P. Radhakrishnan vs Cochin Devaswom Board

2025 INSC 1183 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.11902 OF 2025 (@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.23740 OF 2023)

P. Radhakrishnan & Anr. …Appellant(s)

VERSUS

Cochin Devaswom Board & Ors. …Respondent(s)

JUDGMENT

K.V. Viswanathan, J.

1. Leave was granted in this matter on 09.09.2025.

2. The present appeal calls in question the judgment and

order dated 09.08.2023 passed by the High Court of Kerala at

Ernakulam in Writ Petition (C) No. 29089/2020. At the

commencement of the hearing, Mr. Gaurav Agrawal, learned

Senior Counsel, submitted that the appellants in terms of the Signature Not Verified

Ext.P3-Proceedings dated 16.09.2014 and Ext.P9-Notice Digitally signed by VISHAL ANAND Date: 2025.10.06 15:55:58 IST Reason:

dated 27.11.2020, shall pay the licence fee, at the rate of

Page 1 of 20 Rs.1,50,000/- per annum along with arrears to the first

respondent-Cochin Devaswom Board (hereinafter referred

to as the “Board”).

3. However, the grievance of the appellants is that the

further directions of the High Court have rendered them

worse off in their own writ petition. The further directions in

Para 53 of the judgment, which according to the appellant,

are beyond the scope of the writ petition and with which they

are seriously aggrieved are in the following terms:

“The 1st respondent Board shall take necessary steps to fix the licence fee in respect of the land covered by Exts.P13 to P16 orders, taking note of the law laid down by this Court in T. Krishnakumar [2022 (4) KLT 798: 2022 (5) KHC SN 8] and also the law laid down in this judgment, with notice to the 2nd petitioner Chinmaya Mission Educational and Cultural Trust, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment.”

“In view of the facts noticed by this Court in paragraphs 36 and 37 of this judgment and also the stand taken by the 1st respondent Board before this Court that other than the copy of Exts.P13 to P16 orders, no other documents are seen in the relevant files, we deem it appropriate to direct the 1st respondent Board to conduct an enquiry by the Chief Vigilance Officer (Superintendent of Police), Cochin Devaswom Board in the matter relating to leasing out the

Page 2 of 20 land of Vadakkumnathan Devaswom to the 2nd petitioner Trust and take necessary action, if found necessary, based on the report of the Chief Vigilance Officer”

4. The appellants filed a writ petition on 21.12.2020 before

the High Court of Kerala praying for the following reliefs:

“a) call for the records of the case leading upto Exts. P3, P7 and P9 and quash the same by the issuance of writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ order or direction.

b) issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction staying all further proceedings pursuant to Exhibits P3, P7 and P9 proceedings.

and

c) Pass any other appropriate writ, order or direction which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit to issue and the petitioner may pray from time to time.”

5. Ext.P3 under challenge was the order of the first

respondent-Board dated 16.09.2014, enhancing the annual

license fee of the premises let out to the second appellant

from Rs.227.25/- per annum to Rs.1,50,000/- per annum.

Ext.P7 is the proceeding dated 02.05.2015 rejecting any

review of the order dated 16.09.2014 and further directing

the measurement of the property. Ext.P9 is the

communication dated 27.11.2020 demanding arrears totaling

Page 3 of 20 to Rs.20,46,788/- within 14 days of the receipt of the

communication.

6. To understand the grievance of the appellants before

the High Court, a brief reference to the facts of the case is

essential. The second appellant-Chinmaya Mission

Educational and Cultural Trust was established as a society

under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882. It functions under the

Central Chinmaya Mission Trust, Bombay, and is involved in

social, religious and cultural activities in Kerala for more than

half a century. By a Royal Order (Thittooram), the Maharaja

of Cochin, on the request of Swami Chinmayananda,

transferred the Rama Varma Bhajanamadam, a part of the

Bhuvaneswari temple and situated on the northern side of the

Swaraj Round, Thrissur, to the second appellant.

7. When matters stood thus, on 16.02.1974, the Board

allotted six cents of land adjacent to the Rama Varma

Bhajanamadam for constructing a hall subject to the

following conditions:

Page 4 of 20

“1. The hall constructed by the Mission should be used only for marriage and religious and cultural activities.

2. Accommodation to the tourist pilgrims coming to the Wadakunathan temple should be provided in the hall as per request of the Assistant Commissioner, Trichur free of rent.

3. For religious and cultural activities of the Devaswom Department the hall should be spared free of rent as per the request of the Assistant commissioner, Trichur.

4. The Mission will pay in the Wadakunnathan Devaswom an annual contribution of Rs. 101/- for the use of this site.

5. The Assistant Commissioner, Trichur should be an ex-

officio member, in the committee for the proper utilization and maintenance of the hall.

6. Space should be left at the northern end for providing a pathway of 12 ft wide for entrance from the Devaswom road to the remaining portion of the vacant space on the eastern side of the proposed site.

7. The Mission will provide compound wall on the northern and eastern sides of the site granted to them.

8. The Mission will execute proper agreement on stamp paper as advised by the Devasom Advocate.”

8. It will be noticed that for the site, an annual contribution

of Rs.101/- was fixed as use charges. On the site a hall was to

be constructed by the second appellant and was to be used

Page 5 of 20 only for marriage, religious and cultural activities. As part of

the consideration, in the hall, tourist pilgrims coming to the

Wadakunnathan temple should be provided accommodation

as per the request of the Assistant Commissioner free of rent.

Further, for religious and cultural activities of the Devaswom

Department, the hall should be spared free of rent as per the

request of the Assistant Commissioner. The Assistant

Commissioner was also to be an ex-officio member in the

committee for the proper utilisation and maintenance of the

hall. A twelve feet wide pathway was to be left at the

northern end for entrance from the Devaswom Road to the

remaining portion of the vacant site. Pursuant to the

proceedings dated 16.02.1974, an agreement of license

dated 19.07.1974 was executed incorporating the conditions

set out in the proceeding dated 16.02.1974.

9. By the proceeding dated 13.12.1974, on the request of

the second appellant for additional space, and on being

satisfied that the purpose for which the site was originally

allotted can be achieved only if some additional space is Page 6 of 20 allowed, a further extent of 2½ cents of land lying vacant on

the eastern side of the site already allotted, was allotted to

the second appellant. Consequently, fresh agreement of

license was executed on 25.03.1975. It is averred that the

license fee was revised from Rs.101/- per annum to Rs.142/-

per annum with the very same stipulations as contained in

the license agreement dated 19.07.1974. By proceeding

dated 09.12.1976, further four cents of land were allotted,

and by the proceeding dated 21.02.1977 a small bit of land

lying vacant on the eastern side was also sanctioned for the

second appellant and it was ordered that the license fee be

fixed on pro-rata basis.

10. The second appellant is in occupation of 13.5 cents of

land and is using the hall constructed by it for religious and

cultural purposes and for conducting marriages. According

to the appellants only few takers are available for the

marriage hall since there is no parking space and further that

the hall is not air-conditioned. Though the rent levied is

Rs.50,000/- per day for the marriages, very few marriages Page 7 of 20 numbering ten or fifteen per year are held and the second

appellant-Trust is running at a loss with its income being

compensated from the money generated from other units. It

is also averred that even now the hall is given free for the

programmes of the Board as and when requested.

11. The license fee was finally revised in the year 1977 to

Rs. 227.25/- per annum. According to the appellants, no

period for license having been fixed, the license continued

uninterruptedly.

12. At this stage, by proceeding dated 16.09.2014,

unilaterally and without affording any opportunity the license

fee was refixed at Rs.1,50,000/- with a direction that the

license fee shall be renewed every three years. The

appellants, by a letter dated 29.10.2014, sent a reply to the

proceedings dated 16.09.2014. In the reply, the appellants

set out that the order of 16.09.2014 was unauthorized, illegal

and against the terms of entrustment. It denied that the

second appellant was a profit-making institution. It conceded

that a reasonable hike was justified but questioned the Page 8 of 20 exorbitant hike to Rs.1,50,000/- per annum. It highlighted the

fact that after taking possession they had developed the

same and constructed a two-storey building with accessories

and provided furniture at their expense. They stated that the

hike was unilateral, and no notice was given to them and

prayed that the enhancement be dropped.

13. By its order of 07.02.2015, the Board declared that there

was no need for review of the orders hiking the license fee

charges to Rs.1,50,000/-. The Board further issued orders of

02.05.2015 and 27.11.2020, the details of which have been set

out hereinabove.

14. The first appellant filed Writ Petition (Civil) No.29089 of

2020 for the reliefs stated in the earlier portion of the order.

The second appellant was later impleaded as a party. It is in

the said writ petition that the order as extracted in para 3

above has come to be passed after the High Court found that

there was nothing illegal in the enhancement of the license

fee and the High Court upheld the proceedings dated

Page 9 of 20 26.09.2014, the order dated 02.05.2015 and the notice dated

27.11.2020.

15. The High Court, in the impugned order, was called upon

to decide on the validity of Ext.P3, P7 and P9. In the process

of adjudicating the validity, the High Court noticed that the

license fee issue was flagged by the local fund audit and the

local fund audit raised objection against the quantum of

license fee as originally fixed. The High Court observed that

there was no validity period fixed for the license and there

was no clause for periodic hike prior to the issuance of Ext.P3

order. The High Court saw the photographs of the property

in question. The High Court also made a detailed analysis of

the provisions of the Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious

Institutions Act, 1950 and dealt with the powers and duties of

a trustee.

16. The High Court, after perusal of the files in question and

the correspondence observed that the appellants themselves

had requested the Board to increase the fee to a reasonable

extent. After observing that the land was situated in a prime Page 10 of 20 locality, the High Court dealt with the judgment of T.

Krishnakumar v. Cochin Devaswom Board1 and in the end

analysis upheld the levy of Rs. 1,50,000/- per annum by

observing as follows: -

“52. In the above circumstances, we find no reason to interfere with Ext.P3 proceedings dated 26.09.2014 of the 1st respondent Board whereby the rate of licence fee of the property covered by Exts.P13 to P16 was enhanced from Rs.227.25 per annum to Rs.1.50 lakhs per annum; Ext.P7 proceedings dated 02.05.2015 of the Board whereby the stand taken in Ext.P5 letter dated 07.02.2015 not to review or reconsider the decision in Ext.P3 proceedings dated 26.09.2014 was intimated to the 2nd petitioner Trust; and Ext.P9 notice dated 27.11.2020 issued by the 2nd respondent Secretary of the Board, whereby the Trust was directed to remit a sum of Rs.20,46,788/- towards arrears of licence fee at the rate of Rs.1.50 lakhs per annum, penal interest and GST, within a period of 14 days.

53. In the result, this writ petition fails and the same is accordingly dismissed. It is for the 1st respondent Cochin Devaswom Board to recover the arrears of licence fee in terms of Ext.P3 proceedings dated 26.09.2014 and Ext.P9 notice dated 27.11.2020 by initiating appropriate proceedings, if found necessary, by initiating proceedings under the Revenue Recovery Act in terms of the G.O.(P)No.22/2021/RD dated 09.02.2021 published in Kerala Gazette Extra Ordinary No.668 dated 11.02.2021….”

17. In view of the statement of the learned Senior Counsel

for the appellants there is no need to discuss the correctness

of the reasons why the High Court upheld the enhancement

1 2022 (5) KHC SN 8

Page 11 of 20 of license fee. The learned Senior Counsel has fairly

submitted that the appellants are ready to deposit the license

fee as enhanced along with arrears as claimed inter alia in

the notice of 27.11.2020.

18. However, the appellants have been completely taken

by surprise with the High Court proceeding further and

directing fixation of the license fee in respect of the land in

question by applying the law laid down in T. Krishnakumar

(supra). Further, the High Court directed the first respondent

Board to conduct an inquiry through the Chief Vigilance

Officer with regard to the transaction between the Board and

the appellants and take necessary action based on the

report.

19. When the matter came up for admission, this Court on

30.10.2023 granted stay of operation of the order on

condition that the appellants deposit a sum of Rs.10,00,000/-

with the first respondent.

20. We are of the opinion that the High Court was not

justified in passing the directions extracted at Para 3 Page 12 of 20 hereinabove. The directions were far beyond the scope of

the writ petition. The appellants could not have been

rendered worse off in their own writ petition. What is more,

the directions have been made without putting the appellants

on notice.

21. A party invokes the jurisdiction of courts being

aggrieved by a certain course of action taken against him/it

by the respondent. In this case, the appellants were

aggrieved by the unilateral hike of the annual charges to

Rs.1,50,000/- per annum from Rs.227.25/- which they were

paying. The High Court was justified in examining the

correctness or otherwise of the said decision. In this case, the

High Court found that the respondents were justified in

enhancing the annual license fee to Rs.1,50,000/-. Having

done so, it should have disposed of the writ petition by

simply dismissing it.

22. It is well settled that if in an exceptional case the Court

feels the need to travel beyond the scope of the writ petition

Page 13 of 20 and make observations, the least a party is entitled to, is an

opportunity to explain and defend themselves.

23. Disapproving the practice of catching parties by

surprise by the writ courts travelling beyond the scope of the

issues in question, this Court in V.K. Majotra vs. Union of

India and Others2, made the following telling observations:-

“8. …. The writ courts would be well advised to decide the petitions on the points raised in the petition and if in a rare case keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case any additional points are to be raised then the concerned and affected parties should be put to notice on the additional points to satisfy the principles of natural justice. The parties cannot be taken by surprise. We leave the discussion here.”

24. Though said in the context of expunging adverse

comments in an order or judgment, the following paragraphs

from State of U.P. Vs. Mohammad Naim3,repays study: -

“11. The last question is, is the present case a case of an exceptional nature in which the learned Judge should have exercised his inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A CrPC in respect of the observations complained of by the State Government? If there is one principle of cardinal importance in the administration of justice, it is this: the proper freedom and independence of Judges and Magistrates must be maintained and they must be allowed to perform their functions freely and fearlessly and without undue interference by any body, even by 2 (2003) 8 SCC 40 3 1964 2 SCR 363

Page 14 of 20 this Court. At the same time it is equally necessary that in expressing their opinions Judges and Magistrates must be guided by considerations of justice, fair-play and restraint. It is not infrequent that sweeping generalisations defeat the very purpose for which they are made. It has been judicially recognised that in the matter of making disparaging remarks against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before courts of law in cases to be decided by them, it is relevant to consider

(a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself;

(b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct, justifying the remarks; and

(c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct.

It has also been recognised that judicial pronouncements must be judicial in nature, and should not normally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve.”

25. No doubt, what the High Court has done in the present

matter is to direct the fixing of the license fee, keeping in

mind, the judgment of the Court in T. Krishnakumar (supra). The appellant had no opportunity to explain whether T.

Krishnakumar (supra) had application to the transaction in

question or not. Further, to direct the Chief Vigilance Officer

to hold an inquiry in the “matter relating to leasing out the

land to the appellant” was not warranted on the facts and

Page 15 of 20 circumstances of the case. Directions of this nature for a

fishing and roving enquiry can seriously impinge upon

reputation and character of the parties. Even in a given case

if the High Court was constrained to pass such directions it

ought to have put the appellants on notice.

26. The directions extracted in Para 3 above have rendered

the appellants worse off in their own writ petition. In Ashok

Kumar Nigam v. State of U.P.4, this Court held as under:-

“2. Appearing for the appellant, Mr. D.K. Singh, strenuously argued that the High Court had misdirected itself in issuing a notice of enhancement of the punishment awarded to the appellant. He submitted that by doing so, the High Court had placed the appellant in a worse-off position, simply because he had challenged the punishment awarded to him. That was, according to Mr. Singh, legally impermissible. In support of his submissions, Mr. Singh placed reliance upon two decisions of this Court in Pradeep Kumar v. Union of India and Others - (2005) 12 SCC 219 and Ramesh Chander Singh v. High Court of Allahabad and Another - (2007) 4 SCC 247.

4. The legal position, as to the powers of the High Court to direct enhancement of punishment in a writ petition arising out of disciplinary action taken against an employee, stands concluded by the decisions of this Court, referred to above. In Pradeep Kumar's case (supra), in a somewhat similar circumstances, a similar question had arisen for consideration before this Court. In that case too the High Court had found the punishment of reduction in pay and denial of increments awarded to the appellant to be

4 (2016) 12 SCC 797

Page 16 of 20 inadequate, for the gravity of the misconduct. The High Court had accordingly remanded the matter back to the disciplinary authority to award the maximum punishment of dismissal from service which direction was then assailed before this Court on the ground that the High Court had no such power to direct enhancement of punishment either by itself or by remanding the matter to the disciplinary authority. An employee complaining against the punishment awarded to him could not, observed this Court, be placed in a worse-off position for coming to the Court.

7. We have, in the light of the above decisions, no hesitation in holding that the High Court had fallen in a palpable error in directing issuance of a show cause notice to the appellant. The appellant could not, as observed earlier, be placed in a worse-off situation because of his having sought redress against the punishment awarded to him by the disciplinary authority which in the instant case is the High Court itself.” (Emphasis supplied)

27. In Pradeep Kumar v. Union of India5, the Court held: -

“4. Irrespective of the crime/offence with which the appellant may have been charged, it was not open to the High Court to have issued such a direction. The scope of judicial review did not allow the High Court to have interfered with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authorities on the appellant. Besides, a writ petitioner cannot be put in a worse position by coming to court. The directions of the High Court are not sustainable and must be set aside. We are told by the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent authority pursuant to the directions issued by the High Court initiated proceedings against the appellant for the purpose of imposing the penalty of dismissal from service. We have held that the direction of the High Court was wholly outside its jurisdiction. The appeals are thus allowed and the High Courts directions are set aside. The disciplinary enquiry initiated on the basis of the High Court's order is

5 (2005) 12 SCC 219

Page 17 of 20 consequently also quashed. However, the writ petitions will stand dismissed. There is no order as to costs.” (Emphasis supplied)

28. Litigants go to court for vindicating their rights when

they perceive that there is an infringement. The court may,

after hearing both parties, grant or deny them relief

depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. As

pointed out in V.K. Majotra (supra) and Mohammad Naim

(supra), if without putting parties on notice (even in the rare

and exceptional case where facts warrant) the court travels

beyond the scope of the petition, takes parties by surprise

and makes any strong observations and directions, it will

create a chilling effect on other prospective litigants too.

They will be left to wonder whether by going to court in

matters where they perceive injustice has resulted, they will

be rendered worse off than what they were, before initiating

the proceedings. This could seriously impact access to

justice and consequently the very rule of law. Hence, in such

matters, courts must exercise great caution and

circumspection.

Page 18 of 20

29. We are of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances

of the case, the observations extracted hereinabove at para 3

are absolutely unjustified apart from the fact that they were

made in violation of principles of natural justice.

30. In view of what has been stated hereinabove, we partly

allow the appeal by expunging and setting aside the

following portion of the impugned order:-

“The 1st respondent Board shall take necessary steps to fix the licence fee in respect of the land covered by Exts.P13 to P16 orders, taking note of the law laid down by this Court in T. Krishnakumar [2022 (4) KLT 798: 2022 (5) KHC SN 8] and also the law laid down in this judgment, with notice to the 2nd petitioner Chinmaya Mission Educational and Cultural Trust, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment.”

“In view of the facts noticed by this Court in paragraphs 36 and 37 of this judgment and also the stand taken by the 1st respondent Board before this Court that other than the copy of Exts.P13 to P16 orders, no other documents are seen in the relevant files, we deem it appropriate to direct the 1st respondent Board to conduct an enquiry by the Chief Vigilance Officer (Superintendent of Police), Cochin Devaswom Board in the matter relating to leasing out the land of Vadakkumnathan Devaswom to the 2nd petitioner Trust and take necessary action, if found necessary, based on the report of the Chief Vigilance Officer”

Page 19 of 20

31. However, notwithstanding the expunction of the above

paragraphs, if the respondent-Board has legitimate rights to

enhance the licence fee, they may do so independently and

in accordance with law.

32. By our interim order of 30.10.2023, we directed the

appellants to deposit a sum of Rs.10 Lakhs with the first

respondent. The amount has since been deposited. In view

of the judgment passed today, we direct that the balance

amount be paid by the appellants to the first respondent, as

undertaken before us within three months from today.

33. No order as to costs.

……….........................J. [DIPANKAR DATTA]

……….........................J. [K. V. VISWANATHAN]

New Delhi;

06th October, 2025

Page 20 of 20