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P. Rammohan Rao vs K. Srinivas

Supreme Court13 February 2025Vikram Nath · Sanjay Karol

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

1. Where temporary appointments to posts are made under general service rules governing temporary appointments (Rule 10(a)(i) of the Andhra Pradesh Subordinate Service Rules), and the appointee continues uninterrupted in the post until regularisation of service in accordance with the rules, the period of officiating service shall be counted for determining seniority, notwithstanding that the initial appointment was not made by following the procedure prescribed by special rules for that service—provided the governing law, if any, for the service in question was absent at the time of appointment. 2. Temporary appointments that are characterized as such but are neither restricted by a fixed tenure nor conceived as stop-gap or ad-hoc arrangements, but rather are structured to ensure continuity and stability of workforce, fall under Proposition (B) of Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association v. State of Maharashtra. 3. Once the services of an employee are regularised, the ad-hoc or stop-gap nature of the appointment does not survive, and the employee becomes entitled to seniority from the date of initial appointment when other conditions of Proposition (B) are satisfied. 4. The doctrine of *functus officio* has no application to the rule-making power and administrative policy-making authority of the State; the State is not rendered functus officio by issuing a policy decision and may re-examine, revisit, and modify or revise that decision based on fresh consideration of facts and circumstances. 5. Where the State Government exercises its rule-making and administrative authority to modify or revise a prior policy decision concerning regularisation and seniority, there is no requirement under the principles of natural justice or audi alteram partem to afford a prior hearing to individuals who may be adversely affected by such policy revision, as doing so would paralyse governance and defeat the purpose of efficient policy implementation. 6. The principles of natural justice requiring prior notice and opportunity to be heard are not applicable to the exercise of rule-making power by the State Government where the nature of the action, its object and purpose, and the scheme of governance warrant their exclusion.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

2025 INSC 212 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2025 (Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 4036-4038 of 2024)

P. RAMMOHAN RAO .…APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

K. SRINIVAS AND ORS. ETC. ….RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2025 (Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 4596-4597 of 2024)

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2025 (Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). of 2025) (Diary No. 27613/2024)

JUDGMENT

Mehta, J.

Civil Appeals @ SLP(Civil) Nos. 4036-4038 of 2024 Civil Appeals @ SLP(Civil) Nos. 4596-4597 of 2024

1. Heard.

2. Leave granted.

3. These appeals take exception to the final judgment and Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by SONIA BHASIN Date: 2025.02.13 18:26:35 IST

common order dated 21st September, 2023 rendered by the High Reason:

1

CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad1 whereby the

Division Bench allowed the batch of writ petitions preferred by the

private respondents herein and quashed the Government Office

Memorandum2 No. 262, dated 17th June, 2006, issued by the

Government of Andhra Pradesh.

4. Facts in a nutshell relevant and essential for the disposal of

these appeals are as under.

5. The appellants who hold the qualification of B. Tech

(Bachelor of Technology) were selected and appointed as Work

Inspectors in the Andra Pradesh Scheduled Castes Cooperative

Development Corporation3 on 1st January, 1990 and were serving

in the said department. The Government of Andhra Pradesh issued

G.O.M. No. 89, dated 9th February, 1990, sanctioning posts of

Assistant Executive Engineers4 for achieving Phase-II of the

Andhra Pradesh Primary School Project5, which was initiated in

collaboration between the Government of Andhra Pradesh and the

Government of United Kingdom in the year 1983. The said project

1 Hereinafter, being referred to as the ‘High Court’. 2 Hereinafter, being referred to as the ‘G.O.M.’ 3 Hereinafter, being referred to as the ‘Corporation’. 4 Hereinafter, being referred to as ‘AEEs’.

5 To achieve the first objective 84 primary school building with improved designs were constructed in 11 selected project districts. In order to achieve phase-II of the project construction work needed to be entrusted to the Panchayat Raj Engineering department and to have a separate class of engineer’s staff for undertaking construction of buildings of primary schools and teachers’ centres.

2 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

was time-bound and hence, directions were issued by the

Government of Andhra Pradesh to the Chief Engineer, to fill up the

posts immediately from the list available with the Andra Pradesh

Public Service Commission6, and if the list was not adequate then

the Chief Engineer was permitted to recruit the candidates through

the employment exchange.

6. Since the list available with the APPSC was inadequate to fill

the posts required for the project, the Chief Engineer wrote to the

State Government, and in response thereof, G.O.M. No. 429, dated

6th March, 1990, was issued by the Panchayat Raj and Rural

Development Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh,

directing that these vacancies may be filled up from the Work

Inspector/Draughtsman/Tracers who were already serving in the

Panchayat Raj Department and possessed a graduation degree in

Engineering i.e. B.E./B.Tech. It was further clarified that the

nature of these appointments would be temporary under Rule

10(a)(i) of the Andra Pradesh Subordinate Service Rules7 pending

amendment to the Special Rules for Panchayat Raj Engineering

Services. The said G.O.M. also contained a direction to frame a

formula for the promotion of the above-mentioned candidates,

6 Hereinafter, being referred to as ‘APPSC’.

7 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘Service rules’.

3 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

taking into account the strength of cadre and the retirement

vacancies in the next two years as per the rules. A Committee was

also constituted to consider the proposal for temporary

appointments and for filling up the remaining vacancies.

7. Thereafter, another G.O.M. No. 540, dated 30th August, 1990

was issued by the Panchayat Raj and Rural Development

Department, whereby 386 posts of AEEs were sanctioned under

the Cyclone Emergency Reconstruction Project8. The appellants

herein and one individual who were already serving as Work

Inspectors were appointed as temporary AEEs on 5th December,

1992 against these vacancies. It is an undisputed fact that the

appellants herein and his peers were appointed against

substantiate vacancies created for the project.

8. Subsequently, the Andhra Pradesh (Regulation of

Appointments to Public Services and Rationalization of Staff

Pattern and Pay Structure) Act, 19949 came to be enacted on 15th

January, 1994 to streamline the recruitment process. The same

was made effective retrospectively from 25th November, 1993.

9. Thereafter, the G.O.M. No. 391, dated 30th June, 1994, came

to be issued by the Panchayat Raj and Rural Development

8 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘CERP’ 9 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘Act of 1994’.

4 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

Department, creating 729 posts of AEEs for taking up the works

related to rural water supply and sanitation10. Under the said

G.O.M., employment assurance scheme and employment

guarantee scheme were also created.

10. In July, 1994, the Technical Grade-I Inspectors filed Original

Application No. 533 of 1994 before the Andhra Pradesh

Administrative Tribunal,11 to consider their cases for appointment

as AEEs against the project based vacancies. The APAT vide order

dated 4th July, 1994 disposed of the O.A., wherein the State

Government was directed to consider the case of Work Inspectors

for appointment to the posts of AEE before notifying the vacancies

to employment exchange.

11. In compliance with the aforesaid direction passed by APAT,

G.O.M. No. 1289, dated 10th August, 1994, came to be issued by

the Panchayat Raj and Rural Development Department in relation

to the appointments under the ‘Jawahar Rojgar Yojana Scheme’,

permitting the Chief Engineer to fill up the vacancies of AEEs

which had been created by way of G.O.M. No. 391, dated 30th June,

1994, from eligible Work Inspector/Draughtsman/Tracers having

the requisite degree qualification. The aforesaid G.O.M. No. 1289

10 ‘Jawahar Rojgar Yojana Scheme’.

11 Hereinafter, being referred to as ‘APAT’.

5 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

contained a specific stipulation that the candidates would be

appointed temporarily subject to the condition that they should

make an endeavour of selection through the APPSC, failing which,

they would be reverted back to their original cadre of Work

Inspector/Draughtsman/Tracers.

12. AEEs appointed under Rule 10(a)(i) of the Service Rules from

the category of Work Inspector/Draughtsman/Tracers and the

candidates, who were selected from the list tendered by the

employment exchange between 2nd August, 1989 to 30th June,

1995, made several representations requesting the State

Government to regularize their services as most of them had

completed more than five years in service.

13. In 1995, Notification No. 8 of 1995 came to be issued by the

APPSC inviting applications from eligible candidates for

appointment in various posts including that of AEEs in the

Panchayat Raj Department. The recruitment process for the

aforesaid appointment was to be conducted under the Act of 1994.

The aspiring candidates appeared in the test conducted by the

APPSC and as many as 627 posts were filled and the successful

candidates including the private respondents herein were

appointed in the year 1997, upon due selection by APPSC.

6 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

14. Being aggrieved by the non-consideration of their

representations for regularisation, the temporary AEEs (including

the appellants herein), who had been appointed between the years

1990-1995, filed Original Application No. 5730 of 1995 and batch

matters before the APAT, seeking regularisation of their services as

they had been working on a temporary basis for several years. The

APAT, vide order dated 19th February, 1996, disposed of these

O.A.s, directing the State Government to take a decision regarding

the claim of regularisation of services of temporarily appointed

AEEs within a reasonable time. The APAT, further, directed that

till such decision was taken, the services of the applicants therein

shall not be terminated.

15. In compliance with the above direction, G.O.M. No. 997,

dated 27th July, 1996, was issued by the State Government

rejecting the prayer seeking regularisation of the temporarily

appointed AEEs with the observation that there was no provision

in the extant service rules for recruitment to the post of AEEs by

promotion.

16. Aggrieved by the aforesaid G.O.M., the temporary AEEs, who

were appointed between 1990-1995, again approached the APAT

7 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

via various Original Applications12. Initially, a stay was granted by

the APAT vide order dated 10th August, 1996, suspending the

operation of G.O.M. No. 997, dated 27th July, 1996, and a direction

was issued to the State Government, not to notify the vacancies

occupied by the applicants therein for the purpose of

selection/appointment.

17. In the meantime, and during the pendency of the aforesaid

Original Applications13, the Government issued another G.O.M.

No. 234 dated 27th June, 2005, whereby the services of all

temporary AEEs appointed between 1990-1995 and continuing in

service on that date were regularised. It was further clarified that

the services of all the temporary AEEs, who were appointed

between the years 1990-1995, shall be regularized below the last

regularly selected candidate of AEEs.

18. Pursuant to the issuance of the aforesaid G.O.M., the

pending Original Applications filed before the APAT were dismissed

as withdrawn vide order dated 13th December, 2006, and liberty

was granted to the applicants therein to work out their remedies,

if they were still aggrieved after the issuance of G.O.M. No. 234.

12 O.A. No. 4991 of 1996, O.A. No. 5547 of 1996, O.A. No. 4427 of 1997 and batch matters. 13 Id.

8 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

19. Though satisfied with the regularisation of their services, but

aggrieved by the denial of seniority under the G.O.M. No. 234,

AEEs appointed between 1990-1992, including the appellants

herein, made various representations to the State Government,

claiming that they were appointed before the promulgation of the

Act of 1994, and thus they were required to be treated as a different

class from those appointed between 1993-1995, which was after

the promulgation of Act of 1994. It was asserted that G.O.M. No.

234, had caused significant prejudice and injustice as the

Engineers appointed between 1990-1992 had been placed below

the AEEs appointed during the year 1997 in the order of seniority,

who had thereby lost nearly 10-15 years of continuous service. The

State Government was requested to regularize the services of this

category of AEEs appointed between 1990-1992 from the date of

joining the posts.

20. The State Government, after examining the representations

and the prolonged service of the temporary AEEs appointed

between the years 1990-1992, modified G.O.M. No. 234, dated 27th

June, 2005, and issued a revised G.O.M. No. 262, dated 17th June,

2006, which inter alia provided that: -

“5. Accordingly, in partial modification of the orders issued in the G.O. 1st read above, the Government hereby directs the

9 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

Engineer-in-Chief, Panchayat Raj, Hyderabad to regularize the services of the Assistant Executive Engineers who were appointed during the period 1990-92 below the last regular Assistant Executive Engineer appointed through Andra Pradesh, Public Service Commission prior to the promulgation of Act, 2/94.” (emphasis supplied)

21. In effect, the above G.O.M. directed that the temporary AEEs

appointed before promulgation of the Act of 1994 would retain their

seniority from the date of their initial induction on the posts.

22. Being aggrieved by the issuance of the revised G.O.M. No. 262,

dated 17th June, 2006, the AEEs regularly appointed through the

APPSC Notification No. 8 of 1995, i.e., the private respondents

herein, who had joined service in the year 1997 and also, the AEEs

appointed on a temporary basis between 1993-1995, filed Original

Applications14 before the APAT. In these batches of Original

Application, the State Government filed an affidavit specifically

asserting that the appointments made between 1990-1992 were

not de hors the service rules and there was no requirement of

selection on these posts through the APPSC as the same were

exempted from the purview of the Commission (APPSC).

14 O.A. No. 5818/2009, O.A. No. 10733/2009, O.A. No. 5933/2009, O.A. No. 6020 of 2009

and batch matters.

10 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

23. Vide a common order dated 3rd February, 2011, the APAT

dismissed the Original Applications15 preferred by the 1997 Batch

regularly appointed candidates (private respondents herein) and

allowed the Original Applications16 preferred by the temporary

AEEs selected between 1993-1995. The APAT, while upholding the

validity of G.O.M. No. 262, dated 17th June, 2006, also held that

the temporary AEEs appointed between 1993-1995 were also

entitled to a similar treatment as extended to those appointed

between 1990-1992 and that the candidates regularly appointed

through APPSC in 1997 (private respondents herein) could not

claim seniority over the candidates whose regularisation was done

in the year 2005.

24. The 1997 batch regularly appointed candidates (private

respondents herein) assailed the common order dated 3rd

February, 2011 passed by the APAT by filing writ petitions17 before

the High Court. These writ petitions came to be allowed by the

learned Division Bench vide final judgment and common order

15 O.A. No. 5018/2006, O.A. No. 5109/2006, O.A. No. 5789/2006, O.A. No. 6394/2006, O.A.

No. 6423/2007, O.A. No. 1892/2010 and O.A. No. 4056/2010. 16 O.A. No. 5818/2009, O.A. No. 5933/2009, O.A. No. 6020/2009, O.A. No. 6023/2009, O.A.

No. 6038/2009, O.A. No. 10733/2009 and O.A. No. 10897/2009. 17 Writ Petition Nos. 3903, 3910, 3954, 4173, 4434, 4435, 4437, 4439, 4441 and 22422 of

2011.

11 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

dated 21st September, 2023 which is subjected to challenge in

these appeals by special leave.

Submissions on behalf of the appellants: -

25. Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants

advanced the following pertinent submissions assailing the

impugned judgment: -

(a) That the appellants hold the qualification of Bachelor in

Engineering. They were duly selected and appointed as Work

Inspectors on 1st January, 1990 in the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled

Castes Co-operative Development Corporation against a

sanctioned post.

(b) That the State Government felt an imminent need for

qualified engineers to carry out the Cyclone Emergency

Reconstruction Project (CERP) in the year 1990. The Panchayat

Raj Department issued G.O.M. No. 540, dated 30th August, 1990,

sanctioning another 386 posts of AEEs under the CERP. At that

point in time, no rules were in place for the appointment of

Engineers in the Panchayat Raj Department. To meet the

exigency, the appellants and one other who were already serving

as Works Inspectors in the Cooperative Department Corporation

were appointed as temporary AEEs under Rule 10(a)(i)(1) of

12 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

Andhra Pradesh State and Subordinate Service Rules vide order

dated 5th December, 1992. Their appointment was in no manner

de hors the rules or a backdoor appointment.

(c) That no challenge was ever laid by the private respondents to

the G.O.M. No. 234 dated 27th June, 2005, vide which the services

of the appellants and other similarly situated candidates were

regularized and thus, the same has attained finality. He urged that

the services of the appellants and the similarly situated candidates

could not be regularized at an earlier point in time due to the need

for amendment of the Andhra Pradesh Panchayati Raj and Rural

Development Act/Rules and for the creation of a channel for the

absorption of the appellants and similarly placed persons. He

urged that the delay in amending the aforesaid rules cannot be

attributed to the appellants and they cannot be put to a

disadvantage for this reason by placing them below the last

regularly appointed employee selected after the promulgation of

the Act of 1994.

(d) That the appellants and the other similarly situated

candidates are of the 1990-1992 batch and have continued to

discharge their functions uninterruptedly for the last 31 years

while securing periodic promotions. If the impugned order is not

13 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

set aside, they would be placed below the regularly recruited batch

of 1997(private respondents herein) and thereby, they would lose

7 years of seniority. He further stated the appellants are due to

retire in January, 2026 and they will superannuate without

receiving the promotion to which they are rightfully entitled.

(e) The learned counsel tried to draw a clear distinction between

the G.O.M. No. 540, dated 30th August, 1990, vide which the

sanctioned posts under CERP were created and the appellants

were appointed as AEEs, and the G.O.M. No. 1289, dated 10th

August, 1994. He urged that G.O.M. No. 1289, which permitted

the department to fill up the further project-based vacancies to the

posts of AEEs, contained an express stipulation that the

candidates were being appointed temporarily, subject to the

condition that they should seek selection by APPSC, failing which,

they would be reverted as Work Inspectors, whereas, no such

condition existed in G.O.M. No. 540 dated 30th August, 1990.

(f) That though the terms of appointment would show that the

appointment of the appellants and the similarly situated

candidates was temporary, however, it was neither limited by time,

nor was it meant to be a stop-gap/ad hoc arrangement. He drew

the Court’s attention to the G.O.M. No. 391, dated 30th June, 1994,

14 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

which dealt with Jawahar Rozgar Yojana Scheme and urged that

this G.O.M. contained a clause providing that as and when the

Cyclone Emergency Reconstruction Project/Circles/Divisions are

abolished, the persons working in these Circles/Divisions/Sub-

Divisions shall be posted in newly sanctioned Circles and

Divisions. The posts that were sanctioned for the CERP in the

office of the Chief Engineer, CERP would stand abolished w.e.f.

30th June, 1994, but the staff would continue to attend the

residual work till the work is completed. He urged that there was

a clear intent on the part of the State Government while issuing

this G.O.M. that the persons working in the Sub-divisions created

under the CERP would be posted to new Circles/Divisions/Sub-

Divisions under the Panchayat Raj Department and thus, for all

practical purposes, the services of the appellants and his peers

who were appointed as AEEs under the CERP were to be absorbed

into the cadre of Panchayat Raj Department upon the completion

of the project.

(g) That the State Government had filed a counter affidavit in the

writ petitions18 filed before the Division Bench by the regularly

appointed 1997 batch recruits(private respondents herein)

18 Supra Note 16.

15 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

challenging the G.O.M. No. 262, dated 17th June 2006, wherein a

specific plea was taken that the appointments to the post of AEEs

made between 1990-92 were not de hors the service rules and at

that point of time, there was no requirement for these selections to

be made through the APPSC as the same were exempted from the

purview of the Commission (APPSC).

(h) That the Division Bench has passed the impugned order on

an erroneous assumption that once the State Government issued

G.O.M. No. 234 dated 27th June, 2005, it became ‘functus officio’

and could not have modified the same by re-examining the case of

the temporary employees appointed between 1990-1995 and

supersede the same by issuance of the G.O.M. No. 262, dated 17th

June, 2006. He submitted that the doctrine of ‘functus officio’ is

not applicable to administrative decisions based on policy

considerations and if such doctrine is made applicable to the rule-

making power of the Government, the administrative setup would

be virtually crippled. In this regard, he placed reliance on Rule 25

of the Andhra Pradesh State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1996,

and the judgment of this Court in Orissa Administrative

Tribunal Bar Association v. UOI19.

19 (2023) SCC OnLine SC 309.

16 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

(i) That the reasoning given by the Division Bench for quashing

the G.O.M. No. 262, dated 17th June, 2006, vide which the benefit

was given to the temporary appointees (including the appellants

herein) that the same was issued without hearing the affected

persons i.e. the writ petitioners(private respondents herein) is ex-

facie misplaced. He urged that there is no requirement in law for

issuance of notice to the set of employees likely to be affected where

the Government takes a policy decision of conferring the benefit of

regularisation and fixing the date from which the seniority is to be

reckoned for a particular set of employees.

(j) That neither was the State Government denuded of the power

to amend the earlier G.O.M. nor was there any requirement of

hearing the candidates likely to be affected by the revised G.O.M.

before its issuance thereof. He urged that the rule-making power

of the State Government cannot be curtailed by the principle of

‘Audi alteram partem’ because such a view would virtually bind the

hands of the State Government, and it would lose the right to

exercise the rule-making power. In this regard, he placed reliance

on Patel Engg. Ltd. v. Union of India20.

20 (2012) 11 SCC 257.

17 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

(k) That the G.O.M. No. 262 was passed in consonance with the

extant rules and the procedural requirements. The representations

filed by the appellants and his peers pursuant to the issuance of

G.O.M. No. 234, dated 27th June, 2005, were objectively

considered by the State Government, and a well-considered

equitable policy decision was taken to count the services of the

candidates appointed between 1990-92 from the date of their

initial induction in service as temporary AEEs and as a sequel

thereto, the appellants were assigned seniority from the said date.

(l) That the instant case falls under Proposition(B) enumerated

by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Direct

Recruit Class II Engg. Officers’ Association v. State Of

Maharashtra21, which lays down that “If the initial appointment is

not made by following the procedure laid down by the rules but the

appointee continues in the post uninterruptedly till the

regularisation of his service in accordance with the rules, the period

of officiating service will be counted.” He urged that no rules were

in force in the Panchayat Raj Department when the appellants

were appointed. They continued in his post till regularisation in

2005, and thus, the period of the temporary service (i.e. from 1990

21 (1990) 2 SCC 715.

18 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

to 2005) of the appellants before the regularisation, has to be

counted for determining their seniority.

He concluded his submissions by urging that the impugned

judgment has disturbed the settled seniority of the cadre posts

which has been in vogue for the past two decades, and as a result,

the appellants are placed below the private respondents who are

more than seven years junior to them at the fag end of their career

and thus, deserves to be set aside.

26. Learned senior counsel representing the State Government

has supported the submissions advanced by the learned counsel

for the appellants.

On these grounds, learned counsel appearing for the

appellants and the State implored the Court to allow the appeals,

set aside the impugned judgment passed by the Division Bench,

and restore the judgment passed by the Tribunal (APAT).

Submissions on behalf of the private respondents:

27. E-converso, learned senior counsel representing the private

respondents strenuously supported the impugned judgment. He

advanced the following submissions:-

(a) That the respondents were appointed as AEEs in 1997 after

undergoing a regular selection process in pursuance of Notification

19 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

No. 8 of 1995, dated 8th December, 1995 issued by APPSC. On the

other hand, the appellants and other similarly situated candidates

were appointed as AEEs purely on a temporary basis during 1990-

1995, either on promotion, on recruitment by transfer or were

sponsored by the employment exchange.

(b) That the appellants and other similarly situated employees

were neither appointed with due adherence to any selection

procedure nor was their appointment made in accordance with any

service rules. He urged that the appellants were not even borne in

the cadre as on the date on which the respondents were regularly

selected as AEEs in the Panchayat Raj Department and thus, the

respondents who were directly recruited through APPSC are

entitled to be placed above the appellants and other similarly

situated temporary AEEs in the order of seniority.

(c) That the APPSC published Notification No. 4 of 1990 calling

for applications from all persons aspiring to be appointed as AEEs

on a regular basis. Further, a second opportunity was given vide

another Notification No. 8 of 1995 calling for applications for

regular selection on the post of AEEs. He thus urged that sufficient

opportunities were given to the appellants and similarly situated

20 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

persons to get appointed via the direct recruitment process

conducted by the APPSC, but they did not avail of the same.

(d) That vide G.O.M. No. 234, dated 27th June, 2005, a final

decision was taken and the services of the appellants and other

similarly situated employees were regularized. However, they were

rightly directed to be placed below the last regularly selected

candidate appointed through APPSC. He submitted that this

G.O.M. was a final policy decision taken by the State Government,

since it was issued after duly taking into consideration the

recommendations of the Cabinet Sub-Committee and the General

Administration Department and also the fact that the appellants

and other similarly situated candidates had rendered more than

10 years of uninterrupted service and were working against the

sanctioned posts.

(e) The learned senior counsel appearing for the private

respondents fairly submitted that the decision to regularise the

services of the appellants and other similarly situated candidates

was justified. He, however, urged that once a final decision had

been taken and orders were passed with respect to seniority vide

G.O.M. No. 234, the State Government became functus officio and

21 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

could not have re-examined and re-opened the issue of seniority

on the basis of representation made by the affected parties.

(f) That vide the revised G.O.M. No. 262, dated 17th June, 2006,

one set of the employees who were appointed between 1990 and

1992(including the appellants herein) were placed above the

respondents in the seniority list. He urged that the revised G.O.M.

was issued without affording an opportunity of hearing to the

respondents herein as no notice was given to them before taking a

decision adversely affecting their seniority, which is in utter

violation of principles of natural justice and thus, the same was

rightly struck down by the Division Bench.

(g) That the factors forming the basis for the issuance of the

revised G.O.M. No. 262 were evidently within the knowledge of the

State Government at the time of issuing the earlier G.O.M. No. 234.

However, no sufficient explanation has been offered by the State

Government as to why these critical considerations were

overlooked during the formulation of the earlier G.O.M., thereby

necessitating the subsequent revision.

(h) That the instant case falls under the corollary drawn to

Proposition(A) enumerated by the Constitution Bench of this Court

in the case of Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers’

22 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

Association(supra), which lays down that “where the initial

appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules and made as

a stop-gap arrangement, the officiation in such post cannot be taken

into account for considering the seniority.” He urged that the initial

appointment of the appellants and the similarly situated persons

to the post of AEEs was ad-hoc and not according to the rules

prevailing in the Panchayat Raj Department, and thus, the period

of temporary service (i.e. from 1990 to 2005) rendered by the

appellants prior to their regularisation cannot be counted for

determining the seniority.

He concluded his submissions by urging that granting

seniority to the appellants over and above the respondents is

totally unconstitutional and de hors the rules, and, therefore, the

High Court was wholly justified in quashing the revised G.O.M. No.

262. He urged that the view taken by the Division Bench of the

High Court is unassailable in the eyes of law and hence, the

appeals merit rejection.

28. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the

submissions advanced at the bar and have gone through the

impugned judgment along with the material placed on record.

23 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

Discussion and Conclusion:

29. A few important facts which are not in dispute and require

mention for the adjudication of the present appeals are noted

below:-

(i) The appellants and his peers were holding the qualification

of B.E/B. Tech and were regularly appointed in the year 1990 as

Work Inspectors in the Andhra Pradesh Schedules Castes

Cooperative Development Corporation.

(ii) Vide G.O.M. No. 540, dated 30th August, 1990, the State

Government sanctioned 386 posts of AEEs under the Cyclone

Emergency Reconstruction Project (CERP) of the Panchayat Raj

Department with a purpose to carry out the project-based

reconstruction of the infrastructure including schools, etc., which

had been destroyed in a cyclone. The appellants and one similarly

placed candidate were transferred from the Corporation and came

to be appointed as Assistant Executive Engineers (AEEs) on a

temporary basis in the said project vide order dated 5th December,

1992. The relevant portion of the appointment order is extracted

below: -

“1. In pursuance of the orders issued in G.O. 3rd, 4th, and 6th cited and basing on the recommendation of the Committee, the candidates annexed to this order who were appointed as Work Inspector/Draughtsman, Tracer in S.C. Corporation, Tribal Welfare Department, weaker Section, Housing Scheme under

24 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

Social Welfare Department and Panchayati Raj Engineering Department and possessing graduate qualification in engineering are hereby appointed as Temporary Assistant Executive Engineers in the zones mentioned against their names in the annexure I to IV in A.P.P.R.E.S. against the posts sanctioned under Cyclone reconstruction Project (CERP) sanctioned in G.O. 1st cited 2nd cited under rule 10(a)(i)(1) of the General Rules for state and Sub Ordinate services in the scale of pay of Rs. 1,330-60-1, 980-70-275/ with usual allowances as admissible under the rules from the actual date of joining and allotted to Chief Engineer (CERP) P.R. Hyderabad.

2. The appointment referred to in para (1) above is purely temporary and does not confer any right for regular appointment or otherwise liable to be terminated at any time without prior notice or intimation and without assigning any reasons therefore, since the project is temporary.”

Thus, it is clear that a specific reference was given while

taking the decision for these temporary appointments, that the

said appointments were being made under Rule 10(a)(i) of the

General Rules for State and Subordinate services i.e., Andhra

Pradesh Subordinate Service Rules. In this background, there is

no dispute that the appellants were appointed as AEEs against the

regularly sanctioned posts albeit on a temporary basis.

(iii) The private respondents were appointed as AEEs in 1997,

after undergoing the regular selection process through APPSC in

accordance with the Act of 1994.

(iv) The appellants and similarly situated employees continued to

serve as AEEs in the Panchayat Raj Department for almost 13

years before their prayer for regularisation was favourably 25 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

considered by the State Government vide G.O.M. No. 234, dated

27th June, 2005. However, this G.O.M contained a stipulation that

the services of all temporary AEEs (including the appellants herein)

appointed between 1990-1995 would be placed below the last

regularly selected candidate of AEEs in terms of seniority. This

G.O.M. further directed that all the temporary appointments made

between 1990-1995 and continuing on that date, shall be excluded

from the purview of APPSC under the proviso to clause 3 of Article

320 of the Constitution of India. Aggrieved by the denial of

seniority and being placed below the private respondents, the

appellants and others filed various representations to the State

Government contending that the AEEs appointed during 1990-

1992, i.e., before the promulgation of the Act of 1994, and those

appointed between 1993-1995, i.e., after the enactment of the Act,

should not be treated at par. They asserted that these groups were

in different legal classes and could not be merged as directed in

G.O.M. No. 234. Additionally, they claimed that significant

injustice had been done to the AEEs appointed between 1990-

1992, who were made junior to AEEs appointed in 1997, thus

losing nearly 10-15 years of continuous service. As a result, they

26 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

would retire without the chance of receiving even a single

promotion during their entire service tenure.

(v) These representations were considered and accepted by the

State Government, leading to partial modification of the earlier

G.O.M No. 234 and issuance of a revised G.O.M No. 262, dated

17th June, 2006, wherein the State Government introduced a

classification amongst temporarily appointed AEEs based on their

dates of appointment with reference to the promulgation of Act of

1994. The classification divided the AEEs into two groups: those

appointed between 1990-1992 and those appointed between 1993-

1995. The revised G.O.M. further stipulated that the temporary

AEEs appointed between 1990-1992 would be placed below the

last regular AEE appointed through the APPSC, prior to the

enactment of the Act of 1994.

(vi) The reason assigned by the State Government for this

modification and sub-classification (i.e. one group of AEEs

appointed between 1990-1992 and the other between 1993-1995),

was that the temporary AEEs in the first group had put in 10 years

of interrupted service including the services in the feeder cadre of

Work Inspector/Draftsmen/Tracer before their appointment as

temporary AEEs. The significant delay in considering their prayer

27 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

for regularisation in the Panchayat Raj Department was

attributable to the fact that the Government could not amend the

service rules as per G.O.M. No. 429, dated 6th March, 1990, to take

up the regularisation of the temporary AEEs. Therefore, one of the

crucial factors in the decision to issue the revised G.O.M. No. 262

was the Government's inaction in amending the service rules, as

required by G.O.M. No. 429.

(vii) The decision to regularize the services of the appellants and

other similarly situated candidates, appointed as temporary AEEs

between 1990 and 1995, taken by the State Government vide

G.O.M. No. 234 dated 27th June 2005, remains unchallenged and

has, therefore, attained finality.

30. Thus, the Court finds merit in the appellants’ contention that

the delay in the regularisation of their service was attributable to

the need for amendments to the Andhra Pradesh Panchayati Raj

and Rural Development Rules, which were necessary to create a

channel for absorption into the cadre.

31. Seen thus, the fundamental issue that boils down for

consideration is: “Whether the period of officiating service of the

temporarily appointed AEEs between 1990-1992(including the

appellants herein) should be taken into account for considering

28 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

their seniority over and above the 1997 batch of regularly

appointed candidates through APPSC (private respondents

herein)”?

32. The Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Direct

Recruit Class II Engg. Officers' Association(supra), after

considering all the earlier decisions, summarized the legal position

with regard to the determination of seniority in service in para 47

of the judgment. For the purposes of the present controversy,

paras (A) and (B) of para 47 are relevant and are extracted

hereunder: -

“47. To sum up, we hold that:-

(A) Once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to rule, his seniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not according to the date of his confirmation.

The corollary of the above rule is that where the initial appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules and made as a stop-gap arrangement, the officiation in such post cannot be taken into account for considering the seniority.

(B) If the initial appointment is not made by following the procedure laid down by the rules but the appointee continues in the post uninterruptedly till the regularisation of his service in accordance with the rules, the period of officiating service will be counted.” (emphasis supplied)

33. The appellants contend that their case falls under Proposition

(B), while the private respondents argue that it aligns with the

corollary to Proposition (A). To resolve this dispute, two crucial

29 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

aspects must be examined: (i) the prevailing rules in the Panchayat

Raj Department, State of Andhra Pradesh, and (ii) whether the

appellants initial appointment was purely ad-hoc or a temporary

stop-gap arrangement.

34. It is undisputed that at the time of the appointment of the

appellants and other similarly placed candidates as AEEs between

the years 1990-1992, there was a vacuum in rules governing the

appointment of AEEs in the Panchayat Raj Department. To address

the project-based exigency, the appellants and one other were

appointed as temporary AEEs under Rule 10(a)(i)(1) of the General

Rules for State and Subordinate Services, i.e., Andhra Pradesh State

and Subordinate Service Rules. The relevant rule is extracted below:-

“10. TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT INCLUDING APPOINTMENTS BY DIRECT RECRUITMENT, RECRUITMENT/APPOINTMENT BY TRANSFER OR BY PROMOTION:

(a) Where it is necessary in the public interest to fill emergently a vacancy in a post borne on the cadre of a service, class or category and if the filling of such vacancy in accordance with the rules is likely to result in undue delay the appointing authority may appointing a person temporarily, otherwise than in accordance with the said rules, either by direct recruitment or by promotion or by appointment by transfer, as may be specified as the method of appointment in respect of the post, in the special rules.

…..

(i) Temporary posts requiring special qualifications. Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules or special rules, if and when, a temporary post is created as an addition

30 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

to the cadre of any service, class or category and the holder thereof is required by the State Government to possess such special qualifications, knowledge or experience, any person who possesses such qualifications, knowledge or experience and who is considered to be the most suitable person to discharge the duties, of such post may, irrespective of other considerations, be appointed temporarily to that post by the appointing authority; but the person so appointed shall not, by reason only of such appointment, be regarded as a probationer in such-service, class or category nor shall be acquire thereby any preferential right to future appointment to such service, class or category.”

35. Since there was a vacuum in the rules, it cannot be said that

these appointments were de hors the rules. Further, this Court

finds merit in the distinction drawn by the counsel for the

appellants between G.O.M. No. 540 dated 30th August, 1990 and

the later G.O.M. No. 1289 dated 10th August, 1994, both issued by

the Panchayat Raj Department. A careful comparison of the two

G.O.M’s highlight a significant difference in their terms and

conditions. G.O.M. No. 540, which created the sanctioned posts

for AEEs under CERP, did not include any clause making the

appointments conditional upon selection by the APPSC. There was

no provision for reversion to a lower position if the appointees were

not selected through a regular selection process conducted by the

APPSC. On the other hand, G.O.M. No. 1289, issued on 10th

August, 1994, explicitly provided that the appointments were

temporary and subjected the appointees to the rigor of selection

31 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

through the APPSC or else face reversion. It stipulated that the

candidates who were not selected through APPSC, they would be

reverted to the position of Work Inspectors. This clause made it

clear that the appointments under G.O.M. No. 1289 were

temporary and contingent upon selection through the APPSC, a

stipulation that was notably missing in G.O.M. No. 540. The

absence of such a condition in G.O.M. No. 540 indicates that the

appointments under that order were not of a temporary or

conditional nature as those made under G.O.M. No. 1289.

36. Also, upon a perusal of G.O.M. No. 391, dated 30th June

1994, concerning the Jawahar Rozgar Yojana Scheme, it is

apparent that the State Government had a specific and

unequivocal intent to retain the services of individuals posted

under the CERP Circles/Divisions, since, this G.O.M specifically

directed that upon abolition of the CERP Circles/Divisions, the

personnel temporarily appointed under the project(s) would be

reassigned to the newly sanctioned Circles and Divisions,

underscoring the Government's intent to maintain employment

and continuity of service. The relevant extract from G.O.M. No. 391

is reproduced hereinbelow: -

“10. As and when the Cyclone Emergency Reconstruction Project Circles/ Divisions are abolished, the persons working in

32 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

these circles/ Divisions shall be posted to the new circles and divisions. The sub-divisions attending to cyclone Emergency Reconstruction Project Works shall stand abolished w.e.f. 30.6.1994 A.N. and the persons working in these Sub-Divisions shall be posted to New Circles/ Divisions Sub-divisions now sanctioned.

11. The posts which were sanctioned for Cyclone Emergency Reconstruction Project works in the office of Chief Engineer (CERP) shall also stand abolished w.e.f. 30.6.94 A.N. but the staff in O/o Chief Engineer (RWS) sanctioned in this order will continue to attend to the residual work if any of the C.E.R.P. till the work is completed.”

37. Thus, this Court is of the view that, notwithstanding the

designation of the appointments of the appellants and similarly

situated candidates as being temporary, such appointments were

neither restricted by a fixed tenure nor conceived as a stop-gap or

ad-hoc arrangement. While characterized as temporary, these

appointments were not intended to address a transient or interim

requirement, rather, they were structured to ensure continuity and

stability within the workforce.

38. Further, it is an admitted fact that the services of the

appellants and other similarly situated candidates employed

between 1990-1995 were regularised vide G.O.M. No. 234, dated

27th June, 2005, which was not challenged before any forum and

has attained finality. It is trite that once the services of employee(s)

are regularised, the ad-hoc or stop-gap nature of the appointment

does not survive. In this regard, we may gainfully refer to Santosh

33 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

Kumar v. State of A.P.22, wherein, while dealing with a similar

issue and the self-same service rules, this Court upheld the

regularisation of services of temporary employees with

retrospective effect and granted them seniority from the date of

initial appointment holding that their case falls under

Proposition(B) of Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers’

Association(supra). The relevant extract of the said judgment is

as follows:-

“10. …………. The respondent and others were appointed as Sub- Inspectors out of seniority looking to the outstanding merit and record prior to the direct recruits like the appellant. Their services were admittedly regularised by relaxing the Service Rules in the exercise of power available under Rule 47 of the General Rules. The appellant did not challenge the validity of Rule 47 and no mala fides were established against the authorities in exercise of powers of relaxation under the said Rule. The Tribunal has recorded a finding that the Rule relating to the method of recruitment was not relaxed but only the conditions which had to be fulfilled for the purpose of promotion to the category of Sub- Inspector were relaxed; this finding is not disturbed by the High Court; there was no relaxation as to the basic qualification; the State Government regularised the services of the respondent and others with retrospective effect from the date they were temporarily appointed as Sub-Inspectors (OSSIs). It is also not disputed that they continued in service uninterruptedly for about 12-13 years till their services were regularised with retrospective effect. This being the factual position it could not be said that the corollary to para 47(A) of the aforementioned Constitution Bench judgment applies to the facts of the present case. Once their services were regularised it cannot be contended that their initial appointment was only on ad hoc basis and not according to the rules and made as a stopgap arrangement. On the other hand, para 47(B) supports the case of the respondent.” (emphasis supplied)

22 (2003) 5 SCC 511.

34 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

39. Similarly, this Court in Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra v.

State of Orissa and Ors.23, while dealing with a similar issue of

grant of seniority to ad-hoc employees upon regularisation with

effect from the date they were appointed on an ad-hoc basis

especially when the ad-hoc appointment had continued without

any interruption till their regularisation, answered it in the

affirmative observing thus:-

“68. Appearing for the State of Orissa, Mr Nageswara Rao contended that grant of seniority to ad hoc Assistant Engineers regularised under the legislation w.e.f. the date they were appointed on ad hoc basis was legally permissible especially when the ad hoc appointments had continued without any interruption till their regularisation. ………. The case at hand, according to the learned counsel, fell under Proposition B formulated in the said decision. Grant of seniority from the date of initial appointments did not, therefore, suffer from any constitutional or other infirmity to warrant interference from this Court.

69. Mr Shishodia appearing for some of the parties, on the other hand, contended that seniority could be granted only from the date of regularisation under the enactment and not earlier. The learned counsel for some of the interveners adopted that contention, including Ms Aishwarya appearing for some of the diploma-holder Junior Engineers and urged that ad hoc service rendered by the Engineers appointed otherwise than in accordance with the rules could not count for the purposes of seniority and that even if Section 3(1) of the Validation Act was held to be valid, Section 3(2) which gave retrospective seniority from the date they were first appointed on ad hoc basis must go.

……..

71. There was some debate at the Bar whether the case at hand is covered by corollary to Proposition A or by Proposition B (supra). But having given our consideration to the submissions at the Bar we are inclined to agree with Mr Rao's submission that the case at hand is more

23 (2014) 4 SCC 583.

35 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

appropriately covered by Proposition B extracted above. We say so because the initial appointment of ad hoc Assistant Engineers in the instant case was not made by following the procedure laid down by the Rules. Even so, the appointees had continued in the posts uninterruptedly till the Validation Act regularised their service. There is, in the light of those two significant aspects, no room for holding that grant of seniority and other benefits referred to in Section 3(3) of the impugned Act were legally impermissible or violated any vested right of the in-service Assistant Engineers appointed from any other source.

72. Proposition A, in our opinion, deals with a situation where an incumbent is appointed to a post according to the rules but the question that arises for determination is whether his seniority should be counted from the date of his appointment or from the date of his confirmation in the said service. The corollary under Proposition A, in our opinion, deals with an entirely different situation, namely, where the appointment is ad hoc and made as a stop-gap arrangement in which case officiation in such post cannot be taken into consideration for seniority. Be that as it may, as between Propositions A and B the case at hand falls more accurately under Proposition B which permits grant of seniority w.e.f. the date the appointees first started officiating followed by the regularisation of their service as in the case at hand.

……

78. Having said so, there is no reason why a similar direction regarding the writ petitioners degree-holder Junior Engineers who have been held by us to be entitled to regularisation on account of their length of service should also not be given a similar benefit……….

(emphasis supplied)

40. Applying these precedents to the facts of the case at hand, we

are of the firm view that the case of the appellants clearly falls

under Proposition(B) of the Direct Recruit Class II Engg.

Officers’ Association(supra) as there were no selection rules in

force in the Panchayat Raj Department for appointment of AEEs at

36 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

the time of appointment of the appellants as temporary AEEs

which was in the year 1992. These appointments though termed

temporary, were not bound in a fixed tenure and were not stop-

gap or ad-hoc in nature. The appellants worked uninterruptedly on

the same post till the regularisation of their service vide G.O.M No.

234 dated 27th June, 2005.

41. The Division Bench of the High Court gave imprimatur to the

contention of the private respondents (the regularly appointed

candidates of the 1997 batch), that the issuance of G.O.M. No.

234, dated 27th June 2005, rendered the State Government

‘functus officio’, thereby precluding it from both revisiting or

reopening the matter and issuing the revised G.O.M. No. 262,

dated 17th June 2006. Consequently, the Division Bench allowed

the writ petitions filed by the private respondents herein and

quashed the revised G.O.M., observing as follows in Para 29 of the

impugned judgment:

“29………After taking a final decision, the State Government could not have re-examined the case of the contesting respondents, and that too, only for such of those contesting respondents who were appointed during 1990-92, on the ground that they were appointed prior to the promulgation of Act 2 of 1994. When the State Government has taken a final decision in G.O.Ms.No.234, it becomes functus officio and hence, it could not have touched the same by re-examining the case of the contesting respondents and granted relief by issuing G.O.Ms. No.262 dt. 17-06-2006 contrary to the findings recorded in the earlier G.O.…….”

37 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

42. It cannot be disputed that the rule-making power of the

legislature cannot be curtailed or nullified by application of the

concept of functus officio. The principle of functus officio normally

applies to a judicial forum or a quasi-judicial authority and would

have no application to the rule-making authority which is within

the domain of the State Government by virtue of Article 245 of the

Constitution of India.

43. This Court in the case of Orrisa Administrative Tribunal

Bar Associations(supra), while dealing with the application of the

doctrine of ‘functus officio’ to the sphere of the administrative

decision-making by the State and its impact on the policy

decisions, observed that “if the doctrine of ‘functus officio’ were to

be applied to the sphere of administrative decision-making/rule-

making power of the State, the executive power would be virtually

crippled and the State would find itself paralyzed, unable to

change or reverse any policy or policy-based decision and its

functioning would be brought to a grinding halt. The relevant

extract from the said judgment is as follows:

“113. Turning to the present case, the appellants' argument that the Union Government was rendered functus officio after establishing the OAT does not stand scrutiny. The decision to establish the OAT was administrative and based on policy considerations. If the doctrine of functus officio were to be applied to the sphere of administrative decision-making by the state, its executive power would be crippled. The state

38 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

would find itself unable to change or reverse any policy or policy-based decision and its functioning would grind to a halt. All policies would attain finality and any change would be close to impossible to effectuate.

114. This would impact not only major policy decisions but also minor ones. For example, a minor policy decision such as a bus route would not be amenable to any modification once it was notified. Once determined, the bus route would stay the same regardless of the demand for, say, an additional stop at a popular destination. Major policy decisions such as those concerning subsidies, corporate governance, housing, education, and social welfare would be frozen if the doctrine of functus officio were to be applied to administrative decisions.

This is not conceivable because it would defeat the purpose of having a government and the foundation of governance. By their very nature, policies are subject to change depending on the circumstances prevailing in society at any given time. The doctrine of functus officio cannot ordinarily be applied in cases where the government is formulating and implementing a policy.” (emphasis supplied)

44. Therefore, we are unable to concur with the reasoning

assigned by the High Court that the State Government became

functus officio after issuance of G.O.M. No. 234 dated 27th June,

2005 and could not have issued the revised G.O.M. No. 262 dated

17th June, 2006. The view so taken by the Division Bench is

untenable and ultra vires the Constitution of India.

45. Further, it is a well-settled principle of law that while

administrative actions and statutory rules that impact citizens’

rights are subject to judicial review, the notion that the State must

provide a prior hearing to affected individuals during the exercise

of its rule-making power is fundamentally flawed. In this regard,

39 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

we are benefitted by the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this

Court in the case of Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel24, wherein

it was held that:

“101..……….So far as the audi alteram partem rule is concerned, both in England and in India, it is well established that where a right to a prior notice and an opportunity to be heard before an order is passed would obstruct the taking of prompt action, such a right can be excluded. This right can also be excluded where the nature of the action to be taken, its object and purpose and the scheme of the relevant statutory provisions warrant its exclusion; nor can the audi alteram partem rule be invoked if importing it would have the effect of paralysing the administrative process or where the need for promptitude or the urgency of taking action so demands, as pointed out in Maneka Gandhi case [(1978) 1 SCC 248 : (1978) 2 SCR 621, 676] at p.

681. If legislation and the necessities of a situation can exclude the principles of natural justice including the audi alteram partem rule, a fortiori so can a provision of the Constitution, for a constitutional provision has a far greater and all-pervading sanctity than a statutory provision……..” (emphasis supplied)

46. In Patel Engg. Ltd.(supra), this Court held as follows:

“38. …….that there is no inviolable rule that a personal hearing of the affected party must precede every decision of the State..……”

47. We are also of the considered view that the reasoning

assigned by the High Court, in the impugned judgment that the

private respondents herein, as affected parties, were required to be

heard before the issuance of the revised G.O.M. No. 262 dated 17th

June 2006, is unsustainable and contrary to the established legal

24 (1985) 3 SCC 398.

40 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

principles. Such an interpretation by the Division Bench has far-

reaching and potentially disastrous implications. If the State

Government is compelled to afford an opportunity of hearing to

every individual or entity likely to be affected by its administrative

decision-making, it would effectively paralyze governance by

imposing an undue procedural roadblock. This would place the

State in a position where its rule-making authority would be

severely constricted, defeating the very purpose of efficient policy

implementation and undermining its ability to discharge its

administrative duties.

48. In the wake of the discussion made above, we answer the

issue in the affirmative and hold that the period of officiating

service (i.e. period between 1990 to 2005) of the appellants and the

batch of the AEEs appointed between 1990-1992 has to be

counted as regular service for determining the seniority, entitling

him/them to be placed above the 1997 batch of regularly

appointed candidates(private respondents herein) in the seniority

list. The State Government was fully justified in issuing the revised

G.O.M. No. 262 dated 17th June, 2006, which is unassailable in

the eyes of law.

41 CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP(CIVIL) NO(S). 4036-4038 OF 2024

49. Consequently, we are of the view that the impugned judgment

dated 21st September, 2023, is unsustainable in the eyes of the law

and thus, the same is quashed and set aside.

50. The appeals are allowed accordingly. No order as to costs.

51. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2025 (Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). _________ of 2025) (Diary No. 27613/2024)

52. Delay condoned.

53. Leave granted.

54. In terms of the judgment passed in Civil Appeals arising out

of SLP(Civil) No(s). 4036-4038 of 2024 and connected matters,

these appeals are disposed of accordingly.

55. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

……….………………….………………….J. (PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA)

………….………………………………….J. (SANDEEP MEHTA) NEW DELHI;

FEBRUARY 13, 2025.

42

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