Nimai Ghosh vs The State Of Bihar Now Jharkhand
- Neutral2025 INSC 816
- SCR[2025] 1 SCR 1932
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
Where an eyewitness claims to have witnessed a serious crime such as murder, the credibility of that testimony must be assessed not only against the direct evidence of the crime itself, but against whether the witness's conduct following the incident comports with ordinary human behaviour in response to such traumatic events. While different witnesses may react differently to traumatic circumstances, if the conduct of a witness is so wholly unnatural and disconnected from how a prudent person would reasonably be expected to act that it defies normal human response, that testimony may be discarded as unreliable notwithstanding other supporting evidence. In particular, an eyewitness's testimony may be found inherently improbable where: (1) the witness made no attempt to save or assist the deceased despite having opportunity to do so and despite the accused being armed only with weapons that did not preclude intervention; (2) the witness left the scene of the occurrence and did not immediately report the incident to the police or to family members despite having ready means to do so; (3) a close relative of the deceased who allegedly witnessed the crime failed to inform other family members upon returning home; and (4) the eyewitness offered no satisfactory explanation for inaction despite being in proximity to medical facilities or the deceased's residence. The accumulation of such wholly unnatural conduct may be sufficient to render the eyewitness testimony unsafe for conviction even where trial and appellate courts have found the evidence credible. Where eyewitnesses cannot identify or account for the presence of alleged "chance witnesses" at the scene, the testimony of those chance witnesses corroborating the eyewitnesses' account cannot be reliably used as corroboration, as the entire narrative may be concocted. In a case primarily resting on testimony of eyewitnesses alleging specific acts of violence with particular weapons, the absence of recovery of those weapons, or their seizure and ballistic or scientific examination by the Forensic Science Laboratory, constitutes a material gap that prevents adequate corroboration of the eyewitness account with physical evidence and renders the conviction unsafe, particularly where the prosecution case otherwise rests on testimony whose credibility is doubtful on grounds of unnatural conduct. A High Court, when entertaining an appeal against acquittal, must undertake a searching scrutiny of the evidence and must find an absolute assurance of guilt before reversing an acquittal, rather than merely taking one possible or different view of the evidence from that reasonably taken by the trial court.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
NIMAI GHOSH & ORS. APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF BIHAR (NOW JHARKHAND) RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
J.K. Maheshwari, J.
1. Challenging the findings recorded by High Court
of Jharkhand in judgment dated 02.08.2012 passed in
Government Appeal (DB) No. 31 of 1998, convicting the
appellants for the charges under Section 302/34 of
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short ‘IPC’) and Section
27 of the Arms Act, 1959, by setting-aside the
judgment of acquittal dated 02.04.1998 of Additional
Sessions Judge, Pakur, in Sessions Trial No. 148 of Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by NIDHI AHUJA Date: 2025.07.10 17:30:59 IST 1990, the present appeal has been preferred by the Reason:
accused-appellants.
1 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
2. The necessary facts in brief are, P.S. Case No.
127/89 was registered by Shyama Ram, A.S.I., the
Investigating Officer (PW–11) on the basis of
fardbeyan of Janmejay Ghosh (PW–8, informant and son
of deceased) on 09.07.1989 at 05.30 a.m. The incident
allegedly took place on 08.07.1989 at around 4 p.m.,
in which one Manmohan Ghosh (father of the informant)
was murdered. The P.S. Case was registered against
six accused persons namely (i) Nimai Ghosh; (ii)
Sonachand Ghosh; (iii) Sambal Ghosh; (iv) Gaya Nath
Ghosh; (v) Shridhar Ghosh and (vi) Sachin Ghosh.
After investigation, challan was filed against all
accused persons. The prosecution was unable to prove
the case beyond reasonable doubt leading to acquittal
of all the accused persons. On filing appeal by the
State, the High Court dismissed the same qua three
accused persons sustaining their acquittal, however,
by partly allowing the appeal qua other three accused
persons namely (i) Nimai Ghosh; (ii) Sonachand Ghosh
and (iii) Sambal Ghosh, they have been convicted for
the offences as charged, hence, this appeal.
3. As per case of prosecution, on 08.07.1989 at 2 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
about 3 p.m., the deceased Manmohan Ghosh accompanied
with his son Janmejay Ghosh (PW–8), Megh Nath Ghosh
(PW–5, nephew of deceased on maternal side) and
Shankar Ghosh (PW–2, nephew of deceased on paternal
side), started on bicycles from village Malaypur to
visit Pakur, where the house of the deceased was
under construction. Around 4 p.m., when they reached
the railway bridge near village Dadpur, Janmejay
Ghosh saw Nimai Ghosh and Sonachand Ghosh
(appellants–accused) came from eastern side of the
railway under bridge. Co-accused Gaya Nath Ghosh,
Shridhar Ghosh, Sachin Ghosh and Sambal Ghosh also
came from the western side of the bridge. Accused
Nimai Ghosh and Sonachand Ghosh were armed with
pistol and they forcibly dragged the deceased under
the railway track, where Nimai Ghosh fired on the
back of the deceased, as a result of which deceased
fell down and started bleeding. Co-accused Sonachand
Ghosh shot second fire with intention to kill him. In
the meantime, while the deceased was bleeding and
withering, Sambal Ghosh assailed him by means of
knife, as such the deceased succumbed to the 3 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
injuries. As further alleged, the entire incident was
witnessed by Janmejay Ghosh (PW–8), Megh Nath Ghosh
(PW–5) and Shankar Ghosh (PW–2) and when alarm was
raised by them, accused persons threatened to kill
them. Fearing the same, they could not save the
deceased. Thereafter, the accused persons left the
place and moved towards Purab Jheel. The motive for
the incident attributed in the fardbeyan is of
previous enmity and prior litigation of deceased with
accused Gaya Nath.
4. On 09.07.1989, the next day of incident, at
around 5.30 a.m., the Investigating Officer (PW–11)
reached the place of scene and recorded the statement
of Janmejay Ghosh (PW–8). Later, the investigation
was carried out by Dinanath Ram (PW–10). The post-
mortem was conducted by Dr. S.K. Gupta (PW–1) on
09.07.1989, wherein following injuries were found –
(i) One injury having one inch diameter round shape with burnt periphery on the angle of left scapula entrance wound;
(ii) One injury to the continuation of injury no. 01 on the left side of the chest, triangular shaped 4" above medial 5" 4 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
lateral 6’ forming a cavity fracturing a bone spanding ribs and puncturing the lungs, aorta, heart and surrounding structure exit;
(iii) One injury on the back by the X ride of the vertible columns 2" above the waist 1/2" x 1/2" with lacerated margins;
(iv) One incised wound on the left side on neck 2" x 1/4" x muscle deep;
(v) One incised wound on the face by the right side of the nose 1/2" x 1/6";
(vi) One incised wound on left iliac crest 1 and 1/2" x 1/4" x skin deep.
Out of these, injury nos. 1 and 2 were of
firearms and other injuries except injury no. 3 were
incised. Injury No. 3 was a lacerated wound on the
left side of the vertical column above neck. As
opined, the cause of death was due to injury no. 1
and 2 leading to massive intra thorax hemorrhage and
shock. After completion of investigation, the charge-
sheet was filed, and the case was committed to the
Court of Sessions for trial.
5. The charges for offence under Section 302/34 of
IPC read with Section 27 of the Arms Act were framed.
5 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
The accused persons abjured the guilt and demanded
trial taking defence of false implication because of
previous enmity and pending litigation. The
prosecution examined Shankar Ghosh (PW–2), Megh Nath
Ghosh (PW–5) and Janmejay Ghosh (PW–8) as
eyewitnesses. The prosecution further examined Manjur
Rahman (PW–4), Mahadev Ghosh (PW–6), Saidul Rahman
(PW–9) as chance witnesses. On due appreciation of
material placed on record, the trial Court was of the
opinion that in the facts of the case, testimonies of
the witnesses cannot be believed and moreover,
material contradictions qua injuries and the weapon
possessed by the accused persons are there. Neither
the recovery of the weapon has been made out, nor any
ballistic or scientific evidence connecting overt act
of the accused persons is on record. The trial Court
also found that the conduct of the eyewitnesses is
absolutely doubtful as none of them intimated the
police about the incident that took place at about 4
p.m. on 08.07.1989. PW–11 stated that he got
intimation about the occurrence over phone by
someone, however, no clear proof has come in this 6 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
regard in the testimony. In such situation, the trial
Court was of the opinion that the testimonies of
eyewitnesses or chance witnesses are not worthy to be
relied upon for proving the guilt of the accused
persons, in particular looking to the previous enmity
and the litigation pending between deceased and co-
accused Gaya Nath Ghosh. As such, all the accused
persons were acquitted from the charges because the
prosecution failed to prove the case against them.
6. On filing appeal before the High Court, it was
partly allowed qua Nimai Ghosh, Sonachand Ghosh and
Sambal Ghosh. The High Court by the impugned judgment
convicted all the appellants for the charges under
Sections 302/34 of IPC and further convicted accused
Nimai Ghosh and Sonachand Ghosh for charge under
Section 27 of the Arms Act, inter–alia observing that
the defence to disprove the charge cannot be believed
when the testimonies of the eyewitnesses are
consistent with respect to the incident, corroborated
by the statements of chance witnesses. The High
Court, believing the testimonies of those witnesses,
set–aside the judgment of acquittal of trial Court so 7 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
far as the appellants are concerned, noting that
active role of the appellants in commission of
offence by shooting from the firearm namely pistol
and other weapon, i.e., knife has been specifically
proved and corroborated by medical evidence.
Challenging the said findings as recorded by the High
Court, the appellants have preferred this appeal.
7. Mr. Jayesh Gaurav, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of appellants submits that the incident took
place on 8th July 1989, at around 4 p.m. in an open
place where the deceased accompanying his son,
maternal nephew and paternal nephew were going
towards village Pakur on bicycles. The other three
persons were following the deceased from behind. It
is surprising that at the first instance, when only
two persons came at the place of the incident who
dragged off the deceased, the alleged eyewitness who
were deceased’s own son and close relatives were not
in a position to stop two persons and save the
deceased. The other four accused persons later came
from another direction. Therefore, the testimonies of
those witnesses were not worthy to be relied upon for 8 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
conviction of accused persons, in particular when
there has been no recovery of the weapon from them.
It is also not on record that the weapon (pistol)
allegedly used by two accused persons, namely, Nimai
Ghosh and Sonachand Ghosh was the same and the third
accused Sambal Ghosh used knife. In absence of
recovery of those weapons, the incident itself is
doubtful, and the charges as alleged under Section 27
of the Arms Act cannot be proved. It is further
contended that in absence of recovery, no
scientific/ballistic investigation has been carried
out and trial Court in such absence has rightly
disbelieved the testimonies of those witnesses and
recorded the finding that in absence of recovery of
weapon and ballistic report, recovered empty bullet
cover cannot be connected with the incident and the
guilt of the appellants cannot be proved, in
particular, when there is a previous enmity and
litigation pending between them. It is said that the
High Court committed grave error in setting aside
those findings without any plausible reasons and
grounds, therefore, the judgment of conviction by the 9 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
High Court deserves to be set-aside.
8. Per contra, learned counsel Mr. Sujeet Kumar
Chaubey representing the State has strenuously argued
in support of the findings of the High Court, inter-
alia stating that the testimonies by the eyewitnesses
have been fully corroborated by chance witnesses and
the entire incident cannot be disbelieved on the
testimony of the defence witnesses who merely heard
the gun shot and arrived at the place of incident. It
was further urged that the High Court has rightly
set-aside the judgment of acquittal so far as the
appellants are concerned, therefore, the interference
in this appeal is not warranted.
9. After having considered the submissions made and
on perusal of the material placed on record, it
emerges that Janmejay Ghosh (PW–8) is the son of the
deceased, Shankar Ghosh (PW–2) is the paternal nephew
and Megh Nath Ghosh (PW–5) is the maternal nephew of
the deceased. All three along with the deceased were
going to Pakur on bicycles. On reaching the place of
occurrence, deceased was dragged off by accused Nimai
10 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
Ghosh and Sonachand Ghosh and was shot by firearm
from the back side by Nimai Ghosh. It is further
submitted that another shot thereafter was fired
Sonachand Ghosh. However, as per the testimony of
doctor S.K. Gupta (PW–1), out of the six injuries,
only one firearm injury was found with an entry and
exit wound. Therefore, the allegation in the
testimonies of eyewitnesses of having taken two shots
of firearm on the body of the deceased is suspicious.
The deceased was going along with his son and two
other relatives and these three persons, who were
eyewitnesses, were frightened because of the incident
and threatening by the accused person. The said
conduct of the witnesses has been questioned in the
facts of the case. In addition, the place of incident
is not a place where the deceased/accused were
residing, though 5-6 kms (as deposed by PW–11) far
from village Malaypur, i.e., from where they started.
The normal conduct of the son and other two nephews
should have been to immediately report the incident
to the nearest police station, however, in the
present case no information was furnished by them for 11 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
approximately 14 hours. All the eyewitnesses left the
place of the occurrence after some time and later
came back without intimating the other family members
and villagers.
10. Given the circumstances, before assessing the
witnesses’ testimony to determine the appellants’
guilt, it is imperative to consider as to how and in
what manner a witness’s testimony may be deemed
credible or otherwise in support of the prosecution’s
case. In this regard, reference is made judgment of
this Court in case of ‘Alil Mollah and Anr. Vs. State
of West Bengal’1, wherein this Court while allowing
the appeal against concurrent conviction for offence
under Section 302/24 of IPC based on testimony of
solitary eyewitness, observed in paragraph 7 as thus:
-
“7. On his own showing PW 3 was an employee of the deceased. He was present, according to his testimony, when the deceased was assaulted by the appellants. He admits that after committing the crime the appellants and their associates fled away. The witness, however, not only did not raise any alarm when his master was being assaulted, he did not go near his employer even after the assailants had
1 (1996) 5 SCC 369 12 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
fled away to see the condition in which the employer was after having suffered the assault. According to him he got frightened and fled away to his home. He also admitted in his cross-examination that neither at his home nor in the village did he disclose what he had seen in the evening of 4-2-1982 to anyone.
Though in the morning of the following day, the witness went to the brick-fields of the deceased-employer and many of his co-employees were also present there, he admitted that he did not disclose the occurrence to anyone of them and went on to concede that even to the Manager of the brick-fields he gave the information about the occurrence only 2-3 days after the occurrence. His statement was recorded by the police on the next day in the afternoon. This conduct of the witness that he did not tell anyone about the occurrence till the next day appears to be rather unnatural and creates an impression that he had not witnessed the occurrence. The witness however tried to take shelter on the plea that he was ‘frightened’ and therefore till he appeared before the police, he did not pick up courage to inform anyone either in the village or in the brick-fields regarding the occurrence. This plea does not impress us. ………”
As noted, this Court disbelieved the evidence of
this eyewitness due to his unnatural conduct who did
not tell about occurrence to anyone despite his
presence at the place of occurrence. His plea of fear
was also discarded.
11. In the case of ‘Gopal Singh Vs. State of Madhya
13 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
Pradesh’2, relating to double murder, this Court
allowed the appeal against conviction by High Court,
which had set-aside the judgment of acquittal by
trial Court for offences under Section 302/34 of IPC,
and disbelieved the testimony of eyewitness Feran
Singh (PW–5) noting as thus:-
“25. We also find that the High Court has accepted the statement of Feran Singh, PW 5 as the eyewitness of the incident ignoring the fact that his behaviour was unnatural as he claimed to have rushed to the village but had still not conveyed the information about the incident to his parents and others present there and had chosen to disappear for a couple of hours on the specious and unacceptable plea that he feared for his own safety.”
In the above case also, this Court observed that
behaviour of the eyewitness is unnatural since after
the incident, he rushed to the village, however, did
not convey any information either to the villagers or
his parents and other persons present. He disappeared
from the spot merely on the pretext of fear and to
save himself.
12. Similarly, in ‘Shivasharanappa and Others Vs.
2 (2010) 6 SCC 407 14 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
State of Karnataka3’, this Court in an appeal against
conviction by the High Court, which had set-aside the
judgment of acquittal by the trial Court primarily
for offences under Section 302/149 of IPC, while
allowing the appeal, disbelieved the testimony of the
daughter (PW–9) who is said to be eyewitness and
inter-alia observed as thus:-
“22. Thus, the behaviour of the witnesses or their reactions would differ from situation to situation and individual to individual. Expectation of uniformity in the reaction of witnesses would be unrealistic but the court cannot be oblivious of the fact that even taking into account the unpredictability of human conduct and lack of uniformity in human reaction, whether in the circumstances of the case, the behaviour is acceptably natural allowing the variations. If the behaviour is absolutely unnatural, the testimony of the witness may not deserve credence and acceptance.
23. In the case at hand, PW 9 was given a threat when her mother was forcibly taken away but she had the courage to walk in the night to her grandmother who was in her mid-fifties.
After coming to know about the incident, it defies commonsense that the mother would not tell her other daughter and the son-in-law about the kidnapping of the deceased by her mother-in-law. It is interesting to note that the High Court has ascribed the reason that PW 7 possibly wanted to save the reputation of the deceased daughter and that is why she did not inform the other daughter and son-in-law. That apart, the fear factor has also been 3 (2013) 5 SCC 705 – 07.05.2013 15 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
taken into consideration. Definitely, there would have been fear because, as alleged, the mother-in-law had forcibly taken away the deceased, but it is totally contrary to normal behaviour that she would have maintained a sphinx-like silence and not informed others. It is also worthy to note that she did not tell it to anyone for almost two days and it has not been explained why she had thought it apt to search for her daughter without even informing anyone else in the family or in the village or without going to the police station. In view of the obtaining fact situation, in our considered opinion, the learned trial Judge was absolutely justified in treating the conduct of the said witnesses unnatural and, therefore, felt that it was unsafe to convict the accused persons on the basis of their testimony. It was a plausible view and there were no compelling circumstances requiring a reversal of the judgment of acquittal. True it is, the powers of the appellate court in an appeal against acquittal are extensive and plenary in nature to review and reconsider the evidence and interfere with the acquittal, but then the court should find an absolute assurance of the guilt on the basis of the evidence on record and not that it can take one more possible or a different view.”
The Court as noted above, while taking into
consideration the fear factor, weighed in the conduct
of the daughter who is said to be the eyewitness of
the incident in remaining silent and not informing
others, and concluded that it is contrary to normal
human behaviour.
16 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
13. In yet another instance in the case of ‘Lahu
Kamlakar Patil and Another Vs. State of
Maharashtra’4, wherein this Court seized of an appeal
against concurrent conviction primarily for offences
under Section 302/149 of IPC, had the occasion to
deal with human conduct and reaction and observed as
under:-
“26. From the aforesaid pronouncements, it is vivid that witnesses to certain crimes may run away from the scene and may also leave the place due to fear and if there is any delay in their examination, the testimony should not be discarded. That apart, a court has to keep in mind that different witnesses react differently under different situations. Some witnesses get a shock, some become perplexed, some start wailing and some run away from the scene and yet some who have the courage and conviction come forward either to lodge an FIR or get themselves examined immediately. Thus, it differs from individuals to individuals. There cannot be uniformity in human reaction. While the said principle has to be kept in mind, it is also to be borne in mind that if the conduct of the witness is so unnatural and is not in accord with acceptable human behaviour allowing variations, then his testimony becomes questionable and is likely to be discarded.
27. Keeping in mind the aforesaid, we shall proceed to scrutinise the evidence of PW 2. As is evincible from his deposition, on seeing the assault he got scared, ran away from the hotel and hid himself behind the pipes till early morning. He went home, changed his 4 (2013) 6 SCC 417 – 14.12.2012 17 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
clothes and rushed to Pune [Ed.: Since the case has been tried by the Additional Sessions Judge, Raigad, Alibag, it would seem that the incident took place in Alibag, Raigad, which is about 300 km from Pune.]. He did not mention about the incident to his family members. He left for Pune and the reason for the same was also not stated to his family members. He did not try to contact the police from his residence which he could have. After his arrival at Pune, he did not mention about the incident in his sister-in-law's house.
After coming back from Pune, on the third day of the occurrence, his wife informed him that the police had come and that Bhau, who had accompanied him, was dead. It is interesting to note that in the statement under Section 161 of the Code, PW 2 had not stated that he was hiding himself out of fear or he was scared of the police. In the said statement, the fact that he was informed by his wife that Bhau was dead was also not mentioned. One thing is clear from his testimony that on seeing the incident, he was scared and frightened and ran away from the hotel. He was frightened and hid himself behind the pipes throughout the night and left for home the next morning. But his conduct not to inform his wife or any family member and leaving for Pune and not telling anyone there defies normal human behaviour. He has also not stated anywhere that he was so scared that even after he reached home, he did not go to the police station which was hardly at any distance from his house. There is nothing in his testimony that he was under any kind of fear or shock when he arrived at his house. It is also surprising that he had not told his family members and he went to Pune without disclosing the reason and after he arrived from Pune and on being informed by his wife that his companion Bhau had died, he went to the police station. We are not oblivious of the fact that certain witnesses in certain circumstances may 18 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
be frightened and behave in a different manner and due to that, they may make themselves available to the police belatedly and their examination gets delayed. But in the case at hand, regard being had to the evidence brought on record and, especially, non-mentioning of any kind of explanation for rushing away to Pune, the said factors make the veracity of his version doubtful. His evidence cannot be treated as so trustworthy and unimpeachable to record a conviction against the appellants. The learned trial court as well as the High Court has made an endeavour to connect the links and inject theories like fear, behavioural pattern, tallying of injuries inflicted on the deceased with the post-mortem report and convicted the appellants. In the absence of any kind of clinching evidence to connect the appellants with the crime, we are disposed to think that it would not be appropriate to sustain the conviction.”
In the facts as discussed, the conduct of the
eyewitness in the facts of the case was found highly
improbable vis-à-vis normal human conduct out of fear
who has witnessed an incident as after the incident,
this witness without reporting the same to anyone,
left the place to visit Pune making his testimony
doubtful.
14. Assistance may also be drawn from the judgment
of this Court in ‘Amar Singh Vs. State (NCT of
19 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
Delhi)’5, wherein this Court yet again while dealing
with an appeal against concurrent conviction for
offences under Section 302/34 of IPC based on
testimony of sole eyewitness PW–1, found his conduct
to be unnatural and inconsistent with the ordinary
course of human nature. The consideration as made by
the Court is reproduced for ready reference as under:
-
“20. The assailants were only armed with hockey sticks and a knife and not with any firearms. It seems very unnatural that two brothers present on the spot will not even make slightest attempt to intervene and try to save the other brother being assaulted, merely on the threat extended by the assailants armed with hockey sticks and a knife. This unnatural conduct totally against natural human behaviour casts a serious doubt of shadow on the presence of eyewitness on the spot at the time of occurrence. Moreover, the facts stated by PW 1 Parminder Singh in this regard, as already discussed above, have not been corroborated by the other brother Amar Singh PW 11.
21. The other unnatural conduct of two brothers PW 1 and PW 11 just after the incident again makes their presence on the spot extremely doubtful. There was a medical clinic of Doctor Bhardwaj just nearby the place of incident and the first endeavour of the two brothers would have been to take injured brother to the clinic for immediate medical aid or try and get some medical aid
5 (2020) 19 SCC 165 20 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
from the clinic of Doctor Bhardwaj.
Admittedly, according to the statement of Parminder Singh PW 1 PCR van arrived after about 15 minutes. During this period no effort was made to either take the injured brother to the clinic or to call Doctor Bhardwaj for some first aid. This is totally against normal human behaviour.
22. Further no effort is alleged to have been made to either shift the injured to any hospital or even inform the police. It is highly unnatural that two real brothers made no efforts to save the life of third brother who was severely injured if they were present at the place of the incident. The PCR van is stated to have arrived after 15 minutes on the basis of information given by some unknown person regarding a person lying injured in front of Qumayun Hotel. PW 20 lady constable Renu in her evidence stated that on the fateful night she was posted at PCR van when at about 10.27 p.m. an unknown person made a call to inform that one man was lying unconscious near Qumayun Hotel, Defence Colony which was registered as DD No. 493. It was on the information given by an unknown, the PCR van reached at the site of the incident and shifted the injured to Aiims where he was declared brought dead.
xx xx xx xx
24. This in itself casts serious doubts of shadow on the prosecution story that two brothers of the deceased, namely, Parminder Singh PW 1 and Amar Singh PW 11 were present on the spot and accompanied the injured in PCR van to Aiims. Had it been so, naturally, they would have given the name of the deceased and their own names which would have been recorded in the MLC Ext. PW 17/A at the first instance. Doctor Romesh Lal PW 17/A who prepared the MLC stated in his evidence that one dead body was brought in the casualty of Aiims by Head Constable Dharam Singh having multiple sharp 21 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
deep injuries all over the body and he prepared the MLC PW 17/A. xx xx xx xx
32. The conviction of the appellants rests on the oral testimony of PW 1 who was produced as eyewitness of the murder of the deceased. Both the learned Sessions Judge, as well as the High Court have placed reliance on the evidence of PW 1 and ordinarily this Court could be reluctant to disturb the concurrent view but since there are inherent improbabilities in the prosecution story and the conduct of eyewitness is inconsistent with ordinary course of human nature we do not think it would be safe to convict the appellants upon the uncorroborated testimony of the sole eyewitness. Similar view has been taken by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Selvaraj v. State of T.N. [Selvaraj v. State of T.N., (1976) 4 SCC 343 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 620] wherein on an appreciation of evidence the prosecution story was found highly improbable and inconsistent of ordinary course of human nature, concurrent findings of guilt recorded by the two courts below was set aside.”
As discussed, the Court noted that brothers of
the deceased have not attempted to save him though
indicating their presence as eyewitness on the place
of occurrence. In addition, they did not bring the
deceased to the medical clinic which was situated
nearby and admittedly, the deceased was brought to
the doctor by a constable. This creates a doubt about
the presence of eyewitness on the spot and also the
22 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
natural conduct of any prudent person whose brother
has been killed.
15. Further, in the case of ‘Narendrasinh Keshubhai
Zala Vs. State of Gujarat6’, this Court addressing an
appeal arising out of concurrent conviction for
offence under Section 302/34 of IPC based on
testimony of sole eyewitness (PW–3), examined his
conduct and in paragraph 13 observed as under:-
“13. Further, PW 3's credit stands impeached in the cross-examination part of his testimony. The witness is an adult, mature and worldly wise. He is aged 24 years and runs a grocery shop. He is not illiterate, yet he chose to not take any action, even to save the life of his friend. His explanation that he went home and slept is uninspiring in confidence for the incident took place in his presence and in close proximity of habitation, more specifically at a short distance i.e. just 3-4 minutes of walking distance from the Police Headquarters where constables are posted round the clock. He left his friend profusely bleeding on the spot but did not seek any help and immediately did not report the incident to the family members of the deceased whose house he visited only the following day at around 8.00-9.00 a.m. His conduct of going off to sleep, having seen his friend being murdered right before his eyes and then not visiting the hospital forthwith is quite unnatural. Also he did not inform the incident to his parents. It was only when the police interrogated him that he named the
6 (2023) 18 SCC 783 23 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
accused. His testimony is not free from embellishments, nor is not corroborated by any other evidence. Also, he admits not to have any information of any monetary transactions between the accused and the deceased.”
16. In view of the foregoing, it can safely be
observed that, as a general rule, to prove the case
of the prosecution, the testimony of eyewitness
primarily ought to be considered and be relied upon
to prove the guilt of the accused. It is trite to say
that the testimony of the eyewitness must be
trustworthy, free from any kind of blemish and of
sterling character to prove the incident, whereby the
case of the prosecution may be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. It is also settled that the quality
of evidence brought to prove the guilt is a relevant
factor and not the quality of the witnesses. The
testimony of those witnesses either proves the case
as alleged by the prosecution or otherwise.
Sometimes, the testimony of the eyewitness is found
unbelievable and can be discarded. To adjudge the
credibility of the said testimony, relevant factor
would be the conduct of the witness indicating the
natural reaction comparable to a prudent man, making 24 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
the conduct of witness realistic. The said factors
shall be based upon parameters which have been
discussed in the judgment hereinabove.
17. At the cost of repetition and to prove those
parameters it can be observed that if a friend or
relative is accompanying the deceased at the time of
incident, action taken by the witness is a relevant
factor to save him. Moreover, in addition, at the
time of incident and immediately after commission of
the offence, what steps were taken by the eyewitness
to save the life of the deceased. Whether the
eyewitness left the place of occurrence and returned
the place of incident simpliciter without furnishing
information to the police or intimating the
relatives/friends/near dear ones becomes relevant. In
case, the eyewitness does not convey any information
about the incident to anyone which is not expected
from a prudent man, his conduct does not appear to be
natural of a human being. The time of furnishing
information to the police at the earliest by
eyewitness is one of the relevant factors to dislodge
the plea of belated FIR, therefore, the conduct of an 25 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
eyewitness should be reflected like a real image in a
mirror, thereby making his testimony reliable to
prove the guilt of the accused.
18. In the context of the above said principles,
reverting to the facts of the present case, the
allegation of commission of murder as alleged against
the appellants is required to be analyzed on the
anvil of testimonies of eyewitnesses and whether they
have proved the same to bring home the guilt of the
accused. In this regard, as per testimony of Janmejay
Ghosh – son of the deceased (PW–8), who at the time
of incident was behind deceased on a bicycle along
with two cousin brothers, in his examination in
chief, except to narrate the incident and the
allegation of exhortation by Gaya Nath Ghosh, has
merely said that when they tried to raise voice, the
accused persons threatened to kill them. This witness
has not reported the incident to the police. After
the incident and staying there for some time, he
visited his village Malaypur where except to
communicate the same to Bridaban Ghosh (PW–7,
Sarpanch), he has not informed about incident to 26 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
anyone. However, PW–7 in his testimony has not
deposed or accepted that any information was
furnished by PW–8. Furthermore, it is highly
improbable that deceased’s son on reaching home did
not inform his mother, sister and brothers about the
incident and returned to the place of occurrence
after some time without intimating the police.
19. Likewise, in the statement of other eyewitness
Shankar Ghosh (PW–2), paternal nephew of deceased,
similar allegations were made by prosecution against
the appellants, though he also did not make any
attempt to save the deceased uncle and returned to
his village without furnishing any information to the
police. Further, at one place, he states that on the
next day he had not reached the place of occurrence,
though in the latter part of the testimony it is said
that in the evening he has visited the place of
occurrence, and his statement was recorded in the
morning on the next day. Lastly, this witness does
not know about the chance witness and does not
mention them in his testimony.
27 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
20. The third eyewitness is Megh Nath Ghosh (PW–5),
cousin of two other witnesses and maternal nephew of
the deceased. He has also deposed alike two other
witnesses. He does not have any knowledge that anyone
had gone to the police station to report the
incident. The said witness did not convey the
incident to anyone on returning home. As such all the
three eyewitnesses are unable to say who were the
chance witnesses at the time of incident and saw the
commission of crime by the accused persons. In
absence thereof, the testimonies of the chance
witnesses, howsoever supporting the allegation,
cannot be relied upon. It is to be observed that once
the eyewitnesses do not recognize the presence of the
chance witnesses at the time of occurrence, then
their testimonies are unrealistic and concocted.
21. After perusal of the record, it is seen that in
support of the prosecution allegations and the
testimonies of the eyewitnesses or chance witnesses,
the allegations were of assault by means of firearm
and knife. Those allegations were corroborated by the
injuries received by deceased as per the statement of 28 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
doctor S.K. Gupta (PW–1). In this regard, if the
testimony of eyewitness is worthy to rely on, its
corroboration by medical evidence along with seizure
report reflecting the weapon used in the commission
of offence becomes highly relevant. It is pertinent
here to mention that in the present case, neither the
pistol nor the knife was recovered or seized. From
the spot of occurrence, merely one bullet cover along
with blood-stained soil was seized by PW–11. As per
the testimony of the doctor in his cross-examination,
it is specifically admitted by him that injury nos. 1
and 2 have been caused by single shot firearm,
meaning thereby, the firearm was used only once, not
twice. Injury no. 1 is of entry wound and injury no.
2 is of exit wound. Therefore, it appears that
prosecution has concocted the story of causing
firearm injury on the deceased by Sonachand Ghosh
using firearm by taking the second shot. In absence
of recovery of the weapon used in commission of the
offence either by pistol or knife and its ballistic
as well as scientific examination through FSL,
corroboration of the allegations as per the testimony 29 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
of eyewitness is not possible. Moreover, the bullet
cover which was recovered and seized by the police at
the place of incident cannot be tallied with the
weapon.
22. Further, if we examine the testimony of first
investigating officer Shyama Ram (PW–11), wherein he
has deposed that information was received through
telephonic message, however in the cross-examination
of second investigating officer Dina Nath Ram (PW–10)
to whom investigation was later carried forward to,
he has specifically mentioned that no telephone was
installed in the police station. As such, how and in
what manner PW-11 received the information of the
incident that occurred at 4 pm and reached the place
of incident is unexplained. Similarly, in the
testimony of PW–11, it is stated that he has deputed
two chowkidars namely, Kishori Ram and Badal
Rajbanshi at the place of occurrence, who stayed in
the night, but their statements have not been
recorded for reasons not explained.
23. Lastly, upon examining the records, it is
30 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
evident that following the entire incident, Janmejay
Ghosh (PW–8), along with his relatives and police
chowkidars, remained at the scene of the occurrence
with the deceased’s body throughout the night.
According to the cross-examination of PW–11, he
arrived at the scene on the night of the incident to
see the body and assigned two chowkidars to guard the
same. Despite his presence, neither PW–8 nor any
other relatives lodged FIR. Notably, PW–11 also
failed to record any fardbeyan from those present at
the site. At this point, it is pertinent to note
that no explanation has been brought either by this
witness, any family member, or other eyewitnesses for
the delay in lodging the FIR. Curiously, the
witnesses’ testimony remains completely silent on why
the deceased’s body was not taken to the nearest
hospital and why it was kept at the site overnight.
This conduct raises serious questions, especially
considering that PW–8, a key eyewitness, allegedly
witnessed the brutal murder of his own father. Given
these circumstances, it is perplexing and surprising
as to why he refrained from reporting the incident 31 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
immediately and bringing the deceased to the nearest
hospital. Such inaction undermines the credibility of
the prosecution’s narrative, as any reasonable person
faced with the murder of a close family member would
typically inform the police without delay. This kind
of passive conduct runs contrary with the natural
behavior expected of a prudent person in such grave
and distressing circumstances.
24. In view of the foregoing facts, in our
considered opinion prosecution has miserably failed
to prove the allegations of the commission of murder
of Manmohan Ghosh by the appellants Nimai Ghosh,
Sonachand Ghosh and Sambal Ghosh. Therefore, the
findings as recorded by the High Court are not based
on due appreciation of records but on misreading of
evidence which cannot be sustained and is hereby set-
aside. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed, and the
impugned judgment stands set aside. The order of the
Trial Court stands restored.
25. Since the accused persons have been exempted
from surrendering as per order dated 23.11.2012, as
32 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 2013
such in view of their acquittal from the charges,
they are not required to surrender. Pending
application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
……………………………………………………….,J.
[J.K. MAHESHWARI]
……………………………………………………….,J.
[ARAVIND KUMAR]
New Delhi;
January 23, 2025.
33
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