant portion: -

8

"Section 17 - Fixation of fair rent - (1) The Controller shall, on application made to him either by the landlord or by the tenant in the prescribed manner, fix the fair rent in respect of any premises in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

..................................................................... .....................................................................

(4A) Where a tenancy subsist for twenty years or more in respect of the premises constructed in or before the year 1984 and used for commercial purpose, the fair rent shall be determined by adding to the rent as on 1.7.1976 five times or by accepting the existing rent if such rent is more than the increased rent determined under this sub-section."

The text of Section 20 which deals with the issuance of a

notice required to be mandatorily given to the tenant by the

landlord if he wants to increase the rent is also reproduced

hereunder: -

"Section 20 - Notice of increase of rent - Where a landlord intends to increase the rent of any premises, he shall give to the tenant the notice of his intention so to do in so far as such increase is permissible under this Act; the increase of rent shall be due and recoverable from the month or period of tenancy next after the expiry of thirty days from the date on which the notice is given. "

9 11. It may be mentioned herein that in the original Act of

1997 there did not exist the provisions of sub-section 4A of

Section 17 and the same was brought in by the Amendment

Act of 2002, operating retrospectively with effect from

10.07.2001. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the

Bill of 2002 it was stated that one of the purposes for bringing

in the Amendment Bill is to extend the application of the said

Act to the premises let out for residential purpose and non-

residential purpose having monthly rent upto Rs. 6,000/- and

Rs. 10,000/- respectively situated within the limits of Kolkata

Municipal Corporation or the Howrah Municipal Corporation

as well as to extend the application of the said Act to the

premises let out for residential purpose and non-residential

purpose having monthly rent upto Rs. 3,000/- and Rs.

5,000/- respectively situated in other areas to which the said

Act extends. Another reason stated for bringing in the

Amendment Bill was to amend Section 17 of the said Act for

fixation of fair rent in such a manner so as to provide benefit

to both the landlord and the tenant concerned.

10

12. A plain reading of Section 17(4A) would suggest that the

three conditions which must co-exist for the applicability of

that sub-section in a given case are:

i. There must be a subsisting tenancy for twenty years or

more; and

ii. The tenancy must be in respect of a premises

constructed in or before the year 1984; and

iii. The premises must be used for a commercial purpose.

The counsel for the parties have, before us, not disputed the

fulfillment of these three pre-conditions in the present case.

Therefore, we intend to directly move to the point which is in

issue before us in the present appeal. At the outset, we wish to

point out that for a number of reasons set out in the following

paragraphs, we cannot accept the view propounded by the

learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant.

13. A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is that a

provision in a statute must be read as a whole and not in

isolation ignoring the other provisions of that statute. While

11 dealing with a statutory instrument, one cannot be allowed to

pick and choose. It will be grossly unjust if the Court allows a

person to single out and avail the benefit of a provision from a

chain of provisions which is favourable to him. Reference may

be made to a constitutional bench decision of this Court in the

case of Prakash Kumar v. State of Gujarat (2005) 2 SCC 409.

The Court, in para 30, of that judgment observed as follows:

"30. By now it is well settled principle of law that no part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place. It is also trite that the statute or rules made thereunder should be read as a whole and one provision should be construed with reference to the other provision to make the provision consistent with the object sought to be achieved."

14. We wish to also refer to a latest judgment of this Court

reported as SAIL v. S.U.T.N.I. Sangam and Ors. 2009 (10)

SCALE 416, wherein this Court, very succinctly reiterated the

aforesaid position in, para 79, as follows:

"79. The learned counsel, however, invited our attention to take recourse to the purposive interpretation doctrine in preference to the literal interpretation. It is a well settled principle of law that a statute must be read as a whole and then chapter by chapter, section by section,

12 and then word by word. For the said purpose, the Scheme of the Act must be noticed. If the principle of interpretation of statutes resorted to by the Court leads to a fair reading of the provision, the same would fulfill the conditions of applying the principles of purposive construction."

15. From these authorities, it is amply clear that a provision

in a statute ought not to be read in isolation. On the contrary,

a statute must be read as an integral whole keeping in view

the other provisions which may be relevant to the provision in

question in order to correctly arrive at the legislative intent

behind the provision in question. Applying this principle to the

case at hand which involves an interpretation of Section 17

(4A), it will not be appropriate for us to read sub-section 4A of

Section 17 ignoring the other relevant provisions. It will also

be pertinent to note that Section 18 of the Act which speaks

about revision of the fair rent employs the words

"automatically increased" in contradistinction to the word

"determined" used in Section 17 (4A). The use of different

terminology in the two sections thus indicates that the

13 legislative intent was to lay down different modes for fixation of

the rent under the two sections.

16. Furthermore, a plain reading of Section 20 of the Act

would show that Section 20 allows the landlord to only give a

notice of his intention to increase the rent, which becomes due

and recoverable from the month or period of tenancy next after

the expiry of thirty days from the date on which the notice is

given. We are of the considered view that the requirement of

giving by the landlord a notice of intention to increase the rent

instead of a notice of increase of rent and the period of one

month which has been allowed before the increased rent

becomes due and recoverable from the tenant by the landlord

sufficiently indicate that the legislature did not intend to make

the rent fixed by the landlord automatically applicable without

any reference to the Rent Controller.

17. The stand of the learned senior counsel appearing on

behalf of the appellant that under sub-section 4A of Section 17

there is automatic fixation of the fair rent without any

14 reference to the Rent Controller is untenable as it is not in

conformity with the cardinal rule referred to above by us.

Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, as

it stands today, consists of a number of sub-sections. Sub-

sections 4A and 4B were both inserted in Section 17 by the

West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 2002 with

retrospective effect from 10.07.2001. Sub-section (1) of Section

17 clearly states that the Controller shall be the authority to

fix the rent in respect of any premises in accordance with the

provisions of that Act. Sub-section 4A of Section 17 lays down

the mode for the determination of fair rent where a tenancy

subsists for twenty years or more in respect of the premises

constructed in or before the year 1984 and used for

commercial purpose.

18. Further, it is a well established principle of statutory

interpretation that the legislature is specially precise and

careful in its choice of language. Thus, if a statutory provision

is enacted by the legislature in a certain manner, the only

15 reasonable interpretation which can be resorted to by the

courts is that such was the intention of the legislature and

that the provision was consciously enacted in that manner. It

is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read

anything into a statutory provision which is plain and

unambiguous. The language employed in a statute is the

determinative factor of the legislative intent. If the language of

the enactment is clear and unambiguous, it would not be

proper for the courts to add any words thereto and evolve

some legislative intent, not found in the statute. Reference in

this regard may be made to the recent decision of this Court in

Ansal Properties & Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana

(2009) 3 SCC 553.

19. We must also take note of the submission made by the

learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent that sub-

section 4A of Section 17 employs the word `determine'. The

learned senior counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of

a three Judge bench of this Court, which is binding on us,

reported as Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Rly. v.

16 T.R. Chellappan (1976) 3 SCC 190, the relevant portion of

para 21 is reproduced herein below:

"21....................The word "consider" has been used in contradistinction to the word "determine". The rule-making authority deliberately used the word "consider" and not "determine" because the word "determine" has a much wider scope. The word "consider"

merely connotes that there should be active application of the mind by the disciplinary authority after considering the entire circumstances of the case in order to decide the nature and extent of the penalty to be imposed on the delinquent employee on his conviction on a criminal charge. This matter can be objectively determined only if the delinquent employee is heard and is given a chance to satisfy the authority regarding the final orders that may be passed by the said authority. In other words, the term "consider" postulates consideration of all the aspects, the pros and cons of the matter after hearing the aggrieved person..................."

20. We may also add herein that all the sub-sections

included in Section 17 are independent provisions laying down

different criteria on the fulfillment of which an application

could be filed before the Rent Controller praying for increasing

the fair rent. In other words, Section 17 lays down different

types of causes of action as to when such an increase could be

sought for. Sub-section (1) of Section 17 makes it crystal clear

17 that on the happening and fulfillment of the criteria laid down

in each of the cause of action, an application would be

required to be filed before the Rent Controller who would then

determine as to what would be the fair rent. Although, it

could only be a case of mathematical calculation yet an order

in that regard is to be passed by the Rent Controller on the

basis of an application filed before it by determining the

quantum of such fair rent.

21. In case there is a case of deemed increase of fair rent or

an automatic increase, as suggested by the counsel appearing

for the appellant, still somebody would have to determine that

it has so increased and that authority is definitely the Rent

Controller who could exercise the jurisdiction only when he

receives an application. Unless an application is received in

that regard, nobody would know that in fact a case for

increase of fair rent has accrued or is sought for by the

concerned party.

18

22. Thus, it cannot be said that sub-section 4A of Section 17

was sought to be brought in by way of an exception to the

general rule of Section 17. Had the legislature intended

otherwise, it would have specifically, in its wisdom, made sub-

section 4A an exception to sub-section (1) by adding a proviso

or by making a specific provision thereto under Section 3,

where the Act itself provides some exemptions and provides for

specific cases where the Act is not applicable. The fact that the

West Bengal State legislature did not, even after insertion of

sub-section 4A, amend or modify Rule 8 of the West Bengal

Premises Tenancy Rules, 1999 which prescribes the manner of

making applications under Section 17 for fixation of fair rent

also fortifies the fact that the State legislature did not intend

to incorporate sub-section 4A as an exception to sub-section

(1) of Section 17. On the contrary, the non-amendment of Rule

8 goes on to show that the legislature intended the same

procedure to be followed with regard to making an application

under any provision of Section 17 for the fixation of fair rent.

19

23. Thus, in light of the discussion made above, we are of the

considered opinion that this appeal is liable to be dismissed,

which we hereby do. The parties are left to bear their own

costs.

..................................J. [V.S. Sirpurkar]

......................................J. [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma]

New Delhi March 26, 2010.

20

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