Paka Saroja vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh
- Neutral2023 INSC 844
- SCR[2023] 12 SCR 433
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
1. The death of a complainant before trial, or a complainant's non-availability or hostile stance during trial, does not prove fatal to the prosecution case or constitute grounds for acquittal; the prosecution may prove the contents of the complaint and other facts in issue through other oral or documentary evidence or circumstantial evidence. 2. Where an accused public servant has accepted an undue advantage (any gratification other than legal remuneration), once this is proved by the court, Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act mandates the court to raise a presumption that he accepted the undue advantage as a motive or reward under Section 7 for performing or causing performance of a public duty improperly or dishonestly; this presumption is rebuttable and the burden then shifts to the accused to dispel it. 3. An accused need not establish his defence beyond reasonable doubt but only on the preponderance of probability; however, the court must consider whether the accused has offered a reasonable and probable explanation based on the evidence that the money was accepted as something other than illegal gratification, and if so, the benefit of doubt should be granted. 4. The conscious acceptance of tainted currency by an accused public servant, as proved through pre-trap and post-trap proceedings supported by examination of concerned witnesses, coupled with recovery of tainted currency from the accused, satisfies the requirement of proof under the Prevention of Corruption Act.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
2023INSC844 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2173 OF 2011
P. SARANGAPANI (DEAD)
THROUGH LR PAKA SAROJA …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.
1. The original appellant P. Sarangapani son of
Laxmaiah (accused no.1) having expired pending the
present Appeal, his wife Paka Saroja was permitted
to proceed further with the Appeal as per the order
passed by the court on 31st August, 2023. Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by
2. The instant Appeal is directed against the judgment SNEHA DAS Date: 2023.09.21 16:37:25 IST Reason:
and order dated 21st March, 2011 passed by the High
1 Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Criminal
Appeal No.54 of 2005, whereby the High Court had
dismissed the Appeal filed by the appellant-accused
no.1 and confirmed the judgment and order dated
06.01.2005 passed by the Principal Special Judge for
SPE and ACB Cases-cum-IV Additional Chief Judge City
Civil Court Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as
the Trial Court) in CC No.08 of 1994. The Trial
Court had convicted the appellant accused no.1
P.Sarangapani for the offences under Section 7 and
Section 13(1)(d)r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, the PC Act) and
sentenced him to imprisonment for one year and pay a
fine of Rs.1,000/- in default, to suffer Simple
Imprisonment for three months for the offence under
Section 7 and to suffer Rigorous Imprisonment for
two years and pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- in default,
to suffer Simple Imprisonment for six months for the
offence under Section 13(1)(d)r/w 13(2) of the P.C.
Act.
2
3. The chargesheet for the alleged offences was laid by
the Investigating Officer, Deputy Superintendent of
Police Shri P.L. Raju, Anti-Corruption Bureau,
Warangal Range, Warangal against the appellant
accused no.1 P.Sarangapani and one another accused
P.Vasudev son of Mallaiah. The said accused
P.Vasudev having expired pending trial, the
appellant accused alone was tried by the Trial
Court. The defacto-complainant Sri Immadi Laxmaiah
also had expired prior to commencement of the trial
and therefore he could not be examined by the
prosecution.
4. The case of prosecution in nutshell was that the
appellant accused Sri Sarangapani while discharging
his duty as the Sub Registrar, Cooperative Societies
had demanded and accepted a sum of Rs.1500/- as
gratification other then legal remuneration from the
defacto-complainant Sri Immadi Laxmaiah on
27.03.1993, for himself and for the accused no.2
P.Vasudev, the Deputy Registrar Cooperative
3 Societies in the office of Divisional Cooperative
Khammam, as a motive or reward for showing an
official favour, in allowing the complainant to
continue as the President of the Society, and
thereby both the accused had committed the offence
under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d)r/w 13(2) of the
PC Act.
5. To prove the charges levelled against the appellant-
accused, the prosecution had examined PW-1 Shri Dana
Pullaiah to prove the contents of the RC No.1496/92-
C. The PW-2 Sri M. Laxmi Narsu, one of the mediators
(panch witness) working as Agricultural Officer, in
the office of Joint Director Agriculture Khammam was
examined to prove the pre-trap and post-trap
proceedings. The PW-3 Sri K.L.N. Krishna Kumar was
examined to prove the Sanction orders relating to
the accused, accorded by the then Secretary of
Agriculture Cooperative – II Department. The PW-4
was Sri B. Pulla Reddy, working as the President of
Lachannagudem Village, who succeeded the Vice
4 President of the society, on the previous Vice
President B. Pulla Reddy having been suspended. The
PW-5 was Sri V. Vengalaiah, Inspector of Police ACB,
a member of raiding party; and lastly PW-6 Sri P.L.
Raju, the then DSP Warangal Range, was examined as
he was the trap laying officer cum investigating
officer. The prosecution had also adduced
documentary evidence in support of its case.
6. On the closure of prosecution evidence, the
appellant-accused P.Sarangapani was examined under
Section 313 of Cr.P.C, wherein he had denied the
allegations levelled against him and had stated that
he was falsely implicated. He also had filed a
written statement contending inter alia that he
never demanded and accepted any illegal
gratification from the complainant as alleged. The
appellant accused had also examined DW-1 Sri K.
Venkateshwarlu, resident of Chintakani Mandal of
Khammam District, to substantiate his defence.
5
7. The Trial Court after appreciating the oral as well
as the documentary evidence adduced by the
prosecution, held that the prosecution had proved
the charges levelled against the appellant/ accused
beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the appellant
was convicted and sentenced as stated hereinabove.
In the Appeal preferred by the appellant before the
High Court, against the said judgment of conviction
and sentence, the High Court reappreciated the
evidence on record and confirmed the conviction and
sentence recorded by the Trial Court.
8. The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently
submitted that both the courts had committed gross
error of law in misappreciating evidence on record
and in holding the appellant guilty of the alleged
charges, though the prosecution had miserably failed
to prove the demand of illegal gratification
allegedly made by the appellant. Placing reliance on
the decision of this Court in case of B. Jayaraj v.
State of Andhra Pradesh1, he submitted that it was 1 (2014) 13 SCC 55 6 required to be proved by the prosecutor beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused had voluntarily
accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe, and in
absence of proof of demand for illegal
gratification, presumption under Section 20 could
not be drawn against the accused. According to him
in the instant case, the complainant having expired
before the commencement of trial, could not be
examined and hence the very allegation of demand of
money as bribe was not proved by the prosecution.
The learned counsel for the appellant placed
reliance on the statement of complainant recorded
before the Additional I-Class Magistrate under
Section 164 of Cr.P.C. to submit that the
complainant himself had stated therein that he had
paid the amount to the accused towards the Audit
fees of the society and that the accused was falsely
implicated by the former President of the society
Pulla Reddy, who had a grudge against the accused. 7
9. In our opinion, there is no substance in any of the
submissions made by the learned counsel for the
appellant. It is well settled proposition of law
that the death of the complainant or non-
availability of the complainant at the time of trial
could be said to be fatal to the case of
prosecution, nor could it be said to be a ground to
acquit the accused. It is always open for the
prosecution to prove the contents of the complaint
and other facts in issue by leading other oral or
documentary evidence, in case of death of or non-
availability of the complainant. Recently, the
Constitution Bench in case of Neeraj Dutta vs. State
(Government of NCT of Delhi)2, has held that: -
“88.6. (f) In the event the complainant turns “hostile”, or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does 2 (2023) 4 SCC 731 8 not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant.”
10. In the instant case the appellant/ accused in his
explanation under Section 313 had accepted the
receipt of alleged amount. The court therefore was
required to appreciate the evidence laid by the
prosecution in the light of the said explanation and
to consider as to whether the said amount was an
illegal gratification other than the legal
remuneration or not. It cannot be gainsaid that if
the accused offers reasonable and probable
explanation based on the evidence that the money was
accepted by him other than as illegal gratification,
the benefit of doubt should be granted to the
accused. It is also true that the accused is not
required to establish his defence beyond reasonable
doubt as the prosecution, and can establish the same
on the preponderance of probability. However, the
court cannot be oblivious to the statutory
presumption permissible to be raised under Section
9 20 of PC Act with regard to the motive of the
accused. Section 20 reads as under: -
“20. Presumption where public servant accepts any undue advantage. — Where, in any trial of an offence punishable under section 7 or under section 11, it is proved that a public servant accused of an offence has accepted or obtained or attempted to obtain for himself, or for any other person, any undue advantage from any person, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he accepted or obtained or attempted to obtain that undue advantage, as a motive or reward under section 7 for performing or to cause performance of a public duty improperly or dishonestly either by himself or by another public servant or, as the case may be, any undue advantage without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate under section 11.”
11. In view of the above, once the undue advantage i.e.,
any gratification whatever, other than the legal
remuneration is proved to have been accepted by the
accused, the Court is entitled to raise the
presumption under Section 20 that he accepted the
undue advantage as a motive or reward under Section
7 for performing or to cause performance of a public
duty improperly or dishonestly. No doubt, such 10 presumption is rebuttable. The Constitution Bench in
Neeraj Dutta (supra), also had dealt with the issue
of presumption under Section 20 of the Act and held
as under: -
“88.7. (g) Insofar as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.”
12. In the instant case the pre-trap and post-trap
proceedings were duly proved by the prosecution by
examining the concerned witnesses, who had duly
supported the case of prosecution. Both the courts
below have recorded the findings that the
prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt the
conscious acceptance of the tainted currency by the
accused and also the recovery of tainted currency
from the appellant. Therefore, the burden had
shifted on the appellant to dispel the statutory 11 presumption under Section 20 of the said Act, and
prove that it was not accepted as a motive or reward
for the performance of his public duty, which the
appellant had failed to dispel. The explanation
offered by the appellant did not tally with the
statement of the complainant recorded under Section
164 of Cr.P.C. The High Court had also recorded that
the defence taken by the appellant that the
acceptance of tainted currency by him was towards
the Audit fees of the Society was not proved by him
in as much as there was nothing on record to show
that the amount paid by the complainant Immadi
Laxmaiah to the appellant was out of the funds of
the Society.
13. Both the courts have appreciated the evidence on
record threadbare in the right perspective and have
found the appellant guilty for the offence under
Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the PC
Act. We do not see any valid ground to interfere
12 with the well considered findings recorded by both
the courts below.
14. In that view of the matter, the criminal appeal
being devoid of merits is dismissed.
.…………………………………………. J.
[BELA M. TRIVEDI]
…………………………………………. J.
[DIPANKAR DATTA] NEW DELHI;
September 21st, 2023
13
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