Oriental Bank Of Commerce & Anr vs R.K. Uppal

Oriental Bank of Commerce & Anr. .... Appellants

Versus

R.K. Uppal ....Respondent

JUDGMENT

R.M. Lodha, J.

Two questions presented for consideration in this appeal

by special leave, at the instance of the appellants--Oriental Bank of

Commerce and its General Manager - are: (one) whether in terms

of regulation 17 of Oriental Bank of Commerce Officer Employees

(Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1982 (for short, `the 1982

Regulations'), the appellate authority is required to accord personal

hearing to the respondent in a departmental appeal; and (two)

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whether the order dated June 4, 2004 passed by the appellate

authority in the appeal preferred by the respondent under regulation

17 suffers from infirmity for want of reasons.

2. The brief facts leading to the above questions are these :

the respondent--R.K. Uppal (hereinafter referred to as `delinquent')

faced departmental inquiry under regulation 6 of the 1982

Regulations for acts of omission and commission committed by him

while working as Senior Manager/Incumbent In-charge at 19-D,

Chandigarh Branch. The article of charges served on the

delinquent contained four charges, namely : (I) between the period

September 14, 1999 to December 20, 1999, while recommending

sanction of credit facilities and further enhancements in the

account of M/s. Dunroll Industries Limited, the delinquent failed to

ensure that the proposal has been properly

appraised/processed and all the relevant information has been

recorded in the process note; (II) the delinquent recommended

release of working capital facilities aggregating to Rs. 64 lac

in the account of M/s. Dunroll Industries Limited for the unit

located at Sikandarabad (UP) at a distance of approximately 300

k.m. from the branch although the monitoring of unit at such a

2

distant place was not possible; (III) the delinquent recommended

enhancement of Rs. 175 lac in the Bank Guarantee limit on

November 17, 2000 in the account of M/s. Dunroll Industries

Limited without ensuring satisfactory conduct of the account and

without going into the details of the transactions and implications

thereof and (IV) the delinquent released credit facilities in the

account of M/s. Dunroll Industries Limited without complying with the

terms of sanction.

3. On March 17, 2003, Shri M.K. Ghosh, Commissioner for

Departmental Inquiries, Central Vigilance Commission, was

appointed inquiring authority to inquire into the above charges

levelled against the delinquent.

4. The delinquent submitted his reply and denied the

charges. The inquiring authority after recording the evidence

submitted its report on November 11, 2003. Charge I and Charge II

were held to be partly proved while Charge III and Charge IV were

held to be proved.

5. The findings and report of the inquiring authority were

sent to the delinquent who in response submitted his representation

on December 15, 2003. The disciplinary authority concurred with

3

the findings of the inquiring authority and keeping in view the

seriousness of charges and gravity of the proved conduct, it

imposed the penalty of dismissal vide order dated February 14,

2004.

6. The delinquent preferred appeal under regulation 17 of

the 1982 Regulations assailing his dismissal order on diverse

grounds and also requested for grant of personal hearing. The

appellate authority rejected the delinquent's request for personal

hearing and dismissed his appeal vide its order dated June 4, 2004.

7. The delinquent challenged the order of penalty dated

February 14, 2004 and also the order of the appellate authority

before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. The Division Bench of

that Court vide its order dated January 23, 2006 allowed the

delinquent's writ petition partly and set aside the order of the

appellate authority and remitted the matter back to it with a direction

to pass a reasoned order after giving an opportunity of hearing to the

petitioner. It is this order which is impugned in the present appeal.

8. We have heard Mr. K.N. Bhatt, senior counsel for the

appellants and Mr. Ram Lal Roy, counsel for the respondent.

4

Re : Question (one)

9. Regulation 17 of the 1982 Regulations reads as follows:-

"17. Appeals :

(i) An officer employee may appeal against an order

imposing upon him any of the penalties specified in

regulation 4 or against the order of suspension

referred to in regulation 12. The appeal shall lie to

the Appellate Authority.

(ii) An appeal shall be preferred within 45 days from the

date of receipt of the order appealed against. The

appeal shall be addressed to the Appellate Authority

and submitted to the authority whose order is

appealed against. The authority whose order is

appealed against shall forward the appeal together

with its comments and the records of the case to the

Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority shall

consider whether the findings are justified or whether

the penalty is excessive or inadequate and pass

appropriate orders. The Appellate Authority may

pass an order confirming, enhancing, reducing or

setting aside the penalty or remitting the case to the

authority which imposed the penalty or to any other

authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the

circumstances of the case....."

10. The High Court has taken a view that regulation 17 of

the 1982 Regulations impliedly requires that a delinquent who has

preferred appeal is afforded an opportunity of personal hearing by

the appellate authority. While taking such view, the High Court

relied on a decision of this Court in Ram Chander v. Union of India &

5

Ors.1 and a Full Bench decision of that Court in Ram Niwas Bansal

v. State Bank of Patiala & Anr.2 .

11. We shall refer to the above two decisions first. In Ram

Chander's case1 before this Court, the appellant who was employed

as Shunter, Grade `B' in the Railways was removed from service

after holding disciplinary inquiry wherein his guilt of misconduct was

held to be proved. The inquiry officer proceeded ex-parte against the

delinquent as he did not appear and recorded a finding that

misconduct was proved. The disciplinary authority (General

Manager) concurred with the view of the inquiry officer; formed a

provisional view that penalty of removal should be imposed on him

and issued a show cause notice to the delinquent in this regard.

This time, the delinquent did respond to the show cause notice and

submitted his explanation. The disciplinary authority was not

satisfied with the delinquent's response and imposed the penalty of

removal. The delinquent preferred a departmental appeal before the

Railway Board under the relevant Rules. His appeal was dismissed

by the appellate authority. The delinquent then challenged the

orders of the appellate authority and disciplinary authority before the

1 (1986) 3 SCC 103

2 (1998) (4) SLR 711

6

High Court in a writ petition. The writ petition was dismissed and so

also the Letters Patent Appeal preferred by him. The matter then

reached this Court in an appeal by special leave. Inter alia, the

contention of the delinquent before this Court was that it was

incumbent upon the appellate authority to afford him personal

hearing before his appeal was decided. Construing the relevant

Rules, namely, Rule 18(ii) of the Railway Servants (Discipline &

Appeal) Rules, 1968 and Rule 22(2) of the said Rules, this Court

held (at pages 117-118) as under :

"25. ..........Such being the legal position, it is of utmost

importance after the Forty-Second Amendment as

interpreted by the majority in Tulsiram Patel [(1985) 3 SCC

398] case that the appellate authority must not only give a

hearing to the government servant concerned but also

pass a reasoned order dealing with the contentions raised

by him in the appeal. We wish to emphasize that reasoned

decisions by tribunals, such as the Railway Board in the

present case, will promote public confidence in the

administrative process. An objective consideration is

possible only if the delinquent servant is heard and given a

chance to satisfy the authority regarding the final orders

that may be passed on his appeal. Considerations of fair

play and justice also require that such a personal hearing

should be given.

26. In the result, the appeal must succeed and is allowed.

The judgment and order of a learned Single Judge of the

Delhi High Court dated August 16, 1983 and that of the

Division Bench dismissing the letters patent appeal filed by

the appellant in limine by its order dated February 15, 1984

are both set aside, so also the impugned order of the

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Railway Board dated March 11, 1972. We direct the

Railway Board to hear and dispose of the appeal after

affording a personal hearing to the appellant on merits by a

reasoned order in conformity with the requirements of Rule

22(2) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal)

Rules, 1968, as expeditiously as possible, and in any

event, not later than four months from today."

In our opinion, in Ram Chander's case1, this Court has not laid down

as an absolute proposition that in matters of departmental appeal

against the punishment order of a disciplinary authority, the appellate

authority must invariably afford personal hearing to a delinquent.

12. Insofar as, Punjab and Haryana High Court is concerned,

it is true that in Ram Niwas Bansal2 while dealing with a similar

regulation, i.e. regulation 70 of the State Bank of Patiala (Officers)

Service Regulations, 1979, the Full Bench of that Court has read into

such rule a provision of right of personal hearing to a delinquent but

we find it difficult to approve that view. As a matter of fact, the

judgment of this Court in the case of State Bank of Patiala Vs.

Mahendra Kumar Singhal3 was not brought to the notice of that Court

nor that judgment was adverted to which lays down in clear terms

that the rule of natural justice does not necessarily in all cases confer

3 (1994) Supp (2) SCC 463

8

a right of audience at appellate stage. This is what this Court said (at

page 464) in Mahendra Kumar Singhal3 :

"2. Heard counsel on both sides. The respondent was

visited with the punishment of dismissal from service. He

filed a departmental appeal which came to be dismissed,

whereupon he moved the High Court by way of a writ

petition. The High Court quashed the order of the appellate

authority on the ground that no personal hearing was given

before the appeal was dismissed. The matter was,

therefore, remitted to the appellate authority to dispose of

the appeal after hearing the delinquent personally. It is

against the said order that the present appeal is filed.

3. No rule has been brought to our attention which requires

the appellate authority to grant a personal hearing. The rule

of natural justice does not necessarily in all cases confer a

right of audience at the appellate stage. That is what this

Court observed in F.N. Roy v. Collector of Customs,

Calcutta [1957 SCR 1151 = AIR 1957 SC 648]. We,

therefore, think that the impugned order is not valid. Our

attention was, however, drawn to the decision in Mohinder

Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi

[(1978) 1 SCC 405] wherein observation is made in regard

to the right of hearing. But that was not a case of a

departmental inquiry, it was one emanating from Article

324 of the Constitution. In our view, therefore, those

observations are not pertinent to the facts of this case."

13. In Union of India and Anr. v. Jesus Sales Corporation4, this

Court was concerned with an appeal that was filed against the

judgment of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court holding that an

oral hearing has to be given by appellate authority before taking a

decision under 3rd proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 4-M of the

4 (1996) 4 SCC 69

9 Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947. The Court noticed

Section 4-M of that Act and in paragraph 3 at page 73 of the

Report framed the question as to whether the requirement of

hearing to the appellants has to be read as an implicit condition

while construing the scope of 3rd proviso to sub-section (1) of

Section 4-M. This Court held (at pages 74-75) as under :

"5. The High Court has primarily considered the question

as to whether denying an opportunity to the appellant to be

heard before his prayer to dispense with the deposit of the

penalty is rejected, violates and contravenes the principles

of natural justice. In that connection, several judgments of

this Court have been referred to. It need not be pointed out

that under different situations and conditions the

requirement of compliance of the principle of natural justice

vary. The courts cannot insist that under all circumstances

and under different statutory provisions personal hearings

have to be afforded to the persons concerned. If this

principle of affording personal hearing is extended

whenever statutory authorities are vested with the power to

exercise discretion in connection with statutory appeals, it

shall lead to chaotic conditions. Many statutory appeals

and applications are disposed of by the competent

authorities who have been vested with powers to dispose

of the same. Such authorities which shall be deemed to be

quasi-judicial authorities are expected to apply their judicial

mind over the grievances made by the appellants or

applicants concerned, but it cannot be held that before

dismissing such appeals or applications in all events the

quasi-judicial authorities must hear the appellants or the

applicants, as the case may be. When principles of natural

justice require an opportunity to be heard before an

adverse order is passed on any appeal or application, it

does not in all circumstances mean a personal hearing.

The requirement is complied with by affording an

opportunity to the person concerned to present his case

before such quasi-judicial authority who is expected to

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apply his judicial mind to the issues involved. Of course, if

in his own discretion if he requires the appellant or the

applicant to be heard because of special facts and

circumstances of the case, then certainly it is always open

to such authority to decide the appeal or the application

only after affording a personal hearing. But any order

passed after taking into consideration the points raised in

the appeal or the application shall not be held to be invalid

merely on the ground that no personal hearing had been

afforded. This is all the more important in the context of

taxation and revenue matters. When an authority has

determined a tax liability or has imposed a penalty, then

the requirement that before the appeal is heard such tax or

penalty should be deposited cannot be held to be

unreasonable as already pointed out above. In the case of

Shyam Kishore v. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi [(1993) 1 SCC

22] it has been held by this Court that such requirement

cannot be held to be harsh or violative of Article 14 of the

Constitution so as to declare the requirement of pre-deposit

itself as unconstitutional. In this background, it can be said

that normal rule is that before filing the appeal or before the

appeal is heard, the person concerned should deposit the

amount which he has been directed to deposit as a tax or

penalty. The non-deposit of such amount itself is an

exception which has been incorporated in different statutes

including the one with which we are concerned. Second

proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 4-M says in clear and

unambiguous words that an appeal against an order

imposing a penalty shall not be entertained unless the

amount of the penalty has been deposited by the appellant.

Thereafter the third proviso vests a discretion in such

appellate authority to dispense with such deposit

unconditionally or subject to such conditions as it may

impose in its discretion taking into consideration the undue

hardship which it is likely to cause to the appellant. As such

it can be said that the statutory requirement is that before

an appeal is entertained, the amount of penalty has to be

deposited by the appellant; an order dispensing with such

deposit shall amount to an exception to the said

requirement of deposit. In this background, it is difficult to

hold that if the appellate authority has rejected the prayer

of the appellant to dispense with the deposit

unconditionally or has dispensed with such deposit subject

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to some conditions without hearing the appellant, on

perusal of the petition filed on behalf of the appellant for the

said purpose, the order itself is vitiated and is liable to be

quashed being violative of the principles of natural justice.

14. Thus, in Jesus Sales Corporation4, it was held by this

Court that under the relevant rule, it was not obligatory upon the

appellate authority to hear the appellant.

15. In Ganesh Santa Ram Sirur v. State Bank of India and

Anr.5, the appellate authority proposed to enhance the penalty

imposed upon the delinquent by the punishing authority. The

disciplinary authority recommended to the punishing authority the

punishment of reduction in substantive salary at one stage. The

punishing authority accepted the recommendation of the disciplinary

authority and imposed the punishment accordingly. The appellate

authority proposed to enhance the penalty to an order of removal. In

this context, inter alia, one of the contentions raised before this Court

was that the order of removal from service could not be sustained as

no personal hearing was given to the delinquent before the

enhancement of punishment even though personal interview was

specifically asked for. The Court noticed various judgments of this

Court including the Constitution Bench judgment in Managing

5 (2005) 1 SCC 13

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Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and others v. B. Karunakar and Ors.6 and

also the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ram

Niwas Bansal2. In paragraph 31 at page 29 of the Report, it was held

that the approach and test adopted in B. Karunakar6 should govern

all cases where the complaint is not that there was no hearing, no

notice and no opportunity but one of not affording the proper hearing

that is adequate or a full hearing or violation of a procedural rule or

requirement governing that inquiry. We have not been able to discern

anything in Ganesh Santa Ram Sirur5 that lays down that the

appellate authority must, in all cases of departmental appeal, afford

personal hearing to the delinquent.

16. Be it noted that the principal question for consideration

in B. Karunakar6 was whether the report of the inquiry

officer/authority who/which is appointed by the disciplinary authority

to hold an inquiry into the charges against the delinquent employee

is required to be furnished to the employee to enable him to make

proper representation to the disciplinary authority before such

authority arrives at its own finding with regard to guilt or otherwise of

the employee and the punishment, if any, to be awarded to him.

While dealing with this question and its diverse facets, the Court

6 (1993) 4 SCC 727

13

exhaustively considered the principles of natural justice in the context

of furnishing the report of the inquiry officer/authority to the delinquent

employee. B. Karunakar6 does not deal with the question of necessity

of affording a personal hearing to a delinquent by the appellate

authority.

17. Mr. K.N. Bhatt, learned senior counsel for the appellants

cited a Single Bench decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Y.

Malleswara Rao v. Chief General Manager, State Bank of India,

Hyderabad & Ors.7. In that case the delinquent was visited with the

penalty of removal from service. The concerned delinquent preferred

appeal before the appellate authority and one of the contentions

raised before the High Court was that the appellate authority failed to

afford a personal hearing to the delinquent and, therefore, the order

of the appellate authority suffered from transgression of an essential

principle of natural justice. The Single Judge of the High Court

referred to decisions of this Court in Mahendra Kumar Singhal3,

Jesus Sales Corporation4 and Ganesh Santa Ram Sirur5 and also the

decision of Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ram

Niwas Bansal2. The Single Judge also referred to few decisions of

other High Courts and followed the proposition propounded by this

7 2006 LAB. I.C. 1384

14

Court in Mahendra Kumar Singhal3 viz; that in the absence of the

specific requirement by the relevant rules, there is no right to a

personal hearing at the appellate stage and the rules of natural

justice do not require that in all cases a right of audience should be

provided at the appellate stage.

18. It is now fairly well settled that the requirements of natural

justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of

the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject

matter that is being dealt with and so forth. In the words of

Ramaswami, J. (Union of India & Anr. v. P.K. Roy & Ors.8) the extent

and application of the doctrine of natural justice cannot be imprisoned

within the straitjacket of a rigid formula. The application of the

doctrine depends upon the nature of jurisdiction conferred on the

administrative authority, upon the character of the rights of the

persons affected, the scheme and policy of the statute and other

relevant circumstances disclosed in the particular case.

19. A right of appeal is not an inherent right. None of the

facets of natural justice requires that there should be right of appeal

from any decision. The extent of power of an appellate forum and the

mode and manner of its exercise can always be provided in the

8 AIR 1968 SC 850

15

provision that creates such right. Insofar as provision of appeal in

regulation 17 of the 1982 Regulations is concerned, it must be stated

that the said provision affords to an employee right of appeal against

an order imposing upon him any of the penalties specified in

regulation 4 or against the order of suspension referred to in

regulation 12. It provides for limitation within which the appeal is to

be preferred. As per the said provision, the appeal must be

addressed to the appellate authority and submitted to the authority

whose order is appealed against. The authority whose order is

appealed against is required to forward the appeal together with its

comments and also the record of the case to the appellate authority.

The appellate authority then proceeds with the consideration of the

appeal and considers whether the findings are justified; whether the

penalty is excessive or inadequate and passes appropriate order

confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting aside the penalty or

remitting the case to the authority that imposed the penalty or to any

other authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the

circumstances of the case. The appeal provision in regulation 17 of

the 1982 Regulations does not expressly provide for personal hearing

to the appellant. Is the right of personal hearing to the appellant

16

implicit in the provision? We think not. In our considered view, in the

absence of personal hearing to the appellant, it cannot be said that

the very right of appeal is defeated. One situation is, however,

different. Where the appellate authority proposes to enhance the

penalty, obviously, the appellate authority must issue notice to the

delinquent asking him to show cause why penalty that has been

awarded to him must not be enhanced and give him personal

hearing. It is so because the appellate authority seeks to inflict such

punishment for the first time which was not given by the

disciplinary/punishing authority. Although there are no positive words

in regulation 17, requiring that the appellant shall be heard before

enhancement of the penalty, the fairness and natural justice require

him to be heard.

20. It is true that in Ganesh Santa Ram Sirur5, this Court did

not accept the contention of the delinquent relating to non-grant of

personal hearing to him by the appellate authority before the

enhancement of the punishment. But it was so in the peculiar fact-

situation of the case. First, this Court observed that Charge 5 of

granting loan to the spouse under SEEUY Scheme in violation of

Rule 34(3) of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service

17

Rules was found by the appellate authority more serious and grave in

nature. Secondly and more importantly, the Court noticed that

delinquent in his appeal before the appellate authority admitted that

he had committed misconduct of disbursing the loan to his wife in a

Scheme which was meant for educated unemployed youth. To our

mind, thus, there is no inconsistency in the judgment of this Court in

Ganesh Santa Ram Sirur5 and our statement above that where the

appellate authority proposes to enhance the penalty, the appellate

authority must issue notice to the delinquent and give him personal

hearing.

21. However, personal hearing may not be required where

the appellate authority, on consideration of the entire material placed

before it, confirms, reduces or sets aside the order appealed

against. Regulation 17 of the 1982 Regulations does not require that

in all situations personal hearing must be afforded to the delinquent

by the appellate authority. The view taken by the Full Bench of

Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Ram Niwas Bansal2

is too expansive and wide and cannot be held to be laying down

correct law particularly in light of the judgment of this Court in

Mahendra Kumar Singhal3 . We answer this question accordingly.

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Re : Question (two)

22. The High Court has faulted the order of the appellate

authority also on the ground of it being a non-speaking order. Is it

so? We have carefully perused the order of the appellate authority

and we find that the order dated June 4, 2004 cannot be labelled as a

non-speaking order. The order does not suffer from the vice of non-

application of mind. The appellate authority has addressed the points

raised in the appeal and critical to the decision, albeit briefly. It is true

that the appellate authority must record reasons in support of its order

to indicate that it has applied its mind to the grounds raised but it is

not the requirement of law that an order of affirmance by the

appellate authority must be elaborate and extensive. Brief reasons

which indicate due application of mind in decision making process

may suffice. Each ground raised in the appeal has been dealt with

briefly as would be apparent from the following consideration of the

matter by the appellate authority:

"The contention of the appellant that no departmental

action can be taken against him during pendency of

criminal proceedings before the Court is not tenable; as

departmental enquiry is independent of criminal

proceedings and as such there is no bar to pass the order

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of punishment by the Disciplinary Authority during the

pendency of criminal proceedings.

The appellant has alleged that Inquiring Authority has erred

in holding the imputation 2 & 3 under Article of Charge No.

1 as proved. On carefully perusing the evidence brought on

record of the enquiry and other related record, I find that

Disciplinary Authority has fully considered

evidence/submissions made by the appellant and based on

that the article of charge no. 1 is held partly proved against

the appellant. This does not, however, mean that the

Disciplinary Authority has in anyway exonerated the

appellant of this charge. Hence, I do not find any

force/substance in the allegation of the appellant. I find that

on the basis of evidence adduced in the inquiry, article of

charge no. 1 has been rightly held as partly proved against

the appellant.

The appellant has further contended that PO had not

furnished any proof of his having recommended the

proposal to the Regional Office. I have perused the

relevant record and evidence adduced in respect of the

charge. It is evident from Ex. MEX 10/6 (which is admitted

document in the enquiry) that the appellant had sent letter

dated 24-10-2000 based on which Regional Office

permitted the party to avail facility for unit at Sikandrabad

which was 300 kms away from Chandigarh and in this way,

it was not possible for the branch to monitor the unit at

such a distant place. Although the appellant has not

disputed reference of letter dated 24-10-2000 in Ex. MEX

10/6, yet due to its non-production by the PO, the IA has

held this charge as partly proved. On the basis of evidence

brought on record of enquiry and after considering

submission of appellant, I find that Disciplinary Authority

has rightly held article of charge no. 2 as partly proved and

contention of the appellant that this charge should be set

aside is devoid of any merit.

The appellant has contended that he had recommended

the proposal keeping in view the General Manager's

instructions. The appellant had neither produced any

document nor adduced any evidence in his defence to

substantiate this fact. However, during general examination

20

by the Inquiring Authority, he has admitted that he had no

exposure of processing of the guarantees and proposal

was analysed at Regional Office and he had just

recommended it. This clearly shows that the appellant

recommended enhancement of bank guarantee limit of

Rs. 175 lacs in the account of M/s. Dunroll Industries Ltd.

without ensuring satisfactory conduct of the account and

without going into details of transaction and implications

thereof. After carefully analyzing the evidence adduced

during the enquiry, I find that the article of charge no. 3

against the appellant is rightly held proved by Disciplinary

Authority. I therefore, do not find any merit/force in the

allegations of the appellant.

The Appellant has contended that common seal on all

documents had been affixed and all the documents are

valid. On careful perusal of documents ME-23/1/2 and after

evaluating evidence of PW-1 during regular hearing held

on 20-9-2003, I observe that article of charge no. 4 against

the appellant in respect of releasing credit facilities in the

account of M/s. Dunroll Industries Ltd. without complying

with terms of sanction is rightly held proved by the

Disciplinary Authority. Hence I do not find any force/merit in

contention of the appellant that article of charge no. 4 has

been wrongly upheld by the Inquiring Authority.

The appellant has also referred to some pending enquiry

proceedings against him in respect of charge sheet dated

12-8-2003 in the matter of Bankarpur Cold Storage and

has contended that it is against principles of natural justice

to take into account past service record without valid legal

grounds. After perusing relevant enquiry record, I find that

Disciplinary Authority in his order has referred to certain

lapses/irregularities attributable to the appellant for the

misconduct committed by him while posted as Sr.

Manager/Incumbent In-charge, B/O 19-D, Chandigarh.

Having regard to imposition/inflictment of penalty of

dismissal on the appellant w.e.f. 14-2-2004 by the

Disciplinary Authority under Regulation 4(j) of Oriental

Bank of Commerce Officer Employees (Discipline &

Appeal) Regulations, 1982 it was not open to the bank to

pursue pending charge sheet dated 12-8-2003 against the

appellant as referred to in the appeal. Disciplinary

21

Authority, therefore, has rightly stated in his order dated

14-2-2004 that "no action is required to be taken at this

stage" in relation to this charge sheet. Hence, I do not find

any force/merit in the allegations of the appellant that

Disciplinary Authority has taken into account the matter of

pending inquiries in respect of charge sheet dated 12-8-

2003. As such, there is no violation of principles of natural

justice as alleged."

Having discussed the matter as above, the appellate authority held

that on consideration of the inquiry record and facts and

circumstances of the case, the findings and the order dated February

14, 2004 passed by disciplinary authority are based on evidence

brought on record of inquiry and not founded on past record or any

other matter not connected with inquiry as alleged by the delinquent

in the appeal. Consequently, the appellate authority concurred with

the view of the disciplinary authority and found no justification to

interfere with the penalty awarded by the disciplinary authority.

23. The order of the appellate authority, by no stretch of

imagination can be said to suffer from vice of lack of reasons. We

answer question no. (two) in the negative.

24. In our view, the High Court was clearly in error in setting

aside and quashing the order dated June 4, 2004 passed by the

appellate authority and in directing the appellate authority to pass a

22

reasoned order after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner

(respondent herein).

25. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed and the judgment and

order dated January 23, 2006 passed by the High Court of Punjab

and Haryana is set aside. The parties shall bear their own costs.

.........................J.

(Aftab Alam)

........................ J.

(R.M. Lodha)

NEW DELHI.

AUGUST 11, 2011.

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