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National Highways Authority Of India vs Tarsem Singh

Supreme Court25 March 2026Surya Kant

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

A change in judicial interpretation of substantive law effected by a binding Supreme Court decision does not warrant reopening or review of cases that attained finality before that decision, even where the earlier decision denied entitlements later declared to be constitutionally mandated; however, claims for such entitlements may be pursued where the original matter remained pending and alive on the date of the intervening judicial pronouncement. Where a landowner's compensation claim under the National Highways Act, 1956 remained pending before a prescribed forum on or after 28 March 2008, the landowner is entitled to claim solatium, interest, and interest on solatium as components of compensation, notwithstanding that these entitlements were not previously recognized. Where a compensation claim under the National Highways Act remained alive on or after 28 March 2008 but the landowner raised a claim for solatium, interest, or interest on solatium only after that date, the landowner is entitled to such components only from the date the claim was actually raised, with no interest payable for the period of delay between 28 March 2008 and the date of claim. Where a compensation claim under the National Highways Act attained finality prior to 28 March 2008 with no further remedy available to the landowner, the landowner cannot seek reopening, review, or modification of that decision for the purpose of claiming solatium or interest. The fiscal burden imposed upon the state by granting solatium and interest to entitled landowners cannot override or diminish the substantive constitutional entitlement to just compensation, and escalation in the projected financial liability does not constitute grounds for review or modification of a judgment establishing such entitlement.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

REPORTABLE 2026 INSC 291 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

INHERENT/CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Review Petition (Civil) No. 2528 / 2025 in

Miscellaneous Application No. 1773 / 2021 in

Civil Appeal No. 7064 / 2019

National Highways Authority of India …Appellant(s)

versus

Tarsem Singh and others …Respondent(s)

with

Civil Appeal No. __________ / 2026 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. __________ / 2026) (Arising out of Diary No. 67885 / 2025)

Civil Appeal No. __________ / 2026 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. __________ / 2026) (Arising out of Diary No. 68010 / 2025)

Civil Appeal No. __________ / 2026 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 2507 / 2026)

Civil Appeal No. __________ / 2026 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 36306 / 2025)

Civil Appeal No. __________ / 2026 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 37094 / 2025) Signature Not Verified

Civil Appeal No. __________ / 2026 Digitally signed by SATISH KUMAR YADAV Date: 2026.03.25 14:51:52 IST

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 2425 / 2026) Reason:

Page 1 of 14 Civil Appeal No. __________ / 2026 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 38641 / 2025)

Civil Appeal No. __________ / 2026 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 52 / 2026)

Civil Appeal No. __________ / 2026 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 37666 / 2025)

Civil Appeal No. __________ / 2026 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 38674 / 2025)

Civil Appeal No. __________ / 2026 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 41 / 2026)

JUDGEMENT

SURYA KANT, CJI.

1. The instant Review Petition has been filed by the National Highways

Authority of India (NHAI) for recalling our order dated 04.02.2025,

passed in Miscellaneous Application No. 1773/2021 (Tarsem Singh-

II).1 Vide that order, this Court had dismissed NHAI’s application

seeking clarification whether the judgement dated 19.09.2019 passed

by

a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Union of India and another v.

Tarsem Singh and others (Tarsem Singh-I)2 would apply

prospectively.

2. Notably, several Special Leave Petitions preferred by the NHAI/its

Project Director are also tagged with the instant Review Petition,

1 Union of India and another v. Tarsem Singh and others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 235.

2 (2019) 9 SCC 304.

Page 2 of 14 challenging different orders passed by the High Courts of Bombay and

Chhattisgarh.

3. The High Courts, vide those orders, have, inter alia, directed NHAI and

its officers to pay (i) interest, (ii) solatium, (iii) and interest on the

solatium, along with the statutory compensation, for acquisition of

lands under the National Highways Act, 1956 (NH Act) in terms of

Tarsem Singh-I and Tarsem Singh-II in a time-bound manner. NHAI’s

grievance in these Special Leave Petitions appears to be that such

directions ought not to have been issued in view of the pendency of the

Review Petition against Tarsem Singh-II before this Court.

4. Be that as it may, since the survival of the claims raised in the

adjoining Special Leave Petitions hinges on the outcome of this Review

Petition, we shall first turn to adjudicate the latter on its merits.

A. BACKGROUND

5. To that end, given that this Review Petition constitutes the third round

of litigation on the limited issue of various landowners’ entitlement to

‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ as part of the compensation for land acquisition

initiated by the NHAI, we do not deem it appropriate to delve into the

entire legislative and judicial history of the matter. Suffice it would be to

notice certain salient events:

5.1. In 1997, a fresh, comprehensive land acquisition framework was

introduced into the NH Act. Included in this Amendment was Section

3-J, stipulating that the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1894 Act) in toto

Page 3 of 14 would not apply to acquisitions under the NH Act. A necessary by-

product of this amendment was that the provisions of the 1894 Act

granting ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ to land-losers would not apply to

acquisitions initiated under the NH Act.

5.2. Section 3-J held the field until the purported dissonance between the

land acquisition compensatory schemes contemplated under the NH Act

and the 1894 Act was agitated as being ex-facie illegal and ultra vires

the Constitution of India before various High Courts.

5.3. A learned Single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka in Lalita v.

Union of India, New Delhi,3 struck down Section 3-J of the NH Act,

holding it to be unconstitutional for perpetuating an arbitrary

distinction, in opposition to the strict contours of Article 14 of the

Constitution of India. That ruling, however, was stayed by a Division

Bench of the same High Court on 10.02.2003, while it was seized of the

intra-court appeal preferred by the Union of India. The stay continued

to operate till 15.10.2019, when the Writ Appeal was eventually

dismissed by the High Court in terms of this Court’s judgement in

Tarsem Singh-I, which is elaborated upon later.

5.4. As stated earlier, similar challenges were made before other High Courts

as well, resulting in two noteworthy decisions:

3 2002 SCC OnLine Kar 569.

Page 4 of 14

(i) Judgement dated 28.03.2008 passed by a Division Bench of the

High Court of Punjab and Haryana, titled Golden Iron and Steel

Forging v. Union of India;4 and

(ii) Order dated 04.03.2011 passed by a learned Single Judge of the

High Court of Judicature at Madras, titled T. Chakrapani v.

Union of India.5

5.5. These decisions assume significance for the reason that, rather than

striking down Section 3-J of the NH Act in its entirety, the High Courts

adopted a calibrated approach. While preserving the distinct

acquisition framework under the NH Act, they held the statutory

scheme to be unconstitutional to the limited extent that it denied land-

losers the benefit of ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’. In effect, Sections 3-G and

3-J of the NH Act were read down to align with the compensatory

principles embodied in Section 23(1-A) and Section 23(2) of the 1894

Act. The result was that, notwithstanding the separate statutory

regime, landowners under the NH Act were also held entitled to

‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ on parity with acquisitions under the 1894 Act.

These decisions, along with similar pronouncements by other High

Courts, were subsequently carried in appeal before this Court.

5.6. While the aforesaid appeals were pending consideration, the Right to

Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,

Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (2013 Act) came into force

4 2008 SCC OnLine P&H 498.

5 2011 SCC OnLine Mad 2881

Page 5 of 14 with effect from 01.01.2014, replacing the 1894 Act. Thereafter, by way

of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land

Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (Amendment) Ordinance,

2014 (2014 Ordinance), the compensation framework under the 2013

Act was extended to acquisitions under the NH Act, with effect from

01.01.2015. Although the said Ordinance subsequently lapsed, the

Union of India, in exercise of its powers under Section 113 read with

Section 105 of the 2013 Act, issued a notification dated 28.08.2015,

thereby continuing the applicability of the compensation provisions of

the 2013 Act to acquisitions under the NH Act.

5.7. The net effect of this entire rigamarole was that a distinct class of land-

losers came to be excluded from the benefit of ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’.

To be specific, the acquisitions undertaken under the NH Act during

the interregnum, namely, after the insertion of Section 3-J in 1997 and

till the beneficial compensation regime of the 2013 Act was made

applicable to the NH Act w.e.f. 01.01.2015, remained outside the fold of

entitlement to ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’. This resulted in an anomalous

situation, where similarly situated landowners, differing only in the

timing or statutory route of acquisition, were subjected to materially

unequal compensatory frameworks.

5.8. As a consequence of the statutory rights accorded through the 2014

Ordinance and the notification dated 28.08.2015, the appeal arising

from T. Chakrapani (supra) was disposed of by this Court with the

statement of the then Solicitor General of India being recorded that

Page 6 of 14 solatium in terms of the order of the Madras High Court would be

granted in that case.6

5.9. Similarly, in Sunita Mehra v. Union of India,7 a two-Judge Bench of

this Court, disposed of the NHAI’s appeals against other comparable

judgements of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, with the

directions that the benefit of ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ shall be available

to land-losers in all such cases where the proceedings for computation

of compensation were pending as on 28.03.2008. In doing so, this

Court clarified that while future acquisitions would be covered by the

2013 Act and its benefits, those cases which had been decided prior to

the said date and, thus, stood concluded ought not to be reopened. Here, it may be noted for clarity that this cut-off date was derived from

the date on which the judgement in Golden Iron and Steel (supra) was

pronounced by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.

5.10. Following the aforesaid developments, the NHAI chose to withdraw its

appeals pending before this Court in which the judgement of the High

Court of Punjab and Haryana in Golden Iron and Steel (supra) was

under challenge.8

5.11. It is in this backdrop that a two-Judge Bench of this Court, including

one of us (Surya Kant, J., as he then was), in Tarsem Singh-I held that

the benefit of ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ must be extended to landowners

6 Civil Appeal Nos. 129-159/2014.

7 (2019) 17 SCC 672.

8 Civil Appeal No. 10695/2011. Page 7 of 14 even in respect of acquisitions made during the period between 1997,

when Section 3-J was introduced into the NH Act, and 2015, when the

compensation scheme of the 2013 Act was made applicable to the

acquisitions under the NH Act. With this in mind, Section 3-J was

declared unconstitutional to the extent that it denied solatium and

interest, and landowners were held entitled to such benefits in terms of

Section 23(1-A) and Section 23(2), along with interest under the proviso

to Section 28 of the 1894 Act.

5.12. Aggrieved thereby, the NHAI moved Miscellaneous Application

No. 1773/2021, seeking a clarification that the directions in Tarsem

Singh-I would operate only prospectively. That prayer was declined by

this Court in Tarsem Singh-II, wherein it was held that the entitlement

to ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’ inheres in the right to just compensation,

and that the grant of such benefits does not amount to reopening of

cases that have attained finality.

5.13. It must be mentioned that in those proceedings, this Court also rejected

a specific argument of the NHAI apropos the financial burden that

would have to be borne by the public exchequer for payment of such

solatium and interest to the landowners. The relevant para is

reproduced below:

“23. In all fairness, the only defense that may perhaps seem appealing is the claim of a financial burden amounting to Rupees 100 crores. However, this argument does not persuade us for several reasons: First, if this burden has been borne by the NHAI in the case of thousands of other landowners, it stands to reason that it should also be shared by the NHAI in this instance, in order to eliminate

Page 8 of 14 discrimination. Second, the financial burden of acquiring land cannot be justified in the light of the Constitutional mandate of Article 300A. Third, since most National Highways are being developed under the Public Private Partnership model, the financial burden will ultimately be passed on to the relevant Project Proponent. Fourth, even the Project Proponent would not have to bear the compensation costs out of pocket, as it is the commuters who will bear the actual brunt of this cost. Ultimately, the burden is likely to be saddled onto the middle or upper-middle-class segment of society, particularly those who can afford private vehicles or operate commercial ventures. We are thus not inclined to entertain the plea for prospectivity on this limited tenet.” [Emphasis supplied]

5.14. While dismissing the Miscellaneous Application, this Court also alluded

to the decision in Sunita Mehra (supra) and underlined that it stood

appropriately addressed and clarified in Tarsem Singh-I.

B. SCOPE OF THE REVIEW

6. The NHAI has filed the present Review Petition inter alia contending

that the financial burden projected to this Court in the course of

arguments in Tarsem Singh-II was based on a clerical error. It is

submitted that the actual liability towards payment of solatium and

interest to all landowners is not Rs. 100 crores, as is recorded in the

extract reproduced hereinabove, but is in fact amounting to

approximately Rs. 29,000 crores. On this basis, it is urged that an error

apparent on the face of the record has crept into the order, warranting

reconsideration thereof.

7. At the outset, it must be clarified that while the corrected estimate of

the monetary costs is taken on record, the same does not persuade us

to revisit the merits of the earlier adjudication. This Court had

Page 9 of 14 unequivocally held that the fiscal implications of granting solatium and

interest cannot override the substantive entitlement of land-losers.

There is no gainsaying that the constitutional guarantee of just

compensation cannot be rendered contingent upon the magnitude of

the financial burden. Consequently, a mere escalation in the projected

liability, howsoever significant, does not constitute, per se, a valid

ground for review or modification of the judgement.

8. There is, consequentially, no occasion for us to reconsider our decision

in Tarsem Singh-II on the above-noted ground.

9. Regardless thereto and upon a careful consideration of the submissions

advanced on behalf of the NHAI, it appears that certain aspects of the

judgements rendered in Tarsem Singh-I and Tarsem Singh-II warrant

limited clarification. The necessity for such clarification arises not from

any error in principle, but to ensure a consistent and equitable

understanding of the scope and effect of those decisions. The instant

proceedings, therefore, are confined strictly to that limited exercise.

C. CLARIFICATION RE: DELAYED AND BARRED CLAIMS

10. The undisputed position of law, settled by successive judgements of the

High Courts and this Court, is that the landowners who suffer

acquisition of their land under the NH Act are entitled to interest,

solatium, and interest on solatium as part of their compensation. In

Tarsem Singh-I, this Court recognised “that the Government itself is

of the view that solatium and interest should be granted even in

Page 10 of 14 cases that arise between 1997 and 2015.” It is also not in question

that such benefits shall be payable in line with those granted in the

1894 Act or the 2013 Act, as the case may be.

11. However, as a matter of caution, we deem it appropriate to clarify that

each claim for this entitlement cannot be treated in the same way. We

say so for the reason that, in many cases, the landowners have chosen

to approach the different authorities, like the Competent Authority, the

Arbitrators, or the Courts, for the grant of ‘solatium’ and ‘interest’

decades after the cases regarding the quantum of the land acquisition

compensation for their lands stood closed.

12. This Court is conscious of the legal necessity of giving quietus to

decided matters. Once a judgement or an order passed by a court in a

particular case has attained finality and is not the subject matter of

further challenge before a prescribed forum, a subsequent change in

the judicial interpretation would not entail a reversal of such decision

inter-se the parties to that case. In fact, a three-Judge Bench of this

Court, including both of us, in State (NCT of Delhi) v. K.L. Rathi

Steels Ltd.9 has observed that such overturning of the principle of law

cannot sustain even a formal review of the original decision once the

same has attained finality. As such, we find that while, as a matter of

legal principle, the landowners may be entitled to solatium and interest,

they cannot be permitted to reopen old, stale claims which have been

decided conclusively by a court of law.

9 (2024) 7 SCC 315.

Page 11 of 14

13. However, where final remedy has not been exhausted and statutory

appeals or applications have been filed after inordinate delay, claiming

the benefit of ‘interest’, ‘solatium’, or ‘interest on solatium’, a balance

must be struck between the entitlement of the landowners and the

equities operating against their delay. A similar balancing exercise is

usually undertaken by this Court while considering cases for

enhancement of land acquisition compensation in a belated appeal. The

notable method used in such cases is the denial of ‘interest’ payable on

the enhanced amount of compensation for the period of delay. A similar

exercise must be undertaken for the land acquisition cases arising from

the NH Act in the matter of grant of ‘solatium’, ‘interest’, and ‘interest

on solatium’.

D. CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS

14. Considering the facts and circumstances explained in the instant

proceedings along with the various submissions placed on record and

with a view to balancing the equities regarding delay and the

entitlements of the landowners, we issue the following directions:

(i) All landowners whose claims re: the quantum and/or

components of compensation for their lands acquired under the

NH Act were alive on or after 28.03.2008, i.e., they were pending

before one of the prescribed fora, shall be entitled to seek

addition of ‘interest’, ‘solatium’, and ‘interest on the solatium’ to

their compensation claim;

Page 12 of 14

(ii) In the cases where compensation claims are alive on the

aforesaid date, but the landowner has claimed ‘interest’,

‘solatium’, and ‘interest on solatium’ after 28.03.2008, no

interest on both components shall be payable for the period of

delay. Such landowner shall be entitled to ‘interest’ and ‘interest

on solatium’ only from the date on which such claims were

raised; and

(iii) If the claims of the landowners stood concluded prior to

28.03.2008, with no further appeal, Writ Petition, Special Leave

Petition, etc., then such landowners are not entitled to seek

reopening, review, or modification of the said decision for the

purpose of claiming ‘solatium’ or ‘interest’.

15. The instant Review Petition, along with all pending applications, stand

disposed of accordingly.

16. Delay is condoned and leave is granted in the tagged Special Leave

Petitions, and while setting aside the impugned judgements of the High

Courts, the matters are remanded to the concerned High Courts with a

request to recalculate the ‘interest’, ‘solatium’, and ‘interest on solatium’

payable to the landowners. Such computation shall be strictly in

accordance with the directions issued hereinabove. If the landowners

are held to fall within the category of Paragraph 14(ii) then the payment

has to be made accordingly. Similarly, in the cases of landowners who

are covered by Paragraph 14(iii), no such benefit shall be granted.

Page 13 of 14

17. As a matter of abundant caution, however, it is clarified that these

directions do not entitle the NHAI or the Union of India to seek refund

or recovery of the solatium or interest already paid to the landowners.

18. Ordered accordingly.

…….......…….........CJI (SURYA KANT)

…….........…….........J. (UJJAL BHUYAN)

NEW DELHI;

MARCH 25, 2026

Page 14 of 14

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