P.Suresh vs D.Kalaivani

Reportable

IN THE SUPRME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 739 OF 2026 (@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.20423 OF 2025)

P.SURESH …APPELLANT(S)

VS.

D.KALAIVANI & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

N.V. ANJARIA, J.

Leave granted.

2. Could the High Court entertain an application invoking and

exercising its powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the

Constitution, even where a specific remedial provision available in

Signature Not Verified the Code of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as Digitally signed by MINI Date: 2026.02.04 16:44:46 IST Reason: SLP (c) No.20423 of 2025 Page 1 of 27 ‘CPC’) relating to the subject matter – issue is the focal point

arising to be addressed in the present appeal.

2.1 What is challenged in this appeal at the instance of the

appellant - original plaintiff, is the judgment and order passed by

the High Court of Madras dated 03.06.2025 in CRP No. 3197 of

2024 and CMP No. 17106 of 2024, which were the proceedings of

the Civil Revision Petition filed by the defendant under Article 227

of the Constitution, whereby, the High Court allowed the Revision

Petition and struck off the plaint in Original Suit No. 93 of 2020

before the Court of District Munsif, Tambaram.

3. Outlining the facts would be relevant to notice the case

pleaded in the plaint. The suit instituted by the appellant-plaintiff

before the District Munsif Court, Tambaram was for the relief of

permanent injunction against the defendants and their agents from

interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the suit property

by the plaintiff. The suit property comprised of Survey No.

125/1A, Survey No. 125/1C, and Survey No. 230/1B, which was

described in their specified boundaries of Patta No. 320.

SLP (c) No.20423 of 2025 Page 2 of 27 3.1 The case of the plaintiff was that the land originally belonged

to one Sambandam Chettiar, who sold the same to the mother of

the appellant named Meena under a registered sale deed dated

20.10.1975, Document No. 3994 of 1975. The said Meena - wife

of Paramasivam, was in exclusive possession of the suit property

and she died intestate on 07.12.1985. It was further averred that the

plaintiff as her sole legal heir inherited the property and has been

in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the same and further that

the plaintiff got revenue records mutated in his favour in Patta No.

11941.

3.1.1 It was further averred in the plaint that the suit property, an

open land, was to be bound by the fence. It was stated that at that

time, defendant No. 2 trespassed and prevented the plaintiff from

erecting the fence. It was averred that the defendants claimed to be

the relatives of Sambandam Chettiar. The plaintiff stated that since

the defendants threatened to encroach upon the suit property, the

cause of action arose for instituting the Original Suit No. 93 of

2020.

SLP (c) No.20423 of 2025 Page 3 of 27 3.2 In the written statement filed by the defendants, the

transaction of sale in favour of the plaintiff’s mother Meena was

disputed by contending that the sale document was fabricated. It

was sought to be contended that the certified copy of the sale deed

filed along with the plaint used to be the property of another

document and further that the sale deed was not signed by the said

Sambandam Chettiar. It was the case of the defendants that the

document did not pertain to the suit sale but it was a mortgage deed

executed by a third party.

3.2.1 It was then contended that the said Sambandam Chettiar

and his mother owned the suit property which they had purchased

in the years 1922 and 1928 under registered sale deeds, and that

agricultural operations were carried out in the lands using the

services of coolies. The defendants contended that in the year

1940, when their mother died, all the properties were inherited and

that they were in possession and enjoyment of the same. It was

stated that in the year 2020, the defendants tendered kist for the

land covered under Patta No. 320, but the Village Administrative

SLP (c) No.20423 of 2025 Page 4 of 27 Officer refused to receive the same, stating that the ownership of

the land/Patta had changed.

3.3 By raising the above and other contentions, the defendants

put forward their case inter alia that the question of trespassing

into the suit property by them did not arise as the title of the

property belonged to them and that the case of the plaintiff for

injunction was based on fabricated documents and that the suit was

fraudulent.

3.4 In the Civil Revision Petition filed before the High Court

under Article 227 of the Constitution by the defendants, it was

contended that although the plaintiff was claiming exclusive title

over the property, he did not seek the declaration of his title. The

principles of exercising powers under Order VII Rule 11, CPC and

the provisions of Order VI Rule 16 of CPC were pressed into

service on behalf of the defendant-petitioners, praying before the

High Court to strike off the plaint in exercise of powers under

Article 227 of the Constitution.

SLP (c) No.20423 of 2025 Page 5 of 27 3.5 The High Court noted the case and averments, the defence

of the defendants, and proceeded to record finding that the certified

copy of the sale deed produced by the plaintiff pertained to some

third party and did not relate to the plaintiff. The High Court

further recorded a finding that the document was a forged

document and that the suit filed by the plaintiff was a false suit.

According to the High Court, since the suit was once dismissed for

default on 05.07.2022 and the plaintiff did not take any steps for

about a year, it showed that the plaintiff did not show interest for

long, and that it implied that the defence of the defendants was a

valid defence. The High Court viewed that the ground of fraud was

substantially established by the defendants. According to the High

Court, the continuation of the suit was not necessary. On such

grounds, the High Court exercised its Constitutional jurisdiction

under Article 227 of the Constitution, allowed the civil revision

petition, and struck off the plaint.

4. Heard learned advocate Mr. Abdulla Naseeh for the

petitioner and learned senior advocate Mr. V. Prabhakar with

SLP (c) No.20423 of 2025 Page 6 of 27 learned advocate on record Mr. S. Rajappa for the respondents, at

length.

4.1 By referring to various judgments of this Court, it was

submitted on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was not

justified in the facts of the case in exercising the powers under

Article 227 of the Constitution and pursuant to exercise of such

powers, to set aside the plaint. It was submitted that the powers

under Article 227 of the Constitution are supervisory, to be

exercised sparingly. More particularly, when specific provision in

the form of Order VII Rule 11, CPC exists in the statute book under

which the defendant could have filed its application, a manifest

error was committed by the High Court, it was submitted.

4.2 Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand,

submitted that the supervisory powers of the High Court under

Article 227 are wide enough and when the High Court found that

the suit-plaint was liable to be struck off, no exception could be

taken for invoking the powers. Learned counsel for the respondent

SLP (c) No.20423 of 2025 Page 7 of 27 also referred to the provision of Order VI Rule 16, CPC, which

permits the Court to strike off the pleadings.

5. Article 227 of the Constitution invests the power of

superintendence over all courts by the High Court. Sub-Article(1)

thereof provides that every High Court shall have superintendence

over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to

which it exercises jurisdiction. As per sub-Article(2), without

prejudice to the generality of the provisions in sub-Article (1), the

High Court may (a) call for returns from such courts; (b) make and

issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice

and proceedings of such courts and (c) prescribe forms in which

the books and accounts etc. to be kept by the officers of courts. As

per sub-Article (3), the High Court may also settle tables of fees.

Sub-Article (4) provides that nothing in the Article shall deem to

confer on a High Court powers of superintendence over any court

or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed

Forces.

SLP (c) No.20423 of 2025 Page 8 of 27 5.1 The scope, ambit, amplitude and nature of the powers of a

High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution are discussed and

delineated by this Court in catena of decisions. Article 227 is

perceived to be a custodian of justice, which is in the nature of

extraordinary supervisory powers, discretionary in nature. In

Shalini Shyam Shetty vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil1, this Court

cautioned that an improper and frequent exercise of this power will

be counterproductive and would divest this extraordinary power of

its strength and vitality. It was observed that this discretionary

power has to be exercised very sparingly.

5.1.1 The reserve of exceptional power of judicial intervention

is not to be exercised just for granting of relief in individual cases

but should be directed for the promotion of public confidence in

the administration of justice. It is emphasized that though the

power under Article 227 may be unfettered, its exercise is subject

to high degree of judicial discipline. The Court observed in Shalini

Shyam Shetty (supra), ‘The power of interference under Article

1 (2010) 8 SCC 329

SLP (c) No.20423 of 2025 Page 9 of 27 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice

does not come to halt and the foundation of justice remains pure

and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the

functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High

Court.’

5.2 Similarly, in State vs. Navjot Sandhu2, the powers of the

High Court under Article 227 came to be explained by this Court

observing that the powers available to the High Court under Article

227 of the Constitution are not meant for and not to be exercised

just for the purpose of correcting errors. It was held:

‘It is settled law that this power of judicial superintendence, under Article 227, must be exercised sparingly and only to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not to correct mere errors. Further, where the statute bans the exercise of revisional powers it would require very exceptional circumstances to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India since the power of superintendence was not meant to circumvent statutory law. It is settled law that the jurisdiction under Article 227 could not be exercised “as the cloak of an appeal in disguise.’ (Para 28)

2 (2003) 6 SCC 641

SLP (c) No.20423 of 2025 Page 10 of 27 5.3 In A. Venkateshubbiah Naidu vs. S. Chellappan3, this

Court held that ‘though no hurdle can be put against the exercise

of the constitutional powers of the High Court, it is a well-

recognised principle which gained judicial recognition that the

High Court should direct the party to avail himself of such

remedies before he resorts to a constitutional remedy.’

5.4 In Rajendra Diwan vs. Pradeep Kumar Ranibala and

Anr.4, this Court reiterated that the supervisory power under

Article 227 of the Constitution available to the High Court is not

for a routine exercise, it is meant to keep the courts and tribunals

within the bounds of their jurisdiction or where grave miscarriage

of justice has occurred or there is a flagrant violation of law. What

was stated was that the jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot be

exercised ‘in the cloak of an appeal in disguise’, it cannot be

converted into an alternative appellate forum. 3 (2000) 7 SCC 695 4 2019 (20) SCC 143

SLP (c) No.20423 of 2025 Page 11 of 27 5.5 In K.Valarmathi and Ors. vs. Kumaresan5, this Court

reiterated the same principles for exercising the powers under

Article 227 of the Constitution by the High Courts as under,

‘Essence of the power under Article 227 being supervisory, it cannot be invoked to usurp the original jurisdiction of the court which it seeks to supervise. Nor can it be invoked to supplant a statutory legal remedy under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908.’

(Para 9)

5.5.1 It was further observed, which observation may also be

pertinently reproduced,

‘Civil Procedure Code is a self-contained Code and Order VII Rule 11 therein enumerates the circumstances in which the trial court may reject a plaint. Such rejection amounts to a deemed decree which is appealable before the High Court under Section 96 of the Code. This statutory scheme cannot be upended by invoking supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 to entertain a prayer for rejection of plaint.’ (Para 10)

5.6 In Virudhunagar Hindu Nadargal Dharma Paribalana

Sabai and Others vs. Tuticorin Educational Society and

Others6, the appellants therein had filed a suit for declaration and

permanent injunction. In the said suit proceedings, the trial court

5 2025 SCC OnLine SC 985 6 (2019) 9 SCC 538

SLP (c) No.20423 of 2025 Page 12 of 27 passed order granting an injunction. Respondent No. 5 in the suit

called in question the order of granting injunction by filing a

regular appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the Civil Procedure

Code, 1908. But the Defendant Nos. 1 and 6 challenged the said

order of injunction not by filing regular appeal but by invoking the

powers of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution.

The High Court allowed the said civil revision petition and set

aside the order of injunction granted by the trial court.

5.6.1 The exercise of supervisory powers under Article 227 of

the Constitution by the High Court to challenge the injunction

order was strongly disapproved by this court, observing that the

High Court ought to have seen that when remedy of appeal under

Section 104 read with Order XLIII Rule 1(r), CPC, was directly

available, Defendant Nos.1 and 6-Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 before

this Court ought to have taken recourse to the same. 5.6.2 In Virudhunagar (supra), by categorizing the cases

where the remedy is available under the provisions of the Civil

Procedure Code and the cases where such remedial provisions

SLP (c) No.20423 of 2025 Page 13 of 27 exist under special statutes, this Court emphasised that in cases

falling under the first category, where there is availability of

remedy in terms of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, the

existence of such remedy has to be treated as almost a complete

bar against applying powers under Article 227 of the Constitution

in that regard.

5.6.3 The Court observed thus,

‘…courts should always bear in mind a distinction between (i) cases where such alternative remedy is available before civil courts in terms of the provisions of Civil Procedure Code, and

(ii) cases where such alternative remedy is available under special enactments and/or statutory rules and the fora provided therein happen to be quasi-judicial authorities and tribunals. In respect of cases falling under the first category, which may involve suits and other proceedings before civil courts, the availability of an appellate remedy in terms of the provisions of CPC, may have to be construed as a near total bar. Otherwise, there is a danger that someone may challenge in a revision under Article 227, even a decree passed in a suit, on the same grounds on which Respondents 1 and 2 invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court.’ (Para 12)

5.7 The statement of law observed by a Three-Judge Bench of

this Court in Radhey Shyam vs. Chhabi Nath7, while overruling

7 (2015) 5 SCC 423

SLP (c) No.20423 of 2025 Page 14 of 27 the earlier decision in Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai8, was

recollected, that ‘orders of civil courts stand on a different footing

from the orders of authorities or tribunals or courts other than

judicial/ Civil Court’, stating further as under,

‘Therefore wherever the proceedings are under the Civil Procedure Code and the forum is the civil court, the availability of a remedy under the CPC, will deter the High Court, not merely as a measure of self-imposed restriction, but as a matter of discipline and prudence, from exercising its power of superintendence under the Constitution. Hence, the High Court ought not to have entertained the revision under Article 227 especially in a case where a specific remedy of appeal is provided under the Civil Procedure Code itself.’ (Para 13)

6. In the case on hand, the High Court has exercised its

supervisory powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and

proceeded to set aside the plaint. The invocation of such powers

are sought to be justified by the defendants – respondents by stating

that the amplitude of such power is vast and pervasive, which was

duly exercised by the High Court to strike off the erroneous plaint.

A shelter is also taken from the provision of Order VI Rule 16,

CPC to submit that it is a provision under which frivolous or

8 (2003) 6 SCC 675

SLP (c) No.20423 of 2025 Page 15 of 27 vexatious proceedings could be struck off, reading it with powers

of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution.

6.1 For easy reference, the provision of Order VI Rule 16 CPC

is extracted hereinbelow,

‘16. Striking out pleadings.

The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any matter in any pleading-

(a) which may be unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or

(b) which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trail of the suit, or

(c) which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court.’

6.1.1 The bare perusal of the aforementioned provision mandates

procedural defects whereby the courts can exercise their

discretionary power to strike out any matter in any pleading. Such

discretion could be exercised cautiously and only when the

parameter stipulated under the said provision are apparent, such as,

when the matter in the pleading is unnecessary, scandalous,

frivolous or vexatious or it is of such a nature it tends to prejudice,

embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit or it is otherwise an

abuse of the process of the court.

SLP (c) No.20423 of 2025 Page 16 of 27 6.2 Now, there is a specific provision under the CPC in the

nature of Order VII Rule 11, which deals with the rejection of the

plaint, which mentions specific grounds on which the court may

reject the plaint. The said provision is reproduced herein,

‘11. Rejection of plaint.

The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:

(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;

(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;

(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is returned upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;

(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;

(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;

(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9.

…..’

6.2.1. The provision says that the plaint shall be rejected in the

following cases, firstly, if it does not disclose a cause of action.

Now, the cause of action is a bundle of facts. Whether cause of

action exists for the purpose of validly instituting the suit or not

would necessarily require a factual inquiry. The second ground is

SLP (c) No.20423 of 2025 Page 17 of 27 that the relief claimed when undervalued and the plaintiff, on being

required by the Court to correct the valuation and pay the deficit

court fee within the time which may be fixed by the Court, fails to

do so. The third ground mentioned for rejection of the plaint is

similar with regard to the plaint which is insufficiently stamped

and the plaintiff has failed to supply the requisite stamp paper

within the time fixed by the court.

6.2.2 The fourth ground is about the suit appearing from the

statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. Though this may

be a legal consideration, the attendant facts would become relevant

and the issue may not always be finally adjudged without

application of facts. The fifth ground is that the plaint is not filed

in duplicate. This is curable defect and a procedural aspect. The

sixth ground is where the plaintiff fails to comply with the

provisions of Rule 9, which is also not to be immune from

consideration of facts of the case.

6.2.3 As far as the ground of correction of valuation for

supplying of the stamp paper is concerned, the proviso mentions

SLP (c) No.20423 of 2025 Page 18 of 27 that time may be extended by the Court, for the reasons to be

recorded, if the court is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by

any cause of exceptional nature. There is no gainsaying that there

will have to be factual inquiry in the process of determination for

rejection of plaint and for the satisfaction to be arrived at by the

Court with regard to the extension of time, which the court may

grant. Therefore, it would be entirely proper to conclude that when

the grounds for rejection of the plaint, provided in statutory

provision, require the consideration of the facts of the case, such

issue should not be gone into by exercising supervisory jurisdiction

under Article 227 of the Constitution, which even otherwise is

supposed to be exercised by the Court sparingly and not just for

the purpose of correcting purported errors. In any view, the

overriding criteria in law is that the supervisory jurisdiction cannot

be applied to substitute the remedy available specifically in the

CPC itself.

6.3 While the principal issue addressed in the present appeal is

about the principle whether the High Court could have exercised

SLP (c) No.20423 of 2025 Page 19 of 27 its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to

strike off the plaint, even though a specific provision for rejection

of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11, CPC was available to the

defendants to be taken recourse to, it is also to be noted additionally

that the dispute in the suit was essentially a title dispute between

the parties. Secondly, the defence of the defendants was that the

suit was fraudulent and based on false documents. The High Court

accepted the said contentions and struck down the plaint vide its

powers under Article 227 of the Constitution.

6.3.1 In Shalini Shyam Shetty1, this Court in Paragraph 64 of

the judgment has flagged the growing tendency among the High

Courts to entertain writ petitions in cases of property disputes,

partition suits, matters relating to the execution of decrees,

landlord-tenant disputes, money decrees and in respect of such

other various cases and has disapproved the same and held that the

High Courts could not in a routine manner entertain petitions under

Article 227.

SLP (c) No.20423 of 2025 Page 20 of 27 6.3.2 It has to be acknowledged that almost all civil suits would

involve disputed question of facts. The averment in plaint quite

often than not, raise controversy which, in ultimate analysis, is to

be addressed and adjudicated by leading evidence. As these are the

disputes of civil nature to be dealt with by the civil court, and the

invocation of Constitutional powers thereover in a routine manner

may not be necessary nor is advisable. This proposition, in its

analogousness, would justify holding that powers under Article

227 of the Constitution would not be available to be exercised

where there is an alternative remedy.

6.4 For the very above reasoning, the reliance placed on the

provision of Order VI Rule 16, CPC to support the impugned order

and to justify the exercise of powers under Article 227 of the

Constitution for striking out the plaint, is misconceived in law.

Order VI Rule 16, CPC deals with the question of striking out

pleadings, to provide that the Court may, at any stage of the

proceedings, order to be struck out or amended in any matter in

any pleading which is unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous, or

SLP (c) No.20423 of 2025 Page 21 of 27 vexatious or which may tend to prejudice or embarrass the fair trial

of the suit or which is otherwise an abuse of the process of Court.

6.4.1 Evidently, this provision deals with the striking out of a

part or a section of the pleading which suffers from any of the kinds

mentioned in the provision, such as unnecessary, scandalous,

frivolous, vexatious, prejudicial, embarrassing or delaying the fair

trial or abuse of the process of law. It would be stretching beyond

the logic of law to interpret and imply that Order VI Rule 16 can

be utilized and employed for striking down the entire plaint.

Striking down the plaint or rejection of plaint on the legal grounds

available in Order VII Rule 11, CPC is entirely different than

striking out the infirm or abusive pleadings. Under the guise of

invoking Order VI Rule 16, CPC, therefore, justification for using

the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot be

extended.

7. When the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution are

of supervisory nature and when the aforestated settled dictum of

law is that the High Court does not act as a court of appeal or a

SLP (c) No.20423 of 2025 Page 22 of 27 court of error, it would logically follow that the powers under

Article 227 would not be exercised when the non-exercise of such

powers does not result into miscarriage of justice or deprivation of

remedy in law to a party.

7.1 It is to be conceived as one of the prohibited area for

exercising Article 227 powers where, in respect of the grievance

for which party has remedy in law, these powers are surely to be

invoked. The principle is therefore to be emphasized that the

exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the

Constitution has to be treated as an exceptional resort when an

alternative efficacious civil remedy by way of appeal or revision

or any other, like Order VII Rule 11, CPC in the present case, is

available to the party for the redressal of the grievance.

7.2 The proposition that the availability of alternative remedy

shall be legitimately construed to displace the exercise of

Constitutional jurisdiction by the High Court, is true not only for

the purpose of exercising powers under Article 226 of the

SLP (c) No.20423 of 2025 Page 23 of 27 Constitution but also for the purpose of invoking Article 227 of the

Constitution.

7.3 In the garb of exercising supervisory jurisdiction under

Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court is not expected to

engulf the specific statutory remedy or provision in law and, thus,

become a supervisor over the court below or the tribunal, as the

case may be. It would be a legally wise exercise of discretion for

the High Court to adopt and adhere to such self-imposed discipline

and to insist that the aggrieved party should take recourse to such

alternative remedy or statutory provision available in law,

especially, for the case falling in category indicated in

Virudhunagar6 (supra) where remedy available in the CPC for

the cases falling under category/other law also, where such specific

statutory remedy is available, the dictum laid down herein is true

to grant extent.

7.4 As stated above, embargo in this regard would have to be

construed as near total when provision is available in CPC. It is

held, therefore, that once the specific provision under Order VII

SLP (c) No.20423 of 2025 Page 24 of 27 Rule 11 of the CPC, is available, the High Court cannot exercise

powers under Article 227 to reject or strike off the plaint. For such

relief, the specific provision under Order VII Rule 11, CPC, will

have to be resorted to, on the grounds mentioned in the said

provision.

8. In adopting such approach, the High Court would be giving

due regard to the legislative intent. When the legislature has

enacted specific remedial provision to be taken recourse to by the

person aggrieved to challenge the orders and decisions of the court

to seek redress in law accordingly that remedy alone will have to

be sought for.

9. From the aforesaid discussion, it would logically follow that

the High Court would not only discourage but desist from

exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution in

respect of a challenge for which a separate, distinct, and specific

remedy or statutory provision is available under the statute

concerned. Availability of an alternative civil remedy and/or under

the CPC shall be treated as complete and near total bar on the High

SLP (c) No.20423 of 2025 Page 25 of 27 Court to venture to invoke and exercise its power available under

Article 227 of the Constitution, except where exercise of

supervisory jurisdiction becomes absolutely necessary.

10. For all the aforesaid reasons and discussions, this court is of

the view that High Court committed a manifest error in exercising

its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution to strike down the

plaint. It ought to have asked the defendant to take recourse to, in

accordance with law, when specific provisions available in the

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the nature of Order VII Rule 11.

The impugned judgment and order of the High Court, therefore,

deserves to be set aside.

10.1 As a result, the judgment and order dated 03.06.2025 passed

by the High Court of Madras in CRP No. 3197 of 2024 and CMP

No. 17106 of 2024 striking off the plaint of Original Suit No. 93 of

2020 before the Court of District Munsif, Tambaram, is hereby set

aside.

11. The appeal is allowed. Consequently, the suit is restored to

its original file and parties are directed to appear before the trial SLP (c) No.20423 of 2025 Page 26 of 27 court for further proceedings on 16.02.2026 without awaiting

further notice. Liberty is reserved for the defendants to file

application under Order VII Rule 11, CPC, to be considered strictly

in accordance with law. There shall be no costs.

In view of the disposal of the main appeal, all interlocutory

applications, as may be pending, stand disposed of.

…………………………………..,J.

[ARAVIND KUMAR]

…………………………………..,J.

[ N.V. ANJARIA ] NEW DELHI;

03.02.2026.

SLP (c) No.20423 of 2025 Page 27 of 27