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Odut Ali Miah vs The State Of West Bengal

Supreme Court18 February 1974D.G. Palekar · P.N. Bhagwati · V.R. Krishna Iyer

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

A delay between the incidents forming the basis of detention and the order of detention does not invalidate the detention order where the incidents constitute a course of conduct, provided the order is made within a reasonable time of the last incident. Particulars furnished to a detenu need only be sufficiently specific to enable the detenu to make an effective representation against the detention; absolute specificity in all details is not required. The names of associates of the detenu in the prejudicial activities need not be disclosed in the particulars furnished to the detenu. Activities that obstruct the movement of ships and river navigation are sufficiently connected to the maintenance of supplies and services to the community to justify detention under Section 3(2) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971. Where the counter-affidavit of the State contains general characterizations of the detenu's conduct, the detention order remains valid if the substantive facts underlying those characterizations have been communicated to the detenu in the grounds of detention. Hardship to the detenu's family is not a legal ground for release under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971; such matters are within the discretionary review power of the State Government and not cognizable by the court in a habeas corpus petition.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

JUDGMENT
Krishna Iyer, J.

1. Shri G.S. Rama Rao, appearing as amicus curiae, has urged five grounds in support of his challenge to the validity of the order of detention passed on the petitioner by the District Magistrate, 24 Parganas, under Section 3(2) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (for short, the Act) read with Sub-section (1) thereof.

2. One point urged was that there was a delay of five months between the first incident relied upon in the grounds in support of the detention and the actual order of detention, but it is obvious that it was a course of conduct attributed to the petitioner which persuaded the District Magistrate into the conclusion that it was necessary to inhibit his activities prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services to the community. The last of such instances was in April 1972 and within two months thereof the order of detention had been made. We are not impressed with the argument that there has been such a long gap between the materials on which reliance is placed and the actual order passed as to lead to the inference that the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate is unreal and invalid.

3. The second ground of attack is that the particulars furnished to the detenu are vague. There is no force in this either. The three episodes recited in the annexure to the detention order give sufficient particulars to enable an effective representation contra.

4. The point that the associates of the petitioner in his prejudicial adventures were not named in the particulars furnished also has no legal force (vide this Court's decision in Hasan Ali v. State of West Bengal) .

5. The other plea that the grounds or particulars mentioned by the Dist. Magistrate have no relevance to the maintenance of supplies and services has no merit whatever. The prejudicial activity of the petitioner appears to be to remove the lighting equipments in the Diamond Harbour on the Hoogly loading obviously to the hinderance of vessel navigating and thus producing disruption in the maintenance of supplies and services. After all, the movement of ships is essential to supplies and services to the community at large.

6. Equally meritless is the contention that the counter affidavit of the State describes the petitioner as "a notorious anti-social and he was indulging in stealing valuable river navigational lighting equipments from light posts and buoyas in the river Hoogly", and that therefore, more than what has been communicated to the detenu has influenced the detaining authority and the higher authorities in directing or affirming the detention. We see nothing now as having been relied upon by the authorities under the Act and all that is stated in paragraph 7 of the State affidavit in return has in substance been communicated to the petitioner.

7. The plea that the detenu has been undergoing incarceration for a long time since the middle of 1972 and that, unless released, his poor family will be in great distress is no contention in law under the Act but has to be made to the State Government which has always the power to review the situation with reference to a detenu. May be, the State Government may consider the position if appropriately moved. We see no ground to direct release of the petitioner on any of the contentions set up on his behalf by counsel.

8. In these circumstance we dismiss the petition.

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